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International Scene

Greece
Afghanistan
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Nicola Chiaromonte

Tribute to a Renaissance Man

The Frankfurt School

A Debate

Rescuing Soviet History

Memory and Amnesia

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A Tribute to a Renaissance Man

Nicola Chiaromonte

IT is now 10 years since Nicola Chiaromonte died. His friends will always remember him, but he has not yet received the international recognition due to him as a remarkable figure of our time.

He certainly deserves it, no less than many more famous writers actively involved in the turbulent events of our age. We therefore decided to devote a section of this issue to Nicola Chiaromonte. His writings show such political and philosophical perspicacity that they retain their freshness even today. Succeeding generations can learn much from him; his thoughts and political evolution are highly relevant to the analysis of contemporary problems. So is his moral stance, which remained unchanged through all the vicissitudes and changes in his intellectual and political opinions. This can easily be observed in the selection of his writings presented here. Immersed in classical Greek culture, which he linked with the historical experience of his own age, he applied the same ethical code throughout his life, although he certainly modified his views in other respects. The " existentialist " aspect of his philosophical development was not really a fundamental modification; it reflected the stoical temperament, comparable with that of Joseph Conrad, which he had always possessed.

His theoretical, political, and historical perceptions were quite outstanding. It was certainly amazing for a young man to write in 1932 about the future Reich of Adolf Hitler, and make the comparison of his not yet established state, a year before he came to power, with that of Salin and of Mussolini. That was a long time before the concept of totalitarianism even came into general use.

In 1946, while still a member of the " progressive " intelligentsia, Chiaromonte wrote incisively about Marxism, of which his critique is in many respects comparable with that by Leszek Kolakowski written 30 years later. It was certainly incongruous with the general tenor of the magazines (such as " politics ")*) to which he contributed at that time.*

This is even more striking in his writings on intellectuals and communism in the 1950s and 60s when he was editor of Tempo presente *with Ignazio Silone. His flair for diagnosing future political developments, combined with an undeviating loyalty to his essential moral values, is reflected in what he wrote, not long before his death, about* Kultura, *the Polish magazine published in Paris. He, the exile from fascist Italy in* la ville lumière, *had an understanding of the exiles from communist Poland in post-war Paris. He also recognized, better than most Western commentators, the significance of the developments which led to the emergence of " Solidarity " eight years after his death.*

It is, however, not on political grounds alone, about which he was increasingly sceptical, that he is most impressive. He deserves to be remembered as a modern-day Renaissance man who endeavoured to understand his epoch and who gave an insight into subsequent history too.

L. L.

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Chiaromonte: Citizen of the World

Enzo Bettiza

THE death of Silone and the publication in Italy of the third posthumous book by Nicola Chiaromonte, with the fine title of *Silenzio e parole* (Silence and Words), have been the occasion for many reappraisals and illuminating critical comment about the personalities of the two editors of *Tempo presente*, morally so similar yet so different psychologically. Ignazio Silone was a truly difficult personality. Already ill and in a clinic before the war, he made his illness into a sort of mythical barrier between his own despondency and the world. Chiaromonte himself, who was also a difficult person but of another kind, whenever he was asked about Silone used to lower his voice, and with a strange sigh tinged with regret and reserve would murmur as his face clouded over: " You know, he's not well, he goes out very little, he even comes to the office less and less. I'll telephone him and try to fix an appointment for you. But I don't know if I'll manage it." And then he would turn over the page, as if he had no wish to spend more time on such a dark and troubling subject.

In short, Chiaromonte let it be understood that not even his own relationship with " Silone the rustic," whom he had known all his life and with whom for a number of years he had shared the editorship of the same periodical, was privileged or free from shadowy complications—dark and difficult to grasp. The two came from similar, if not identical, backgrounds. In childhood they had known almost the same area of the South, primordial, stagnant, ossified. In youth they had experienced the same bitterness of political involvement and exile. Finally, in their intellectual maturity, they had arrived in perfect consonance at the same implacable thirst for truth, for lucid style and moral rigour. It may indeed be the case that such affinities generated in the two a sort of reciprocal tedium, an excessive understanding, and that the painful feeling that they had nothing more to say to each other merged in the end into that intolerant and unreasonable taciturnity that sometimes overcomes us in the presence of people who are too much like ourselves. The fact is that in the last years of their strained collaboration on *Tempo presente* Silone and Chiaromonte communicated with each other almost entirely through the medium of that most patient of human telegraphs, Vittorio Libera, the managing editor of the review.

But underneath there was, too, a divergence of character and of talent. Their common goal was truth. But for the peasant nature and the simple, almost didactic, narrative skill of Silone, truth was to be nothing so much as an ascetic flight from the sinful world of ideas, a return to the bare origins of the earth and its people. For the more Faustian

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temperament and critical talent of Chiaromonte, on the other hand, truth could not be a return to roots, or a renunciation, but a perennial search: an inexhaustible excavation, in fact, into the world of ideas, a solitary but continual challenge to reason of all contemporary conventions and idolatries. If Silone's artistic field consisted of nature lived afresh without aesthetic filtres, the conceptual field of Chiaromonte was culture re-examined without ideological screens. It was, in his view, necessary to traverse anew, critically, with complete freedom of spirit, the whole gamut of European humanist culture, from Homer to Tolstoy and beyond, in order to rediscover there, or even within it, the ultimate nature of things—always supposing that it existed. Socratic doubt, the risk of coming up against the opposite of what was being sought, or even of finding in its place a void, are in fact a constant feature of the lucid methodological pragmatism with which Chiaromonte's thought proceeds freely from one object to another, in reiterated soundings, linked by reason, never shackled by a preconceived system.

Undoubtedly, the impulse towards discovery of the naked truth, from which Chiaromonte set out, was almost identical in its moral nucleus to that which Silone strove to conjure from the peasants of the Marsica. This was what imprisoned them in that mute companionship which disintegrated only to become eloquent and complementary in the memorable pages they wrote for *Tempo presente*. But the way in which Chiaromonte was to carry out his impulses as a moral researcher was not, as he himself once wrote to Silone, a way that led to " a uniform, bigoted truth, self-imprisoned, indifferent to anything foreign to it." He was not a man of dogmatic certainties. Had he been, he would have written novels or constructed philosophical systems which, given his remarkable speculative vigour, would certainly have appeared unexceptional on the plane of formal logic. Instead, like his master Andrea Caffi, who communicated more readily in speech than in writing, he became in his turn a peripatetic master, a " pirate essayist," a " philosophos " in the Greek sense, an authentic intellectual who had no truck with the playthings of the intellect or the drawing-room.

Chiaromonte was, in short, the opposite of a technician in professional speculation. There was nothing academic about him—for instance, in his dry style, always condensed around the crux of the matter. The word seemed to rise up to the surface of his thought from the deep atavistic roots of his classical Greek intellectual formation, strangely mingled with the most agonising of contemporary questions. Meditation, intentionally fragmentary because intentionally incomplete, resolved itself into a dense diffusion of cold anxieties, precise shadows, lucid existential questionings never contaminated by aesthetic complacency; all this gave the impression of gushing forth from that twofold inner heritage of the thinker, at once ancient and intensely modern. That is to say, above all, from that ancestral point which was most strongly fixed in him: the moral geometry of the Hellenic universe,

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with its pedagogic aspiration aimed at the persuasion of the " free man." And then, from a more elusive and more disquieting point: the story of the intellectual in action, our contemporary, which had led Chiaromonte to challenge destiny in the skies over Spain piloting the antiquated flying coffins of the Malraux squadron during the Spanish Civil War. Given that, it is easier to explain how and why his ratiocinating and basically pessimistic meditation should be based on a tragic feeling of the real, in the sense that he wanted to penetrate the ultimate significance of human action and of the events that determine it in this world, ultimately, the real significance of that tragedy without a final act, perennial in its unsolved enigma, that we call history.

IN the posthumous volume edited with devoted care by his wife Miriam, perhaps the most compact of all his works, Chiaromonte, through analysis of many different kinds of literary phenomena, returns again to the mystery of the will and hence of human destiny caught in the whirlwind of the violent social transformations of the last two centuries. He speaks here, with his customary irreverent acumen, of Dante and Shakespeare, of Aristophanes and Sophocles. But these are only the solid pillars of a discourse, the style of which is entirely concerned with the uncertainties of literary modernity, with the explanation of that complex phenomenon, both expressive and interpretative of reality, which is the novel. For Chiaromonte, the novel, as it has evolved in 200 years of astonishingly prolific creation, from Defoe to Musil, is like a multinational key which, better than any other cognitive instrument, introduces us directly, through life itself, to the most inaccessible and secret regions at its base. " The novel is narrative," he says, " and to narrate literally means ' to make known.' "

Setting out from this assumption, Chiaromonte seems to develop, from one essay to the next in *Silenzio e parole*, a genuine theory of the novel. Or so it seems. But in fact, with his dazzling theses, he tackles first and foremost the eternally ambiguous relationship of man and society, of the existential frailty of the individual and collective violence, of reality, unknowable in itself, and the constantly changing perception we have of it. What he explores in the evolution of the novel itself is the gradual but relentless course of that crisis of contemporary sensibility of which we get alarming indications in his perceptive essays, in passages which, for instance, expose the false coherences of history in *War and Peace*. A crisis that concerns not literature alone but humanity in general, the fracture between consciousness and the world order that surrounds it, of which the novelist is the most faithful recorder: in effect, a general crisis of confidence between the " I " and the outside world. The hypertrophy of the " I," which begins with Proust, marks the first crumbling of the outer universe, which even in the bitter Flaubert still expresses itself in the objective third person. The twilight of the traditional novel, with its formal compactness and its realist faith in things, coincides almost exactly with the waning of any certainty about the rationality of history.

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In the self-destruction of the novel is foreshadowed the destruction of the relationship between consciousness and reality which had, in general, been positive and often optimistic up to the Proustian watershed at the turn of the century. After Proust and Freud, who destroyed real psychology through excesses of abstract psychologism and therefore denied that realism without which the novel ceases to exist, perceptive sensibility, now dismembered, was to lapse into the most agonizing relativism.

I have merely summarised that which finds much fuller and richer expression in the book itself. But what I have said so far may give rise to misunderstanding, causing people to think that the view which Chiaromonte had of the declining history of the novel was basically the same as that of Lukács. Nothing could be further from the truth. The philosophical approach of the Italian thinker to the categories of realism, decline and crisis is the very opposite to that of the Hungarian Marxist philosopher. Chiaromonte sees the decease of the novel as the decease of historical consciousness, but, for him, it is in history, and above all in the myth of history, that something has ceased to function, even before this happened in the novel. Lukács, on the other hand, indulges in selective historicism in his treatment of the crisis, and condemns decadent novelists, with the exception of those eternal archetypes of an immortal genre, who, according to him, remain classics, in order to tell us finally that history always continues along its undisturbed, imperturbable course. Only mistaken writers such as Kafka, Proust, Joyce and Musil diverge from it and lose themselves in so doing.

The religious sentiment about sin and the fall was completely absent from Chiaromonte's pessimistic rationalism. And it was in the world, not in the novel, that he sought the germ of the crisis, and he sought it by a perilous, harsh, and lonely route which was certainly not the same as that of Lukács nor even of Croce. His teaching was not directed at public audiences or posterity. He spoke to contemporary man, to the individual as he is, not as he should be or ought to be, and he taught him the difficult task of an upright, and even heroic, way of life in a twisted and perhaps suicidal world. He was a " philosophos," not a philosopher.

" FOR us he was a master. I don't say that for me alone—I was then just a teacher at the start of my career—but for all of us. We used to talk for whole evenings about Tolstoy and Dostoevsky, and in those talks he changed my life in many ways."

This almost humble confession came from one of the most well-known women in the world, the writer Mary McCarthy; " he " was a serious, upright Italian exile, Nicola Chiaromonte, whose fame in his own country was nil and was to remain so, for the public at large, right up to his death; the " all of us " to whom she refers represented the best of a certain radical American intelligentsia, from Edmund Wilson to Dwight McDonald, gathered together in the mid-1940s around such periodicals as *politics* (with a small " p "), *Partisan Review* and *The Nation*. This

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culturally sophisticated milieu was certainly not an easy one. Nicola Chiaromonte (who had been part of the anti-fascist circle in Paris with Rosselli and Caffi, and had also been a pilot in Malraux's squadron in Spain and a friend of Camus in Algiers) was then barely 40 years old: to be recognized as a " master " he must have possessed quite exceptional qualities.

Chiaromonte had such qualities, and perhaps this was actually uncomfortable for his extremely scrupulous personality of an intellectual. His European culture, his personal rigour, his intransigence in political commitment, his rejection of what he called " modern Jesuitry " and " useless lies," his very ability to write easily in English and French, had all equipped him to participate in the life of ideas at a sophisticated and hard-headed level. But those very same crystalline qualities as a man and a thinker which enabled him to incorporate himself readily in the cultural circles of Paris and New York were to alienate him from a large part of the so-called " progressive " culture in Italy which he scorned from the depths of his being. Significantly, after the war ended, for a long time he put off his final return from exile. He had in fact very clearly anticipated the fate of solitude that awaited him in a modish and superficial Rome, sycophantic, shallow and in some ways still part of the seventeenth century, eclectically exposed to all kinds of obsolete fashions. " The Italy of today," he used to say, " is demeaning."

HE once confided to me that after the war he had postponed his return for so long because he was undecided as to whether he should live the second part of his life as an Italian, French or perhaps even American intellectual. He was, like his friend Andrea Caffi, a citizen of the world, a polyglot of the spirit as well as of tongues. But with a basic difference. While Caffi coupled with his outlook on the world a certain eccentricity, the outer expression of a sort of imponderable verve, half Italian and half Russian, Chiaromonte, who was from Lucania, manifested an intractable, almost wounded feeling of discontent. Present-day Italy, with its vulgarities and its ideological dilettantism, was not cut out for the austere standards of this sulky son of the South; from a libertarian and utopian background, he emerged from the sunlit town of Campanella to the phenomenology of Husserl, ignoring Croce and arguing against the versions of history propounded by Hegel and Marx.

Chiaromonte's first passion was political action, in which he was involved in the inter-war period in France and, above all, in Spain during the civil war. But his last and greatest passion was meditation on political action and on the meaning of history, in the broad sense. In this he shared the outlook of the great commited intellectuals of his day, from Malraux to Koestler. Unfortunately he did not write much, perhaps partly as a result of his deep mistrust for the constructions of philosophical systems. But the little that he did leave behind is so dense and concentrated, so profoundly inspired by an entire life dedicated to

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the mystery of human action in history, that it leaves us dazzled: Chiaromonte is perhaps the only Italian intellectual who attempted to give an articulate dignity, in essay form, to the experiences of political action which involved the European anti-totalitarian elites in the 1930s and 40s.

Not many people realised that it was an existential and direct experience of history that fermented below the surface of the literary essays in *Tempo presente* which Nicola Chiaromonte devoted (around 1956) to Tolstoy's *War and Peace* and Roger Martin du Gard's *Les Thibaults*. In substance, Chiaromonte was denying in these essays the validity of all historicist reconstructions, *a priori* and *a posteriori*, whether of idealistic Hegelian or materialistic Marxist derivation.

Such a rejection of the religion of history, an idea which had developed in the European consciousness from Napoleon onwards, could not but isolate Chiaromonte within the Italian cultural establishment which, when it is not Crocean is Marxist and when it is not Marxist is Catholic, and which therefore in all its variations of necessity, leaves little room for a philosophy that rejects any form of finality or fatalism.

It is symptomatic that Chiaromonte should have wished to collect his reflections in a volume with the peremptory title *Credere o non credere* (To Believe or Not to Believe). As against faith in a final justice governing the myriads of events flowing without any order into the great stream of history—a stream which is only perceived within the philosophical systems or ideological catechisms. Chiaromonte preferred the hazard of the event in action; the incident, however absurd, remains at least in part still controllable by human reason. A humanism that is lean, lucid, stoical in its consciousness of limits, and allergic to the perennial postponements for the sake of Great Designs for the History of Tomorrow—such is the lesson of freedom that Chiaromonte leaves to us after a life spent with courage in the European drama of the last 40 years.

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The Story of a Friendship

Chiaromonte and Caffi

Gino Bianco

THE friendship between Andrea Caffi and Nicola Chiaromonte, their relationship of " teacher–disciple " strengthened by a real affinity of ideas, of values, and by a profound solidarity, is an eloquent example of the way in which culture and life interact across frontiers and in the face of historical adversity.

Caffi (born in St. Petersburg in 1886) had been a revolutionary in tsarist Russia, a student in Berlin, a member of the Parisian artistic vanguard at the beginning of the century, and a radical exile between the wars. In Paris he frequented the circles of the Russian emigration where some of his particularly close friends were Michael Ossorguine, Victor Chernov, Irakli Tseretelli and Peter Garvy. At the same time he maintained contact with the groups of Italian anti-fascists exiled in France.

Chiaromonte was as much interested in literature as in philosophy. A pupil of Adriano Tilgher, he had published his first writings in the literary magazine *Solaria.* He was a member of the Italian underground organization *Giustizia e Libertà* and his clandestine trips to Paris were a means of keeping in touch with anti-fascist groups abroad. It was on one such trip in 1932 that he sought out Caffi.

Their first meeting was a memorable event for them. From Rome, where Chiaromonte returned at the end of the year, he wrote to Caffi:

> When I am not with you I lack the feeling of spiritual companionship. If I were close to you, everything would go better for me: at least I would have a clear and definite " master," a man alongside whom it would be easier for me to overcome my own lack of confidence, my sense of desolation.[1]

Caffi, for his part, quickly recognized in Chiaromonte a fellow spirit. Chiaromonte's rebellion against Mussolini's dictatorship was something more than the routine ideological objections of the official anti-fascism. It was disgust with brutality, an impatience which made it impossible for him to come to terms not just with the fascist regime, but with a world whose " absence of values and rationality " he found profoundly displeasing: in short, the rational conviction that to be valid every idea must, in the last analysis, be tested through life experience.

When Carlo Rosselli (one of the two brothers who led the *Giustizia e Libertà* movement) came to Paris after his escape from Lipari Island, Caffi was quick to make contact with him. He found the poverty of anti-

[1] Letter from Chiaromonte to Caffi, Nov. 1932.

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fascist thought hard to bear. " The political illiteracy of *Libertà*, the paper of the *Concentrazione Anti-Fascista*." he confided to a friend, " is dreadful." Yet he wished above all to devote himself to the common cause. Besides, Caffi, like Chiaromonte, thought that *Giustizia e Libertà*, since it was a new political grouping born out of the crisis of the old Italian parties, would by virtue of its origins and programme be the most suitable vehicle to carry forward that which in the 1930s was termed " the necessary revolution." Again, joining *Giustizia e Libertà* did not involve the acceptance of a particular party discipline or a particular party orthodoxy. Consequently it seemed the most suitable choice for one who found himself on the fringes of the parties and movements which comprised the so-called " historic Left."

At the beginning of 1930, the great depression, the rise of totalitarianism, the rising tide of nationalism and the crisis of parliamentary democracy had combined to undermine faith in liberalism once and for all. At the same time, in the world of culture, the crisis of rationalism was heightened by the recognition that, as Bergson described it, what one saw was, " instead of the spiritualization of matter, a mechanization of the spirit itself." The avant-garde intellectuals were talking of a turning point in the history of the West. Ortega y Gasset began to ask what would be the fate of the individual menaced by the ever-growing oppression of the political and state apparatuses.

Caffi found in his friendship with Chiaromonte encouragement to write for *Giustizia e Libertà* and generally to collaborate in its publishing activity. Chiaromonte despatched from Italy a " letter " on the subject of the formation of a revolutionary elite. Its publication gave Caffi the opportunity to take up and expand the whole discussion.

CAFFI'S thought offers an original mode of understanding politics and society; it involves a consideration of the role and function of intellectuals, of the relationship between elites and revolution, and between minorities and the political apparatuses. In his text, " Marginal Notes on Two Letters from Italy," Caffi points out that there is an irreducible antithesis between revolution and society, involving a reality infinitely more complex than mere politics.[2]

This was an era in which a large number of intellectuals and socialist politicians had surrendered their judgment to the powerful influence of the Soviet myth. Among their ranks were such names as Otto Bauer, Beatrice and Sidney Webb, Franz Adler and many others. Caffi was among the first to realize that the Soviet Union was not in any way a counterweight to the capitalist regimes which existed in many countries in Europe and the United States: rather it was an essential part of that reactionary constellation of forces. Caffi said that " the USSR in 1932 exercises its absolute state power more efficiently than does any other state organization in the whole world." He was at pains to emphasize

[2] A. Caffi, " In margine a due lettere dall'Italia," *Quaderni di Giustizia e Libertà* (II Series) No. 11, 1934.

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that militarism was an essential element in this efficiency. In his article, " The Moscow Tragedy," he was one of the first to point out the connexion between the assasination of Kirov and the wave of indiscriminate terror of which the massacre of the *kulaks* was a prelude.[3] Rosselli, in publishing the article, thought it necessary to express some reserve regarding " its overtly polemical tone." Just the same, he did not fail to defend its author against the communist reaction which appeared in *Stato Operaio*, edited at that time by Togliatti.

In the years between the wars those intellectuals who supported the Soviet Union were either ignorant of the true nature of Satlinism or simply refused to face up to the facts. The Bolshevik revolution, when compared with the bankrupt Europe of Versailles, seemed to promise Utopia, especially after 1928 when the notion of the " scientific planning of society " had come to supplement that of violent revolution. It is true of course that in these years Nazism seemed to most democratic intellectuals to be the greater and more immediate danger. However, in spite of the fact that between 1930 and 1938 the Soviet regime was at its most cruel and inhuman (manifested in the forced collectivization of agriculture, the Great Purges, the tragic farce of the Moscow Trials with their false confessions, the extermination of a whole generation of revolutionaries, the concentration camps and mass repression), it was precisely at this time that so many people in Europe found it an attractive alternative.[4]

To the equivocations into which so many intellectuals and men of politics lapsed, Caffi opposed a clear perception of the contrast between the Soviet regime and the Communist Party on the one hand, and the socialist and libertarian tradition on the other. The year 1934 saw the events of 6 February in Paris, the socialist rising in Vienna, the Asturian revolt (which was bloodily repressed), an increase in the power of Hitler and the consolidation of the semi-fascist regimes of Central and Eastern Europe. Despite all this, the leaders of the Third International did not see fit to abandon their optimism.

Caffi developed his analyses of modern society, of the nature of totalitarianism and of the structure and functioning of the state in a series of articles which appeared in the weekly and quarterly press of *Giustizia e Libertà*. A further series of articles, *Nuova Generazione,* which brought out the gulf dividing the earlier democratic generations from the new totalitarian generation, impressed Rosselli a great deal. Already in these articles we perceive the first signs of the differences which were to lead to the so-called " crisis of the innovators " (" *novatori* "), and the breach between Caffi, Chiaromonte, Mario Levi, Renzo Giua and *Giustizia e Libertà*.

[3] " Tragedia moscovita," *Giustizia e Libertà*, 4 Jan. 1935.

[4] Cf. David Caute, " Left-Wing Intellectuals Between the Wars," *Journal of Contemporary History*, London, 1966.

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ALTHOUGH the *Giustizia e Libertà* movement was perhaps the most advanced expression of Italian anti-fascism of that epoch, it must nonetheless be said that it was in itself scarcely modern, taking for granted as it still did in the 1930s, those same idealistic banalities which had characterized the first years of this century. It was against precisely this singular mixture of Mazzini-type enthusiasm and ruthless realism, the general atmosphere of confused idealism coupled with pragmatic political attitudes, of revolutionary radicalism and liberal sentiments, that the *novatori* directed their criticism.

The *novatori* would have wished *Giustizia e Libertà* to devote itself to an intellectual and political effort aimed at the formation of a movement quite free of any preconceptions regarding the idea of the nation, of any bias in favour of democracy in general. They were also convinced that the First World War, the post-war years and the world crisis had profoundly modified two of the essential elements of modern society: the structure of the state and the composition as well as the possibility of collective action by the working class. They wished *Giustizia e Libertà* to make some positive contribution to the renewal of the European socialist and libertarian tradition. But they valued in it the communitarian anarchism of Proudhon rather than the parliamentary and ministerial *combinazioni* which they detested.

In the Italian socialist emigration only Caffi, Chiaromonte, and Silvio Trentin carried out a thoroughgoing criticism of the idea of the nation-state. Caffi's condemnation is very far-reaching indeed. " As long as there are states they will have *sacro egoismo* as their supreme law. Fortunately, today we cannot delude ourselves that this egoism can serve the general interest. These are chimeras which we can leave for the amusement of liberal historians." Mussolini and Hitler " were aided with the greatest goodwill precisely by the democratic West in order—and this was essential—for them to perpetuate all the ambiguities of false peace."[5]

The *novatori* were convinced that the nations of Europe were heading towards an even deeper crisis which already rendered futile the idea of a restoration of the kind of democracy and socialism as they were conceived before 1914. The crisis extended to include, as a matter of course, even cultural values and the place they had occupied in society at the turn of the century. The outcome of the Russian revolution, the rise of fascism and other types of authoritarian regimes confirmed this conviction, as did tendencies appearing in the cultural field.

Giustizia e Libertà, to the extent that it functioned as a political party, was intolerant of " revisionists " and criticized them for being too abstract and intellectual. Although its programme rejected any suggestion that there might be a " restoration " of the type of democracy which existed before fascism, it remained unable to rise to a higher plane than that of conventional anti-fascist polemic and of its own

[5] A. Caffi, " Semplici riflessioni sulla situazione europea," *Giustizia e Libertà*, 19 Apr. 1935.

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extremely confused ideology. Practical and psychological factors also served to make difficulties in the relations between Caffi and Rosselli. Despite everything Rosselli remained a " respectable " intellectual, tied even in his revolt to traditional values, incapable, for that very reason, of involving himself completely either in a rigorously realistic, that is to say, political dimension, or in a rigorously religious dimension. Besides, Rosselli's life, at least until the end of the war in Spain, was quite a normal, economically assured existence, bound to the interests of his work and of his family. As for Caffi, Chiaromonte has described his way of life in Paris during the 1930s:

> His life, that is to say, his daily activity, was that of a sociable hermit. He lived in furnished rooms, his door, following the Russian custom, was always open to anyone who might call and start a discussion, he welcomed visitors as if all his time was at their disposal. But he met with heavy silence, or worse, gave only embarrassed monosyllabic replies to a variety of "important persons" who came to interview him, or, as he described it himself, tried to " fish him out " and restore him to a more normal mode of existence. Caffi's lonely existence was the outcome of his decision to enjoy only such company as he chose: it was not in itself ascetic, rather it was simply an expression of the free spirit of a man unable to adapt himself to the ways of the world, determined to remain faithful to the *non serviam* vow he had taken in his youth. The truth is that Caffi lived the life of a philosopher in the ancient sense of the word, of a man devoted exclusively to the pursuit of truth and justice and convinced that such a pursuit must inevitably become tainted once mixed with concern for worldly success or making a career.[6]

Once Mario Levi and Renzo Giua, two young anti-fascists from Turin who combined political disagreements with strong personal differences with the " leaders " of *Giustizia e Libertà*, joined up with Caffi and Chiaromonte, a split became inevitable. At the same time these young people gathered around Caffi were concerned with something more than the activities of a political group: they lived through a communitarian experience and the solidarity of a group of friends.

In their conversations, in their letters to one another, these friends debated ideas and discussed philosophic and artistic theories, but above all they wanted to " live together for our ideas."

And this indeed is how they lived—in close friendship, " dividing amongst themselves the little they had, not supporting any political group, and with no plans for the future, since no future was possible."[7] Rosselli declared of Levi and Giua that " their heads had been stuffed by that Russian Caffi who had passed on to them his fascination for philosophical niceties and the preoccupation with abstraction with which he was diseased." Other members of *Giustizia e Libertà* added that the *novatori* were quite isolated and no longer had any contact with reality.

[6] Introduction by N. Chiaromonte to A. Caffi, *Critica della violenza* (Bompiani, 1966), p.17.
[7] Cf. Natalia Ginzburg, *Lessico familiare*, 1963.

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IN the 1930s amongst the anti-fascist emigration in Paris, there were interminable discussions about the proper forms of action for a revolutionary movement. As was to be expected, the views of this group of non-conformists were highly unorthodox. " To recognize a revolutionary," they wrote, " we need to know not about the ' positions ' he adopts, but instead how he conducts himself with people."[8]

The main preoccupations of the *novatori* were the rejection of the established world and the denunciation of the " established disorder." They held nationalism to be one of the prime causes of the disorder in Europe, they criticized parliamentary democracy and the political parties, both as such and as a means of political action. Whilst impotent in the face of the totalitarian state, even in the so-called democracies, the parties showed the same faults as parliament itself, i.e. they were only concerned with abstract political demands and neglected actual problems and real interests.

Opposing Marxist socialism's scientific pretensions, the *novatori* supported the Proudhonian tradition, its criticism of centralization and the state, in the name of the spontaneous life of the community. The utopian ideal of democratic theory, which was itself derived from the ideology of 1789, reduced the individual, the real individual made up of flesh and bones, to the abstract entity of a citizen or an elector. Counterposing Proudhon to Marx, Caffi tried to show that it was possible to conceive of human society in a different fashion and to envisage liberty and justice in a different way. Socialism's claims to humanism are based on the fact that it sought to defend society against " the inhuman devices of state regulation." The political constitution, itself the outcome of the liberal movement of the nineteenth century, must be brought to an end through the agency of the social constitution, a constitution which would limit the functions and prerogatives of the state apparatus. By limiting these functions, by permeating them with the idea of social justice, it would be possible to establish a framework of checks and balances which would in their turn provide the foundation for industrial democracy. After all, European political democracy based on the principles of 1789 had been able to triumph even then only in a most imperfect and insecure fashion, only after violent and bloody struggles, and after bitter efforts in all fields of culture, of economic organization, in the emancipation from the Church which occupied several generations. The Russian revolution had required a century of underground activity beforehand to prepare the ground (and then ended in a *ricorso* to tyranny). The slow and laborious process of the democratization of European society was halted by the emergence of totalitarianism and the ever more accentuated tendencies towards authoritarianism. The myth of efficiency also contributed to that process, nurtured by the headlong pace of technological development.

[8] Letter from Chiaromonte to Caffi, 17 Dec. 1935.

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The crisis of parliamentary democracy and the advent of mass society, the ever more abstract form which political events came to assume for the people, itself a consequence of the growing complexity of the social mechanism and the enormous and chaotic growth of the functions of the state, had led to a governmental apparatus ever more independent of popular control, and to an enormous and despotic governmental bureaucracy, in short to a situation in which society itself disintegrated whilst the state rose in triumph over the ruins of every form of human community. The process of concentration, the growing intervention of the state, was operating with exceptional intensity already towards the end of the last century, and it took place quite independently of the various constitutional and political regimes. The advent of a war economy and industrial mobilization, with all that it involved, and above all the corporate state introduced by the fascist regimes, represented its culmination. Caffi saw the corporate idea as a technical device of the totalitarian state in modern industrial mass society rather than as kindred to the state socialism of Wagner, Schaeffle, and Sombart.[9]

Caffi often anticipated the themes of that school of hostile criticism which sprang from the culture of the Weimar Republic in the 1930s and reached its fulfilment in the Frankfurt School but together with his young friends he felt that the contrast between politics and social life is irremediable. Chiaromonte, for example, insisted that social experience was of necessity always " imperfect," incomplete, untidy. He added: " The idea of a perfect state is totally absurd."[10]

FACED with the crisis which was shaking European society, the degeneration of Soviet society, the advent of totalitarianism and the mechanization of society, " thinking outside politics " became the way of this group of friends. The aim, they declared, has always been a more human society, and it could be achieved only outside the existing institutions. Saint-Simon, Caffi stressed, had denounced the error committed by the revolution when it wished to remedy what was essentially a social disorder. Similarly, Proudhon considered it pointless to " organize the republic " when the real problem was how to " organize society."[11] Even the writings of Plato appeared to suggest that when the city has become corrupt there is nothing to be done, that there are moments in history in which it is both reasonable and far-sighted to abandon hope of any immediate or large-scale results.

When the civil war broke out in Spain Chiaromonte enrolled in Malraux's air squadron. Renzo Giua enrolled in the International Brigade. The latter was to give up his life in the defence of Madrid, with a courage which Chiaromonte, in a letter to Levi, described as " dreadful, since I had no idea what he was capable of." Caffi worked in Langevin's laboratory, where he repaired range finders, telescopes, and

[9] A. Caffi, " Sul corporativismo e una certa tecnica," in *Scritti Politici* (1970), p. 223.
[10] Letter to Caffi, 18 June 1936.
[11] A. Caffi, *Critica della violenza*, op. cit. p. 97.

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precision optical equipment for the Spanish Republican Army. Chiaromonte spoke to Nenni (then Commissar of the Socialist International in Spain) suggesting that Caffi be brought to Madrid to work in an international press office. " Certainly," Chiaromonte wrote from Madrid, " the prospect of the gang reuniting *sul terreno* cannot fail to move me."[12] But the project came to nothing, and Caffi remained in Paris, where he had begun to collaborate with the Italian socialists exiled in France. It was above all Tasca who wished to utilize his intellectual experience for the magazine *Problemi del Socialismo* and for *Nuovo Avanti*.

Meanwhile in Spain Chiaromonte saw " all the efforts of the politicians directed towards the separation of the revolution from the war." The farce of non-intervention organized by the English conservatives and imposed on the France of the Popular Front, the conflicts between socialists and anarchists, and the tragedy of May 1937 in which the secret police controlled by the communists launched a powerful attack on the anarchists and the semi-Trotskyists of POUM *(Partido Obrero di Unificacion Marxista)*, confirmed " the absurdity and the inconsistency of all political action in the present situation. The inanity of every dogmatic standpoint must finally be recognised and this, above all, I believe, is the profound conviction of the Spanish popular masses."[13] But now the tragedy of Spain moved towards its fatal conclusion. Politics " had acquired that inhumane foolishness of which Europe must soon know . . . other extremes."

When in Paris in 1938 Angelo Tasca succeeded in organizing an Italian language radio programme transmitted by French radio, Caffi, Chiaromonte, and Levi all associated themselves with this initiative. But the Second World War and the fall of France swept away and dispersed this group of friends. Tasca, in danger of arrest by the Gestapo (which was presumably alerted by the Soviet secret service which reserved special treatment for such ex-communists), left the appartment in Place de la Sante without warning his friends amongst the editors, and disappeared. Chiaromonte fled from Paris during the German invasion of France. This was just after his wife Annie, exhausted by a protracted lung disease, had died in his arms. He succeeded in making the hazardous journey to North Africa, and thence travelled to the United States. Caffi and Levi left Paris on foot when the Germans were almost on the outskirts, and ended up in a village near Toulouse. Levi joined the *maquis*, whilst Caffi remained in Toulouse.

WHY did Chiaromonte not stay near his friend instead of leaving France for the United States? After the end of 1941, Caffi heard nothing of Nicola, since the war hindered any kind of communication. However, he felt the pain of this separation and one day confided to Levi that he considered the way Nicola had abandoned him to be almost an

[12] Letter to Caffi, 5 Apr. 1936.
[13] Letter from Chiaromonte to Caffi, 2 Nov. 1936.

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insult. Chiaromonte suffered a consuming remorse and expressed the desire to rejoin his friend:

> Leaving you, dear Andrea [he wrote to him] was desertion on my part, a mutilation, a brutal gesture, a deliberate rupture of the strongest and deepest ties I have ever had, since my friendship with you was not a chance one . . . I had promised myself to stay with you, but if I did not do so, it is because you discouraged me and made me feel that neither my staying nor my going would make much difference. That happened because of the pernicious and terrible nature of your spirit that insists on refusing offers of love and devotion.

Only after the end of the war and the liberation of France would these two friends be able to engage in a regular correspondence. For Caffi it was like resuming the old discussion, so brutally interrupted, of the group's Parisian years, whilst Nicola, for his part, observed that it was like hearing the same voice talk with a new accent of things that he had so often heard from his own mouth . . . " and this small fact of our ever-growing correspondence gives me much courage." Chiaromonte tried to let his friend participate in his New York experiences, giving quick sketches of the people with whom he mixed, talking of American intellectuals, or telling him of his marriage to Miriam, " an affectionate and intelligent girl."

But there is a dominant theme to which Chiaromonte always returns: the Parisian years of " his second youth," the memory of Caffi and the gift of friendship which were the most precious things in his life. But what had he really become during those years in America? " A provincial, I fear," wrote Nicola, adding, " in any case, Herzen had already observed that whatever is decided on the other side of the Atlantic is lost to Europe. America is hostile to what in France is called *intelligence*, not in theory or in principle, but in fact." As for the actual state of the world, Chiaromonte felt increasingly attracted towards philosophy as if that were the only intelligible refuge.

Between them, the two friends returned to talking of both old and new projects (a small publishing house, a magazine, etc.) and naturally the idea of a commune reemerged, to be established this time in America, or in Paris, or why not even in Italy?

Some of the letters that Caffi continued to write to Chiaromonte were translated into English and published in *politics*, Dwight Macdonald's magazine. They were agonizing descriptions of the catastrophe that had befallen Europe, of the effects produced by Nazi barbarity, of the crisis into which the sensibility and culture of the contemporary world had hurled itself. In those fragments of letters, there emerges the idea of socialism as a defence against the process of " rationalization " which Max Weber had, at the beginning of the century, indicated as the characteristic of contemporary society.

Chiaromonte, happy finally to be able to communicate that " Andrea's ideas were understood in America," organized, with

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contributions from his New York friends, the forwarding of regular financial help to Caffi (100 dollars a month) as advance payment for a book that he was to have written, since " your observations, and even more the inimitable style of your way of thinking, are more precious than ever." Caffi was less inclined to share the enthusiasm of his disciple-friend. The publication in *politics* of his notes and letters in an " *anglais assez stérilisé* " and for a public that " seems profoundly indifferent," was not a sufficient stimulus to inspire him to further activity. Instead, Caffi continued to repeat that his life had become more difficult than ever, due to illness, solitude, and poverty, and that he did not feel able to plan his future. In a word, he felt that the circumstances in which he lived " had transformed even a humble life into something terrible and unreal."

For his part, Chiaromonte deplored his incapacity to help further (what he himself earned was scarce and irregular), and lamented the solitude and squalor of New York life. He confided to his friend that he was going through long periods of anxiety and depression, in which he felt " sterile and unable to give form or coherence to his ideas." Nicola wanted to return to Europe, to rejoin his friend and with him to attempt a new cultural enterprise, the only way, perhaps, " to return some sense to my existence," as, " I think I can also say that since my youth, I have never searched for anything with as much passion as for the opportunity to dedicate myself to a cause."

This time, even Albert Camus (whom Chiaromonte had known in North Africa and with whom he remained friends until the death of the French writer) was willing to associate himself with a common initiative. Camus's idea was to unite the dispersed intellectual forces, thus " forming a society within a society," for a cultural battle that was to save " Europe and its destiny." Naturally, Nicola immediately attached himself to this project. A great admirer of Camus, in a letter to Caffi he described him as " a spirit that, struck by the horror and absurdity of our world, falls back upon himself, and, against a background of desperation and nausea, refuses ambiguity in the name of integrity, and makes the light of reason and the dignity of an intransigent morality shine again."

Chiaromonte returned to Europe, first to Paris and then to Italy. Caffi left Toulouse and went to live in Paris, and his life " remained that which it had always been: poor and prodigal." The two friends no longer lived together, but their passionate world of reason and shared emotions continued to bind them.

A short while before Caffi's death in 1955, Chiaromonte wrote to him from Rome: " Believe me, no distance in time or space could weaken the friendship, the gratitude and finally the admiration that I have for you. Your friendship has been a comfort and a light for me in the confusion and atrocities of this century."

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A Selection From Chiaromonte's Writings

Letter from an Italian Youth (1932)*

THE phrase " crisis of Western civilization " has been much abused. Not, however, that one can deny that it describes an obvious state of affairs. The crisis exists, and is profound. It cannot be reduced, as the communists would have it, to the " agony of the capitalist regime "; it is precisely by virtue of this mistake that the communists, energetic and exact as they are in their ideological position, do not in practice succeed in being much stronger than the social democrats whom they look down on. The crisis, as we understand it, is complex: there seems to be a blight upon all values according to which man in our civilization was accustomed to regulate his social relationship, his vision of the future, and his choice in the conflicts of his existence. Thus it is plainly a question of moral order.

We have said " crisis," not " twilight," of Western civilization, thus clearly differentiating our interpretation from the Spenglerian type of apocalypse. According to Spengler, the " vital urge " had become exhausted, which, after blossoming forth, began to wither in the successive " morphological " phases of civilization described by him as " Faustian." To us it seems rather as if the general confusion to be found in the consciences and functioning of institutions and in international relations is to be attributed to the difficult transition (difficult because impeded by hesitations arising from impatience, simplistic diagnosis, short-term palliatives and revivals of past romanticisms) of outworn " superstructures " to new *forms* in which economic, juridical, political, ethical and intellectual activities can rediscover a means of expressing their effectiveness and accord.

Confining ourselves to the realm of political forms, it can perhaps be said that what is in crisis is the idea of the *state based on law*. That idea, the product of a lengthy evolution (both in the sphere of philosophical and juridical thought, and in that of experience of government) took shape—after the American and French revolutions—in a system of " guarantees," which, in an impersonal way and with increasingly egalitarian criteria, ensured definite freedoms and thereby limited the action of the state, but which above all eliminated arbitrary action, replacing it with the abstract rationality of " controlled " mechanisms. Throughout the nineteenth century it seemed that such a system was destined to expand without stop and become perfected in the sense of according an ever-increasing and effective respect to the " inalienable rights of man and the citizen." The war cut short that development. And

* from Nicola Chiaromonte, " Lettera di un Giovane dall'Italia " published in *Quaderni di Giustizia e Libertà*, December 1932.

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in the immediate post-war period the light-hearted way in which the most modern types of constitutions were introduced in new states, and constitutionally governed countries proceeded to " extensions of democracy," demonstrated something fictitious and lifeless in the system which formerly had shown " organic " tenacity and a lively capacity to adapt so as to overcome strong resistance in widely differing social surroundings.

Today, against the " state based on law " we find the *myth-state* arising, the state conceived of as a person, a " supra-subject," a divinity, an idol; it is thought of as a mystical being preceding and superior to the human beings that " stand within it." Like God, this state " is, because it is," and recognizes no confines to its own competence beyond those it establishes instance by instance by its own sovereign approval. Thus this state does not exist for the good of the citizens, but they are mere instruments in the service of ends that are unfathomable to them; the state arrogates to itself discretional powers not only over their bodies but over their consciences; it supervises and prescribes the way in which one must feel and think; and it exacts unanimity and absolute obedience.

This is not the place to define this myth-state in terms of the philosophy of law, nor would I feel myself qualified to do so; neither do I intend to examine what elements of this contemporary Leviathan have their origins in the monarchy of Diocletian and the enlightened absolutism of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries; or which are inspired by the counter-revolutionary doctrines of Hegel and Comte and which are the direct consequences of the habits of militarized government contracted during the [First] World War.[1] But it seems to me beyond dispute that the scheme of things sketched out by the " myth-state " suffices to show the, so to speak, morphological affinity between Mussolini's state, Stalin's state, and the eventual " third Reich " of Hitler.

Letter to Andrea Caffi (1945)

23 West 8th St.,
New York, NY
30 July 1945

MY very dear Andrea,

Did you get the letter which I sent to Mr. Lasky? I am very impatient to see an improvement in the postal service which operates between France and America. In the meantime I have received two letters

[1] The authoritarian principle of the " new state " is frankly military (with pseudo-religious pretensions), according to which " what is permissible is solely what is prescribed or allowed "; whereas the state of law is based on the principle that " everything is permissible that is not expressly forbidden."

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from Mario—or, to be precise, three—he writes about his departure for Milan, about things in his past and present life, about his young friends in the resistance, and also about his feeling that you treat him with a certain coldness on account of his . . . Jacobin activities. He says that he can well understand this and admits that you are right. He is intent on letting me know that he was never a " Gaullist " or a " communist." But I could never have believed that he could be taken in by such formulae. I regret (in one sense) that he is leaving again, for it is very important to have as many testimonies as possible about what the resistance really was. Over here one's notion of it is rather more cinematographic although one senses with some precision that the movement has always been rather troubled and confused, for all its heroism—a sort of apotheosis of " anti-fascism."

I have so much to say to you, so many things to ask you, my very dear friend—I wonder, for example (but this is out of sheer childish curiosity), if the Andrea who signs those lucid articles on the situation in France has anything to do with an honest man who lives in Toulouse. But above all, I want to say again (and you will forgive me this insistence, which is, perhaps a little gauche of me) how at those moments of my life when I feel less confused than usual, I am moved to take up my pen and tell you how much I owe to your friendship. In short, I owe it to you that I have never fallen more than halfway (and always with a sharp feeling of guilt) into the confusions and errors of our century—it is perhaps hypocritical for me to express myself thus—but then again I cannot stop myself. And I am only too aware that I have not a single virtue which I do not owe to you. I hasten to add that Plato, Pierre-Joseph and Tolstoy have also shown themselves to be very good friends and strong supports.

Speaking of Plato, from a surfeit of conscience, I began to read Aristotle. Perhaps you will find what I am going to say rather impertinent but I personally find this Aristotle impossible—he is as artful as he is mediocre, as dull as he is proud—I wonder how, by what mysterious historical route, he came to be considered a great philosopher—his ethics, my God, such platitudes—he really is a philosopher for Romans and Americans (indeed, Aristotle's is a pragmatic and empiricist ethic—and this is all the worse, I must say, because, after all, he was a Greek and went to a good school).

After this outburst, I expect to be put back in my place in your next letter.

I would have liked to have talked to you at length about Dwight [Macdonald] and his review. But first I must stress that (only if you have no inner resistance to doing so) it is very, very important that you send us your comments on the review—and above all some observations on the situation in France and Europe. We are in the dark over here. All we know is that it is very bad—very confused and desperate. Anton C. [Ciliga]—who managed to escape the clutches of the Yugoslav marshal and is now in Rome, made it known to us that it is not worth hoping for anything from the people—that they have suffered too much—but still,

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France—there it should be somewhat different—lately he's been reading some pieces of news in the papers which cannot but encourage us—but even more than on that of political reality, it is on the plane of ideas that one would want the question to turn.

Dwight (who is too honest not to admit that for him socialist politics still means Marx—even though at the same time he has a horror of " Marxism," and is above all of a certain type of Marxist who is a New Yorker first and foremost) is going to try to organize a sort of " symposium " on it.

As for me, I don't feel myself to be in a position to offer a serious opinion on this question. All that I can say is that I have arrived at the conclusion that one must resolutely cast Marxism to the winds if one wants to arrive at the threshold of any sort of clarity.

" Marxism " is a political theory, as well as a " philosophy," and I wish that Marx had given us some good analytical lessons on economic facts; but having believed in it for a long time, as you know, I have come (with your help) to the conclusion that one cannot operate on any level with Marxist premises, if one wants to understand what is going on on the whole—or, to put it better, in reality. Here one must re-examine many paths which have already been trampled—for otherwise one is not understood and looks like a snob. You will understand what I am trying to say if I tell you that the reaction of my friend Meyer Schapiro (the most " European " of the American intellectuals that I know, or at any rate the most well-informed and the most subtle) to the theories of Proudhon and Gourvitch, whose ideas I tried to summarize, was: " we know that: it's Jefferson and the American constitution. It is precisely from that that Marx helped us emerge." At the same time it is impossible to get a " Marxist " explanation of American society from them. All their attempts have failed—in the very exact sense that they are not *informative*, and tell you nothing *specific*.

I don't trust the post with letters that are too heavy . . . I'm afraid they'll never get there. That is why I am ending abruptly, with much regret. But I shall continue without waiting for a reply.

In the meantime, I hope that you received a suit I sent you (with the help of a friend) in two separate parcels. You'll have to find someone who can alter the trousers for you; not having your exact measurements I couldn't have it done for you. Miriam sends you her regards, I embrace you with all my heart.

Nicola

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On the Kind of Socialism Called " Scientific " (1946)*

SO far as the present writer knows, the clearest general statement of the " materialist conception of history " is contained in a celebrated passage of the *German Ideology*. The passage begins with the assertion:

> The premises, from which we start are not arbitrary, they are not dogmas; they are real premises, from which abstraction can be made only in the imagination. They are the real individuals, their action and their material conditions of life. . . . These premises can therefore be verified in a purely empirical way.

If this were so, then the approach deriving from such premises would actually be a scientific one. The only question would be, in order to avoid dogmas, not to give a dogmatic definition of what is a real individual. Otherwise, a " verification in a purely empirical way " becomes impossible. Such is not the course chosen by Marx and Engels. The passage continues: " Men may be distinguished from animals by consciousness, religion, or anything else. They begin to differentiate themselves from animals as soon as they begin to produce their means of subsistence." Here, without any logical transition, a very dogmatic statement is made, not only, one might say, about " real individuals," but in their very name. With remarkable brusqueness, those " real premises," men, are deprived of any right to be heard, and reduced with one single stroke to the status of very peculiar premises indeed. Premises, one might add, that, after having been silenced, are immediately raised above discussion.

The irrevocable sentence here pronounced about human nature is made more specific, and more sweeping, by the authors' adding:

> The mode in which men produce their means of existence depends in the first place on the nature of the means of existence themselves. . . . This mode of production . . . is a definite form of activity of these individuals, a definite form of expressing their life, their definite *mode of life*. As individuals express their life, so they are. What they are therefore coincides with their production—*what* they produce as well as *how* they produce it. What individuals are therefore depends on the material conditions of their production.

A breathless sequence of assertions, and one about which it is difficult to decide whether to stress its final ambiguity or the complete impossibility of proving the steps that are so ruthlessly taken, if it be admitted that their general direction is clear.

What proposition shall in fact be taken as expressing the essence of the " materialist conception of history? " The one that says that " the mode of production is a definite form of activity of these individuals "—which seems obvious enough—or the one that so bluntly proclaims: " What (individuals) are coincides with their production? " Or both, in spite of

* From Nicola Chiaromonte, " On the Kind of Socialism Called ' Scientific' " *politics* (Feb. 1946), pp. 39–40.

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the fact that the second does not seem at all to follow necessarily from the first? Or maybe the conclusion: " What individuals are therefore *depends* on the material conditions of their production? " But this is completely ambiguous: very obvious in one sense, if the verb *depends* is taken in general to mean that individuals are influenced by the material conditions of their existence; very questionable and not obvious at all, if taken in another sense, which is also the generally accepted meaning of the Marxian theory, namely that individuals are absolutely determined by the mode of production, that the mode of production constitutes the essence of their life.

In any case, the transitions are far from clear. It can easily be granted that the mode of production constitutes " a definite form of expressing " individual life without granting at all that it is the essential, or determining form of life, and much less the only one. " As individuals express their life, so they are " is an acceptable, although uninteresting, kind of statement. But it does not follow at all, from it, that " What (individuals) are coincides with their production."

No wonder that, after such ambiguities, for the " real individuals," referred to at the beginning, a new notion of the real individual is substituted: the " individuals, not as they may appear in their own or other people's ideas, but as they *really* are, that is, as they act and produce in a material way." A proposition that presupposes as firmly established *a priori* the complete unreality of consciousness, and the illusory character of what the individual thinks of himself and of other individuals. Which, among other things, also reduces to pure illusion and empty make-believe all the relations which constitute what is usually called " human society." In fact, there is no reality left, but the dialectical mechanism of the productive forces. A mechanism that is, to say the least, impersonal. Any empirical verification which can be reached after such a thorough and unwarranted simplification would seem to have a rather dubious validity, at least in so far as the real individuals are concerned: i.e. that mixture of reality and appearance of which the individual is admitted to consist even in the text here discussed.

Remarks on Justice (1947)*

ONE could say that the question of justice arises when the fact of " being together " (the social) is seen as a reality of its own, and is not confused either with the merely " subjective " (what belongs to a given individual and to nobody else) or with the merely " objective " and factual (what belongs to everybody in general, and to no one in particular). The fundamental injustice might be to ignore such a reality, and the first step towards justice to recognize in this original datum a

* From Nicola Chiaromonte, " Remarks on Justice," *politics* (June 1947), pp. 89–90.

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value as elementary as any other value. If, on the other hand, the fact that men live *in relation* to each other is viewed as presenting only a " moral " problem, to be solved in the light of a " moral law " (of duty or of love) and the peculiar substance of the relationship is overlooked, there is no ground left for the question of justice. " Just " and " unjust " then become synonymous with " good " and " evil," a problem for individual consciences. The common ground, society, is made to be simply the ground of practical adjustment, of compromise with one another and with the powers-that-be. Peculiarly enough, the " ethical " itself is then turned into a question of moral " regulations," a merely legalistic matter, as in all Church moralities. The " social question " becomes the question of politics, i.e. of the state, a matter on which only the legislator and the jurist are competent to decide. The legislator and the jurist, in their turn, are supposed to apply the moral law to the field of the useful and necessary. Together with the statesman, they ultimately become the real arbiters of morality (as in the Hegelian system). This is the point where modern philosophy, which had started out to assert the complete autonomy of individual consciousness, enters into radical contradiction with itself. This is also the moment when the Church, whose most consistent claim is that there is no such thing as the autonomy of the ethical, appears as the official defender of individual morality against the state.

Those who resolve the moral into the social, and the social into the practical and the political, tend to disregard the stubborn fact of individual consciousness, and the moral problem with it. But, what is more, they eliminate the ground of the just and the unjust by subordinating all questions to the practical exigencies of the body social. The claim is raised, as Proudhon put it, that the individual must be enslaved in order that the mass be free. The practical, or rather the " pragmatic," becomes with such people a kind of Categorical Imperative and Moral Absolute. Instead of moral casuistry we have the casuistry of the economic, the technological, the political and, finally, of expediency. One does not have to deny the importance of economics, technology, politics, or even expediency in social life, to notice that, from such a point of view, the peculiar identity of each social relationship tends to be ignored in favour of certain aspects of it, and, ultimately, in favour of a more or less arbitrary decision about what the general interest is at each moment.

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Letter to Andrea Caffi (1951)

Villa Magrini, Coletta (Livorno),
19 Sept. 1951

MY dear Andrea,
If I have not written to you before today it is not out of laziness or forgetfulness, but because I felt that after our frequent and somewhat inconclusive conversations, I owed it to myself (and to you) to try to set forth, with what little order I can muster, the few reasons why I do not share your views on " revolution," " nihilism " and the duty of the " good citizen." The reasons are not merely polemical.

Before I start, I should like to apologize for my long silence, which you must have taken for lack of friendship. I trust (1) that the summer heat did not affect you too much, (2) that Monsieur S. did not keep you waiting, and (3) that the parcel I sent you from New York has finally reached you.

As for me, I must say that the sun of my native land has been very satisfying.

In broaching the subject about which I should like to talk with you, I should straightaway point out that when I say " your opinion " I refer to those views you dwelled on recently. I do not mean this or that view (with which I might even agree) on the present state of society, social justice, etc., so much as the general position you seemed to hold with a certain tenacity during our recent conversations and which, through my fault, were all too frequently interrupted. As far as I can define it, this position seemed to me to consist of three elements: (1) philanthropy, that is to say, the insistence on the necessity of siding with those people whom the present organization (or disorganization) of society keeps in a state of social inferiority or economic oppression; (2) a relativism, which claims to be absolute (and which seems rather fitful to me), respecting the *order* of ideas, that is, of propositions that we should consider true or false in the course of discussion; and (3) a dogmatism that, if not absolute, is at least fairly insistent about our moral duty to accept certain notions about the class struggle or private property, under pain of being classified with outcasts and monsters.

What distresses me most about this triple combination is the moralism—or, rather, the substitution of the moral duty to take a particular side for the intellectual duty to accept only notions that are unequivocal. The confusion of the " moral " with the " intellectual " seems to me to be especially mortifying. Sartre's maxim " Man is responsible for the whole of humanity " strikes me as being the formula *par excellence* of modern sophistry and false morality. It is evident that if we cease to regard a thought as such and look on it, instead, as a potential act, every single thought can be transformed into a " crime against humanity." Any idea can be invalidated if one considers all the *possible* reasons supporting it, just as any act can be made to appear

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criminal if one projects all the *possible* consequences deriving from it. But that procedure has no meaning—or, rather, it is the metaphysics of Vyshinsky.* At this point, moreover, the remedy is simple. All we need to do is to protect an idea, be it true or false, with the hard shell of a system and to provide an alibi for our acts by placing ourselves symbolically on the " right side " (for example, that of the " oppressed " and of the " sense of history ").

I am not saying (far from it) that you are guilty of such excesses. I simply mean that this sort of conclusion is inherent in a certain mentality which seems to me inappropriate: it appertains to Church and state, not to free men. The whole Marxist critique of human attitudes is rooted in such a mentality, and this is one of the reasons I reject it so radically. Finally, what I demand is the right to regard as false—or, rather, as equivocal—such notions as that of the class struggle, without being accused of being a tool of capitalism. I can say more: I regard it as unfair to try to force me into the dilemma of either proclaiming that I endorse the *total* abolition of social oppression—and, more generally, of social evils—for which I am not responsible and which I am far from sustaining or countenancing in my conscience and in my behaviour. The idea of an " unconscious " or " objective " responsibility seems to me to be utterly unenlightened and to lead nowhere but to abusive criticism. Let me add that Ivan Karamazov's exclamation that the mere fact of hearing a child cry would be sufficiently outrageous to induce him to return his entrance ticket to heaven has always struck me as both histrionic and incomprehensible—for I cannot imagine it to have any such possible effect. The " materialist "and " critical " revolutionary might go still further; for if I say that the idea of a world without children crying seems to me tantamount to a world without any children at all, he is capable of replying that my vocation is that of child executioner. The truth is that, far from longing for heaven, I simply want to see things as they are (and not as they are interpreted by me).

Not long ago I came across the following quotation from Marx: " The ' popular ' economist thinks he is making a great discovery when he dismisses the explanation of the ' inner bond ' by confidently saying that *in appearance* things are different. It is as though he were proud of bowing before appearances and of *regarding them as the final explanation*." I shall not trouble to defend the " popular " economist, who, as far as I know, could easily be wrong (or right). What disturbs me is the contemptuous contrast of the " *final explanation* " and " *appearances*." I do not see this as the calm assertion of the scientist who *accounts for* " appearances " by stating the truth that he has discovered and that he upholds against popular opinions or current ideas. I see it as quite the contrary: as the statement of the dogmatic thinker who has opposed the (" apparent ") reality of " appearances " with the " superior " truth of the system he has constructed. Moreover,

* Andrey Yanuarevich Vyshinsky (1883–1954), the chief state prosecutor in the Moscow Show Trials of 1934 to 1938.

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when we talk about social reality and not about nature, the distinction between " appearances " and " reality " (not to mention the claim to possess the " final explanation ") seems to me very dubious. To start with, the illusions men have about their " real " situation have no less " reality " (practical consequences) than their " final explanations," for in society we are faced with men's *real* errors no less than with their true opinions. Myths, dreams, religions, superstitions, fear, cowardice, vices and weaknesses have no less reality or importance than any " final explanation," or even than any obvious common-sense truth. It is only by excluding all awareness of psychological reality that the individual and *individuals* can be made to fit into a type or a class. The ideal statesman can decide to encourage reasonable inclinations and impose measures demanded by common sense. But the man convinced of being in possession of the " final explanation " will, in the long run, be exclusively concerned with eliminating the " appearances " that contradict him.

* * * * * * *

I hope you won't consider my excogitations arguments *ad hominem*; that would be completely contrary to my intentions. I have long felt that I owed you a little more than some hasty observations to explain my occasional criticisms. And since I had the time and the inclination, I did what I could, in the hope, of course, of provoking a reply, which I know will be both precious and instructive to me—if it comes.

I will probably be back in Paris about 7 or 8 October. I hope you keep well until then and that the cold spell I read about in the papers has not troubled you.

I embrace you as affectionately as ever

Your

Nicola

A Time of Bad Faith (1953)*

AN Italian professor of philosophy recently remarked to a colleague: " There is no doubt that Stalin is a great philosopher. Without privileged knowledge of the deep motives of human history, indeed, how could he possibly have managed to lead the Soviet state to safety? And how could he today steer with so sure a hand, half, or almost half, of the human race? "

About the same time, a French professor of history heard that a colleague of his, a professor of philology, following the publication of the article in which Stalin defined, in opposition to Professor Marr's

* From Nicola Chiaromonte, " Il Tempo della Malafede " (1953).

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deviations, the new postulates of linguistic science, harangued his pupils as follows:

> Up till now I have given you lessons in philological science according to principles that seemed sound to me, but which, I have been forced to admit after mature consideration, were not sound after all. Will you therefore please regard what I have said till now as not having been said. I regard as correct only what I shall be teaching you from now onwards.

When the history professor heard this, he went to the philology professor's study and said:

> But my dear colleague, I was under the impression that the philology professor here was you, not Stalin. It is you, if I am not mistaken, who has studied the science of language for 30 years. If what you have been teaching is wrong, you ought to resign—and that's that. What has Stalin got to do with it?

" You must not think, my friend," was the answer, " that such a decision hasn't caused me serious doubts. But in the end I had to say to myself that the authority on what is ' reactionary ' and therefore harmful to science, and what is ' progressive ' and therefore favourable to sound study, is Stalin, not I."

Similar anecdotes could be told by the dozen. It is a good thing to laugh at them. To be alarmed by them is perhaps excessive: there are more serious things in life than these boring verbal absurdities. Nevertheless, the fact remains that a respectable number of cultured people in Italy, France and other countries in the West argue (it would be quite inappropriate to say " reason ") in this way and worse. Rather than laughing or being alarmed or indignant about it, we have to try to understand how such an attitude can come about; to overcome, in other words, that first moment of shock in which one is tempted to think that there is in the communist mentality today something irreparable which defies analysis and escapes explanation . . . .

Jean-Paul Sartre, The Impossible Communist (1953)*

OF all the pro- or anti-communist intellectuals in the West, Jean-Paul Sartre is undoubtedly the most intelligent; in any case, the most authoritative and articulate. Thus his interventions on subjects to do with communism are particularly significant; more significant than might appear from a consideration of the arguments marshalled by the eminent founder of the movement. They allow us to observe *in vitro*—at first hand—the functioning of the Sartrian intelligence in contact with politics; the fascination, at once profound and *profoundly abstract*, of a substitute for theology which animates this messenger of integral

* From Nicola Chiaromonte, " Il Tempo della Malafede " (1953).

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atheism; and, lastly, the function of negative religion which excuses, for him as for so many other European intellectuals, not only belonging to the Communist Party, but also not being able to belong to it, being forced to stay at its doors in eternal waiting and eternal deprivation—in a situation remarkably similar to that of the spectral hero of Franz Kafka.

Up till now, the argument is most fully expounded in Sartre's famous article " Les Communistes et la Paix."

At first sight, this article has all the appearances of a pamphlet brought out at white heat by a passionate party man. However, the first thing this party man states is that he does not find himself on the side which he supports in his arguments—but outside it, with the bourgeois, the reprobates, the " objective " enemies of the proletariat. By this Sartre means to say that, being born a bourgeois intellectual, he knows perfectly well that he has to bear right to the end the irremediable damnation of his origin, and does not flatter himself that he can ever be admitted into the elect.

Thus Sartre explains to his companions in damnation, first, that they are all wrong to rejoice at communist failures; secondly, that in so doing they automatically make publicity for the anti-Soviet atomic crusade; thirdly, that between the Communist Party, the proletariat and peace there is an absolute indivisibility. All this within the framework of a reconstruction of the history of the working-class movement in which the aim is to demonstrate that from the days of June 1848 down to today there is a rigorous continuity. The demonstration is made particularly rapid by the fact that Sartre constructs it as if between the publication of the Communist Manifesto and the development of European socialism, between the First World War and the Russian revolution, between the Russian revolution, the consolidation of the Soviet state and the formation of the present-day communist parties (not to mention other incidents such as Fascism and the Second World War), as if in the interval between these events nothing had happened but an unshakeable line of dialectical succession.

In short, everything in the article develops as if Sartre, irritated at once by the facility of bourgeois anti-communism and the clumsiness of communist thought, had said to himself: " Now I'll make you see how the present position of communism can be defended by rigourous logic." Thus the partisan is just a performing advocate, his pamphlet a dialectical exercise, and his passion purely cerebral.

It is difficult not to recognise in such a procedure a typical example of the mentality of those numerous European intellectuals who would like to be communists but (because of the irremediable excess of analytical faculties with which they are afflicted) fail to become so. And as a result, they go on saying they are communists even though they are not. But, not being communists, while they long to be, they feel guilty, and, feeling guilty, they persist more strongly than ever in arguing: (i) that to be anti-communist is immoral and wicked; (ii) that to be a communist has been made impossible by the communists themselves; (iii) that it is therefore

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right (as, with priceless candour, was explained to Camus by Francis Jeanson, a faithful disciple of Sartre) to be at the same time for and against communism, since " the Stalinist movement does not seem to us authentically revolutionary, but it is the only one that *claims to be* revolutionary." The end result is that these troubled souls tranquillize themselves with the idea that, while not belonging to the Communist Party, they are nevertheless the only people who belong by right to the ideal party, that is to say, the party which is the logical deduction of its perennial ideological premises.

If to liquidate a mental attitude it sufficed to demonstrate its contradictions, the attitude under discussion would liquidate itself. In Sartre's case in particular, we have to recognize among his other virtues that of intrepid frankness. He not only himself demonstrates his contradictions, he positively flaunts them, digs them out, eagerly lays them bare and claims to construct his intellectual personality upon them and in spite of them. Incapable as he is, whether from caution or from intellectual opportunism, of curbing his formidable analytical capacity, Sartre thus facilitates the task of anyone who, having noted the contradictions and distortions of evidence of which he is boldly (and consciously) guilty, seeks the sufficient and necessary reason for so many and such obvious ambiguities.

Generally speaking, that reason is to be sought in the great need, by which the modern intellectual is possessed, for a non-religious religion—for an effective ideology. Which is the same as saying, for a dogmatic morality, visibly operative, and practically organized—conditions which, in the present state of Western civilization, it seems impossible to find united except in a political party whose proclaimed end is the realization of an absolutely moral state of affairs.

Thus ideology is not enough, and neither is the party. What is needed is the visible sign of collective force, or of the effective capacity of realizing integral morality. A state which is rigidly organized and by its nature and in its original incarnation directed towards this end will therefore be, for a certain type of intellectual, the tangible proof that he is in the presence of that religion—a religion well endowed with the instruments technically necessary for its realization, which alone can satisfy his need for ideal certainty and, at the same time, for pragmatic rationality. Outside it, what else can there be but obstinate evil on the one hand, and an inconsistent idealism on the other?

À *PROPOS* of the adherence to communism of that great physicist and remarkable man, Paul Langevin, someone once said that it was extraordinary that a scientist who would not have accepted the smallest mathematical or physical proposition without a long series of proofs and counter-checks, when faced with the prosecutor Vyshinsky's charge claiming to have proved Trotsky's intention to sell the Soviet fatherland

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to international capitalism, agreed without question to support the condemnation of the " traitors."

Langevin's conduct at that time was attributed to the scientist's inveterate ingenuousness. But it was not explained why ingenuousness functioned in the great physicist in such a way as to make him accept those enormities and not, for instance, to make him hesitate. It was even said that the rationalist, secular, and democratic tradition of French culture predisposed people's minds to accept the rigours of Marxist ideology. This was fairly plausible. But it still left unexplained how a rational scientist, of all people, could agree to a doctrine based on vast generalizations rather than on positive proofs; or, even more seriously, how a secular and democratic rationalist could put up with an absolutist and authoritarian dogmatic practice.

In fact, the simplest hypothesis was evaded: namely, that between Langevin the scientist and Langevin the communist there was no continuity, but a gap or leap, leading to a decision like Pascal's wager. And that decision is possible precisely because scientific rationalism has nothing of the moral system in it, while communist orthodoxy has only an apparent relationship with logical reason.

Once the need for a peremptory morality is born in him, the rationalist cannot entrust himself to God, but only to facts. The object of his cult will therefore be the force that promises the rational organization of facts, the transfiguration, in fact, of the real into Pure Reason: the most irrational of all conceivable ends. The cult will naturally be the cult of an abstract idea, of an Ultimate End in relation to which actual circumstances, the vicissitudes of this world *here*, what happens for each man only once, *facts*, matter only in so far as they can be presumed to hasten or delay the realization of the End. The facts in themselves can never either authorize or disqualify such a presumption. It can therefore only be maintained by an act of authority on the one hand and of faith on the other.

Thus there arises from the ashes a new species of theology and, with the theology, a system of the " double truth." Naturally the risk is serious, both for the old science and for the new faith. It must not be thought that the rationalist is insensible to this risk. But, all the same, why not believe that the probabilities are in favour of the risk? On the one hand there is the moral Absolute to be gained, while on the other hand all there is to lose are a few temporary difficulties and moral scruples: *il faut parier*, you have to make your bet.

Il faut parier, but also, *il faut s'abêtir*—you have to make your bet, but you also have to bamboozle yourself. The one won't work without the other. A faith acquired in this way can never become an authentic faith. Authentic faith does not bet and, if it behaves foolishly, the foolishness it induces has the simplicity of natural phenomena. No church will admit such faithful adherents without suspicion, and no church will fail to keep them at a suitable distance.

Communist orthodoxy is concerned with the interpretation of acts and

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facts, not with the attributes of God. Faced with facts, the rationalist intellectual will always be fundamentally disarmed, at continual risk of accepting them as such rather than as elements of a system. His relationship with orthodoxy must therefore remain as far as possible abstract; he must fight in the " ideal " party, not in the real one; in the party that is ideally consistent with reason and morality, not in a party that acts according to the demands of power or the calculations of force and expediency. An extremely arduous situation when it is a question of practice and not of contemplation.

THE curious fact with Sartre is that in his intellectual relations with communism he follows exactly the path of the rationalist scientist. Curious, because he proclaims himself to be a restorer of metaphysics, a critic of science and an adversary of rationalism. But it is only *seemingly* curious, because, irrationalist that he may be, he is still an intellectual descendant of Descartes, and it is difficult to de-rationalize Descartes.

The difference between the scientist and Sartre is that while the scientist is a specialist, and outside his speciality can provide only approximate and ingenuous reasons, Sartre is a philosopher, obliged to offer considered reasons and thus to expose them to confutation. He is a rationalist at least in this (but this is essential), that he wants to arrive at absolute affirmations by pushing rational analysis to the extreme. Good philosopher that he is, Sartre only becomes ingenuous when faced with the real world, and above all with the world of political action. He sees clearly the reasons for adhering to communism; but he also sees perfectly clearly the reasons against it. Too much of a rationalist to bet on it, all he can do is to perorate in favour of the bet. His unforgiveable ingenuousness lies in the fact that, faced with the problems of society and action, he imagines that dogmatism, while intolerable in philosophy, suddenly becomes legitimate in politics. Therefore he assumes the personality of a partisan, overloads himself with cerebral passion, and mixes up the cards. But, having mixed them up in a laboriously philosophical way, he at the same time puts forward the rule for unmixing them. The game is shown up, and its only effects are intellectual.

Sartre is encouraged to go on in this way by the very premises of his philosophy: the theory that man in the world is in an inevitable situation of " bad faith," inasmuch as he cannot exist without denying the infinite multiplicity of the real, but at the same time he cannot exist without being aware of its negation. From this derives the singular postulate of the Sartrian ethic: that " morality is impossible " and that therefore the most authentic morality is a morality of ambiguity.

These theories are typically rationalistic, indeed one might say " scientistic," inasmuch as it is only if one observes man from outside, as an object, taken out of the context of experience, that one can reach the point of upholding such theses. Bad faith within the consciousness cannot be a primordial fact unless one presumes an even more

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fundamental good faith. And an " ambiguous " morality is quite simply ambiguous, in other words immoral.

The truth is that Sartre is an intellectual who is existentially obsessed by the prime fallacy of rationalism: the idea that the human intellect is subject to the *moral* obligation to provide the *single* and integral law and rule for *all* facts. This explains the fascination exercised over him by the communist promise of a force capable of ordering human facts and bringing them under a single authority, in other words of making them transparent to Reason.

Sartre, an integral atheist, has an absolute need for a radically atheist religion. But he cannot believe in it.

Jean-Paul Sartre and the Nobel Prize (1964)*

THERE were objective reasons that prevented Jean-Paul Sartre from adorning himself with the Nobel Prize. The first, an intrinsic reason, was the figure he had built up of himself. The philosopher who does not believe in philosophy; the literary man who does not believe in literature; the writer who, as he explains in his autobiography, regards the universe of the word as an empty incubus; a man, in fact—as he proclaims in the same book—totally disengaged from himself and for whom, in any case, the situation of the writer today is morally false and socially equivocal—how could Jean-Paul Sartre have gone around with the laurels of the Nobel Prize on his head without feeling ridiculous?

The second reason, a fortuitous one, was the exclamation that escaped him in 1957 on hearing that the Nobel Prize had gone to Albert Camus: " *C'est bien fait pour lui!* "—" Just the thing for him! " If the Nobel Prize was just the thing for the Camus of 1957, whom Sartre suspected of having made his peace with the Establishment, how could it be the thing for Sartre, who even today is thrown into a fever by the very idea that he might incur the praise of *Le Figaro*?

Nevertheless misfortunes do happen in life. Sartre certainly wanted to be a writer and, wanting to be a writer, he also wanted as much fame as possible, as is natural. Fame came, and it was well-deserved too, and when his fame was solidly established there came, as fitting recognition, the Nobel Prize. Sartre might have regarded it as an occupational hazard, or as a misfortune deserved through the simple fact of having wanted to be a writer in a society which he describes as " bourgeois " and in which, in any case (and here many will agree with him), since its values are false, fame is false too, and wanting success means wanting what is false even when one is exercising the apparently most free and honest profession of all, that of the writer.

If Sartre had kept the Nobel Prize, even perhaps saying to himself:

* From Nicola Chiaromonte, " Jean-Paul Sartre Premio Nobel " (1964).

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" Just the thing for me! " no one would have blamed him, partly because no one would have suspected him of having sought it. By refusing it, he has merely managed to add to the honour and repute of the prize the honour and repute of the refusal. And the more he explained this refusal, the less convincing his reasons seemed; indeed, the reasons vanished, and there remained a gesture which signified neither more nor less than that the name of Jean-Paul Sartre had no need of the addition " Nobel Prize-winner." The gesture unfortunately recalled the style of one of the men whom Sartre most detests, and justifiably so, in the world: General De Gaulle.

Sartre's reasons for refusal are far from convincing. When he says that " a writer who takes up political, social or literary positions should make use only of his own means, i.e. the written word," and that " the distinctions he may receive expose his readers to, in my opinion, undesirable pressure," since " it is not the same thing if I sign myself ' Jean-Paul Sartre ' as if I sign ' Jean-Paul Sartre, Nobel Prize-winner ' "—when he says this, Jean-Paul Sartre is just trying to be clever. It is, in fact, simply not true that the title of Nobel prize-winner exerts undue pressure on readers. At most, it may sell the books; but the intelligent reader's opinion of the books themselves does not depend in the least on that accolade. Otherwise, one would have to say that the name itself of the famous writer, and the very fact that he is famous, exerts even more undue pressure than the title of Nobel prizewinner. How many people are there, in fact, in the world who have read carefully all Sartre's works for no other reason than because he said important and problematical things by which alone they have judged him? And how many, on the other hand, are there who have bought and leafed through his books simply because he was famous and had acquired (unintentionally, let's face it) a reputation for reasons that had little or nothing to do with the significance of his writings?

And what is the meaning of that other affirmation of Sartre's, the one the papers quoted and which at first sight seemed reasonable: " the writer must refuse to let himself be transformed into an institution "?

It means nothing. No one can transform a writer into an institution, that is to say into a pompous mummy, except the writer himself. No Nobel prize has ever transformed its winner into an institution, or added or subtracted a jot to or from his real worth.

Feebler still, as was to be expected, is the political argument. According to this, " the only possible battle on the cultural front at present is the battle for the peaceful coexistence of the two cultures, that of the East and that of the West " and, since this is the battle in which Sartre feels himself involved, he cannot accept " any distinction attributed by high cultural tribunals, whether of the East or the West."

Here, as usual when Sartre goes in for politics, we enter the field of the arbitrary and the insubstantial even more than that of the false. We are in fact ineluctably obliged to call on Sartre to note that the distinction between a culture of the East and a culture of the West is a distinction

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made by him, in accordance with an ideology which is that of the Soviet state and not of any authentic Western man of culture (or, let us hope, Eastern). And when he presents himself in the guise of mediator between the two cultures, it is really difficult to know what he understands by such a mission: is it perhaps that of intermediary between the Union of Soviet Writers and the corresponding institutions in the West? And in that case, is it through institutions, congresses, encounters and public speeches that the committed writer is to work, and not by simple virtue of the written word? And whatever sort of result does he expect from such operations and ceremonies? But supposing results can be achieved, and can be fruitful, then the Nobel and Lenin prizes are not useless, nor is it useless that the writer should let himself be transformed into an institution; for such considerations and for such ends, titles have an importance, and the ideal intermediary would be a writer who presented himself with the interwoven laurels of the Nobel and the Lenin prize on his head.

Intellectuals and Communism (1964)*

A RECENT article by Indro Montanelli in the *Corriere della Sera* deplored the fact that the Milanese bourgeoisie has, since the war, allowed the Communist Party to penetrate the citadel of culture.

Here is a brief outline of the Milanese cultural physiognomy according to Montanelli's description:

> As a matter of fact, the Milanese intellectual has never been a monk who rejects society and is rejected by it, like, shall we say, Leopardi in his primitive native town of Recanati. In Milan, culture was the prerogative of the aristocracy practically up to the Risorgimento, and they still give it visible support today. . . . The Milanese intellectual has assimilated this worldly habit—worldly, in the best sense of the word: it has the odour of the salon rather than of the tavern. . . . As often happens in societies receptive to culture, which do not push it to the point of protest, this culture has developed what we might call a collaborationist vocation. It has always remained open to all ideological impulses. But it filtered them, rejecting everything that is not translatable into practical initiatives for reform. . . .

No " monks," no " rejection of society," no Leopardian desolations, no " positions of protest," no taverns; but the odour of the salon, collaborationism, openmindedness " to all ideological impulses " and rejection of " everything that is not translatable into practical initiatives for reform," or of everything that cannot in some way, and quickly, be put to practical use and profit. Is it surprising, then, that, with such characteristics, the cultivated Milanese bourgeoisie should have allowed

* *Tempo presente*, December 1964.

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itself to be penetrated by the cultural activity of the Communist Party? The Communist Party does not love monks, taverns, pessimism or sterile protests either; it appeals for ideological acquiescence and collaboration, and, as for rejecting what cannot be put to profit, that heavenly virtue finds in it a convinced supporter. It is natural that it should have secured conspicuous success in the midst of so favourably disposed a bourgeoisie. It is a question of practical common sense much more than of ideological acquiescence. It is, for example, an instance of practical common sense rather than of ideological surrender that the *Dictionary of Contemporary Literature*, published by Mondadori, includes among its collection of famous writers, side by side with Bernard Shaw and Tolstoy, Iosif, Vissarionovich Stalin (with 13½ columns, the same space as is devoted to the entry on Tolstoy) and Palmiro Togliatti (given his lesser importance, with three). And the same could be said of the other cases of " filtering." After all, the Soviet state and the Italian Communist Party are " practical initiatives " of considerable weight.

This art of cultural filtering is an old art in Italy. It may be that the communists practised it with special finesse, but they certainly did not invent it.

Let's face it: when, in modern times, has Italian culture distinguished itself with a spirit of intransigence and independence? When has it ever done anything other than isolate the protesters, the pessimists, the " resisters "? Even Benedetto Croce was regarded as a sort of " accursed philosopher " until he was suddenly elevated to the status of a national monument. . . . To say nothing of Gaetano Salvemini.

As far as the organization of culture is concerned, before the Communist Party there had been the Fascist Party. It was the Fascist Party that first practised in a big way, if not ideological appeal, then cultural infiltration: with posts in the Academy, with sinecures, alternating intimidation with coaxing by the famous Ministry of Popular Culture. How many were there then among the writers, artists, scientists and scholars who under the fascist regime deplored anything other than the idiocy of the regulations and crudeness of the methods? Most of them accepted quite readily, if not with enthusiasm, the fact that, for the first time in the history of Italy, the state was concerning itself with cultural affairs.

All this is just to show that a certain tendency to allow " infiltration " existed among Italian intellectuals well before the Communist Party arrived on the scene. And it then offered the incomparable attraction of an ideology of protest and rejection combined with the practice of compromise, corporate care and respect for the quiet life. Consequently, in the post-war years, our intellectuals constituted a body of revolutionaries. *Todos caballeros.*

The question, moreover, is not a simple one. It begins with the fact that, in modern times, Italian intellectuals have never fulfilled the civic mission that pertained to them: that is to say, they have never felt themselves responsible for what they said or did vis-à-vis society as a

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whole, but always only in relation to the dominant class, or even solely in relation to their own particular corporative body. No, not even during the Risorgimento, when, literary merits apart, minds turned towards romantic fantasies, Catholic morality or the mirages of an ideal greatness, and little towards the realities of everyday life. This is the great and significant difference between the situation of Italian intellectuals and that of Russian, Polish or Hungarian intellectuals of the same period, to say nothing of the historically privileged French and English.

Hence the isolation and rootlessness of the intellectual class in Italy which still persists. The distance it maintained from socialism, and the closeness, on the other hand, it kept with bourgeois, patriotic and nationalist conformity provide the clearest proof of this after the unification: it meant the perpetration in modern times of that separation and mutual incomprehension between the intellectual class and the real life of society which started around 1500 and continues to this day.

ALL this being so, what did communism have to offer to the intellectuals, among whom fascism had produced a crisis of bad conscience and in some cases even of revolt? Essentially, it gave them a substitute for social conscience. And this was where their mistake lay: in contenting themselves with a substitute and not seeking, however blindly, to emerge from the stagnant pool of conformity. For it was nothing but a substitute and a moral alibi, this communism that was accepted without examination, without a critical sense of its ideas or comparison with reality, simply because it existed and " represented " the revolution, the people, History, and was a strong and efficient organization.

Thus, quite apart from any judgment that may be given about political communism in itself, the communism of the intellectuals was simply an opportunity for a novel kind of conformity, a new way of setting one's conscience at rest by aligning oneself (with a signature) with the side of justice, the proletariat and progress, but without in any way changing one's own way of thinking, living and behaving towards others. A communism without obligations or sanctions, but with considerable advantages, both moral and, on occasion, material. This is the only way to explain how some intellectuals were able to be communists or fellow-travellers, or, in any case good companions of the communists, in Stalin's time because it was an iron ideology, in Khrushchev's time because there was the *sputnik* and no ideology, and continue to be so today when one no longer knows exactly what the ideology is.

But there is something else too. Exasperated and humiliated by the harassments they endured under fascism, the intellectuals in Italy were not only greedy for liberty—they were greedy for power. Italian writers and artists wanted power: not only the freedom to write and paint to the best of their ability, but social prestige and money too. There was nothing new about that, either. But it was being sought in a modern way.

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Our intelligentsia, in fact, got just what it wanted: a cultural industry, culture organized in a modern way, aimed at success, at the conquest of the good things in this world, and in the end, why not? at political power. Communism, which fits in perfectly with a cultural industry and quietly contrives to insert itself more and more into the Establishment, also, at the same time, serves to arouse dreams of political power, in other words of revenge, against a regime such as the present one which cannot be said to enjoy much intellectual prestige.

The totalitarian ambition for success is one of the things that fascism—the experience of force and the humiliation that force inflicts—has taught the intellectuals. Very few of them have learnt the opposite lesson: to scorn force and success. It was not for nothing that for 20 years there was rivalry about who could produce the best ideology of fascism, the best fascist literature, the best fascist painting. It was in the cult of force, success and keen efficiency that fascism and the history of Europe in the fascist years virtually educated a considerable minority (if indeed it was a minority . . .) of our intelligentsia. A morality was learnt (not without the help of neo-Hegelian philosophy) which is so difficult to overcome inasmuch as it is this morality that everywhere rules the world today: the morality of those whom the English picturesquely call time-servers.

The Italian intellectuals as a class have remained servers of their own time, because they have remained more uprooted than ever from the society in which they live and more rooted than ever in their own parochial mentality. The communism of some of them and the quasi-communism of others is a special case in the general situation. In effect, nothing changes in the real state of affairs.

Political Fanaticism in the Age of Doubt (1968)

"IT is not idleness, ill will or clumsiness that causes me to fail in everything," Kafka wrote in his *Diaries*, " but the lack of ground under my feet, of air, of law." And he added: " My task is to create those things for myself."

We know that, if it is a question of literature, Kafka did not fail. But we also know (or should know) that for a real writer—that is, for a man who cannot content himself with fiction—no literary success can make up for " the lack of ground under one's feet, of air, of law," because these are things that are not concerned with the daily life, the virtues, vices, fortunes and occasional misfortunes of the individual, but with the relationship between conscience and the world and, more simply, the question of whether what someone does and thinks day by day has an aim and a meaning or not.

And, as far as that question is concerned, we also know (or should know) that the " ground under one's feet," " air," " law," in the sense

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in which Kafka understood them, as basic fundamentals for living, are not things that the individual can create for himself: they depend on all of us in general and on no one in particular, on the present state of things, on what happened in the past, and, in the last analysis, on we know not what—certainly not on what it is customary to call History, claiming to know what it is, what its laws are, what point it has reached and where it is leading. Thus Kafka was ingenuous, and was yielding to a reverential fear of a non-existent and impossible duty (in which, incidentally, all his works tell us he never succeeded in believing), when he gave himself the task of " creating " for himself and by himself alone those moral realities. All he could do was to suffer the lack of them; and, naturally, in his suffering was the implicit, indeed the incarnate, aspiration towards a different condition, a condition of firmness and peace, of at last being allowed to pass beyond the threshold of that door about which he speaks in one of his finest parables, before which a stranger languished into old age, believing it to be forbidden to enter, only to learn finally from the impassive guardian that the way had always been open and indeed reserved precisely for him.

A FEW years after Kafka's death and the publication of *The Castle* in 1929, a philosopher compatriot of his, Edmund Husserl, like him Jewish by origin, began one of his most important works, *Formal Logic and Transcendental Logic*, with the following considerations:

> The present situation of the sciences in Europe compels us to become radically aware of certain facts. The sciences have, at bottom, lost their great faith in themselves and in their absolute meaning. The modern man of today does not see, as did the " modern " man in the age of the Enlightenment, in science, and in the newly formed cultivation of science, the objectivism of reason or the universal function which mankind has sought in order to make possible a life in which he can be fully satisfied, a life, that is to say, whether individual or social, which is dictated by practical reason.
>
> This great belief—which took the place of religious beliefs—that science leads to wisdom, to self-knowledge, to a truly rational knowledge of the world and of God, and hence to a life founded on happiness, satisfaction and well-being, a life which, though still to be moulded in an ever more perfect fashion, is genuinely worth living, has lost its force among large circles of people. Thus one is living in a world that has become incomprehensible, a world in which the question is asked in vain: " What for? ", a world where one seeks in vain for the meaning that once seemed beyond doubt, since it was recognized by both the intellect and the will.

We won't argue about this. We will confine ourselves to noting that these two observations, formulated from two very different points of view (subjective with Kafka, purely objective with Husserl), are among the clearest and most tranquil to have been expressed on the subject of the " crisis of European conscience " which has been discussed for the past 50 years, if not more, and is still discussed, for the good reason that,

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rather than being resolved, the crisis has merely grown deeper and wider. We also note that, as far as Husserl is concerned, the whole of his philosophical research, from 1900 to 1938, is a supreme and scrupulous attempt to reconfirm the value of truth in a culture undermined by relativism on two main points: first, the idea that truth can be a concern of psychology; and secondly, that it can be found in the field of history and historical action, or can be *filia temporis* and vary as circumstances vary.

Lastly, let us note that, in both Kafka's observations and Husserl's considerations, it is not a question of politics but of something that comes before politics, in fact, quite simply, something that concerns not doing but thinking: the question of truth and the meaning of life.

Now, if we consider what has happened in the field of culture and everyday life from the 1920s to today, but more especially since the Second World War, we see that, while this question visibly becomes corroded by doubt and by negation involving both the deeds and the behaviour of the individual, it at the same time takes on a form that is even more abnormal than paradoxical, which could be defined as " relativist fanaticism " or " fanatical unbelief." Doubt, in fact, takes on the form of violent assertion. Doubt concerns the meaning of existence; fanaticism and violence (intellectual rather than physical) are concerned with political action. There are no longer absolutes of any kind, but politics is now an incontestable absolute.

AN outstanding example of such a position—indeed, to put it bluntly, of such mental dissociation—is Jean-Paul Sartre, one of the most eminent *maîtres à penser* of our time. First in his philosophical work and then in his autobiography, he insists on an ethics of integral atheism which is also an ethics of *glissement*, of sliding freely from project to project, from action to action, regardless of any sort of continuity (because that would mean in a way restoring a transcendent and judging God). But, on the other hand, in his ideological and political pronouncements he shows himself to be fanatical in the extreme and intolerant of any criticism, as if he alone constituted a sort of ultra-totalitarian party based on the proposition that " Marxism is the insuperable philosophy of our time."

A strange proposition, and one that destroys itself, like one of those curious mechanical structures invented by the sculptor Tinguely. For to make of Marxism—which, however you judge it, is a school of thought—a compact and immobile object, a wall, a threshold beyond which (as in Kafka's parable) it is forbidden to pass, is not only to make it the opposite of a philosophy—a dogma—but to deprive it of any value of its own. It is not, in fact, Marx that is transformed in that proposition into an idol, but politics: political action, converted into a categorical imperative. Thus it is no longer a question of philosophy or politics, but of morality: one is not a moral being if one does not in practice follow a

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political line that can be called " Marxist," that is to say, anti-bourgeois, anti-capitalist, anti-imperialist and so on.

The consequence is absurd, but the fanaticism remains; and it is, as has been said, a relativist fanaticism, believed in so long as it is a case of " contesting " the real or supposed adversary, but in itself without basis and also, if that is to be considered, without efficacy. For it is not a question of political thought but of an extreme form of morality which in turn is translated (but we are not saying that Sartre himself goes as far as this: he merely represents an example of a widely diffused mentality) into a sort of totalitarian protest, according to which, unless the absolute is realized there is nothing to be done.

Now, it seems obvious that a political action thus inspired is by its nature incapable of achieving the reform of society: it cannot even subvert, since, despite appearances, it has nothing in common with the revolutionary tradition to which it harks back; it may instead in the long run provoke that organic and almost animal reaction which leads to the establishment of compulsory disciplines. It is from reasonable doubt, not from dogma, that liberating innovations are born.

La Stampa

28 December 1968

Kultura: The Poles in Paris (1971)

IN March 1968, after the students' revolt in Warsaw University, Gomulka made a speech in which he accused the *Kultura* group of having fomented these anti-socialist disruptions. That speech, it will be recalled, was followed by brutal repression directed against Polish universities and intellectuals, a repression that affected mainly the " Zionists," in other words professors, students and intellectuals of Jewish origin. More than 20,000 people, deprived of the possibility of studying and working, were forced into exile.

Were they all victims of the machinations of *Kultura*? And what was *Kultura*? A political party? A terrorist group? A Zionist centre? Nothing of the sort: *Kultura* is a monthly review published in Maisons-Lafitte, a suburb of Paris.

A two-volume anthology of the articles so far published in the review, recently brought out in English under the editorship of Leopold Tyrmand,[1] gives an excellent idea of the nature and quality of the periodical. The two volumes are indispensable to anyone wishing to inform themselves not only of the social and intellectual life of Poland, but also of the relationship between the Polish situation and that of the other satellite countries of the USSR.

[1] Leopold Tyrmand (ed.), Kultura, *Essays and Explorations in Freedom* (The Free Press-Macmillan Company, New York, 1970).

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But what, then, is *Kultura*? There are just four people who work there, both on the review, and in the publishing house by the name of 'Institut Littéraire. This intellectual enterprise constitutes the heart and soul of the last Polish " diaspora," the dispersal that followed the abandonment of Poland to Stalin at Yalta in February 1945. At that time there were among the Poles who fought in General Anders' army some intellectuals who realized the fate that would befall their country, and decided to remain in exile. One of them, Jerzy Giedroyc, began publishing a review in Rome in 1947. It had the aim of keeping alive, around however small a centre, the freedom of Polish intellectual life and at the same time of carrying on a precise analysis of events and developments there. But it was Giedroyc's intention to deal not only with Poland but with the whole of Eastern Europe and in particular with Soviet Russia.

After the first few issues, *Kultura* transferred to Maisons-Lafitte, to a house which was acquired with money earned from subscriptions. Since then it has come out regularly every month. The first numbers were printed with the help of loans which were later paid back in full. Today *Kultura* is maintained entirely by subscriptions and sales. 6,000 copies are printed, of which 4,500 go to subscribers among Polish exiles throughout the world. The work of editing, distribution and administration is carried out entirely by persons who constitute the permanent nucleus of the review.

In addition to them, one of the most devoted and active collaborators is the writer Gustav Herling, who has lived in Italy for many years and is the author of many books, among which the best known is *A World Apart*[2] which remains, in human and literary terms, one of the finest books to be written about the forced labour camps in Siberia. Arrested and deported to Russia after the partition of Poland by Hitler and Stalin in 1940, Herling spent two years in labour camps in the far North. He was freed following the Sikorski-Maisky agreement which gave Polish prisoners in the USSR the chance of forming an army of their own, and he then participated in the Italian campaign in General Anders' corps. At Cassino, which was captured by Anders' soldiers, Herling was awarded the highest Polish military decoration.

AROUND the nucleus of people brought together by Giedroyc, who directs the work of *Kultura* while himself remaining almost anonymous in the background, the best known names of Polish literature and political thought are to be found: among many others there are Witold Gombrowicz, Juliusz Mieroszewski, Czeslaw Milosz, Slawomir Mrozek, Aleksander Wat and Josef Wittlin. But no less important, indeed essential, are the relationships which *Kultura* has succeeded in establishing with Soviet opposition writers. It was in *Kultura* that writings by Andrei Sinyavsky and Yuli Daniel first appeared in the West.

[2] Gustav Herling, *A World Apart*, trans. J. Marek (Heinemann, London, 1951).

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The Institut Littéraire, moreover, besides publishing Polish authors, also brings out in translation the main writers banned in the USSR, from Pasternak to Solzhenitsyn and Amalrik. It has also printed in the original an anthology of all the Ukrainian writers liquidated by Stalin. Such initiatives conform to the fundamental principle of *Kultura*'s policy, namely, the rejection of Polish nationalism which is *anti-Russian* by tradition. As Juliusz Mieroszewski argues in one of the most interesting essays in Tyrmand's anthology, the future of a free Poland presupposes a close alliance with the Russian democratic forces, in order to begin, and continue in the future, a strategy on the part of the Polish leaders to persuade the Russians of the need for an independent Poland, a mediator between East and West.

Gomulka's attack on *Kultura* in 1968 was in itself an indication of the influence its work was having. The publishers send personal copies to all the main Party and government leaders in Poland; and, in addition, the review is compulsory reading for the upper echelons of the communist hierarchy throughout Eastern Europe.

The fact that in the years since 1947, dominated by the superpowers, by high-technology, mass-communications, and characterized by scorn for the groups of few and unarmed individuals, a small group of intellectuals should have been able to achieve such considerable results, is in itself reason to take comfort. But it must also be added that this would not have been possible if this small group had not adopted a way of life which can only be described as monastic. At the Institut Littéraire in Maisons-Lafitte a community way of life is the unwritten rule: they all take it in turns to do what has to be done, from domestic chores to editorial work; and they all take the necessary amount to meet their needs in equal measure. To complete the picture of a modern monastery, there is, annexed to the main building and situated in a beautiful garden, a hostel where guests, Polish or otherwise, who wish to contribute in one way or another to the group's activities, can stay.

Kultura represents one of the most notable cultural and political enterprises of the present day; and it is, too, one of the finest pages in the history of the Polish diaspora which, beginning with Tadeusz Kosciuszko in 1776, still continues, unchanged to this day.

La Stampa
21 January 1971

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Chiaromonte on Silone

Silone the Rustic

IF the formula " socialist realism " had any meaning, Silone would be the only contemporary writer to whom it could truly be applied. That Silone is a " realist " is shown by his exclusive attachment to that quintessence of peasant life: the community of the " *cafoni*," which, though the place name may change, still remains always the Fontamara of his first book; by the simplicity of his way of telling a story, kindly and sardonic, in peasant fashion and, in peasant fashion, seeking its effect in allusions and sudden silences rather than in subtleties; and by the rejection of any complexity that cannot be retranslated into simple words, with the result that Silone always prefers the crude to the unusual and would rather appear a sentimental than an " intelligent " person.

As to Silone's " socialism," it lies wholly in the memory of the real warp and weft of peasant life and the fact that the need for justice is an integral and daily part of that life, just as an integral and daily part of it is the hope that the reign of *force majeure* will one day end. Silone is bound up with this need and this hope, and by comparison nothing else matters to him: not parties, nor ideologies, nor governments, and least of all the " changes," as he calls them, which he measures according to what they change in Fontamara, which amounts to nothing.

But all this is a bit too simple. It leaves out the fact that Silone's realism is radically ironical and his socialism firmly religious, if by religion one means the search and love for what is lasting, above and beyond appearances and " changes." Therefore, strictly speaking, it is not a question of realism or socialism, but of moral truth and hope. Silone does not admire the world of the *cafoni*, rather he finds it pitiful and grotesque. He knows perfectly well that the people of Fontamara are left behind and on the point of being forgotten, if not actually dispersed, by the course of events. Nevertheless, they remain his fixed point, his touchstone, exemplary not because they are endowed with virtues superior to those of town-dwellers, but because by their mere presence, by the fact of continuing to be poor, ignorant, derelict and always the same in themselves, they call into doubt all the rest: history, civilization, governments, churches, ideological constructions. The truth of the *cafoni* is rustic and inarticulate. But it lasts, being forged from necessity, while the rest changes, being made up of ambiguity and arbitrariness. It is a truth that has no validity outside those solitudes, but is irreducible to what is foreign to them. A monotonous truth, obstinate, closed in on itself, which cannot express itself other than with irony. And it is that irony that Silone explains and illustrates in the form of novels.

TO see Silone as a regional writer would be a really laughable misunderstanding. It was not to describe his native Abruzzo that he took

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to writing, but to give account to himself and to others of what remained of the socialist faith, once facts had destroyed the hope of its constitutional realization. Silone was never, to be precise, an anti-fascist writer, but was from the beginning, and is to this day, a socialist writer, or to phrase it better, a writer about socialism. He was a refugee not only from Mussolini's Italy, but also, and above all, from the Communist Party and Stalin's Russia—from the International, in the full sense of the word. This made him, right from the beginning, an eminently cosmopolitan or, more precisely, European writer. And, among all the refugees from communism, Silone is the only one who has remained firm on the initial question, which was the transformation of the world according to the law of justice and, more concretely, the redemption of the poor. As much could not be said of Arthur Koestler, for whom the question of communism was from the beginning purely ideological—a debate of the modern intellectual with himself, and so on; or of George Orwell, who ended up in the Swiftian misanthropy of *Animal Farm* and the global nausea of *1984*.

Certainly, in Silone's case, it can be said that it was the memory of the peasants of Abruzzo that held him back from the abyss of abstract arguments and sectarian struggles and, in the end, from the typical desperations of the present-day intellectual. Essentially, it was the comparison between the mechanisms of the Muscovite bureaucracy and the reality of everyday life that caused him to cast off the communist uniform. But there is more to it than that: there is the fact that, once the conflict had broken out, Silone never for a moment indulged in the abstractions of ideological politics, never for a moment made appeal from the badly informed party to the informed party. His choice was not between Church and heresy, but between Church and " the substance of things hoped for "; to believe and remain in the Church was by now impossible, given that the place of faith was now taken by orthodoxy, and socialist faith appeared to Silone at once simple and radical. It was not a conflict between opposing political reasons, but between ideology and everyday reality, between hierarchies and society, between the functionaries of a distant power and the *cafoni*. If the ideology was true, the reality was false; if the hierarchies were infallible, the society of the oppressed was in error; if the instructions of the functionaries expressed a superior truth, then the very existence of the *cafoni* was a perverse " deviation." The contrast, in the end, was so simple and absolute that it became comical. From it emerged Silone's irony: " So was the life of Fontamara *less* true than the Historical Process?" If the answer had to be " yes," then one was back in the same old territory, since princes and popes, ministers and leaders, tax-collectors and representatives of order had always maintained the same principle, namely that the *cafoni* were by nature in error: the great Communist Party was going to join those venerable institutions, showing once again how right the peasant people were to have little belief in " changes." But if the answer was " no," then, in spite of everything, it was still permissible to hope and believe. It

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was not a question of exalting those " primitive people " but of showing how deficient modern faiths and superstitions were, how comically abstract was the order they put forward if they failed not only to revitalize but even to touch that derelict community, that corroded, disfigured life petrified by time. The *cafoni* might be grotesque, but how much more grotesque was an " historical " world in which the life of the *cafoni*, their customs and rites consumed by use and habit and never revivified, remained an example of moral truth.

To have been able to remind the world of today, in the context of today's struggles, of the existence of this immemorial reality which, while it casts doubt on the pride of the modern world, nevertheless indicates reasons for not despairing—herein lies the great merit of Silone the writer. And it is not purely the merit of an artist.

SILONE'S books are something more than novels: they are parables and moral fables. The themes and the style are those of an educated peasant who tells his stories in such a way as to be understood by peasants, and so he not only has to explain his meaning with familiar and simple examples, but also, if he wants to move people's feelings, he must move them in ways to which his audience is accustomed, and not according to the rules of urban literature. There is, in short, something of the peasant priest in Silone, but a priest without hierarchical impedimenta and with no theology whatever, free, untrammelled, and rustic both by birth and by deliberate choice.

In *Fontamara*, to explain what fascism was, i.e. the relationship between the state and the *cafoni*, Silone made use of the example of the blocked-off stream.* In *Pane e vino*, the question was one of the relationship between the Party, with its dogmas and its " passwords," and peasant life, and Silone explained this relationship with the journey of Pietro Spina, the militant Party man, through his villages, and his meetings with the local " dead souls " plus the occasional living person; and dogmas and " passwords " vanished without trace other than loyalty to those men and that countryside. In *Seme sotto la neve* (The Seed Beneath the Snow), Silone had sought to rediscover a symbol expressive of his hope, and he had sarcastically thought to find it in the guise of the dumb *cafone* and his ass; but in reality he had no need to look for a symbol because he had always had one and it was the peasant community. In *Una manciata di more* (A Handful of Blackberries), in fact, the theme is simply the permanence, through all the changes, of that tenacious society, and the congruency of its customs in comparison with the incongruity of every bureaucratic order, whether established or still to be established. The sober clarity achieved by Silone in the development of his essential themes makes this the strongest and most complete of his books.

In this last book, Silone's example is as simple as the one he chose in

* This refers to the ploy used by the landlords who, in case of a dispute or out of spite, would block off the water-supply to the peasants' land.

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Fontamara. Here the subject is the forest which from time immemorial, over a century ago, belonged to the commune, and subsequently the Tarocchi family gained possession of it by fraud. Nothing ever happened to the forest, and so it always remained in the Tarocchis' hands. Thus the " changes " changed nothing. Nor was the " change " that followed the fall of fascism any different in this respect from the others. So the *cafoni* did not think they should honour the event by bringing out the trumpet to the sound of which, prior to fascism, they had been accustomed to meet, consult and act together and which, under fascism, they had jealously kept hidden. Now the communists wanted to have this symbolic trumpet, declaring themselves to be the legitimate heirs to it. But how could they possibly be regarded as legitimate heirs to the trumpet if they, the communists, for reasons of their own and not at all to do with the *cafoni*, thought they should come to an agreement with the Tarocchi family? Consequently, after reappearing briefly during an ephemeral and anarchistic occupation of the land, the trumpet went back into hiding again. " And how soon can it reappear? " the ex-communist Stella asked Lazzaro, head of the resisting *cafoni*. " How should I know? " said Lazzaro. " It doesn't depend on me. Perhaps in a year, or twenty years, or five hundred. But it isn't used to trusting in things that last." " Have you never thought," said Lazzaro, " that something guides the path of ants under the ground, and the flight of birds from one continent to another? " " Are you really sure there is something? " asks Stella. " I'm not at all sure myself." " It seems to me," says Lazzaro, " that it isn't all that important to know for certain. Even someone who doesn't know goes where he has to go just the same. . . ."

This is the conclusion, indeed the moral, of *Una manciata di more*; the moral of Silone's return to Fontamara. It is easy to say that it is a well-known moral. Silone is not speaking to the " know-alls," but as a peasant to other peasants. To him it is much more important to rediscover the meaning of the ancient " commonplaces " than to discover novelties. His search is for what lasts, whatever it may be. As for what changes, Silone would concede very few changes in the world since the advent of Jesus Christ, except for the fading of that " good news " and the waiting for the next. Anyone who wants to know what Silone thinks of " historical " changes can read his description of the fall of fascism seen through the eyes of his peasants.

Il Mondo

23 August 1952

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Silone on Chiaromonte

Chiaromonte Remembered

I MET Nicola Chiaromonte for the first time in 1934 in Switzerland, where I had already been living for some years. He came from Paris. I had been struck by some unsigned notes and articles in *Giustizia e Libertà*, which I had been told were by him. I had learnt some more personal details about him from Annie Pohl, his first wife, who was seriously ill and had come to Italy under the illusion that she would find there a climate more suited to her health.

I still remember the strong impression Chiaromonte left on me after that first meeting. In exchanging news about the situation in Rome, we could not but realize the isolation and demoralization in which the remaining forces of anti-fascism were living, both among the intellectuals and the working classes.

Chiaromonte constituted for me the discovery of a new and unexpected phenomenon of self-liberation. He seemed immune to the dominant rhetoric, without the help of a family or group political tradition. He had arrived at clear ideas about society through reading the classics, especially the Greeks, and a few modern authors. He knew Proudhon, and also some little-known works of Marx (such as the *Deutsche Ideologie*) which had been published in Germany at that time, and he had begun to study Husserl. But he found the Roman scene unbearable because hostility to the regime among his friends had become reduced to mere words.

We became friends, but our relationship had to be continued through letters. I was not allowed to live in France since I had been expelled from that country, and I had resigned myself to living isolated in Switzerland. Chiaromonte, on the other hand, had found more favourable surroundings in Paris which seemed to satisfy him. But soon he and his great friend Andrea Caffi began to feel impatient towards certain exigencies of the political movement *Giustizia e Libertà* which it found difficult to shed. 15 years later these arguments were to be taken up again by Chiaromonte in a letter to Mario Pannunzio to express the limitations of his adherence to the political campaign of *Il Mondo* and the radical group.

Chiaromonte took part in the Spanish civil war with no hesitations or regrets, together with many other volunteers from other countries; but among the numerous intellectuals of every kind who took part in that episode, he was perhaps the only one, or one of the few, who did not make publicity out of it. We know what the Spanish war meant to Orwell, Koestler, Hemingway and Malraux. (We also know Simone Weil's grievous judgment of the republican terror, but that was expressed in a private letter to Georges Bernanos which was made known only after their deaths.) Chiaromonte expressed himself about particular

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political aspects of the war only once or twice (for instance about the timing of the communist intervention) and no more. In this attitude there is probably a reflexion of his vision of man in the irrationality of history, as shown in his essays on *War and Peace*, on Roger Martin du Gard, Stendhal and Pasternak.

Chiaromonte expressed himself more freely and readily in the review *Tempo presente* during the dozen years, 1956–68, when we edited it together. He remained faithful to the precept chosen as its programme from the beginning: " To promote the re-examination of current ways of thinking, comparing them with the actual state of affairs in the world today." The review had an influence outside the purely intellectual sphere as well. Its denunciations of the persecutions of religious minorities in Italy, and its fight against censorship of plays had good results. Its defence of writers and artists persecuted in Russia, Poland, Hungary, and Spain helped to free the cause of cultural liberty from the sectarian monopoly of the political parties. The same can be said of its firm denunciation of any indulgence, even by friends, towards Gaullism and McCarthyism. It was in keeping with its dignity that the review ceased to exist when its survival came to be conditional on the sacrifice of its own independence.

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Greece: The Triumph of Socialism?*

P. J. Vatikiotis

ANY part-time student of Greece today is at a comparative advantage in contrast to his predecessor of, say, 20 or even 10 years ago. Work on the economy, politics and society of modern Greece seemed to acquire momentum and vitality in the 1960s and '70s. It is not only the work of English-speaking historians, economists, anthropologists, and sociologists on modern and contemporary Greece which comes to mind (in the British contingent alone John Campbell, Richard Clogg, Douglas Dakin, Philip Sherrard, and C. M. Woodhouse are prominent). Significant too is the new generation of Greek economic and political historians, economists and sociologists, among them Nicos Mouzelis, John Kolliopoulos, Thanos Veremis, Constandinos Tsoucalas, George Yannoulopolous, Costas Vergopoulos, Costis Moskoff, and Nikeforos Diamandouros. An equally large contingent of Greek-Americans, led by John Petropoulos and including Van Coufoukadis, Theodore Couloumbis, John Iatrides, and others have been looking at the domestic and external aspects of the Greek economy and society since independence, linking their studies to new research on the Turkish occupation of the country for some four centuries, a period that had long remained obscure. All these scholars, some Anglo-American trained, others educated in France and Germany, have enlightened us on the *nature and structure of the Greek economy, society and culture*, and formulated propositions about their peculiarities, using methodological approaches and theoretical frameworks, ranging from those of traditional cultural anthropology to economic history, structural-functional analysis, Marxist and neo-Marxist theory. Whatever their particular analyses, findings and proposed hypotheses, certain generalizations about Greece, even today, emerge as reasonable and even valid.

The first is that Greece has been a tenaciously conservative society, its culture laden with religious overtones and affording the Greek Orthodox Church a peculiarly unassailable prominence in its integral identification with the nation. Deviation or dissent from this cultural norm or ideal was always considered and pronounced an evil—a sin against the nation—and the transgressor labelled an anti-Hellene.[1] The second is that the political experience of the first 150 years of independence had yet

* This essay is an updated and expanded version of the Montague Burton Chair in International Relations Lecture, delivered at the University of Edinburgh on 2 November 1981 under the title "Present-day Greece."

[1]The highly commendable introduction of legislation by the Papandreou government recognizing civil marriage has elicited the Church's frenetic—in fact, irrational—wrath. Until this year marriages outside the Church were not recognized in Greece, leading to ludicrous complications regarding the issue of these marriages, inheritance, and related matters.

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to overthrow the peculiarly pre-modern (and very much part of the Ottoman-Near Eastern tradition) pre-eminence and predomination of the family-kinship group as the primary object of loyalty and the key institution in the relations between Greeks, as well as between them and their state and government. The third is the persistent social atomism, volatility, and adventurism of the Greek in all his endeavours and particularly in economic pursuits. As a result, a sense of the public, or common, interest of public endeavour that requires mutual trust and cooperation has been difficult to realize.

Widespread poverty, at least until the mid-1950s, and the resulting insecurity compounded by political instability, allowed the perpetuation of a confusion between private and public interest, while at the same time sustaining the division between the official world or domain—that of state and government—and that of the sub-culture of a popular, informal social order, based on a vast network of kinship and other personal relations. The link between the two worlds was a vast patronage system. This, however, we are told, is a world that is about to be discarded because of the entry of the masses into politics, and the phenomenal demographic, economic, and social changes that have occurred in the last 30 years. No one can doubt that the triumph of Mr Papandreou's Pan-Hellenic Socialist Movement, PASOK, in the national elections on 18 October 1981 was achieved on the basis of the slogan of " Change." Today, Greece, a country populated by the most private-property-minded people in the world, most of whom dream of being *lumpencapitalists*, has a socialist government.

One could choose to be uncomplimentary by accepting without argument a Greek professor's formulation of yet a fourth generalization about Greece and the Greeks. In an article published in March 1981 in the magazine *Politika Themata,* he inveighed against Greek frivolity and superficiality. The Greek, he argued, succumbs to demagogy because, as a family-centred individualist, he is concerned only with his own interests—and that of his kin. Thus the promise of change, any change, attracts him, since he believes he can gain something by and from it at the expense of another who will lose. And this pleases him, according to the professor, because the modern Greek, he firmly believes, is possessed and motivated primarily by envy, disguised as a desire for equality—i.e. a levelling downwards. Thus the Greek argues, " Since I cannot rise, you must not either; if you do, then I must bring you down by any means." He will therefore follow anyone who promises him equality, because he is politically immature. His highly developed subjectivity and prejudice prevent him from facing events, situations, public issues and personalities calmly and rationally, or judging them on the basis of objective criteria. It was difficult, for instance, to conduct a rational dialogue or discussion with many Greeks over entry into the EEC. There was no consideration of *concrete* problems: e.g. how entry could affect Greek agriculture, Greek business and industry and Greek education, not to mention Greek society as a whole. Once convinced it was all a foreign

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conspiracy, they were not inclined to discuss it further. The same behaviour could be observed over the Cyprus episode in summer 1974.

The professor further depicts the average Greek as over-credulous, despite his intense mistrust of the government and outsiders. Thus he is quickly charmed by rhetoric (what they call phraseology), and easily believes in sweeping promises. This weakness, if it is just a weakness, is nurtured by the Greek's social and cultural upbringing, and reinforced by a highly formal, superficial and contrived educational system, which neither trains nor taxes his mind; instead it chases words—a kind of shallow brain-washing by sterile rhetoric. Critical judgment is therefore at a premium.

A harsh indictment indeed, but one, which even if inaccurate, gives us the opportunity to focus on the question whether, say, in the last decade, the Greeks have matured politically or not. If they have this could be a reflection of a more general maturity.

INSTEAD of going over ground that has been more competently covered by many of the scholars I have referred to, I shall consider some at present very pertinent questions: has a fundamental change at last occurred in Greek political life and, more importantly, in Greek perceptions of it? Have the cumulative demographic, economic and social changes of the last 30 years finally laid to rest the political and psychological ghosts of the pre-war National Schism, of the polarization of the Greek polity caused by the dreadful civil war? And how, if at all, has such change affected the external preoccupations of the Greeks with the position of their country in relation to the East-West conflict, i.e. the NATO alliance and the EEC; and how far will the fact that, for the first time in their history, the Greeks are to be governed by a socialist government for at least the next three years, affect these perceptions and preoccupations?

The demographic change in the country alone is impressive. During the long period of political stability provided by strong conservative governments from 1952 to 1963, the urban population grew, mainly as a result of rapid internal migration, from 33 per cent to 43 per cent, and Athens came to dominate and control the economic, political and social life of the country. Thus, whereas in 1971 only one-fourth of the total population of the country lived in the capital conurbation Athens-Piraeus, in 1979 over a third of the total was there; and by the year 2000 just under half of it will be living there.

It is clear that Greece experienced massive and, especially after 1952, rapid urbanization, but without a proportionately adequate industrialization. That is, the population explosion of the urban centres was not accompanied by the creation of the appropriate productive infrastructure to absorb the new human resources. The whole development was out of balance, since it caused a division between a relatively modernized urban centre (a result particularly of unparalleled

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economic growth in the 1960s) and, for the Greeks at least, unbelievable material prosperity, on the one hand, and another more traditionally organized, under-developed agrarian periphery on the other. The ensuing social dichotomy was accompanied by a permanent population movement from country to town, generating immense pressure on a still inadequate productive economic process.

Acting upon traditional political instinct and following accepted practice, the response of the governing elite was to use its vertically organized patronage network throughout the country in the hope of absorbing much of the new urban population in the rapidly expanding public services, or offering them an alternative outlet in small business opportunities, again through extensive patronage. As a consequence, there emerged a huge group of new bureaucrats, small shopkeepers, under employed itinerant businessmen, fixers, and parasitical middlemen. At the same time, the government was forced to embark upon vast public works and a rapid expansion of public investment, all leading to massive state intervention and paternalistic control of the economy. The state machine grew faster than the underlying socio-economic structures which were needed to satisfy the demands of these new groups. Naturally they all became dependent upon the state; their wages, salaries and pensions bill came to represent nearly 45 per cent of the state budget.

These new groups, however, were not in control of wealth-producing resources, so that their newly acquired consumption habits were beyond the ability of the economy to satisfy. As economic conditions did not permit the absorption of underemployed resources in services and small-scale commerce alone, dependence on foreign financing and a resort to internal financial burdens eventually provoked a reaction from the organized sectors of the population, especially in urban centres. Concurrently, there was a growth in the urban middle class as a result of further industrialization in the mid-1960s and the expansion of education which, regardless of its quality, produced a growing sector of the population with higher expectations, but in fact faced with alarming daily frustrations and disappointments. An overburdened traditional patronage system was no longer able to meet the demands not only of the growing urban groups, but soon also of the neglected rural population. A general feeling by the latter, of being abandoned, was paralleled by the former's annoyance with a creaking, inefficient bureaucracy at the centre.

Unemployment was taken care of by massive emigration to the US, Canada, and Australia in the 1950s and '60s, which neatly dealt with a surplus peasant population in a still not too productive agriculture. It also alleviated the glaring problem of income inequalities. By 1960, 100,000 Greeks emigrated annually, so that the Greek economy gained an added advantage in the remittances from overseas Greeks ($170,000,000 in 1963). Later the emigration of some 800,000 Greeks, mainly as *Gastarbeiter* to Germany, continued to alleviate the

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unemployment problem. More recently, Greek labour (20,000–30,000) goes on contract (i.e. for limited or specified periods) to the oil-rich Arab states (Libya, the Arabian Peninsula and the Gulf, Iraq). In short, a convergence of circumstances allowed the rapid economic growth and prosperity of Greece in the 1950s and '60s. During that time, however, both conversative governments until 1963, and the short-lived centre regime of 1963–65, were not averse to using the available state repressive machine for the exercise of power. Then the economic chaos, created by the hapless, collapsing military junta in 1974, brought to the surface the glaring structural economic problems which any Greek regime must face. The 1971–74 oil crisis finally introduced spiralling inflation into the country.

The collision between a still traditional, politically conservative state structure, struggling with the all too common problems of rapid urbanization and a 7 per cent annual rate of economic growth on one side, and confronting the visibly clamouring new groups on the other, can explain in part the fundamental changes which were taking place in the alignment of political forces in the country from the mid-'60s onwards. Although this process was interrupted for seven and a half years by a military dictatorship, it resumed its momentum after 1974, and culminated in the election results of October 1981. In fact, as early as 1974, it had already influenced the reconstitution of the political Right in Greece by making it less traditional and more liberal. It caused the splitting of the Left, almost decimated the Centre of the 1960s, and generally rendered irrelevant the extreme right end of the political spectrum. More widely, it freed many Greeks of several political hang-ups, especially the one of the spectre of communism, which could not serve forever as a slogan and substitute ideology for the old Right. But the old vicious circle has been broken by, significantly, a movement, not a party, PASOK, which, though purporting to be socialist, exhibits populist and latent autocratic tendencies under the ultra-nationalist leadership.

The upheavals which could ensue from the entry of the new urban groups and the masses into politics, loudly apparent since 1963, plagued as the country has been since then by the Cyprus and the Aegean questions, were not foreseen at the time. As already noted, massive emigration mitigated the problem of unemployment. Then, thanks to the old agrarian reform measures (i.e. land redistribution) of the inter-war period, there was no rural proletariat, no land-hungry peasants, to be mobilized as a class against a class of powerful landlords—the classic Marxist scenario. Nor was there a huge slum-dwelling *lumpenproletariat* in the towns. The classic revolutionary conditions were thus absent. It is my contention that it is the new middle class, if one can call it that, which after 1974 imposed changes upon the Left-Centre and Right political formations in Greece, because it was more directly affected by the new economic difficulties of inflation (over 25 per cent in 1981), balance of payments deficits, giganticism of the public sector, low productivity, the

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growth of a black economy, chaotic and inadequate educational facilities, and pollution—all typical concerns of the new rising urban class. The weakness of local government at a time when the central administration could not meet problems efficiently and effectively, and the paralyzing degree of centralization and formalistic legalism forced many of these Greeks to behave illegally in order to survive economically. In other words, the expansion of the bureaucracy was no real answer to the solution of structural problems. While originally the tenure of public servants was designed to ensure their political independence, and therefore their productivity, the opposite had occurred: public service became the refuge of the weak and the lazy, and today over 185,000 of them absorb nearly 45 per cent of the state budget.

EDUCATION, as noted earlier, is highly formal and superficial. Higher education is even worse: it is anachronistic, produces poor results and lags far behind other systems abroad. It is significantly out of date in relation to the present stage of development of Greek society. It is hopelessly overcrowded, allowing *ex-cathedra* teaching to survive. It has hardly any library facilities, and conducts literally no research. Much of the syllabus is never revised; it remains outdated and useless. It promotes learning by rote at the expense of critical judgment. No part of it, except medicine and engineering, is remotely career-oriented. Law schools produce far too many lawyers, so that the vast majority of them litter the bureaucracy. There is no post-graduate training. Above all, it allows hapless students to remain disoriented for from four to 15 years, sitting exams repeatedly. It is no wonder that by 1974 the politicization of students was accompanied by extreme partisanship; they were only marginally concerned with genuine university matters.

The recent law (June 1981) governing the reorganization of universities and all other institutions of higher learning will introduce subject/discipline departments. Unfortunately, its provisions have the effect of bureaucratizing university teaching staff. In addition, it allows the government greater and more direct control over professorial appointments and promotions. And this is ominous for the independence of higher education.

It should also be noted that, as an ostensibly ideological-political movement, PASOK has its " ideological commissars " (dubbed by the Greek " Green Guards," since green is the colour PASOK) who have ensconced themselves in universities, government departments and a variety of other educational and public institutions. Their task seems to be one of imposing ideological conformity. In short, the purging of personnel in all areas of public service appears to be central to the regime's policy. And this is not the best way of eschewing, or overcoming, once and for all the vast patronage system (of course, there is some patronage in all political systems throughout the world) which has plagued Greek public life for so long. Nor is it the best way of reducing the monstrous size of the bureaucracy.

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THE seven-year military dictatorship had, however, a salutory psychological impact on the whole nation and especially on its political leaders, Left and Right. It liberalized the new conservative constellation under the leadership of the returning " saviour of democracy " Karamanlis, allowing it to shed the bogey of the communist menace, so that the New Democracy Party represented a new Right with a closer affinity to the old democratic Centre, whereas the new PASOK represented the realignment not only of the new social forces after the fall of the old Right in 1963, but also of several new Left-of-Centre and extreme Left elements. This development reflected the realization that the paradoxical situation of the 1960s, when high rates of economic growth led to the uneasy coexistence of a technologically advanced industrial sector on the one hand, and a multitude of small, low-producing units, a backward agriculture, and a huge stratum of parasitic middlemen on the other, was unacceptable. The further paradox was that by the late 1970s, under a government of the Right, the state was well on its way to controlling most of the heavy industrial complex in the country and its financing: 95 per cent of energy, 100 per cent of fertilizers, and 95 per cent of credit.

The combination of the traumatic experience of an incompetent, archaic, reactionary military dictatorship at home and the humiliation in Cyprus abroad acted as a catalyst for a different political evolution in Greece. A new consensus—if only negative in its thrust—not to undermine the parliamentary system again, was nurtured by Karamanlis in 1974–77. Perhaps he stayed on as Prime Minister too long before he translated himself to the Presidency. His dominating presence in the New Democracy Party prevented the easier and faster rise of new elements within it. Nevertheless, he managed to attract leading elements from the now disintegrating and irrelevant old Centre; he abandoned several of the harsher features of the earlier repressive state machine, and consecrated pluralism in the political system. His successor, Mr Rallis, however, though one of the most competent Greek administrators and shrewd politicians, assumed the leadership too late and, lacking charisma, remained overshadowed by the Old Man in the background. He was, moreover, still associated in the minds of many Greeks with the earlier version of the Right.

By this time large parts of the public were alienated from the system and from a government that had been in power too long. These floating, changing and unstable groups were, by phenomenal organization and electoral strategy, mobilized by the new PASOK, whose charismatic leader could move masses and groups of highly disparate political preferences and concerns. Another paradox was born: a socialist movement which obfuscates ideological considerations based on class interests in the slogan, " Change and Hope," in order to attract various groups disappointed with the previous administration. The slogans of nationalist, popular participation in social reorganization conjured up dreams of social cohesion and national unity ending the internal

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stagnation under a tired old elite of the rich and powerful. It pitted the Greek nation against a native oligarchy of the Right, manipulated and supported by dark foreign forces (the old Greek mistrust of outsiders), labelling it the anti-popular class which helps " imperialism " to exploit Greece. The nation thus appeared to consist of all groups except this oligarchy, i.e. the non-privileged against the privileged, which was also reassuring for the traditional urban and rural groups.

The Greeks may have rid themselves of the preoccupation with the communist menace, but, at least throughout the years of PASOK's opposition, they seem to have acquired a new bogey: that of the repressive Right, the capitalist, imperialist exploiting forces, the CIA, monopoly capital and other satans, though all of them faceless and indeterminate. The charge that foreign capital controls the Greek economy, for example, appears to have been swallowed whole without serious examination. Even if one agrees with PASOK's leader, today's Prime Minister, that Greece may be of the West but it is also in the Balkans and the Mediterranean, it may not follow that neutralism or non-alignment is the proper foreign policy posture.

Nevertheless, PASOK's oversimplification of issues, its glib, sweeping answers to complex problems, captured the imagination of the electorate. So long as the old elite governed Greece, PASOK screamed, the country could never know national independence. Equally, parliament in such conditions is inadequate as an institution; the country needs extra-parliamentary and so-called popular mass organizations. How far the Greeks believe these assertions only time will tell. The fact remains that PASOK capitalized on the cumulative errors of conservative rule over 30 years. It stereotyped all those commited to the politics of the Left as automatically and *ipso facto* good democrats; all others, by definition, were anti-democratic. Fortunately for PASOK, New Democracy managed to make an opening for the wider liberal forces in the country in its conference of May 1979, thus bridging a political chasm that had plagued political life for many years. It institutionalized the election of the Party leader by the parliamentary party and explained entry into the EEC as a measure against the isolation of the country in the face of turbulent events in the Middle East, South-west Asia and Eastern Europe. It broke with the old traditional idea of " Greece for the Greeks."

More generously, one might say that PASOK came to represent the liberation of the Left-of-Centre forces from the complexes of the past at a time when the anti-Left psychosis of the Right was dying. Yet it did not develop into a mere Left-of-Centre opposition, but into the first mass movement to entertain Third World models of socialism, which are, by definition, opposed to European or Western civilization. Meanwhile, the old Centre lost its *raison d'être* because it became anachronistic. It broke up and splintered off, throwing up one interesting, though very small, new party, KODYSO, as a democratic counterweight to PASOK, one which may later attract those who are repelled by PASOK's populist and

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autocratic tendencies. Even though after May 1979, New Democracy became more liberal under Rallis, it remained plagued by a lethargic bureaucracy and the lingering influence of a veritable " Sultan " in the Presidential Palace. Significantly though, the extreme Right (*Ethniki Parataxis*–National Front), which refused to recognize the changes of the last decade, not to say of the last 30 years, has been relegated to the dust heap.

WHAT is relevant to Greece's external concerns is the fact that PASOK, now in power, emphasizes national liberation from Western imperialism and a closer cooperation with Southern Mediterranean and Middle Eastern countries against Western consumer civilazation and the economic order of the multi-nationals. The question therefore is whether, before attaining power, PASOK represented an opposition which merely differed from the government of the day, or whether it opposes the actual bases of government and the political system in Greece. Now that it is in power, this question is of the utmost importance. But since political parties in Greece do not reflect strict class differences but cut across classes, it will be difficult for PASOK to abolish the pluralist system easily and replace it by a single-class parliament, or a one-party state.

The fact remains that PASOK came to power not only as a logical outcome of the demographic, economic, social and political changes I have outlined, but also because it attracted all those who felt it was time for a change, and all those who, for whatever reasons, resent political dependence, particularly on the West—as if complete independence is more than a chimera—and dream of non-alignment of the Southern Mediterranean and Middle Eastern variety. Where is it? Perhaps these positions reflect the views only of PASOK's charismatic and dominating leader, and not of his parliamentary deputies and followers among the wider electorate. This is a problem he may have to face in the future, possibly very soon. Nevertheless, 13·5 per cent of the vote in 1974, followed by 25·3 per cent in 1977, and nearly 48·6 per cent in 1981 represents a real achievement.

PASOK also capitalized on the recent growing incompatibility between Western perceptions of collective security in the Eastern Mediterranean within the NATO alliance and Greece's defence priorities as perceived since 1974 at least. Historically, the two persistent Greek security concerns have been with the Turks and the Balkan Slavs. Throughout the nineteenth and much of this century, however, the Greeks had little freedom or independence in dealing with these matters, which were usually controlled by foreign European powers and, since 1947, by the American superpower. They now believe that they have managed to attain a reasonable arrangement of their relations with their Balkan neighbours. Both New Democracy and PASOK have, over the past seven years, worked assiduously towards this end. It is Cyprus and the Aegean which exacerbate relations with Turkey. From the mid-1950s

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the Cyprus issue replaced the old Asia Minor national drama (and trauma), until 1922 the centre of the major ethnic and irredentist conflict with Turkey. The struggle over the Cyprus issue was compounded by the fact that the antagonists have been partners in the wider Western alliance of NATO, and inevitably tend to compete for the favours of the senior partner, the USA.

I do not wish to embark on a lengthy discussion of these issues, joined now by the more delicate and difficult ones of the contested Aegean sea-bed, territorial limits and control of air space. I merely wish to emphasize that the shift in Greek security orientation from North to East accompanied the shift from Right to Left in the political orientation of the country since July 1974. Instead of loyalty to NATO—and the US—closer ties with Western Europe through the EEC were promoted consistently by New Democracy, and at the same time the improvement of relations with Balkan neighbours and the Soviet Union was pursued. Rising anti-Americanism appeared at a time when anti-communism stopped serving as the staple ideology of the state.

The new confrontation with Turkey, since 1974, however, has placed a heavy burden on the Greek economy. By 1979, defence costs amounted to over 25 per cent of government expenditure ($1·5–2 billion) against Turkey's $3–3·5 billion, costs which both countries can ill afford; although with a population of just over 9·5 million, Greece has a GNP of $32·3 billion as against Turkey's $43·5 billion GNP for a population of 45 million.

GREECE returned to the military structure of NATO in 1980 after an absence of six years, an important event not only for the country's security arrangements, but also for its future policy, with significant implications for its domestic politics in the 1980s.[2] The new socialist government, however, came to power with very clear intentions regarding NATO and the EEC. When still in opposition, PASOK indicated that it would take Greece out of NATO and the EEC, since neither alliance has been of any use with regard to Greece's central security problem—the threat from Turkey. A few months before the election the position was modified for obvious reasons, namely, the desire to appeal to as great a number of the electors as possible. How credible or feasible is such a proposition? Is it a real possibility? So long as there are unsettled problems and major disputes between Greece and Turkey it is unlikely that the PASOK government will take Greece out of NATO or the EEC. Nor is NATO likely to accede to the demand that it guarantee Greece's frontiers and territorial integrity as the condition of her staying in the alliance, since this would be at the expense of the other ally, Turkey. It is therefore interesting that the new Prime Minister retained the defence portfolio. The reasons are two, and in this order: to rearrange sensitive command posts by assigning them to officers strictly

[2] For reasons which led Greece back to the military structure of NATO, see my "Greece's return to NATO: political and strategic factors," in *Epikentra* (Athens, May 1981), pp. 25–27.

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loyal to him, and to ensure control as he proceeds to keep Greece in NATO. He may of course thus lose voters from the extreme left of his movement. To withdraw from NATO, on the other hand, would mean running the risk of a military *coup,* and not by bizarre colonels this time.

If it is unlikely that Mr Papandreou will break with NATO and leave the EEC, it leaves open the area of bilateral relations with the United States and the Soviet Union. In effect, American bases in Greece have been under renegotiation for some time now. The Prime Minister may demand only the removal of nuclear warheads from the country. At the same time, he may well seek an arrangement with the Soviet Union similar to that which Syria, Iraq and Libya have had with that superpower. But Greece is not Syria, Iraq or Libya, and in order to do that he must first abolish the present pluralist political system in favour of an autocratic one-party state, and there again he may provoke an Evren-style military *coup.*

Mr Papandreou's easier option in foreign policy will be in puffing-up the relations of Greece with some of the Southern Mediterranean and Middle Eastern countries—this may well satisfy the extreme left wing of PASOK. In any case, the so-called opening to the Arab world was inaugurated by Karamanlis in 1975–76 basically for the expansion of trade and commerce, the exploitation by Greek technical construction, engineering and shipping firms of vast opportunities in the development of the oil-rich states, and the securing of oil supplies. Until now, though, this opening had been a cautious one in so far as any involvement or identification with radical political trends and groups in the Middle East was concerned. The new government, however, may establish closer links with these very groups and the states that support them. The new Prime Minister has already, for example, received Mr Yasser Arafat of the PLO on a visit to Greece and granted diplomatic status to the PLO representative in Greece. If such links lead to the importation into Greece of the violent terrorist and other covert activities associated with such groups and/or states, it is certain that the Papandreou government will suffer, if it is not immediately forced to change course. It is significant that less than a month after assuming power, the KKE (Soviet-oriented Greek Communist Party) denounced the new Prime Minister and his government as another " face "—and younger version—of the old ruling oligarchy in the country.

To be sure, the recent Greek view of foreign policy and foreign affairs has been that the United States and the rest of the Western Allies failed Greece over Cyprus in 1974, and over her oustanding dispute with Turkey regarding the Aegean. Hence the new government's critical stand over American bases in Greece and membership of NATO and the EEC.

There are, however, as I have tried to argue, serious objective constraints on any Greek government that may proceed—or attempt—to leave the Western alliance. First, Greece is isolated from Western Europe by the geographical barrier of Yugoslavia, Albania, and the Soviet satellite states in the Balkans. Secondly, she has outstanding national-

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ethnic and territorial disputes with Turkey over Cyprus and the Aegean. Thirdly, heightened East-West tensions are reflected—and acted out—in a troublesome, conflict-ridden neighbouring Middle East. Maintaining properly equipped armed forces is, in the circumstances, of the utmost importance for Greece. And such equipment has been supplied by America and the West since the end of the Second World War. As for withdrawing from the EEC, constitutionally this requires a national referendum to be called by the President of the Republic who, at the moment, is the man who was the architect of Greece's joining the EEC, Karamanlis.

Greece would be seeking to disengage from the Western alliance at a time when, as already emphasized, its southern periphery, the Mediterranean, has acquired a critical strategic importance. Unlike the central or core area of the alliance in Western Europe, the Mediterranean basin contains some 340 million people in some 15 or 16 countries. It extends about 2,500 miles from Gibraltar to Turkey and over 800 miles from the North African coast to the Alps. It is not as stable politically as the European centre, considering that at its edges there is the conflict-ridden Middle East—the Arab-Israel conflict, the Iraq-Iran war in the Gulf, a devastated Lebanon, Arab states in political disarray, widespread religious militancy, and a sensitive area of political conflict involving Egypt, Libya and the Sudan. The area, moreover, constitutes a major lifeline for Western Europe, for it provides the bulk of its energy supplies. It is a strategic staging area for the protection of these Western interests in the Middle East, including the use of the American Rapid Deployment Force.

The instability of the Mediterranean region, and especially its southern and eastern parts, must be a major concern of NATO. It may even be argued that the strategic centre of gravity for the alliance has shifted southwards. To some extent this is reflected in the formidable Soviet naval presence. Lacking real base facilities (except perhaps in Syria, and airfield facilities in Libya) the Soviet navy may not constitute a real threat or serious challenge to the combined US Sixth Fleet and other NATO-country fleets. When viewed, however, in conjunction with inter-Mediterranean conflict, terrorism and domestic and inter-state instability in the Middle East, the conflict between members of the alliance—Greece and Turkey—in the Eastern Mediterranean, and the recent disagreements among West European members of the alliance regarding this desperately critical periphery, the threat could become real.

In any case, it is interesting to note that Mr Papandreou's recent attempt to explore the possibilities of a nuclear-free zone in the Balkans—in line with his policy of making Greece a non-aligned country—came to grief immediately after his visit to Bulgaria. Clearly, he discovered that Bulgaria cannot be a credible interlocutor, let alone a dependable partner, in such an enterprise. In fact, he had to concede publicly that taking Greece out of NATO was not, for the moment or even in the foreseeable future, a credible or practical policy. Needless to

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say, such retreat from repeatedly and loudly proclaimed policy caused confusion and concern among the more ideological elements in PASOK, as well as among the electorate at large.

Nor has the expected withdrawal from the EEC, or even the renegotiation of Greece's association with it, materialized. This may be due in part to the fact that, in its first year of full membership, Greece received one of the highest shares of loans and grants from the Community, a source of economic assistance no Greek regime, one may assume, can forego blithely or easily substitute.

SIMILARLY, on the domestic scene, if Mr Papandreou were to implement some of his past proposals regarding massive nationalizations and punitive fiscal measures, he would alienate—and perhaps worse—the very new middle-class groups who constitute the heart of his constituency. Not to do anything, of course, could be equally disastrous. One would expect him, therefore, to strike a balance between enjoying the fruits of power for the next three years at least, and instituting economic and social reforms. Whether he can or is willing to do anything about the bureaucratic monster will, among other things, depend on the financial resources available for the creation of alternative employment for many people.

So far, however, the threatened massive nationalizations have not occurred, possibly because the government is anxious about investment. Recently though, a not-so-punitive fiscal measure that was about to be voted by parliament was summarily withdrawn by the Prime Minister during a television interview. The measure would have introduced a new scheme of property taxes. The Prime Minister arbitrarily decided that only property worth over 20 million drachmae (about £200,000) would be liable to such taxation. The hapless responsible minster was, needless to say, hopelessly undermined by his chief's sudden decision, and had no choice but to resign. One can only speculate that, in a society which lacks other personal and social security arrangements, ownership of property is not only important, but an obsession: it is the dream of every Greek to own some kind of real estate. They seem to mistrust other forms of wealth.[3] The proposed measure would clearly have alienated a vast proportion of the government's constituency. It also illustrates the dilemma of the PASOK regime: in order to embark upon any structural economic and social reforms it must institute certain severe, or at least unpleasant, fiscal policies, in some cases even austerity measures. To do this, however, it risks inviting the ire of a fickle and volatile following. In other words, personal interest still prevails over any conceivable public, or common, good.[4]

[3] On a popular real-life level, it is interesting to note that the use of banking facilities is not widespread among the Greeks. Practically all salaries and wages, as well as household bills, are paid in cash. In fact, most Greeks mistrust bank drafts or cheques in payment or settlement of accounts. And yet the VISA credit card, for example, issued by the National Bank of Greece, seems to have caught on.

[4] It is fair to say that in Greece everyone wants " political revolution," but hardly anyone seems to desire social change.

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So far, the net result of the Papandreou government's ambivalence and contradictory policies—or even lack of policy—has been to confuse, frighten, and alienate vast sections of the public. The difficult economic conditions the people face have yet to be properly addressed by the government, let alone effectively tackled. Instead, much of the noise centres on peripheral external concerns, such as the vociferous support for the PLO, and realtions with the Third World. The fact is that the tough talk by PASOK, before its accession to power and after, about relations with Turkey over Cyprus and the Aegean, remains just talk, because all other options, being dangerous, are clearly not on.

Yet the Papandreou government has one overwhelming advantage, albeit not a source of comfort to the captive electorate. The official opposition represented by the New Democracy Party appears weak and still in disarray under its new leader, the septuagenarian Mr E. Averoff. The Centre and the Communist Party of the Interior (KKK-es or Eurocommunists) are non-existent. There is therefore the likelihood that, in a crisis, PASOK could forge an alliance with the Communist Party of the Exterior (KKE-ex, or Moscow-oriented). The price the latter might exact could be unacceptable in Mr Papandreou remains committed to a multi-party political system. It would also increase the chances of a preventive military *coup*. Moreover, an aged, ailing President of the Republic could conceivably be replaced by another candidate more amenable to PASOK dictation. In this case, Mr Papandreou could proceed to change, or modify, the constitution to suit his own purposes. In the meantime, however, the New Democracy Party might revitalize itself by allowing younger, more liberal elements into its leadership ranks or at least into its higher councils. These could align themselves with a new Centre constellation to challenge PASOK.

In short, with a movement like PASOK in power, led by an autocratic hegemonist, anything is possible. If its behaviour ends up by endangering the system constructed since 1974–77, the country may yet be subjected to further military intervention in its political life.

GREECE, one could say, is at the crossroads today: not only in the sense of a watershed in its domestic policy, characterized by the smooth transition of power from a recently liberalized conservative Right to, at least in name, a socialist regime, but also in the implications of this epochal change for the external relations of the country. The latter could be crucial, for the changed perceptions and orientations come at a time of heightened super-power confrontation; at a time when areas peripheral to Europe (i.e. NATO and the Warsaw Pact) in the Mediterranean and the Middle East are being affected by the more direct involvement of the superpowers, at a time of great strain within the Western alliance regarding what to do about these desperately important strategic peripheries. " Radical change " as an election slogan is marvellous, especially in a country that began to experience some serious change only seven years ago. It is not, however, one that a four-year

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tenure of office can easily translate into reality. Even if by some miracle it did, institutional and structure change does not automatically change overnight long-held attitudes and long-standing patterns of political behaviour.

The fact remains that as a result of 30 years of relentless change the majority of the new generation, in town and country alike, became aliented from the traditional authority of the parish priest, the old party ward boss, and the family patriarch. The erosion of the authority of these mainstays of traditional Greece was accelerated by the vast and rapid migration from country to town, since a succession of governments made little effort to improve living conditions and facilities—roads, schools, libraries, running water, electricity, health and social amenities—or to improve the dispersal of economic activities and the development of local government—in most villages, thus failing to render them more habitable, let alone attractive. Thus, whereas only 15 years ago 40 per cent of Greeks lived on the land, today only 25 per cent do so. It is also interesting to note that in a poll taken before the 18 October 1981 elections, 27 per cent of the electorate were mainly concerned with the deteriorating economic conditions, 24 per cent simply wanted a change, and only 5 per cent were concerned with foreign policy issues. The 27 per cent figure acquires greater significance in view of the fact that of the six million voters over half are women.

Greece, however, like other Mediterranean countries, tends to breed, frome time to time, strong men in politics. For good or ill, the Greeks once again have a strong charismatic leader as Prime Minister; one who, like his predecessor on the Right, Karamanlis, tends to overshadow and dominate his colleagues, whether in cabinet or parliament. Charismatic leaders are often also impulsive and unpredictable. Ambitious, forceful, aggressive, autocratic and intolerant of disagreement, Mr Papandreou has the makings of a powerful leader. His background is that of a well-known political family which now seeks continuity by the election of his elder son to parliament from the family's traditional seat in Patras. But he was also, in his youth, a Trotskyite rebel and, as an academic economist in America later, a typical liberal on the Left of the Democratic party. A supporter of Adlai Stevenson in the 1952 and 1956 American presidential elections, he was equally hopeful, when he returned to Greece in 1961, of the Kennedy administration. His obsession with American conspiracy against Greece in the mid-1960s and after, may derive in part from a feeling that the Americans—especially the liberal establishment presided over by the Kennedy elite—let him down, even though later the Americans under President Johnson were instrumental in releasing him from the Colonels' prisons. Clearly, Mr Papandreou must have at least an ambivalent attitude towards the United States.

Whether a socialist, or, as his behaviour in office so far seems to indicate, simply a left-of-centre Keynesian liberal, we may be sure that Mr Papandreou will govern Greece for the next three years in a highly

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personal style, if not as a one-man show. How far this suggests the possibility of monolithic politics in the country cannot be determined at this time. He may choose to develop and strengthen further the pluralist experiment begun haltingly in 1910, which was plagued by the vicissitudes of the inter-war and immediate post-war periods, but which was revived on a more solid basis in 1974. Or he may, judging it to be cumbersome, opt to undermine it. This, however, is an option which may entail the establishment of a one-party state, or the launching of ill-advised nationalist adventures over Cyprus and the Aegean, or the pursuit of a generally disastrous foreign policy. Only time will show which option the new strong man will take.

The Greeks may be only on the threshold of political maturity; they have a very long way to go yet, if they seriously aspire to be considered part of that unfortunately dwindling community of political democracies in the world. Their opting for a pluralist system eight years ago, followed by their orderly acceptance of an alternative government last year were considered good omens. Now, however, a regime that seeks to promote a rigid ideological purity in the public ethic, and a manichean view of world affairs and the country's external relations, at a time of great economic difficulties, threatens to undermine this once promising state in the country's political evolution.

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Soviet–Yugoslav Relations Since 1976

Pedro Ramet

In some places in the West it has recently become fashionable to slander our good relations with you and to spread the most absurd fabrications about them. The authors of these fairy tales try to depict Yugoslavia as some kind of poor, defenceless Little Red Ridinghood whom the terrible, rapacious Wolf—the aggressive Soviet Union—threatens to tear to pieces and devour.

Leonid Brezhnev
15 November 1976

AT the kernel of Yugoslav foreign policy lies a profound internal contradiction which is at one and the same time the source of much of its dynamism and clamour, and the cause of serious misunderstandings in the West. For Yugoslavia, which according to all conventional objective criteria must be viewed as a minor power, has nevertheless pursued a policy which directly refutes all such standards and which would be appropriate to a regional power or even, in some respects, to a great power.

The foreign policy concerns of a minor power, as Raymond Aron has noted, are by and large restricted to the preservation of territorial integrity and political independence; great powers, by contrast, strive to fashion the international environment according to their interests. What distinguishes a regional power from either minor or great powers is the ambition (and ability) to create a favourable regional environment and the aspiration to global political status.[1]

Yugoslavia's aspiration to global political status—through its vaunting of self-management as an alternative ideology and model, in its long involvement in the leadership of the non-aligned movement, and in its high-profile foreign assistance programme—is unmistakable, and quite out of keeping with its minor power status. In fact, non-alignment was specifically aimed at refashioning the international environment as a whole, thus conferring a special status on any state which could legitimately claim to lead the movement.

Because of this internal contradiction, there has been a tendency to treat Yugoslav foreign policy as unique, obscuring in the process the real goals of Yugoslav foreign policy. Three theories have been popularized

[1] Raymond Aron, *Peace and War*, trans. Richard Howard and Annette Baker Fox (Doubleday & Co., New York, 1966), *passim*; and Rouhollah K. Ramazani, "Emerging Patterns of Regional Relations in Iranian Foreign Policy," in *Orbis*, Winter 1975, pp. 1050–51.

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about the " essence " of Yugoslav foreign policy, all of which overemphasize a particular aspect at the expense of the whole and thus produce distortion. The first of these theories holds that Yugoslavia is above all a truly non-aligned state with wide international interests and an altruistic commitment to world peace, world brotherhood and human progress. This is the official Yugoslav explication. The second theory holds that Yugoslavia is a committed socialist country whose vision of a future utopia differs from the Soviet vision in only one essential—it excludes Soviet hegemony. This interpretation has been advanced by a former US ambassador to Yugoslavia.[2] The third theory holds that while Yugoslavia's ruling party is unmistakably Marxist, they are nonetheless " *our* Marxists," and therefore the US has an interest in buoying up Yugoslav independence. This view is often conjoined with an interpretation of Yugoslav–Soviet relations as a modern version of David and Goliath, and it is this interpretation which underlies much of the writing in the popular press.

Yet all these theories ignore Yugoslav national interest as a motivating factor, whether by emphasizing ideology or dependency, and thus contribute to the obfuscation of Yugoslav foreign policy goals.

At the same time, it must be pointed out that Soviet policy towards Yugoslavia has also often been seriously misunderstood in the West. Soviet goals have been scrupulously examined and many sensible analyses have been developed on that theme. However, when it comes to the question of Soviet *strategy*, Western observers are very much in the dark—as illustrated by the conviction expressed by a number of high-ranking American officials in the course of 1980, first that the Soviets would invade Yugoslavia,[3] and later that the Soviets would *have* to invade Poland.

When these views are taken in conjunction, the conclusion can only be that there has been a considerable amount of confusion as to the nature of Soviet–Yugoslav relations, and misunderstanding about the interests of each partner. This paper will endeavour to clarify the nature of Soviet–Yugoslav relations, arguing that the relationship has been one of mutual exploitation, motivated by national interests which have not changed substantially, and thus that the prospects for fundamental change in the relationship are slight. This interpretation, I believe, makes the most sense of a relationship which, though riddled with frictions, continues to be assiduously pursued by both parties.

Brezhnev's Visit in 1976

Ever since the Tito-Stalin rift of 1948 and Yugoslavia's subsequent self-assertion, the West has never been able to rid itself of the view that Titoist Yugoslavia might at any moment be gobbled up. That the semi-

[2] Laurence Silberman, "Yugoslavia's ' Old ' Communism: Europe's Fiddler on the Roof," *Foreign Policy*, Spring 1977.

[3] As Tito lay on his death bed, and the Soviets sent additional troops into Afghanistan, some American diplomats nervously began referring to Yugoslavia as " Afghanistan-West."

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authoritarian Balkan state is no Little Red Ridinghood can be readily seen in its unrelenting condemnation of even the faintest signs of the rejuvenation of NATO, in its vociferous criticism every time the US obtained a new military base, and in its " fraternal " orientation towards other communist states, including the nefarious despots in Angola (though, for all that, communist Yugoslavia has, by preventing the Russians from establishing military bases on its territory, been a force for stability in the Balkans and the Mediterranean).

While Brezhnev's ridicule of Western " fairy tales " about the Soviet Wolf and the Yugoslav Little Red Ridinghood was ostensibly directed at the incomprehension of the West, the playful debunking of the Soviet threat was more particularly aimed at the Yugoslavs themselves who, as their behaviour during the early months after the Soviets invaded Afghanistan demonstrated, have not been able to shake off fears about Soviet intentions.[4] Indeed, relations between the two countries have been marked by serious distrust and, on the Yugoslav side, fear ever since the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, and since Yugoslavia's immediate and resolute condemnation of the invasion. Moscow's hope was that the 1976 visit might effect a *rapprochement* and, at a minimum, restore relations to their " pre-Czechoslovakia " status, when Yugoslavia seemed to be drawing closer to the Kremlin.[5]

Brezhnev attempted much more than a mere *rapprochement*, however, and arrived in Belgrade bearing some 40 separate Soviet requests, including demands for an increase in the servicing of Soviet warships and submarines in Yugoslav ports,[6] closer cooperation with COMECON on Yugoslavia's part, Yugoslav involvement in Warsaw Pact " ideological activity," closer cooperation in foreign policy, the establishment of a Soviet–Yugoslav friendship association, permanent flight-route rights for Soviet military and civilian aircraft,[7] the granting of a Soviet naval base at Kotor, the assignment of a high-ranking Yugoslav military officer to the Military Council of the Warsaw Pact, conversion to more *pro-Soviet* " non-alignment " (on the model of Cuba or Vietnam), the cessation of all anti-Soviet propaganda (including criticism of Soviet

[4] The Yugoslavs nervously made several contacts with the Rumanians, with whom they have close military ties, and demonstratively installed a ring of very obvious anti-aircraft guns at Belgrade airport. See Pedro Ramet, " Tremors in Belgrade," in *Commonweal,* 14 March 1980.

[5] A. Ross Johnson, " Yugoslavia and the Sino–Soviet Conflict: the Shifting Triangle, 1948–1974," in *Studies in Comparative Communism*, Spring/Summer 1974, pp. 191–92.

[6] Under Yugoslav law, any nation so desiring may berth warships in Yugoslav ports for maintenance. In April 1974 Belgrade amended its Law on Coastal Waters, increasing the total number of foreign military vessels from a single country allowed in a Yugoslav harbour from three to five—specified by law as " three foreign combat vessels and two foreign auxiliary naval vessels." The chief beneficiary of this law is the Soviet Union, and since December 1974, when the Yugoslavs opened a major new naval dockyard at Tivat, in Kotor Bay, the Soviets have used that port to the maximum allowed by Yugoslav law. Moreover, there have been persistent reports that Soviet warships have used Yugoslav ports in excess of the number permitted by law, by engaging in the ruse of painting over their military markings and masquerading as merchant ships. According to these reports, this has been done with the knowledge and complicity of the Yugoslav authorities. Cf. Zdenko Antic, " Soviet Naval Commander Visits Yugoslavia," *Radio Free Europe Research*, 6 Sept. 1976, p. 2; and Silberman, op. cit. p. 6.

[7] During the October 1973 war, the Russians had to make a specific request for each overflight to resupply the Arabs.

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" state capitalism " upon which the Yugoslav promotion of self-management is based), and a disclaimer that the Soviet Union supports anti-Tito groups or plays a role in the Yugoslav–Bulgarian dispute over Macedonia.[8] Tito turned down all Soviet requests—scarcely confirming the Soviet claim that the visit represented a turning point in Soviet–Yugoslav relations—and stressed that bilateral relations had to be based on equality, non-interference, and reciprocal respect for sovereignty. A week after the visit, Tito reiterated that Yugoslavia would never join any political or military bloc.

Yet the joint communiqué issued at the end of the visit, which affirmed " mutual respect for each other's independence and the freedom to choose different paths of socialist development,"[9] gives one reason to think. The Soviet Union, to be sure, continues to accept Yugoslavia's right to choose its own path of *socialist* development, but not its right to choose a *non-socialist* programme of development. The implication is that Yugoslavia too is subsumed under the Doctrine of Limited Sovereignty, the so-called " Brezhnev Doctrine," under which the Kremlin arrogates to itself the power of veto over political changes in states of the " socialist commonwealth " and claims the right *and duty* to intervene " when necessary " to preserve socialism in any given country.

Sources of Discord

The Soviet Union and Yugoslavia remain divided by five issues:

1. the Soviet claim to leadership within the socialist camp and their insistence on the universality of the Soviet model of political development, countermanded by Yugoslav denials on both counts (with a corollary dispute as to whether Eurocommunism is a positive phenomenon or not);
2. the Macedonian question, aggravated by the Yugoslavs' belief that Bulgarian irredentism is merely a Soviet device to pressure them, and thus that Bulgarian foreign policy lacks autonomy;
3. the function of the non-aligned movement and its relationship to the Soviet bloc;
4. Soviet desire to gain naval bases along Yugoslavia's Adriatic coast (and particularly at the Bay of Kotor); and, since 1968;
5. the implications of Belgrade's waxing romance with Peking.

Yet at the same time, there are factors that draw Moscow and Belgrade together. Tito, after all, started his political career as a Comintern agent and in the 1930s learned to speak Russian fluently. When Khrushchev, in his Canosso-like visit to Belgrade in 1955, rehabilitated Tito and legitimized Titoism, Tito eagerly reciprocated by proclaiming that Khrushchevite Russia was also a socialist country. But the Yugoslavs have never forgotten Soviet interference in the early post-war period, or the

[8] *New York Times*, 14 Dec. 1976, and 9 Jan. 1977. See also Slobodan Stankovic, " Yugoslav–Soviet Relations Following Brezhnev's Visit," *Radio Free Europe Research*, 28 Feb. 1977.
[9] *Pravda*, 16 Nov. 1976.

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Soviet economic blockade of the late Stalin years. Periodic intimations that Yugoslav socialism is deviant, " revisionist," even Kautskyite, are reminders that the Kremlin brooks no equals. And the protracted existence of anti-Tito groups of Yugoslav *emigrés* in Prague and Kiev, together with the formation of a pro-Soviet, anti-Tito " Communist Party of Yugoslavia " in 1974 within Yugoslavia itself, have been, understandably, unsettling to the Belgrade regime.[10] It is the heterogeneous content of foreign policy,[11] rather than the vagaries of international diplomacy, that account for the seeming alternations of *rapprochements* and estrangements.

This ambivalence—inseparable from the shared ideology which animates both systems—is an important part of the explanation of the delicate balance that characterizes Yugoslav foreign policy. Yugoslavia, which in 1953 had signed a military pact with Greece and Turkey, thus becoming a *de facto* ancillary member of NATO, drew back as soon as it felt it safe to do so. Perched between the blocs, Belgrade has preserved its independence by playing off the US and the USSR against each other. As one Yugoslav Foreign Minister aptly put it, "as Yugoslavs, we need the Americans to protect us from the Russians. As communists, we need the Russians to protect us from the Americans."[12]

Thus, despite deeply rooted differences, the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia have achieved a *modus vivendi*. Belgrade, whose major trading partners in the early 1970s were West Germany and Italy, has, in recent years, greatly expanded its trade with the Soviet Union and the COMECON countries of Eastern Europe. The Soviet Union is today Yugoslavia's most important trading partner, supplying (in 1977) 43 per cent of Yugoslavia's chromium ore, 95 per cent of its anthracite, 67 per cent of its coking coal, 24 per cent of its oil, 41 per cent of its synthetic rubber, 42 per cent of its iron ore, and 50 per cent of its cotton. The USSR was (as of 1977) involved in more than 100 building projects in Yugoslavia, in the power industry, ferrous and non-ferrous metallurgy, the oil industry, etc., and the factories of Djuro Djakovic, Energoinvest, and Litrostroj, built with Soviet assistance, are now manufacturing equipment for nuclear power stations.[13] In addition to expanding trade (which reached $6·6 billion in 1981 between the two countries, and was expected to exceed $7 billion in 1982)[14], Yugoslavia has also recently

[10] *New York Times*, 18 Apr. 1976.

[11] As Meehan has pointed out, " the purposes and actions that are taken to comprise ' foreign policy ' are most diverse, the objects of ' policy ' quite heterogeneous." Hence, foreign policy is intrinsically complex, and aspects of the same foreign policy may be at variance with each other. Cf. Eugene J. Meehan, " The Concept ' Foreign Policy ',' in Wolfram F. Hanrieder (ed.), *Comparative Foreign Policy* (David McKay Co., New York, 1971), p. 266.

[12] Quoted in Pierre Hassner, *The Left in Europe: Security Implications and International Dimensions* (California Seminar on Arms Control and Foreign Policy, Santa Monica, California, Apr. 1979), p. 59.

[13] N. Vladimirov, " An Important Stage in Developing Soviet–Yugoslav Relations," *International Affairs* (Moscow), Nov. 1977, p. 117. See also V. Chernyshev, " Economic Relations between the USSR and the Socialist Federated Republic of Yugoslavia (A Survey)," in *Problems of Economics*, July 1978, pp. 91–93.

[14] *Borba*, 10 Apr 1982. Soviet–Yugoslav trade had notched up $4 billion in 1979, and $5 billion in

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become more active on a number of standing commissions of COMECON, cooperating with other COMECON countries in matters of finance, chemical and engineering industries, and scientific research.

A more significant indicator (since the growth of economic trade can be attributed in part to the non-competitiveness of Yugoslav export items in the West) is Soviet–Yugoslav military cooperation. The Kremlin has been Belgrade's most important arms supplier since 1961. Yugoslav arms purchases from Moscow have been heavy, including, since 1963, surface-to-air missiles (among them, SA-2, SA-3, SA-4, SA-6 and SA-7 systems), T-54/55 and PT-76 tanks, and MiG fighter-bombers. And, despite a nascent Yugoslav arms industry that includes a new jet fighter (the Orao) being jointly produced with the Rumanians, the backbone of the Yugoslav Air Force has long been the Soviet-manufactured MiG-21. Moreover, the Yugoslav refusal to grant the Soviet Union naval bases notwithstanding, the Yugoslavs are servicing a large part of the Soviet Mediterranean submarine and surface fleet.

Stranger still is the degree of intimacy displayed in the periodic military missions and exchange visits. In August 1976, for instance, Admiral Sergei Gorshkov, commander-in-chief of the Soviet Navy, toured the Adriatic coast, visiting Yugoslav naval units and installations, and in July 1977 a delegation of Soviet Air Force officers, headed by Chief Air Marshal Pavel Stepanovich Kulakhov, toured various units of the Yugoslav Air Force and inspected Yugoslav anti-aircraft defences. Given that Yugoslav anti-aircraft artillery, by Belgrade's own admission, is required principally to deter a Soviet strike, it is peculiar that this element would have been included on the tour, unless one wishes to infer that the frank display of their defences was calculated to impress upon the Soviets the seriousness with which the Yugoslavs take the defence of their sovereignty. But what is one to make, then, of Belgrade's contravention of US restrictions by the resale of sensitive strategically relevant technology to Warsaw Pact members? This practice, which went on for years, betrays Belgrade's earnest desire for amicable relations with the USSR. The only hitch—from the Soviet viewpoint—is that Belgrade wants good relations without subordination.

Frictions, 1976–79

In the eight years since Brezhnev's dramatic visit to Belgrade, the Soviets and Yugoslavs have agreed on little of any substance. At the same time, the relationship has been plagued by both major and minor tensions. Among the major issues one might list differences over Vietnam's invasion of Cambodia/Kampuchea in January 1979 and over the Soviet Union's invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979, not to mention Yugoslavia's obstruction, on the eve of Brezhnev's visit, of Moscow's efforts to obtain multilateral confirmation of the primacy of Moscow

1980, and was expected to total between $14 and $17 billion over the 1981–85 period. See *Vjesnik*, 2 June 1980; *Oslobodjenje*, 11 June 1980; and *Tanjug*, 26 Nov. 1980, in Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS), *Daily Report* (Eastern Europe), 28 Nov. 1980.

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and the universality of the Soviet political model at a meeting of communist parties in East Berlin. Among the indications of the issues which have ruffled the relationship, one would have to include the conviction of espionage of a Soviet citizen in Belgrade in 1976[15]; the deletion from the 1976 edition of the authoritative *History of the Soviet Communist Party* of an earlier admission that the expulsion of Yugoslavia from Cominform in 1948 had been a " mistake "[16]; and an acerbic exchange in 1977 over the socialist credentials of the Eurocommunists, in which the Soviet journal *Novoye Vremya* upbraided Santiago Carrillo, Secretary-General of Spain's renegade Communist Party, for his denial of the thesis of the single road to communism,[17] and in which Milenko Markovic replied, in the Yugoslav party's theoretical organ, *Socijalizam*, that " socialism " does not mean " the mechanical copying of foreign experiences."[18]

But it was Hua Guofeng's visit to Yugoslavia in August 1978 that prompted the most virulent Soviet denunciation of Yugoslavia in the last quarter of a century and threatened to shatter the fragile *modus vivendi* worked out by the two parties in the aftermath of the 1968 Czechoslovak crisis. The Soviets objected to the Chinese visit itself, to its deliberate timing to fall on the 10th anniversary of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, and, above all, to Yugoslav refusal to disassociate themselves from Hua's " anti-Soviet " remarks and warnings about " hegemonism."[19] The Soviets continued savagely to abuse Belgrade for attempting to consolidate an anti-Soviet " axis." Moscow abruptly cancelled a visit by Mikhail Solomentsev, an alternate member of the Politburo, which had been organized for late August, and called off several top-level exchange visits involving the Soviet and Yugoslav military. Tito was described as " personally upset " by the heated Soviet reaction and, cancelling a visit to the Soviet Union set for late September, publicly upbraided the Soviets in early September in what was perhaps his toughest anti-Soviet speech in years.[20] Meantime, Yugoslav contacts with Peking continued. In mid-September, General Stane Potocar, Army Chief-of-Staff, led a high-level Yugoslav military delegation to China to discuss the sale of Yugoslav weaponry to China and the establishment of a programme of military exchange.

The battle carried over in academia. The publication of *The International Essence of Scientific Communism* (Moscow, 1978) was a

[15] Ingra Pozhega, a 30-year-old Russian working in a Soviet travel agency in Belgrade, was sentenced to five years in prison for espionage, *New York Times*, 27 May 1976.

[16] Zdenko Antic, " Anti-Soviet Polemics in Yugoslavia Growing," *Radio Free Europe Research*, 27 Dec. 1976, p. 4.

[17] Radio Belgrade, 24 June 1977, trans. in FBIS, *Daily Report* (Eastern Europe), 27 June 1977; and Slobodan Stankovic, " Belgrade Defends Carillo Against Moscow Attacks," *Radio Free Europe Research*, 28 June 1977.

[18] Milenko Markovic, " ' Univerzalni Model ' i razlicitost puteva socijalizma," in *Socijalizam*, Vol. 20, nos. 7–8, 1977, p. 1315.

[19] *Pravda*, 23 Aug 1978, trans. in *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, 27 Sept. 1978, p. 2; *New York Times Supplementary Material*, 22 Aug. 1978, and 29 Aug. 1978. See also *Christian Science Monitor*, 24 Aug 1978.

[20] *New York Times Supplementary Material*, 30 Sept. 1978.

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particular cause for Yugoslav complaint, since, while omitting any mention of Yugoslav self-management, it nonetheless denounced the Yugoslav " illusion " that the general laws of socialist development, illustrated by the Soviet experience, could be circumvented. In the same year *Pravda* ran a brief attack on the newly published book, *Marxism and Socialism*, written by a Yugoslav social scientist and published by Zagreb's Liber publishing house. *Pravda* claimed that the book had " a sharply anti-Soviet slant " and that its general tone was " hostile to the Soviet state and people " and openly " slanderous."[21] The Soviets have, moreover, continued to brand the Yugoslavs as " revisionists "—a charge which frightens Belgrade almost as much as the discovery of anti-Tito factions. In 1979, Moscow published *Revolutionary Theory and Revolutionary Practice*, written by Yury Krasin and Boris Leibzon. The work links Yugoslav self-management with Eurocommunism and condemns both as " revisionist." " Exaggerated stress " on the peculiarities of one's own national circumstances, Krasin and Leibzon warned, leads to disregard for the universal laws of socialist development.[22]

The linkage of the League of Yugoslav Communists (LCY) with the Eurocommunists was, of course, not unfair, and certainly nothing new. And while the charge of " revisionism " was nettling and served to remind Belgrade that Titoism is still heresy as far as the Kremlin is concerned, that charge is nothing new either. In another area, however, the publication of a Soviet university text seemed to signal a significant shift in the Soviet position on Bulgaria's claims to Yugoslav Macedonia. The dispute between Yugoslavia and Bulgaria hinges on the purported existence of a Macedonian nation in south-east Yugoslavia and western Bulgaria. Belgrade's claim to the area of its " Macedonian Republic " hangs on its asseveration that there is a distinctive Macedonian language spoken by a distinctive Macedonian people. Sofia insists that there is no Macedonian nation and that Macedonia is merely a dialect of Bulgarian. Belgrade had long suspected that Bulgarian irredentism was receiving Soviet encouragement, but found solace in the fact that the Soviets had never denied the existence of the Macedonian nation. However, this situation was altered with the publication of the revised edition of the *History of the Southern and Western Slavs* (1979). In its revised text, the work no longer makes any mention of the " Macedonian nation " or the " Macedonian people." Instead, the vacuous phrase, " the people of the province of Macedonia," is substituted. Moreover, where the 1969 edition of this standard university textbook had assumed the existence of a Macedonian *language*, the new edition accepts the Bulgarian position that Macedonian is merely a *dialect* of Bulgarian.[23]

Belgrade is surely going too far in viewing the Bulgarian Communist

[21] *Pravda*, 13 July 1979, trans. in FBIS, *Daily Report* (Soviet Union), 17 July 1979.
[22] Slobodan Stankovic, " Soviet Book About International Communist Movement Angers Yugoslavia," *Radio Free Europe Research*, 8 June 1979.
[23] *Tanjug*, 13 June 1979, in FBIS, *Daily Report* (Eastern Europe), 14 June 1979.

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Party as little more than a proxy for Soviet " hegemonism." Yet it is also clear that such shifts of Soviet policy are not politically innocent, and could have serious consequences.[24]

Uncertainties and False Prospects, 1980–82

President Tito's death in May 1980 appeared to offer opportunities to improve the relationship, and Moscow was quick to send out signals indicating its readiness for closer ties. The presence of both the ailing Brezhnev and Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko at Tito's funeral was an early indication of Soviet interest. In their prominent obituaries for the Yugoslav leader, *Pravda* and *Izvestiya* stressed that Tito had always striven for friendship between the two countries. Within two weeks, both sides were using the 25th anniversary of the Belgrade Declaration (when Khrushchev legitimized Titoism) as a pretext for extending the olive branch.[25] *Pravda* chose this moment to emphasize the Soviet view that " the USSR and Yugoslavia are countries which adhere to the same social system "[26]—a view certainly at variance with the Yugoslav view, but symptomatic of Soviet eagerness to draw socialist Yugoslavia closer.

Moscow ostentatiously renamed one of its squares after Tito, issued a Tito commemorative stamp, and, in the course of a series of high-level visits, including visits to Moscow by Yugoslav Trade Union boss Mika Spiljak in March 1980, by Secretary of the Central Committee Presidium Dusan Dragosavac in February 1981, and by Yugoslav Foreign Minister Josip Vrhovec in May 1981, tried to soft-pedal its political differences with Yugoslavia and to search for areas in which cooperation might be broadened.[27] The Soviet Union stepped in with shipbuilding contracts totalling $100 million for shipyards in Novi Sad and Belgrade—most welcome in a sector which was in some distress after India a couple of years previously decided to build its own ships and stopped purchases of Yugoslav vessels. And between 1980 and 1981, COMECON countries (including the USSR) grew in importance for the Yugoslav market, accounting for 30·1 per cent of Yugoslav imports in 1981 as opposed to 29·2 per cent in 1980), and 49·0 per cent of Yugoslav exports in 1981 (44·2 per cent in 1980).[28]

[24] Certain Czech journals have supported Bulgarian irredentist designs on Macedonia, as has Soviet historian Ulyanin. According to the latter, the Treaty of San Stefano, which assigned Macedonia to Bulgaria, " proclaimed the national independence of the Balkan peoples," while the Congress of Berlin, which returned Macedonia to Turkey, " divided Bulgaria into two parts." Cited in *Ekonomska politika*, 27 Feb. 1978, p. 9. For a more detailed discussion, see Pedro Ramet, " The Soviet Factor in the Macedonian Dispute," in *Survey*, Summer 1979. Also relevant is: Milan Skakun, " Makedonsko nacionalno pitanje i razvoj jugoslovensko-bugarskih odnosa," in *Obelezja*, Sept.–Oct. 1978.

[25] See *Borba*, 18 May 1980. Soviet articles featured in *Pravda* and distributed by TASS are discussed in *Vjesnik*, 2 June 1980.

[26] As given in *Vjesnik*, 2 June 1980.

[27] For particulars, see *Tanjug*, 9 Mar. 1982, trans. in FBIS. *Daily Report* (Eastern Europe), 10 Mar. 1982; *Tanjug*, 2 Apr. 1982, trans. in FBIS, *Daily Report* (Eastern Europe), 6 Apr. 1982; *Vjesnik*, 17 Mar. 1980; *Politika*, 20 Apr. 1980; *Oslobodjenje*, 23 Feb. 1981; and *Tanjug*, 20 May 1981, trans. in FBIS, *Daily Report* (Eastern Europe), 21 May 1981.

[28] *Politika*, 25 Sept. 1981; and *Soviet Analyst*, 21 Apr. 1982, p. 2.

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Even military contracts, which had been tangibly diminished in the period 1977–80, were stepped up slightly, with separate visits by Admiral Sergei Georgevich Gorshkov, commander of the Soviet Navy, and by Alexei Yepishev, Chief of the Political Administration of the Soviet Army and Navy, in July 1981, and a return visit by Yugoslav Defence Minister Nikola Ljubicic in April 1982. Yugoslavia's signing of a joint defence agreement with Hungary in June 1981 must also have appeared to the Soviets to be a favourable token.[29] Yet at the same time Belgrade simultaneously increased its military ties with the US and other Western countries.[30]

The new collective leadership gave some encouragement to Soviet feelers. On 3 June 1980, for instance, Cvijetin Mijàtovic, then president of the collective presidency, gave an interview to Soviet television and told the Soviets that Belgrade was interested in strengthening both inter-state *and inter-party* ties with Moscow—the latter being a key Kremlin *desideratum*.[31] And when Vasily Kuznetsov, deputy chairman of the presidium of the Supreme Soviet, visited Belgrade in July 1980, he met not only with Mijatovic but also, significantly, with Dragosavac. In what was described as a " long conversation," Dragosavac and Kuznetsov reiterated the desirability of strengthening *inter-party* links between the two countries.[32]

Despite these probes, however, inter-party links cannot be said to have been strengthened, and while economic contacts have been expanded, there has been no fundamental change in the *politics* of the Soviet-Yugoslav relationship since Tito's death. This was abundantly clear from the carefully worded joint communiqué issued at the end of Gromyko's visit to Belgrade in April 1982. In a crucial passage the communiqué notes that " although in the assessments made by the two sides there are known differences on some international questions, it was stressed that a constant dialogue and exchange of visits at a high political level are an important factor in promoting relations and mutual understanding."[33] And while the distance between Belgrade and Moscow could be measured in polemics over developments in Poland, Vietnam's involvement in Kampuchea, Cuba's military role in Africa, and the comparability of Soviet and American foreign policy (on which the Yugoslavs insist but which the Soviets strenuously deny),[34] it should be clear that the failure of diplomatic probes to produce a fundamental change in the relationship reflects the inability of either party to offer essential concessions to the other.

During the initial post-Tito phase, as the Soviets and the Yugoslavs

[29] Radio Budapest, 28 June 1981, trans. in FBIS, *Daily Report* (Eastern Europe), 30 June 1981; and *Tanjug*, 28 June 1981, in FBIS, *Daily Report* (Eastern Europe), 29 June 1981.

[30] Milan N. Vego, " Die Militärbeziehungen zwischen der UdSSR und Jugoslawien seit 1961," in *Osteuropa*, Apr. 1982, p. 319.

[31] *Komunist*, 6 June 1980.

[32] *Politika*, 10 July 1980; see also *Oslobodjenje*, 9 July 1980.

[33] *Tanjug*, 6 Apr. 1982, trans. in FBIS, *Daily Report* (Eastern Europe), 7 Apr. 1982.

[34] See *Pravda*, 19 Apr. 1981.

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were testing the waters, Yugoslavia's relations with Bulgaria—which are generally regarded as a touchstone for its relations with the Soviet Union—appeared to become markedly warmer. The Bulgarians, in particular, appeared eager not only to pursue warmer relations with Yugoslavia, but also to project the apparent *rapprochement* backwards in time.[35] Both Sofia and Moscow appeared eager to woo Belgrade with economic credits, trade packages, and cooperative arrangements, and contacts between Yugoslav and Bulgarian economists, enterprises and even journalists multiplied as 1980 drew on.[36] Bulgarian strongman Todor Zhivkov even tendered the reassurance, in July 1980, that the Bulgarians " have absolutely no claims—territorial or otherwise—on our neighbours."[37]

On the other hand, neither the Yugoslavs nor the Bulgarians appeared willing to shelve their controversy over Macedonia, and already in August 1980 the 15th Congress of Historical Sciences, held in Bucharest, became the scene of a clash between Bulgarian historian Kosev and Sarajevo Professor Milorad Ekcemic (Yugoslavia's leading authority on fifteenth-century Balkan history) over the Congress of Berlin and the ethnicity of the Macedonians.[38] Yet despite this and other tensions, neither side was prepared to declare the honeymoon over—Belgrade being eager for political tranquillity as it struggled with galloping inflation, a large foreign debt and associated economic woes. It is possible that Yugoslav foreign policy hardliners were restrained by the argument that trade with Bulgaria could only help the Yugoslav economy, and that amity at that level would contribute to tranquillity in relations with Moscow.

In February 1981, however, the Bulgarian magazine *Vekove* published an article indicating that the Bulgarian fascist army had performed a " liberating " mission in its incursion into Yugoslav Macedonia, and berating Yugoslav historiography for what it called the " falsification of the historic past."[39] The Yugoslav hardliners seized on this article to declare the " *rapprochement* " at an end. Indeed, the Yugoslavs now fired back suggesting that the ostensible *rapprochement* had been a sham, and that the Bulgarians were incapable of breaking with their irredentist expansionism. " In the past year numerous contacts have been established between responsible Yugoslav and Bulgarian personalities

[35] Thus, for instance, *Zemedelsko Zname* wrote, on 21 Nov. 1980: " We note with satisfaction that the positive trend in the development of our cooperation in recent years was ascertained during the talks [between Yugoslav Foreign Minister Josip Vrhovec and Bulgarian Foreign Minister Petur Mladenov]. This trend contributes to the consolidation of mutual trust between the Bulgarian and Yugoslav peoples." Trans. in FBIS, *Daily Report* (Eastern Europe), 28 Nov. 1980.

[36] See " Bulgaria Situation Report," *Radio Free Europe Research*, 31 Oct. 1980, pp. 10–14; *Politika*, 2 Nov. 1980; and Sofia BTA, 5 Sept. 1980, trans. in FBIS, *Daily Report* (Eastern Europe), 9 Sept. 1980. See also " Klimaverbesserung? " in *Wissenschaftlicher Dienst Südosteuropa*, Dec. 1980, p. 305.

[37] Quoted in *Christian Science Monitor*, 12 Aug. 1980.

[38] *Borba* reported that Professor Kosev " asserted that the Macedonians are Bulgarians and based his statement on old travellers' reports." *Borba*, 16 Aug. 1980, trans. in FBIS, *Daily Report* (Eastern Europe), 20 Aug. 1980.

[39] *Tanjug*, 11 Feb. 1981, trans. in FBIS, *Daily Report* (Eastern Europe), 12 Feb. 1981.

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which raised the hope that relations between the two countries [were] improving and moving upward," said Radio Zagreb, continuing, " It is true that in many places in our country, especially in Macedonia and southern Serbia, where Bulgarian crimes during the Second World War are still well remembered, people do not particularly believe that our neighbours—the Bulgarians—have changed their nature. And as we see, they were right."[40]

All this was perfectly predictable, for Yugoslavia has no particular interest in hurling itself into a warm embrace with its old bugbear, nor in encouraging Soviet hopes that Yugoslavia might be lured back into the Soviet bloc. Nor is there any reason why Bulgaria should find it advantageous suddenly to recognize that Macedonians are a distinctive nationality—and it is not inclined to offer such a concession anyway, because, as Belgrade insists, of the large numbers of disenfranchised and politically alienated Macedonians residing in Bulgaria.

Yugoslavia's Options

Tito, who once dreamt of heading a Balkan empire that would have stretched from the Adriatic to the Balck Sea and from the Carpathians to the Aegean, continued, to the end, to play for big stakes. Unable to take over the communist movement, Tito played out the role of high priest of the non-aligned movement for some two and a half decades. Non-alignment and the ideology of self-management became his chief tools of influence, but indispensable too was his Balkan cunning in persuading both the USSR and the US that he was a " positive " force. The post-Tito leadership continues to play from the same hand.

At the same time, the Yugoslavs are aware that they are no longer quite as indispensable to the US as they once appeared. In the 1950s it served American interests to support an independent Yugoslavia in so far as it demonstrated the fiction of communist solidarity and promoted rifts within communist ranks. By the late 1960s, Yugoslavia had ceased to be unique: China, Albania, and Rumania had all forged independent foreign policies before the decade was out. Today even North Korea tries to play an active role in the non-aligned movement and Rumania participates as an observer. American interest in buoying up Yugoslavia is no longer unproblematic, as the affair of the " Sonnenfeldt Doctrine "[41] indicated. Hence the Yugoslavs find it useful to remind Washington of the attractiveness to the Soviet Navy of their Adriatic ports.

[40] Radio Zagreb, 13 Feb. 1981, trans. in FBIS, *Daily Report* (Eastern Europe), 18 Feb. 1981. See also Carl Gustav Ströhm, " Die politische ' Windstille ' über Mazedonien ist vorbei," in *Die Welt,* 18 Feb. 1981.

[41] US State Department spokesman Helmut Sonnenfeldt called for a " more organic " relationship between the Soviet Union and the countries of Eastern Europe. What this meant in practice was not, however, quite clear. In January 1980 Washington extended unsolicited assurances to Belgrade, assurances which were quickly followed by embarrassed retractions. See Aurel Braun, " Soviet Naval Policy in the Mediterranean: Yugoslavia and the Sonnenfeldt Doctrine," *Orbis*, Spring 1978; and *Borba*, 1 Feb. 1980.

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Moreover, the Kremlin is fully aware that the post-Tito leadership in Belgrade lacks the prestige that Tito enjoyed and that this decline in stature could rebound to Soviet advantage even without recourse to overt military threats or the stimulation of an internal *putsch*.[42]

Yugoslav foreign policy has often been described as if it were a kind of pendulum, swinging first towards Moscow, then towards Washington, and intermittently inclining towards Peking. But the Soviet–Yugoslav nexus has an independent life of its own. The Soviets, as Veljko Micunovic, the former Yugoslav ambassador to Moscow, has observed, would be delighted to regain *de facto* control over Yugoslavia—the feat would make the USSR a Mediterranean power, revive the monolithic unity of the socialist bloc in Europe, and, according to Micunovic, end talk about the " independence and equality " of communist parties.[43] Yet Moscow deferred from doing anything precipitous while Tito remained in office. Tito, for his part, sought Soviet legitimation of his heresy. He refused to opt for the institutionalization of Titoism as a separate political creed (as Mao had done), because he was unable to cut the umbilical cord that bound him to Lenin, the October revolution, the Moscow of Stalin's time, and thus, ironically, to the present circle of Soviet leaders. But each time that Tito seemed about to move towards that goal, the Soviets lashed out at Yugoslav *revisionism*, condemning self-management as a travesty of the one, true, universal model of socialist development. Like Homer's Penelope, the Soviets unravel at night what they weave during the day. Hence, their verbal concessions amount to nothing but vacuous ambiguity.

The Yugoslavs are aware that the Soviets ultimately hope to emasculate Titoism and to " straighten " the renegade Yugoslavia. Ideally, the Kremlin would like Yugoslavia to become a kind of Bulgaria—docile, cooperative, and mimetic of the Soviet Union. Given the unlikelihood of that *desideratum*, the Soviets would settle for a Yugoslavia that behaved on the model of Hungary—domestic deviation might be tolerated, but only as long as it is not trumpeted as an alternative model; foreign policy would have to be scrupulously pro-Soviet. One of the fringe benefits of such a development would be an end to Yugoslav obstruction of Cuban efforts to give the non-aligned movement a more pro-Soviet tilt.

There is no sign that the present leadership would ever countenance such an eventuality. In July 1978, for instance, in his report to the 11th Party Congress, Milos Minic, the former Foreign Minister, depicted " hegemonism " (i.e. Soviet expansionism) as the greatest danger in the contemporary world. Thus, for the present at least, Soviet–Yugoslav relations continue to be characterized by a subtle tension that springs from the studied ambiguity of the Soviet position and from a fundamental ambivalence on Yugoslavia's part.

[42] For a very sensible discussion of the international situation in the immediate post-Tito period, see John Darnton, " Eastern Europe After Tito," *New York Times Magazine*, 13 Apr. 1980.
[43] *Washington Post*, 17 May 1979.

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In this respect, the post-Tito leadership is unlikely to diverge from the principles established by Tito and Kardelj. However, in theory at least, the Yugoslav leadership is faced with three options:

1. *Continuation of the high-key policy of non-alignment* that characterized the Tito period. This has the advantage of assuring Yugoslavia a kind of independence in foreign policy behaviour—though the consistency of Yugoslav pronouncements on the subjects of Palestine, South Africa, and Western security serves as a poignant reminder that even " non-alignment " is a kind of alignment, and thus involves a limitation of policy alternatives. Non-alignment may indeed be the " natural " refuge for a Yugoslav communist elite which wants neither to abandon the " anti-imperialist " posture rooted in its socialist ideology nor to relinquish its independence. It is also the position most readily acceptable to the informed sectors of the Yugoslav public. Yet non-alignment is a hard game to play in the absence of a vocal and visible leader, and even aside from the matter of the collective leadership which has to be reckoned with, there is, in fact, no obvious successor to Tito on the horizon. Non-alignment is also a high-risk policy, as it implies the eschewing of guarantees from any power capable of giving them.

2. *Limited cooperation with the USSR.* This is an obvious alternative, and without doubt the policy line which the Kremlin would like to see adopted in Belgrade. Such a policy would be characterized by a low-key style and would attempt to combine assurances of sovereignty with increased receptiveness to key Soviet *desiderata* (e.g. increased access to ports). Although the invasion of Afghanistan initially appeared to throw Belgrade into near panic, the early post-Tito period was marked, as has been noted, by the extension of feelers on both sides. But it is unlikely that the Yugoslavs want anything more than a *modus vivendi* with the Soviets for, especially in so far as this second policy choice would entail even greater passivity within the non-aligned movement and less " provocation " among the " renegades " of the " socialist commonwealth " (in particular less bilateral contact with the Rumanian, Spanish and Italian communist parties), such a policy would very likely result, as the Yugoslavs realize, in a gradual drift, if not into the Soviet camp *per se*, then into the Soviet sphere of influence. That such a development is considered unacceptable was implicit in Stojan Andov's declaration in spring 1980 that the newly signed agreement with the EEC would " reinforce the independence of Yugoslavia."[44]

3. *Superficial non-alignment veiling a tacit drawing to the West.* Tito was the arch advocate of non-alignment. His demise has not resulted in any weakening of this element in Yugoslav foreign

[44] Stojan Andov is the Yugoslav Minister in charge of relations with the EEC and president of the inter-republican committee for foreign trade and hard currency.

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policy. The Slovenes and Croats may be especially inclined to look West and the EEC agreement may permit a reorientation of Yugoslav trade Westwards. But it is difficult to imagine what advantages this third option would yield which are not available under non-alignment. A drift Westwards would, at a minimum, risk the loss of COMECON markets (ever more important to Yugoslav exporters, whose products cannot compete on Western markets), and, at worst, spur an increase in Soviet subversion, both at the level of internal subversion and in the form of encouraging Bulgarian revanchism. Moreover, after the timidity of the US response to crises in Somalia, Iran, and Afghanistan, Belgrade may not feel all that confident about putting all its eggs in one American basket. Most important of all, perhaps, the ideologically bound Yugoslavs would feel uncomfortable if their legitimacy were to be cut off from their " socialist " roots. A drift Westwards is, therefore, unfeasible. Thus, for lack of any real alternatives, a continuation of the policy of strict non-alignment would appear to be Belgrade's most likely choice.

Soviet Strategy vis-à-vis Yugoslavia

Even before Spain officially joined NATO on 1 June 1982, the Soviets, remonstrating against the alleged military imbalance this would produce, had suggested that the adhesion of Yugoslavia to the Warsaw Pact might constitute appropriate " compensation " for Spanish membership of NATO.[45] Since the Yugoslavs have no interest in joining the Warsaw Pact and such a solution could only be arrived at by force, the Soviet " suggestion " was probably primarily designed to buffet and confuse the West.

Soviet strategy towards Yugoslavia has been one of courtship rather than of siege, and has been characterized by economic enticement and penetration, especially in the poorer regions of Yugoslavia, and by the encouragement of cooperation in everything from " parliamentary " exchanges to sales of Soviet military hardware. The rise of the Soviet bloc's share of Yugoslav exports to 49 per cent of the 1981 total (as compared with 32·5 per cent to the West and 18·5 per cent to developing countries)[46] is a measure of a kind of success for the Soviets, though whether it will lead to increased dependency on the part of Yugoslavia, or be convertible into tangible Soviet influence, is open to question.

SINCE the two states are lured by foreign policy *desiderata* which are at variance with each other (complete Soviet endorsement of self-management as an independent authentic route to communism and Soviet recognition of Macedonia as ethnically distinct being the chief Yugoslav *desiderata*; Yugoslav integration into the Warsaw Pact and the

[45] *Christian Science Monitor*, 19 Nov. 1981.
[46] *Soviet Analyst*, 21 Apr. 1982, p. 2.

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abandonment of claims to have devised an improved separate strain of socialism being the chief Soviet *desiderata*), the reasons for the intense contacts between the two states must be sought in secondary pay-offs to the two parties. That is to say, if the relationship is so seriously flawed, the fact that it is so assiduously developed is a sure sign that there are side benefits to both parties. Also, of course, Yugoslavia cannot afford to ignore its giant neighbour to the east and it has reaped concrete benefits in terms of trade and technology. Moreover, the intensity of courtship both by the Soviets and by the Americans represents a sort of corroboration of Yugoslavia's inflated self-image and is useful to the Yugoslavs as " evidence " of the importance of self-management as an alternative ideology. The Soviet link is also useful in so far as it confirms Yugoslavia's socialist credentials.

The Soviets of course benefit from limited access to Yugoslav ports for maintenance and repair of warships, and, at least as long as Tito was at the helm, were more generally interested in maintaining strong relations with one of the luminaries of the non-aligned movement. The major difference between the Yugoslavs and the Soviets in their attitude to the " great courtship," is that while the former are by and large satisfied with the basic outlines of the relationship, the latter are quite capable of imagining arrangements far more propitious for their own interests. It may well be, as Elizabeth Clayton has suggested, that, at least where Yugoslavia is concerned, the Soviets view economic intervention as a substitute for military intervention.[47] But the Yugoslavs understand this potential as well, and understand also the inevitable corollary of the realization of Soviet *desiderata*, namely, the clear demotion of Yugoslav foreign policy from this paradoxical combination of minor power status with great power pretensions to simply unquestionable minor power status. For this and other reasons outlined here, it is unreasonable to expect Yugoslavia to gravitate toward the Soviets in an evolutionary way. Such gravitation is in direct conflict with Yugoslav national interests.

On the other hand, while destabilization ploys are too risky to be sensible as instruments of Soviet policy in the Yugoslav case, the disintegration of the Yugoslav polity into warring nationality factions—a prospect which no longer seems so far-fetched after the violent Albanian nationalist riots in Yugoslavia's province of Kosovo in April 1981—could provide an opportunity for the Soviets to come into the picture again, either as the " guardians " of Yugoslav unity, or as the sponsors of Croation and Serbian mini-states, if Albania and Bulgaria were to be allowed to gorge themselves on Yugoslav territory.[48] Indeed, it is in part because that possibility is no longer so far-fetched

[47] Elizabeth Clayton, " Economic Intervention as a Solution to Soviet Political Problems in the Balkans," Phillip A. Petersen (ed.), *Soviet Policy in the Post-Tito Balkans* (US Air Force: Studies in Communist Affairs, Vol. 4, 1979), p. 120.

[48] Resecessionist currents among the Albanian population of the Yugoslav province of Kosovo, see Pedro Ramet, " Problems of Albanian Nationalism in Yugoslavia," *Orbis*, Summer 1981.

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that Belgrade's new leaders have been treading lightly, endeavouring to protract the *modus vivendi* they have achieved with the Soviets and to reinforce the Soviet conviction that a hands-off policy vis-à-vis the Yugoslav state is in fact the most sensible policy for them.

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Afghanistan and the Persian Gulf*

Thomas T. Hammond

" The road to Paris and London lies through the towns of Afghanistan, the Punjab, and Bengal."

Leon Trotsky, 1919[1]

" The area south of Batum and Baku in the general direction of the Persian Gulf is . . . the centre of the aspirations of the Soviet Union."

V. M. Molotov, 1940[2]

FORMER Secretary of State Edmund Muskie once described a conversation he had had with Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko:

> Gromyko asked me, " Why are you so upset about Afghanistan? " I said, " It's the geography of Afghanistan that disturbs us. Whatever your present intentions are, if you move into Afghanistan and stay there you will become a more serious potential threat to our vital interests in the area than you were before you moved in."
>
> And Muskie added later: " The consequences of a cut-off of the Persian Gulf oil, for us in the West, are too catastrophic to ignore."[3]

Muskie made a crucial point: it is not Afghanistan itself that worries the US, since Afghanistan is one of the poorest countries in the world and borders on no vital waterways. It is what lies this side of Afghanistan, especially the oil of the Persian Gulf, where extremely vulnerable regimes are in power. As Henry Kissinger expressed it:

> We are on a roller-coaster to disaster. Our future is now at the mercy of a precarious political status quo in what is probably the most volatile, unstable and crisis-prone region in the world.[4]

The situation in the Persian Gulf today is frightening for the United

* This article is adapted from Professor Hammond's forthcoming book *Red Star Over Afghanistan: The Communist Coup, the Soviet Invasion, and Their Consequences*, to be published by Westview Press.

[1] Cited by Professor Albert L. Weeks in the *New York Times Book Review*, 21 June 1981, p. 1. Trotsky made the statement on 5 August 1919 in a secret message to the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party, in which he argued that " we have up to now devoted too little attention to agitation in Asia." An English translation can be found in Jan M. Meijer (ed.), *The Trotsky Papers, 1917–1922*, vol. I (Mouton, London, The Hague, Paris, 1964), p. 625.

[2] Raymond J. Sontag and James S. Beddie (eds.), *Nazi–Soviet Relations, 1939–41: Documents from the Archives of the German Foreign Office* (Department of State, Washington DC, 1948), p. 259. Molotov, who was Commissar for Foreign Affairs at the time, made the statement on 26 November 1940. He indicated that the USSR would sign a pact with the Axis powers if they made certain concessions regarding Finland, the Turkish Straits, the area south of Batum and Baku, and other matters considered vital to Russia.

[3] The *Washington Post*, 1 Feb. 1981, p. C5.

[4] *Time*, 22 Sept. 1980, p. 29.

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States and its allies because more than half the oil involved in international trade comes from the Gulf, including a significant portion of American imports and much higher percentages for several of her key allies, including West Germany, France, Italy, and Japan.[5] This vital area is far away from the United States but only a few hundred miles from the Soviet Union, so trying to protect US interests there poses formidable logistical problems. Figuring out how to get significant quantities of troops, weapons, and supplies to the Persian Gulf before the Soviets do is a nightmare for American military planners.

The crucial question about the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, therefore, is the one Muskie referred to: will the Soviets use Afghanistan as a stepping-stone to the Persian Gulf? As indicated above, I do not think this was the main motivation for the Soviet invasion; there were other reasons, to do with Afghanistan itself, that were more compelling. But the Soviet leaders are as easily able to look at a map as we are, and they were hardly ignorant of the fact that the occupation of Afghanistan took them much closer to the Strait of Hormuz. Whether they went into Afghanistan for defensive or offensive reasons, the fact remains that they are there, and the temptation to take advantage of this is great.

The big temptation for the Soviets is to get into a position whereby they could interdict the shipment of oil out of the Persian Gulf—either by securing a base along the Strait of Hormuz, thus gaining a commanding position along the sea lanes leading out of the Strait, or by establishing their domination over one of the major Gulf states. If the Soviets were to acquire the ability to control the oil flow, they could blackmail Western Europe, Japan, and many other states. Then the whole post-war struggle between the United States and the Soviet Union might well be over, and Moscow would be a big step along the road to world domination.

How would this blackmail work? The Soviets probably would *not* attempt to cut off the flow of oil, for this would mean war. They would not have to cut it off, however, as long as other states knew that they *could* cut it off. Instead the Soviets would go to the Western European states and Japan and say something like this:

> We know that the Persian Gulf oil is very important to you, and we are happy to be able to tell you that you need never worry about it again because we have established stability in that area. Through our strengthened position in the Gulf, we can guarantee that from now on you will get all the oil you need. We are your friends, and we will protect your interests. That being the case, there is no need for you to ally with the imperialistic Americans or to spend much money on arms; and there is obviously no longer any need for NATO.

[5]The *Washington Post*, 28 Jan. 1980, p. A16; the *New York Times*, 27 Jan. 1980, section 3, p. 1. For further details see Alvin J. Cottrell (ed.), *The Persian Gulf States* (John Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, Md., 1980), especially ch. 9, " Oil in the Persian Gulf Area " by Keith McLachlan, pp. 195–224; and Rouhollah K. Ramazani, *The Persian Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz* (Sijthoff & Nordhoff, Alphen Aan den Rijn, Holland, 1979).

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Thus a dominating Soviet position in the Gulf could lead to the finlandization of Western Europe, Japan, and the many other states dependent on this oil, all of which would be afraid of antagonizing Moscow.

Even if the USSR does not actually obtain bases near the Strait of Hormuz or put a pro-Soviet regime in power in one of the Gulf states, an uncontested increase in Soviet military and political power in the area could bring about the gradual finlandization of America's allies and of the Gulf states themselves. If Soviet power and influence in the area increase more than that of the US in the next few years, these states may decide that they cannot depend upon the US to defend their interests and may choose to make their peace with Moscow.

Of course it is not a foregone conclusion that Western Europe and Japan would succumb to such Soviet oil blackmail, or that the US would be powerless to respond. A Soviet move of this kind might have the opposite effect of strengthening NATO and binding the industrial powers even closer to the United States. It may be that an American threat to use nuclear weapons (tactical or strategic) would be sufficient to deter the Soviets. It is also possible that the sending of additional American and allied warships to the Persian Gulf would protect the flow of oil and prevent the Soviets from making their blackmail effective. But in view of the faint-hearted reaction by most European states to the invasion of Afghanistan and the imposition of martial law in Poland, America has little reason for confidence that her allies will stand firm against Soviet intimidation.

IT seems likely that the Soviets will move cautiously in the Persian Gulf area, lest they trigger off a war with the US. But one should not rule out the possibility that they will make a major, overt move, such as an invasion of Iran. Although Brezhnev generally followed low-risk foreign policies, it is conceivable that his successor will decide that now is the time to strike in the Gulf area, that the prize is too great to be missed, and that the chances of success are better now than later. The Politburo might conclude that given the present status of the Soviet–American military balance, the US would not be able to make an effective response, and that it makes no sense to wait until the Reagan administration has strengthened American strategic weaponry, built up the Rapid Deployment Force, and established bases in proximity to the Gulf. And if the Soviets should decide to stage a massive invasion of Iran in the near future, i.e., within the next five or six years, it is hard to see how the US could stop them, except through the use of tactical nuclear weapons, with all the risks of escalation that this would involve.[6] Still,

[6] The author wishes to thank Francis Fukuyama for suggesting this paragraph. The US Joint Chiefs-of-Staff in February 1982, declared that a Soviet invasion of Iran was the " least likely " threat to US interests in south-west Asia, but that, if it occurred, it could be very dangerous. They pointed out that an invasion through the mountains of northern Iran would be difficult. The *Washington Post*, 10 Feb. 1982, p. A12.

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the Soviets probably would not want to take this risk, and it seems more likely that they will move slowly, cautiously, and covertly, camouflaging their acts, and using natives or proxies rather than Soviet citizens wherever possible.

It might be useful to outline a number of possible situations in which the USSR could acquire the ability to threaten the flow of oil out of the Gulf. Some of these situations may be quite unlikely, but none of them, I think, is inconceivable, and they are worth thinking about and trying to guard against. The Soviets probably could not carry them out this year or next, and they may never be able to do so, but the Western powers need to plan for the worst possible contingencies, including these.

Iranian Scenario No. 1

Iran offers the greatest possibilities for the expansion of Soviet influence in the Persian Gulf, for several reasons:

1. It is the only Gulf state that borders on the USSR. Since 1979 that border has, in effect, been greatly lengthened, since Soviet troops are today stationed along the Iranian frontier not only in the north, but also in the east, in Afghanistan.
2. Iran occupies the whole northern shore of the Strait of Hormuz, the most strategic point in the Gulf.
3. Iran is one of the few states in the Middle East that has a sizeable communist party, the Tudeh Party.
4. Since the fall of the Shah, the country has been in chaos and may become even more chaotic when Khomeini dies.
5. Azerbaijan and Kurdistan, two large and populous areas in northern Iran, have long been the object of Soviet intrigues.

Meddling in Iran is an old Russian custom; tsarist Russia invaded Iran on occasions, and Soviet Russia has continued the tradition. In 1920, Bolshevik soldiers invaded the Caspian province of Gilan, and they refused to leave until Iran signed a treaty (27 February 1921), which, Russia claims, gives it the right to military intervention if it ever feels threatened.[7] (Iran has repudiated articles 5 and 6 of this treaty, but the Soviets have not; perhaps they think they may want to use them in the future.) During the Second World War the Soviet Union occupied all of northern Iran, in agreement with the US and Britain. But in 1945–46, Soviet troops refused to evacuate Azerbaijan and Kurdistan, and proceeded to set up two puppet states with the help of communist Azerbaijanis and Kurds imported from the USSR. Only strong pressure from the US and the UN forced the Soviets to withdraw.[8]

That Stalin's successors continued to cast a covetous eye on Iran is indicated by a revealing passage in Khrushchev's memoirs:

[7] Alvin J. Cottrell, op. cit., p. 173; Rouhollah K. Ramazani, *The Foreign Policy of Iran: 1500–1941* (University Press of Virginia, Charlottesville, Va., 1966), ch.7.

[8] Rouhollah K. Ramazani, " The Autonomous Republic of Azerbaijan and the Kurdish People's Republic," in *The Anatomy of Communist Takeovers*, ed. by Thomas T. Hammond (Yale University Press, New Haven, Conn., 1975), pp. 448–474.

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> The Afghans asked us to help them build several hundred kilometres of road near the Iranian border. It cost us a hefty sum since we had to tunnel through the mountains. However, because Afghanistan did not have railways, such a highway would be a main artery, carrying the economic life-blood of the country. The road also had great strategic significance because *it would have allowed us to transport troops and supplies in the event of war with either Pakistan or Iran.* [The italics are mine.][9]

Today the Soviets would probably be reluctant to invade Iran, lest this lead to war with the West. But they will certainly do all they can to help the Tudeh Party to seize power. Although Tudeh is at present rather small, it is growing, and it is the only well-organized, tightly disciplined party in the country—an advantage that is of crucial value in a period of political and economic turmoil.[10] Iranian communists have managed to increase their influence since the fall of the Shah by pretending to be loyal followers of Khomeini, supporting his every move, as well as by showing complete respect for Islam. As a result of this tactic, communists have managed to gain a number of important positions in the government.[11] They are said to be especially strong in the Ministry of Foreign Trade, where they reportedly constitute 30 per cent of the personnel.[12] If the Tudeh Party continues to grow in strength, it might be able to carry out a *coup* when Khomeini dies, or at some other time of crisis.[13] The door would then be open for a massive increase in Soviet influence, especially if the Tudeh regime invited Soviet intervention.[14] A logical consequence would be the building of Soviet bases near the Strait of Hormuz, putting the USSR in a position to engage in oil blackmail and to counter Western military power in the Persian Gulf.[15]

Although the Islamic regime in Iran is strongly anti-communist, it is even more anti-American, since the US is identified with the Shah. As a result of its isolation from the West, Teheran has been forced to turn increasingly to Moscow for trade, technology, arms and advisers. In February 1982, Iran and the Soviet Union concluded an agreement for increased economic and technical cooperation, and the Iranian minister who signed the agreement even referred to the USSR as a " friendly country."[16] Trade between the two countries had grown rapidly even

[9] Nikita Khrushchev, *Khrushchev Remembers: The Last Testament*, (Little Brown, Boston, Mass., 1974), p. 299. He added, quite innocently, " It took some time for the . . . Afghan leaders to understand that we weren't pursuing mercenary or military goals in their country."

[10] Interview with Alvin J. Cottrell. For a good discussion of Tudeh see Shahram Chubin, " Leftist Forces in Iran," *Problems of Communism*, vol. XXIX, no. 4 (July–August 1980), pp. 1–25.

[11] The *Washington Post*, 16 Apr. 1982, p. A20.

[12] The *Washington Post*, 10 Apr. 1982, p. A11.

[13] Comment by Professor Bernard Lewis of Princeton University at the Woodrow Wilson International Centre for Scholars, 9 Dec. 1980. There may be some possibility of cooperation between the USSR and the leftist Mujaheddin-i-Khalq, which is much larger at present than the Tudeh Party.

[14] *Time* in its issues of 23 Nov. 1981, p. 44, and 18 Jan. 1982, p. 30, claims that the ruling Islamic Republic Party invited the Soviet KGB to organize the Iranian intelligence and security forces and asked a Soviet military mission to train the Islamic Guards, but the author has been unable to find any substantiation for this charge. Professor Rouhollah K. Ramazani, an expert on Iran, says he doubts that these reports are true.

[15] Interview with Alvin J. Cottrell.

[16] The *Washington Post*, 16 Feb. 1982, p. A16.

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before that, reaching a figure in 1981 that was about 30 per cent higher than it had been during the final year of the Shah's reign. The Soviet Union is also engaged in numerous joint economic ventures in Iran and has signed accords making it possible for Iran to ship goods through Soviet territory, thereby circumventing the American blockade of Iranian ports.[17] Since the fall of the Shah, the new regime has also become more and more dependent on Soviet-made military equipment. Some of this equipment comes to Iran via Russia's friends, including North Korea, Syria, Libya, and East Germany.[18]

Iranian Scenario No. 2

A Tudeh *coup* is not the only way in which the Soviets might gain influence in Iran; dismemberment of Iran is another possibility. Only about half of the population of Iran is Persian; the rest are Azeris, Kurds, Arabs, Baluchi, Turkmen, and so on. The biggest threat of dismemberment comes from the Azeris and the Kurds, who have had repeated rebellions since Khomeini came to power, who have " brother " Azeris and Kurds living across the frontier in the USSR, and who have had their own Soviet-sponsored communist republics in 1944–47. (These are not small minorities: the Azeris in Iran number about 10 million, while there are about 2½ million Kurds.)[19] Culture, language, and religion serve as barriers between these two nationalities and the Persians. While most Persians are Shia Moslems, the great majority of Kurds are Sunnis. The Azeris are Shia, but have their own Ayatollah, Shariat-Madari, and do not recognize Khomeini. Islam, therefore, is not as strong a bond among the three groups as it might be.

Since the government in Teheran does not have firm control over what goes on in Azerbaijan and Kurdistan today, it has become easy for the Soviet Union to increase its influence in the area, both openly and covertly. Cultural relations with fellow ethnics in the USSR have increased, and Soviet propaganda and inflitration have become extensive. Some of the Azeri and Kurdish communists who earlier fled to the USSR have returned, and the political parties that ruled the left-wing republics in 1945–46 have been revived. Since Azeris and Kurds from the USSR look and talk just like their brothers and sisters in Iran, Soviet agents have little difficultry operating in Azerbaijan and Kurdistan.[20]

Under these circumstances, it would be feasible for Moscow to arrange a repetition of the events of 1945—the proclamation of independent

[17] Ibid.

[18] The *New York Times*, 9 Mar. 1982, p. A8. This is not meant to imply that relations between Moscow and Teheran are good in all respects. Anti-Soviet and anti-communist propaganda in Iran is still intense. The Khomeini government closed a Soviet consulate and a Soviet cultural centre, and the Soviet–Iranian Bank was forced to cease operations. The *Washington Post*, 10 Mar. 1982, p. A20. Iran has also refused to resume the shipment of natural gas to the USSR, complaining that the price was too low. The *Washington Post*, 13 Apr. 1982, p. A16.

[19] Interview with Professor Rouhollah K. Ramazani. Estimates of the population of the various ethnic groups in Iran vary widely.

[20] Interviews with Alvin J. Cottrell and Rouhollah K. Ramazani; Chubin, " Leftist Forces in Iran," op. cit,, pp. 1-2.

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Azerbaijan and Kurdistan republics, led by pro-Soviet communists. The new governments could then call upon the USSR for economic and military aid, including arms and military advisers. Over a period of time, the number of such advisers could be increased to a point where Azerbaijan and Kurdistan would be, in effect, under Soviet occupation. Moscow would then have control of provinces that contain a large part of the population of Iran, produce most of Iran's food, border on the crucial Shatt-al-Arab waterway, and are close to the oil fields of both Iran and Iraq.[21]

Again it should be emphasized that the Soviet Union probably will *not* march its army into Azerbaijan and Kurdistan, since this might prompt a military response from the West. Gradual infiltration by Soviet military and political advisers, buttressed by economic and military aid, could, however, lead to Soviet domination without giving the Western powers a specific act about which to protest—just as the West failed to do anything about the growth of Soviet influence in Afghanistan in 1978–79. The Azeris and the Kurds, for their part, would have no choice but to seek close ties with the Soviets, since nobody else would protect them from Iran and Iraq. The establishment of strong Soviet influence in independent Azerbaijan and Kurdistan states would give Moscow several strategic advantages:

1. Soviet intervention in the rest of Iran, either covertly or openly, would be easier.
2. The Soviets would be closer to the oil fields of Iran and Iraq, putting them in a better position to exert pressure on those two countries or, if feasible, to occupy the oil fields.
3. Since there are large and troublesome Kurdish minorities in Iraq and Turkey, the Soviets could gain considerable leverage on those two countries by threatening to support Kurdish territorial claims, or by supplying arms to Kurdish rebels.
4. Since the Soviet position in the Gulf area would be strengthened, those states which get most of their oil from the Gulf would be more fearful about doing anything to antagonize Moscow.[22]

Arguing against a Soviet move into Azerbaijan and Kurdistan, however, is the fact that these are not the most important areas of Iran—they do not contain oil. If the Soviets did succeed in establishing their dominance over the two northern provinces, this might produce retaliatory action on

[21] For more information on the Azeris and Kurds, as well as other minorities in Iran, see Rouhollah K. Ramazani, *The Northern Tier: Afghanistan, Iran, and Turkey* (Van Nostrand, New York, 1966), pp. 29–38. A recent account of Kurdish rebelliousness is in the *Washington Post,* 10 Feb. 1981, p. A12. In April 1981, the Iranian government offered to grant legal recognition to the Kurdish Democratic Party and other rebellious ethnic groups if they would renounce their opposition to the regime and turn in their arms. Teheran has made many such offers of amnesty to the Kurdish guerrillas, but without result, the *Washington Post,* 9 Apr. 1981, p. A24. See also the *Washington Post,* 10 Feb. 1981, p. A12, and the *New York Times,* 31 May 1980, p. A5.

[22] It is interesting to note that the Shah told Vice-President George Bush in April 1978 that he looked upon the communist seizure of power in Afghanistan as one more example of a Soviet grand design, as part of a communist drive to encircle Iran. In the same conversation with Bush, the Shah spoke of his concern for the other Persian Gulf states, which he said were " run by a bunch of bedouins " who had no plans and were no match for the forces determined to overthrow them. Secret cable from Ambassador William Sullivan in Teheran to State Department, cable no. 04062, 30 Apr. 1978, p. 1.

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the part of the US and its allies, moves that would deny the Soviet Union control over the oil fields.

The Baluchistan Scenario

The Soviet occupation of Afghanistan provides opportunities for Soviet expansion into Baluchistan. The Baluch are a separate ethnic group which has no state of its own, but lives in an area of 207,000 square miles that stretches across three countries—south-west Pakistan, south-east Iran, and southern Afghanistan. Like many other peoples in the world today, the Baluch are infected by the spirit of nationalism, resent being ruled by foreigners, and wish to have their own independent national state, uniting all Baluch peoples into a greater Baluchistan. This is particularly true of the Baluch in Pakistan, who fought a bitter and bloody civil war against the Pakistani government from 1973–77. The Baluch in Iran are also dissatisfied, partly because they are Sunni Moslems in a country dominated by Khomeini's Shiites.[23]

Some of the Baluch in Pakistan are pro-Soviet in varying degrees, and others would be willing to accept support from any country, including the USSR. After the civil war, many of the Baluch rebels fled from Pakistan to Afghanistan, including members of the Marxist Baluchistan People's Liberation Front, who have been training and preparing for the day when they can return to Pakistan and start a new uprising.[24] This situation presents Moscow with an opportunity to promote a Baluch rebellion against Pakistan and Iran, leading to the formation of a pro-Soviet independent Baluchistan, which might then grant military bases to the USSR on the Arabian Sea.

Apart from the Baluch rebels who fled from Pakistan, there are about 100,000 or more Baluch who are natives of Afghanistan and about 15,000 who live in the USSR.[25] This means that the Soviets could organize, arm, and train a Baluch " Liberation Army " in Afghanistan or the USSR, and at the same time smuggle weapons and agents into Pakistan and Iran to prepare for the day when the " national liberation struggle " would begin.[26] A Baluch revolutionary government could proclaim the independence of Baluchistan and, if it proved unable to defend itself, could appeal for aid from Soviet troops stationed along the frontier.

An independent Baluchistan, indebted to the Soviet Union and

[23] The *New York Times*, 13 Jan. 1980, p. 2E; Selig Harrison " Nightmare in Baluchistan," Foreign Policy, no. 32 (Autumn 1978), pp. 139, 148–150; the *Washington Post*, 8 Feb. 1980, p. A20.

[24] *Time*, 15 Jan. 1979, pp. 32–33.

[25] Population statistics in these countries are unreliable. The 100,000 figure comes from Louis Dupree, *Afghanistan* (Princeton University Press, Princeton, N.J., 1980), p. 62. The figure of 15,000 Baluch in the USSR is an estimate based on a population of 13,000 in 1970, as reported in Alexandre Bennigsen, " Soviet Muslims and the World of Islam," *Problems of Communism*, vol. 29, no. 2 (March–April 1980), p. 40. The Baluch were not counted in the 1979 census.

[26] Bruce Stannard of *The Observer* was admitted to Afghanistan in the summer of 1981. He wrote: " Afghan government ministers we spoke to would neither confirm nor deny that up to 12,000 Baluchi rebels were now being trained in Afghanistan with Soviet assistance. The Baluchi tribesmen who are demanding independence could . . . easily destabilize Pakistan if the Americans continue to step up their aid to the Afghan rebels through that country." The *Boston Globe*, 30 Aug. 1981, p. 13.

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dependent upon Soviet support against Pakistan and Iran, might then be willing to let Moscow build naval and air bases at the harbour of Qwadar, at the port of Jiwani, only 365 miles from the Strait of Hormuz, or at the already well-developed port of Karachi.[27] If the Baluch-populated areas of Iran also became parts of an independent Baluchistan, the Soviets might acquire even better bases at the Iranian port of Chah Bahar, which is closer still to Hormuz. Moscow would then be in an excellent position to threaten the sea lanes leading out of the Persian Gulf.

What is not clear about the Baluch is how much the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan has antagonized them. According to Francis Fukuyama, " the primary concern of most politically active Baluchs now is the freedom of their kinsmen living under Soviet occupation in Afghanistan."[28] Louis Dupree also reports that in the latter part of 1981 the Soviets sent a group of about 30 Baluch from Afghanistan into Pakistan to stir up trouble, but they all betrayed the Soviets and reported to the Pakistan authorities.[29] If this is typical and most Baluch now hate the Russians more than the Pakistanis, the Baluchistan scenario is obviously less feasible than it seemed.

The Pakistani Scenario

A variation of the Baluchistan possibility would be the complete partitioning of Pakistan. The Baluch would create their own independent state, while Afghanistan and India seized the rest, thereby wiping Pakistan off the map. Afghanistan has long coveted the North-West Frontier Province of Pakistan since it is populated predominantly by Pushtuns and formerly belonged to Afghanistan. India, for its part, would be happy to get the Punjab, Sind, and the Pakistani part of Kashmir. The remainder could become the People's Democratic Republic of Baluchistan, under the protective wing of the USSR. One advantage of this possibility for the Soviets is that they would not have to use their own troops, but could remain on the sidelines as " innocent " bystanders.

Through such a partition the Soviet Union could simultaneously achieve several objectives:

1. Create an independent Baluchistan, beholden to Moscow.
2. Acquire military bases on the coast of Baluchistan, near the entrance to the Persian Gulf.
3. Enlarge its satellite state, Afghanistan.
4. Destroy Pakistan, which is the chief refuge for Afghan rebels, the main route through which arms are sent to the rebels, and a friend of the US.

[27] The *Washington Post*, 9 Feb. 1980, p. A11.

[28] Francis Fukuyama, *The Security of Pakistan: A Trip Report* (Rand Corporation, Santa Monica, Cal., Sept. 1980), p. 12.

[29] Statement by Professor Louis Dupree at a meeting of specialists on Afghanistan, Washington DC, 16 Dec. 1981.

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How India would react to this is another story. It might be happy to acquire some of Pakistan's territory and see its most hated enemy destroyed, but it would probably be uneasy about becoming an immediate neighbour of Soviet-occupied Afghanistan.

Other Possibilities for the Persian Gulf Region

Moscow also might use its client state, South Yemen, as a tool for expanding Soviet influence in the Persian Gulf. If South Yemen should ever succeed in uniting with North Yemen, it might then be powerful enough to promote a revolution in Saudi Arabia, by direct attack, and also by arming and organizing the over one million Yemenis and Palestinians who work in Saudi Arabia.[30]

North and South Yemen together have a population of about 9 million, almost twice as much as that of Saudi Arabia, so a unified Yemen could pose a real threat to the Saudis, especially since the Soviets are sending large quantities of arms to the Yemenis. Beginning in 1979, Moscow sent North Yemen between one billion and two billion dollars in military equipment, including MIG-17s, Sukhoi fighter-bombers, helicopters, tanks, armoured personnel carriers, and various types of artillery. In addition, Moscow increased the number of military advisers in North Yemen to about 600, while about 1,500 Yemenis, mostly military personnel, were brought to the USSR for training. At the same time the Soviet Union has been sending arms to the National Democratic Front, a guerrilla movement led by dedicated Marxists.[31]

Noting the similarities with Afghanistan, which also obtained most of its arms from Moscow and sent most of its military officers to Russia for training, some observers predict that within a few years North Yemen may see a repetition of events on the Afghan pattern—a communist *coup* carried out by officers educated in the USSR. A Marxist North Yemen united with a Marxist South Yemen would then pose a serious threat to Saudi Arabia, and to the West.

Another possible danger spot is Oman, which might be subjected to an invasion by the Marxist regime of South Yemen, combined with a revival of the Dhofar rebellion which plagued southern Oman for many years. Although Oman is a small, poor country, it is of great strategic importance since it occupies the southern side of the Strait of Hormuz and has agreed to allow the United States to use some of its facilities for military purposes. The threat to Oman was highlighted in 1981 when South Yemen massed troops along the frontier and provoked several border clashes.[32]

[30] David Ottoway, " Saudis Cast Wary Eye on Foreign Workers," the *Washington Post,* 4 Mar. 1981, p. A16.

[31] David Ottoway in the *Washington Post,* 21 Apr. 1982, p. A19.

[32] The *Washington Post* on 27 Mar. 1981. p. A4, published the following story: " Oman has accused South Yemeni forces of firing on an Omani aircraft and at an Army patrol during a number of border incidents last month. . . . The firing incidents were followed by the massing of Yemeni troops on the border with Oman. The statement accused the Soviet Union, East Germany and Cuba of supporting moves."

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WHETHER the Soviet Union will try to promote the development of any of these situations, or some combination of them, is anyone's guess. But the occupation of Afghanistan has surely improved Moscow's ability to move in the direction of the Persian Gulf, to exacerbate the problems of states in that area, and to threaten the interests of the United States and its allies. It should be borne in mind, however, that the enactment of some of these situations is dependent on Moscow getting Afghanistan under much firmer control than has been achieved so far.

In addition, we should remember that the situation in the Persian Gulf could worsen for the West and improve for the USSR, even if the Soviet Union does nothing. The biggest change in the region in recent years was the fall of the Shah, and the Soviet Union was not responsible for that. This area is plagued by great political instability, largely due to the strains that occur when conservative Islamic societies undergo modernization. Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states are grappling with the problems of how to introduce Western education and technology without disrupting Moslem traditions, of how to build modern industries and cities without creating social ferment, of how to absorb sudden and enormous wealth without stirring up class antagonisms, and of how to preserve monarchical governments against the threat of revolution by radicals on the left or right. If other regimes in the Gulf succumb to revolution in a manner reminiscent of Iran, the West will be adversely affected, while the USSR will gain from it.

IN view of Soviet actions in Afghanistan and possible future Soviet moves in the area of the Persian Gulf, what should the United States do?

Aid the Rebels

The most obvious and most urgent need is to send arms, food, medicine, and money to the rebels. The US does this not only because it admires these brave people, but also because it serves its own interests. The longer the Soviets have to fight in Afghanistan, the less easy it will be for them to cause trouble elsewhere—in Pakistan, Iran, the Persian Gulf, or other areas. Afghanistan cannot be used as an arena for Soviet moves towards the Gulf as long as more than half the country is in the hands of the guerrillas. The military airfields at Shindand and Quandahar may be insecure bases for flights to the Strait of Hormuz or the Indian Ocean if the runways and fuel dumps are vulnerable to rebel raids.[33] Thus it is to the advantage of the US to support the Afghan resistance movement.

It is also worth remembering that throughout the Vietnam war the Soviets supplied the arms that were killing American soldiers, and they made no attempt to hide the fact; indeed, they boasted to the world that

[33] A Reuters dispatch in the *Washington Post* on 18 Jun. 1981, p. 24A, reported as follows: "Afghan rebels attacked the Soviet air base at Bagram, 36 miles north of Kabul, on 9 June and caused large-scale fires in ammunition and gasoline stores." The rebels are quite active in the vicinity of Qandahar and Shindand.

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Soviet support for the " national liberation struggle " in Vietnam was a sacred duty. The American government, by contrast, has never admitted that it is sending aid to the " national liberation struggle " in Afghanistan. Now that the Soviets are involved in " their Vietnam," the US should make it as expensive as possible for them. If they have to pay a heavy price for their invasion of Afghanistan, this may discourage them from undertaking similar adventures in the future.

Robert K. Neumann, former US Ambassador to Afghanistan, made another important point:

> If we refuse to help the Afghans, we . . . would demonstrate that we are all talk and no action. . . . Our failure to act would give a signal to Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf states that we are simply not to be counted upon. . . .[34]

Some have argued that the US should not send arms to the rebels on the grounds that their cause is hopeless; therefore, the more weapons the Afghans get, the more of them will be killed. Thus we would increase the slaughter by encouraging the freedom fighters to wage a war they cannot win. To this one can reply that the rebels have shown that they are going to fight whether we help them or not; indeed, many of them have already been fighting for years without outside assistance or encouragement. As one Afghan put it, " It is not up to Washington whether we fight or not; it is up to Washington whether we will fight with reasonably good weapons or with stones."[35]

The Importance of Pakistan

Unfortunately, transporting sophisticated arms or large quantities of arms across Pakistan poses problems. If the supplies reaching the rebels via Pakistan were to increase significantly, the USSR might take military action against Pakistan. In fact, the Soviets have already given Pakistan a taste of what they could do; refugee camps and border posts in Pakistan have been bombed and strafed, and Pakistani soldiers have been killed in small-scale border incidents.[36] It would be easy for the Soviets to increase these attacks, make larger incursions across the frontier, occupy small salients of Pakistani territory, or seize key mountain passes.[37]

Pakistan is also vulnerable to Soviet political pressures of various kinds. For example, the Soviets could back Afghan claims to Pushtunistan, i.e., the North-West Frontier Province of Pakistan. Nationalistic Pushtuns in Afghanistan have long demanded that these territories be returned, and the Babrak regime could perhaps gain some popular support by championing this cause. The Soviets could also

[34] *US News and World Report*, 7 July 1980, p. 27.
[35] Ibid.
[36] Francis Fukuyama, op. cit., pp. v, 17; interview with State Department official, Edward Girardet, " With the Resistance in Afghanistan," *Christian Science Monitor*, 26 Sept. 1981, p. 3.
[37] Ibid.

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threaten Pakistan by endorsing Baluch demands for independence, as explained above.

Another handy weapon Moscow can use against Pakistan would be to support President Zia's political opponents, particularly the followers of former Prime Minister Bhutto. They are already doing this indirectly through the Babrak regime. Bhutto's sons are living in a house in Kabul supplied to them by the Afghan government, and it was apparent from Kabul that they planned the hijacking of a Pakistani airliner in March 1981. The hijackers ordered the plane to Kabul, and it remained there for seven days, during which time they were greeted by Murtaza Bhutto, the former Prime Minister's eldest son. Despite appeals by the State Department to the Soviet Union to use its influence to end the hijacking, the Soviets did nothing. While in Kabul all of the hijackers were out of the plane at one time, within rifle range of Soviet and Afghan troops, but no effort was made to detain or shoot them. The State Department later accused the Soviet government of failing to try to end the hijacking and strongly suggested complicity by the Soviet government.[38] Since Zia's rule is rather shaky, he is probably worried that the Soviets will give further aid to his enemies in the future.

Another way in which the Soviets could punish Pakistan for aiding the Afghan rebels would be to encourage India to attack it and seize Pakistani territory. Finally, as the ultimate form of punishment, the Soviets could launch a full-scale invasion of Pakistan and dismember it, with or without the aid of India.[39]

For all these reasons it would be risky for Pakistan to allow arms to flow to the rebels openly or on a scale big enough seriously to damage Russia's position in Afghanistan. Once the Soviets feel they are suffering major setbacks because of Pakistan, they will be tempted to take retaliatory action. This means, in effect, that the rebels may never get sufficient sophisticated arms significantly to improve their present position. Even if the US government should decide to send large quantities of anti-tank and anti-aircraft weapons, Zia might feel he could not allow them to pass through Pakistani territory.

American policy-makers have the delicate task of " trying to maintain a balance between having the insurgents armed well enough to make it too costly for the Russians to want to stay in Afghanistan, while not providing so many weapons that the Soviets will be provoked to attack Pakistan."[40] In public statements Pakistani officials reject the notion that the Soviet Union might launch a large-scale invasion of Pakistan, but some of them admit in private conversation that the prospect worries them. As one high official put it:

> Pakistan provides sanctuary for villagers who support the insurgents. If they had no place to go, the insurgents might knuckle

[38] The *Washington Post*, 8 Mar. 1981, p. A15; 17 Mar. 1981, pp. A1, A14; and 26 Apr. 1981, p. A24; *Time*, 30 Mar. 1981, pp. 32–33.
[39] For similar views see Fukuyama, op. cit., pp. v, 19.
[40] The *New York Times*, 20 July 1980, p. 12.

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> under, the way the Russians see it. They are wrong because the Hazaras in central Afghanistan, the Uzbeks in the east, even the Tadjiks in the north near the Soviet border, are resisting successfully without such a sanctuary. But in their frustration Pakistan has to be a tempting target for the Soviets when they see all the Afghan activity on the North-West Frontier.[41]

American Aid to Pakistan

Pakistan today is in a very difficult position. To the east it is bordered by its big and bitter enemy India, with a population of 650 million compared with Pakistan's 80 million, an enemy with which it has repeatedly been at war. India, moreover, signed a treaty of friendship with the USSR in 1971, and made a massive arms deal with the Soviets in 1980. On the west and north Pakistan is now bordered, in effect, by the Soviet Union. Pakistan feels threatened by these two powerful neighbours and naturally looks to the US for support. But if it accepts large-scale American aid or moves closer to Washington, it may alarm its neigbours and possibly provoke them into retaliatory action.

It was not surprising, therefore, that in 1980 President Zia rejected as " peanuts " President Carter's offer of 400 million dollars in aid. A senior Pakistani official described the situation:

> The 400 million dollars we were being offered were over a two-year period, and half of it was military sales credits that we would have had to pay back, so what we would be getting this year [1980] to build up our forces to face the Soviets was 100 million dollars in credit. And what does 100 million dollars buy these days when it comes to arms?
>
> If we accepted the 400 million dollars we would not be buying any real security and we would be provoking the hostility of both the Soviet Union and India. And we would be endangering our position in the non-aligned bloc and in the Islamic group of nations. We concluded, therefore, that we would be worse off accepting the American offer than rejecting it.[42]

Carter's administration's policy, said President Zia, lacked " credibility and durability." That is, the smallness of the offer indicated a feeling in Washington that it must be cautious about displeasing India or making a substantial, long-term commitment to Pakistan. It simply was not worth it to Zia to line up with the US against the Soviet Union unless Washington gave evidence that it would be a generous and dependable ally. Speaking of the Soviet Union, Zia commented: " You cannot live in the sea and create enmity of the whales. You have to be friendly with them. The Soviet Union is on our doorstep. The United States is ten

[41] Ibid.

[42] The *New York Times*, 16 July 1980, p. A3. Zbigniew Brzezinski, who went to Pakistan to discuss the offer of aid, admits that Zia was justified in complaining that 400 million dollars was not enough. But he argues that it was a tactical error on Zia's part to make the " peanuts " remark in public because it undercut support in Congress and made any efforts to increase the aid offer impossible at that time. The remark received a great deal of publicity, partly because of Carter's well-known agricultural activities. Interview with Brzezinski.

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thousand miles away."[43] Zia knew, moreover, that Pakistan's defences along the border with Afghanistan were weak, which meant that the Soviets could strike there " with impunity."[44]

Zia may have questioned American credibility also because he had seen the US pull out of Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos, and do little or nothing to stop the spread of Soviet influence in Angola, Ethiopia, South Yemen, and Afghanistan.[45] American opposition to Soviet-supported Marxist takeovers in the Third World appeared to be weak and unpredictable, whether under Nixon, Ford, or Carter. In the post-Vietnam era the American people seemed reluctant to do much to stop the spread of communism and Soviet power around the globe.

In April 1979 the Carter administration cut off all aid to Pakistan because it believed that Pakistan was secretly trying to develop nuclear weapons. This hardly seemed fair since Pakistan's chief enemy, India, exploded a nuclear device in 1974, manufactured with the use of heavy water supplied to India by the US.[46] While the policy of trying to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons is admirable, the US has not been able to prevent Pakistan from pushing its nuclear programme in the past and is not likely to be able to do so in the future. As former Prime Minister Bhutto said, Pakistan would " rather eat grass than give up the bomb."[47]

The Carter administration hesitated to make a major commitment to Pakistan, in part because the country is ruled by an unrepresentative, authoritarian military dictatorship, headed by an unpopular general. Opposition to Zia is so widespread that he may well be overthrown within the next few years. If the US sends Zia massive economic and military aid, there may be a repetition of what happened in Iran under the Shah, and Pakistan could end up as an adversary rather than a friend of the US.[48]

While this is a real danger, it seems imperative that the US make use of Pakistan for the defence of the Persian Gulf, if for no other reason. To dramatize the importance of Pakistan to the West, one should picture what it would be like if the Soviet Union gained control of southern Pakistan. Then the Soviets could build air and naval bases at the ports of Karachi, Gwadar, and Jiwani, astride the sea lanes leading from the Persian Gulf. This would largely nullify American sea power in that area and place oil shipments to the US and its friends in jeopardy.

[43] The *New York Times*, 16 Jan. 1980, cited in Vernon V. Aspaturian, " The Afghan Gamble: Soviet Quagmire or Spring-Board? " in *The Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan: Three Perspectives* (Centre for International and Strategic Affairs, University of California, Los Angeles, Cal., 1980), p. 54, footnote 24.

[44] The *Washington Post*, 17 Jan. 1980, p. A1. The quoted words are those of the military governor of the North-West Frontier Province.

[45] Fukuyama, op. cit., pp. 24–25.

[46] Ibid., p. 24.

[47] Ibid., p. 38.

[48] See, for example, the editorial in the *Washington Post*, " Slow on Pakistan," 25 Mar. 1981, p. A18; Jack Anderson, " Pakistan's Zia: ' Shah Syndrome ' Revived," the *Washington Post*, 6 May 1981, p. E19, and *US News and World Report*, 30 Jun. 1980, p. 31.

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Strengthening Pakistan would have several benefits. Pakistan could continue to serve as a refuge and source of arms and other supplies for the Afghan insurgents. It would also be encouraged to persist in its refusal to recognize the Babrak regime. In addition, giving substantial support to Pakistan might perhaps induce it to permit shipment of larger quantities of the munitions the rebels need, including anti-aircraft and anti-tank rockets. American support for Pakistan might also cause it to facilitate the build-up of US military power in the Persian Gulf area. While the Pakistanis do not want to have American bases on their territory, they might permit the stationing of supply ships, loaded with tanks and other military equipment, in Karachi and other harbours, for use by the US Rapid Deployment Force.[49]

For these and other reasons, the Reagan administration decided to make a more generous offer of aid to Pakistan than had the Carter administration. In June 1981 it announced that the US and Pakistan had agreed to a programme of assistance over a five-year period amounting to more than 3 billion dollars, about half of it economic and half military. The economic aid will make it easier for Pakistan to care for the 2½ million Afghan refugees on its territory. (Pakistan is currently bearing about half the cost of this refugee support.) The US has promised to sell Pakistan a variety of weapons, including some F-16 fighter-bombers, the most advanced plane in the American arsenal. However, President Reagan will have to convince Congress to exempt Pakistan from the Symington Amendment, which prohibits the sale of arms to any country trying to develop nuclear weapons.[50]

While India objects to Reagan's arms sales to Pakistan, there seems to be little justification for such objections. India is 10 times the size of Pakistan, has 8 times the population, has a much larger army, air force, and navy, and has recently concluded an arms deal with the USSR worth more than 8 billion dollars. It seems unlikely, therefore, that Pakistan will be so foolish as to attack India. Still, it is to be hoped that the programme of aid to Pakistan will be handled in such a way as to minimize anti-American reactions in India.[51]

Although the arms aid promised to Pakistan by Reagan is much larger than that offered by Carter, it is, of course, far from sufficient to enable Pakistan to defend itself from a full-scale Soviet attack. No amount of aid could guarantee Pakistan security from Soviet aggression, but it could make a Soviet attack more costly, and thus might discourage Moscow from attempting it.[52] The aid package also makes the Pakistanis

[49] Fukuyama, op. cit., pp. 33–34.

[50] The *Washington Post*, 16 Jun. 1981, pp. A1, A12.

[51] Selig Harrison on the OP-Ed page of the *New York Times*, 15 July 1981, raised objections to the Reagan aid programme, arguing that Pakistan wants arms mainly for use against India and pointing out that the US failed to assure India that it would prohibit use of these arms in a Pakistani–Indian conflict. He argued also that the promised arms are better suited for attacking India than for defending Pakistan from a Soviet invasion. James L. Buckley, who negotiated the aid package for the State Department, replied to Harrison in a letter to *The Times* of 5 Aug. 1981, and Niaz A. Naik, Pakistan's chief delegate to the UN, presented his views on the Op-Ed page of the same issue.

[52] Drew Middleton in the *New York Times*, 21 July 1981, p. A11.

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feel that the United States is more committed than before to the defence of their country.

Another conduit for weapons to the rebels is Iran, although on a much smaller scale than Pakistan. Since relations between the US and Iran are hostile, the Teheran government is not eager to cooperate with the United States, but Khomeini has expressed sympathy for the rebels, so perhaps he may be willing to permit the shipment of arms across Iran to Afghanistan. The south-eastern part of Iran, however, is populated predominantly by Baluch, and that area today is largely autonomous, so the sympathy of the Baluch for the rebels may be more important than Khomeini's attitude. In any case, American officials have confirmed that arms are reaching the insurgents via Iran. Some are sold to the rebels at high prices, while others are sent to them free of charge.[53]

IF the Soviet Union is to be discouraged from making future aggressive moves like the invasion of Afghanistan, it will have to pay a penalty for what it has done. Unfortunately, when the USSR invaded Hungary and Czechoslovakia, it got little more than a slap on the wrist. There was a big uproar in the press for a while, but then the noise died down and the United States and Western Europe returned to business as usual. This has happened again. Afghanistan is not news anymore; it is seldom mentioned in the press, and the American government does relatively little to publicize the situation there. Worst of all, President Reagan, despite his antipathy for the Soviet Union, cancelled the grain embargo. Regarding this move, it is interesting to read two letters published in the *Washington Post* (2 May 1981):

> Karl Marx called the shot once again. The ending of the grain embargo neatly fits his metaphor of the capitalist selling the rope with which he will be hanged. Short-sighted profit-seeking, both from the sale of grain and from the garnering of farm-bloc votes, obviously outweighed consideration of principle or even of geopolitical strategy. The Russians rightly label this an American defeat.
>
> *Nahman Zirinsky*

> Why must we feed the mouth that bares its teeth at us; the same mouth that would bite off our head if we turned our back? The only substantive and real signal to the Soviet Union, and the rest of the world, of our abhorrence and disgust at Soviet aggression against defenceless nations is being tossed aside. . . . Is everything for sale in this country?
>
> *Christopher Bova*[54]

[53] Leslie Gelb in the *New York Times*, 7 Aug. 1981, p. 4A. His sources were US administration officials.

[54] President Reagan has also been criticized for cancelling the grain embargo on the grounds that he is bailing out Soviet agriculture and the Soviet economy generally, instead of forcing the regime to suffer the consequences of its economic inefficiency. It has also been pointed out that as long as the US continues to sell large quantities of grain to the USSR, it is difficult for Reagan to tell West European countries that they should not support the Soviet gas pipeline project, nor sell high technology goods to the Soviet Union, nor grant credits, and so on.

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It is also worth noting that most Americans have shown little outrage over Soviet acts in Afghanistan. During America's intervention in Vietnam, the streets were full of demonstrations and many campuses had their riots and sit-ins. Similarly, in 1981 there were protest marches in Washington against the sending of 55 military advisers to El Salvador. But there have been very few demonstrations by Americans against the sending of 100,000 Soviet troops to Afghanistan or the slaughter of thousands of Afghan peasants.

Strengthen America's Position in the Persian Gulf

If the biggest danger from the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan is the potential threat to the Persian Gulf, then the most important thing for the US to do is to strengthen its position in that area. This is no simple task, particularly since the Gulf is so close to the USSR and so far from the United States. It requires the simultaneous pursuit of several interrelated policies:

1. Increase the strength of the American navy in the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean.
2. Establish and/or expand bases and other military facilities in Diego Garcia, Oman, Kenya, Somalia, Egypt, Turkey, and elsewhere. Pre-position large quantities of arms and supplies in the Middle East. Practice military exercises with these states.
3. Speed up the development of the Rapid Deployment Force. Build the cargo planes and ships necessary to transport these forces quickly around the world.[55]
4. Exert every effort to improve relations with Iran, the most important state in the Persian Gulf. If that is impossible with the present regime, support pro-American forces trying to overthrow that regime.
5. Demonstrate to the states of the Gulf, especially Saudi Arabia, that the United States has the will and the power to protect them from Soviet encroachments. Sell them the military equipment they need to defend themselves.
6. Provide economic and military support to Turkey, which lies on the flank of Soviet invasion routes from Transcaucasia to the Persian Gulf, and which has serious economic and political difficulties.
7. Send more military and economic aid to Pakistan and thereby give it the strength to preserve its independence, aid the Afghan rebels, and help the US defend the Persian Gulf.
8. Put pressure on America's allies in Europe and Japan to contribute their fair share to the defence of Persian Gulf oil, which is more vital to them than it is to the United States.
9. America must do whatever it can (and that may not be much) to promote stability in the crisis-prone countries surrounding the Persian Gulf.
10. Protect Oman and North Yemen from any aggression by South Yemen.

[55] On the deficiencies of the RDF, see the *New York Times*, 26 Sept, 1980, pp. A1, A24.

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Accomplishing all these tasks will not be easy. They represent, in the words of Harold Brown, former Secretary of Defence, " the greatest current challenge to the United States' geostrategic and military plan, and to our international political skill."[56] But the energy that flows from the Persian Gulf to the US and its friends is so important, and the Soviet position so threatening, that these things must be done.

The United States and Communist Takeovers

What can the US do to prevent more communist takeovers like the one in Afghanistan? In some cases it can do nothing. It could not prevent the communist *coup* in Afghanistan because it was too far away and it happened too suddenly. Nor could the US have sent troops there without risking war with the Soviet Union. In some cases the cost of intervening may be more than the American people are willing to pay, as in Vietnam. But the US must rid itself of the common attitude that American military intervention in any country, under any circumstances, is both evil and bound to fail. If the Soviets conclude that the US is suffering from a permanent case of post-Vietnam paralysis, they will feel that they can support communist takeovers anywhere and everywhere without fear of opposition. The United States must be prepared to intervene diplomatically, economically, and, if necessary, militarily. The development of a strong Rapid Deployment Force should help. If the US can get troops to a trouble spot before the Soviets or Cubans or Vietnamese do, this would be a great advantage because then they would face the risks of attacking US forces rather than vice versa.

The United States should also try to identify potential trouble spots before communist revolutions occur, since upholding an existing government is more acceptable to world opinion than overthrowing one. Besides, it is difficult to oust a communist regime once it has seized power. Above all, the United States must not give Moscow the impression that it is unable and unwilling to act, as this might encourage the USSR to embark on more foreign adventures, thereby leading to unforeseeable confrontations with the US.

56 " US Security Police in Southwest Asia: A Case Study in Complexity," a speech delivered at the John Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, Washington DC, 30 Apr. 1981, p. 27.

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Effects of Bipolarity on Chinese Foreign Policy

Michael Ng-Quinn

IN this article, I shall put forward the thesis that, since the end of the Second World War, Chinese foreign policy behaviour can best be explained in terms of the effects of strategic bipolarity. Despite what Chinese leaders may have said or wished to the contrary, actual Chinese foreign policy behaviour suggests that Chinese leaders must have been aware of the reality of strategic bipolarity as well as of the constraints it imposes on international relations. This is the case even though the term " bipolarity " itself has never been employed by Chinese leaders, whose conception of the same phenomenon, however, can be inferred from actual Chinese foreign policy behaviour or practice.[1]

I shall further argue that China's own power position in the international system is such that it is viewed by others as having the potential to affect, threaten or upset bipolarity. Consequently, in order to survive bipolar competition, it has been China's policy to " lean to one side " at any given time.

I hasten to add that this recognition of the reality of strategic bipolarity on China's part does not necessarily mean its abandonment of strategic multi-polarity (or tripolarity as in the case of the " Three Worlds ") as an intermediate goal, and a classless and stateless world society as an ultimate fulfilment of the communist ideal. Recognition of bipolarity may indeed have been seen and justified as a mere expedient tactic, or as a means of resolving the " principal contradiction " in world politics, namely, the national survival of oppressed and socialist states amidst superpower domination and competition. Indeed, China has supported economic multi-polarization in the form of a " New International Economic Order," which may be interpreted as China's view of a first step to the eventual realization of similar multi-polarization in the strategic sphere, leading to a more equitable distribution of international power.[2] However, as long as the capabilities

[1] I am aware of similar arguments made by other authors who, however, have not provided any detailed formulation and documentation of a Chinese conception of bipolarity. For a general treatment of Chinese foreign policy in the context of superpower competition, see, for instance, Michael B. Yahuda, *China's Role in World Affairs* (St. Martin's, New York, 1978); Steven I. Levine, " The Superpowers in Chinese Global Policy," in James C. Hsiung and Samuel S. Kim, eds., *China in the Global Community* (Praeger, New York, 1980), pp. 40–62; and Chun-tu Hsueh and Robert C. North, " Peking's Perceptions of Soviet-American Relations," in Chun-tu Hsueh, ed., *Dimensions of China's Foreign Relations* (Praeger, New York, 1977), pp. 44–75. For a discussion of various levels of analysis of Chinese foreign policy, see my " The Analytic Study of Chinese Foreign Policy," in *International Studies Quarterly*, forthcoming.

[2] See Samuel S. Kim, *China, the United Nations, and World Order* (Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1979), Chaps. 5 and 6. See also Dai Lunzhang and Wang Zichun, " Guo Ji Jing Ji Ling Yie De ' Pe Jiu Li Xin ' Dou Zheng " (Struggle to Destroy the Old and Create the New in the Realm of International Economics), *Hongqi* (No. 7, 1980), pp. 44–48.

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of the two superpowers remain unchallenged, and the distribution of international power is such that strategic bipolarity still prevails, a world revolution threatening strategic bipolarity without guaranteeing China's own safety does not seem to be supported by the Chinese. In actuality, despite polemics, China has consistently been " leaning to one side," and, in effect, contributing to the maintenance of strategic bipolarity.

The only exception to the above pattern can be found in the period from 1962–64 to 1968–69, when China felt rejected by both poles at the same time. As a result, it restored to an unsuccessful attempt to defy bipolarity, on which I shall elaborate later.

Let me first turn to a discussion of how a Chinese conception of bipolarity has evolved historically.

From Ideological Dichotomy to Strategic Bipolarity

Before the Second World War, the general international orientation of the Chinese communist leadership seems to have paralleled that of the Soviet leadership. One distinct feature of this shared communist world view was a tendency to dichotomize the world in ideological terms. For instance, Lenin said in 1921 that " there are now two worlds: the old world of capitalism . . . and the rising new world. . . ." Stalin said in 1919 that " the world has definitely and irrevocably split into two camps: the camp of imperialism and the camp of socialism."[3] Likewise, Mao in 1926 remarked that " the present world situation is such that the two major forces, revolution and counter-revolution, are locked in final struggle. . . . The intermediate classes are bound to disintegrate quickly, some sections turning left to join the revolution, others turning right to join the counter-revolution; there is no room for them to remain ' independent.' "[4] This dialectic way of viewing the world continued to find traces in Mao's writings throughout the subsequent war period. For instance, in 1940 Mao again remarked that " the present international situation is one of struggle between capitalism and socialism."[5]

These earlier Chinese views of the world did pave the way for a subsequent conception of strategic bipolarity in at least two respects. First, granted that up to the end of the Second World War the Chinese communist leadership saw the world as being dichotomized along ideological rather than strategic lines, and no power " poles " yet existed, the world was nevertheless seen as being divided into two parts. Secondly, Mao, as quoted above, saw " no room for any to remain ' independent.' " He repeated in 1940 that " heroes " in the colonies and semi-colonies " must stand either on this side or on the other, for

[3] Cited in " Chairman Mao's Theory of the Differentiation of the Three Worlds Is a Major Contribution To Marxism-Leninism," *Beijing Review* (or *Peking Review* before 1 Jan. 1979) (4 Nov. 1977), p. 12.

[4] *Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung* (hereafter referred to as *SW*) (Peking, Foreign Languages Press), Vol. I, p. 14.

[5] Ibid. Vol. II, p. 354.

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there is no third choice."[6] This showed a Chinese readiness or predisposition to " lean to one side."

I suggest that this original view of ideological dichotomy was gradually transformed into a conception of strategic bipolarity towards the end of the Second World War and immediately afterwards, when it became clearer to the Chinese leadership that the United States and the Soviet Union would emerge from the war as two contending power " poles," not only along ideological, but also along strategic lines. This argument is based on the fact that towards the end of the war, not only did the Chinese communists first appeal to a capitalist United States for aid, but they also rather abruptly shifted to the Soviet side in 1946 when they were convinced that the United States would only support the Chinese nationalists.

I must emphasize at this point that it is this shift from one side to the other in 1946—which was subsequently to be reinforced by another shift in the reverse direction in the 1970s—that constitutes proof of a Chinese conception of bipolarity. Such repeated shifts, I shall argue, have been necessitated by bipolar competitive pressure, and Chinese recognition of it.

LET me begin by asking why the Chinese communists first appealed to the United States in the 1940s. This appeal occurred within the context of negotiations between the Chinese communists and nationalists. Since this period of history has been covered by numerous authors in great detail,[7] I shall not repeat the background story here. In a nutshell, the Chinese communists were looking for an outside mediator to: (1) exert pressure on the Chinese nationalists to prevent a civil war; (2) set up an Allied command to coordinate between communists and nationalists, as well as foreign forces to defeat the Japanese; and (3) provide aid for China's post-war economic reconstruction. Britain and France were considered by the Chinese communists to be far too weak.[8] The Soviet Union did not meet their requirements either for at least five reasons. I shall go into greater detail here, for a careful examination of

[6] Cited in Allen S. Whiting, *China Crosses the Yalu* (Stanford University Press, Stanford, 1968; Macmillan, 1960), p.7.

[7] See Tang Tsou, *America's Failure in China, 1941–50* (University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1963); Don Lohbeck, *Patrick J. Hurley* (Regnery, Chicago, 1956); Michael Schaller, *The US Crusade in China, 1938–1945* (Columbia University Press, New York, 1979); Barbara Tuchman, *Stilwell and the American Experience in China, 1911–45* (Macmillan, New York, 1972); Russell Buhite, *Patrick J. Hurley and American Foreign Policy* (Cornell University Press, Ithaca, NY, 1973); John Gittings, *The World and China, 1922–1972* (Harper & Row, New York, 1974); Steven I. Levine, " Soviet-American Rivalry in Manchuria and the Cold War," in Hsueh, pp. 10–43; Steven M. Goldstein, " Chinese Communist Perspectives and International Affairs, 1937–1941," Ph.D. Dissertation (Columbia University, 1972); Steven M. Goldstein, " The Chinese Revolution and the Colonial Areas: The View from Yenan, 1937–41," *The China Quarterly*, No. 75 (Sept. 1978), pp. 594–622; James Reardon-Anderson, *Yenan and the Great Powers: The Origins of Chinese Communist Foreign Policy, 1944–1946* (Columbia University Press, New York, 1980); and John S. Service, *The Amerasia Papers: Some Problems in the History of US-China Relations* (University of California Press, Berkeley, 1971).

[8] Gunther Stein, *The Challenge of Red China* (Whittlesey House, New York, 1945), pp. 444–45.

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the historical record may shed some light on subsequent, current, as well as future, developments of Sino-Soviet relations.

First, the Soviets themselves lacked economic capabilities. As Chu Teh remarked in his interview with Votaw in July 1944, " The Soviets have had such heavy losses that they will need rest and perhaps cannot come into the war against Japan."[9] Mao in his interview with Service in August 1944 repeated the same doubt:

> Soviet participation either in the Far Eastern War or in China's post-war reconstruction depends entirely on the circumstances of the Soviet Union. The Russians have suffered greatly in the war and will have their hands full with their own job of rebuilding. We do not expect Russian help.[10]

Secondly, throughout the Second World War, the Soviet government officially supported Chiang Kai-shek's National Government as the legal government of China, and the Chinese communists had not received any separate aid from the Soviet Union.[11] Mao told Stein in July 1944 that:

> In none of the three stages of our development have we received Russian support. Relations between KMT and the Soviets are closer than ours. Sun Yat-sen invited Russian advisers. CKS has had Russian help during the Northern Expedition and the anti-Japanese war.[12]

For the Soviets, Chiang was still the official Chinese leader. Thus, on purely political grounds, the Chinese communists had no reason to trust that the Soviet Union would be on their side vis-à-vis the Chinese nationalists.

Thirdly, the Soviet Union at that time had still not entered the war against Japan in East Asia, and thus had offered little help, if any, to China's national defence against Japan. Also, as Service has suggested in a retrospective account, Soviet interests in Mongolia and Manchuria also threatened Chinese national interests.[13] Already in 1936, in an interview with Edgar Snow, Mao expressed the view that:

> It is the immediate task of China to regain all our lost territories, not merely to defend our sovereignty below the Great Wall. This means that Manchuria must be regained.[14]

[9] See the Subcommittee to Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act and other Internal Security Laws of the Committee of Judiciary, United States Senate, *The Amerasia Papers: A Clue to the Catastrophe of China* (hereafter referred to as *AP*) (US Govt. Printing Office, Washington, DC, 1970), p. 999.

[10] See Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers* (hereafter referred to as *FRUS*) (US Printing Office, Washington, DC, 1944), Vol. VI, p. 613.

[11] See Max Beloff, " Soviet Far Eastern Policy Since Yalta," in *Soviet Source Materials on USSR Relations with East Asia, 1945–1950* (Institute of Pacific Relations, New York), pp. 5–6. See also Gittings, p. 95.

[12] *AP*, p. 982.

[13] Service, p. 181. See also *AP*, p. 982, where Mao said that, " Outer Mongolia is part of China . . . China must first recognize Outer Mongolia as a national entity. Then organize a sort of United States of China to meet their aspirations. . . ."

[14] See Edgar Snow, " Interviews with Mao Tse-tung, Communist Leader " in *China: The March Toward Unity*, by Mao, et al. (Workers Library Publishers, New York, 1937), p. 40.

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Concerning Outer Mongolia, Mao said that:

> The relationship between Outer Mongolia and the Soviet Union, now and in the past, has always been based on the principle of complete equality. When the people's revolution has been victorious in China, the Outer Mongolian republic will automatically become a part of the Chinese federation, by its own will.[15]

Mao's view on Outer Mongolia in 1944 remained the same. As he told Stein:

> Our National Government must first recognize Outer Mongolia as an autonomous national state in accordance with the promise Dr. Sun Yat-sen gave all national minorities. . . . When they took that right for themselves and set up their own democratic republic, the Outer Mongolians issued a declaration to the effect that they would rejoin China as soon as they were recognized as one of the national entities. . . . I hope and have no doubt that they will rejoin China.[16]

Regarding Manchuria, Mao said, " Ever since 1937, our slogan has been to fight until we reach the Yalu River at the eastern border of Manchuria."[17] Given Soviet interests in Outer Mongolia and Manchuria, on purely national grounds, the Chinese communists did not find the Soviet Union reliable.

Fourthly, from the point of view of domestic politics, the Chinese communists were aware that the Chinese nationalists were suspicious of the Soviets since they too were communists. In January 1944, Ambassador Gauss reported to the Secretary of State that:

> The majority of the officials of the Kuomintang is, however, so motivated by suspicion of Soviet intentions regarding Manchuria and the Chinese communists that they can envisage no possibility of Sino-Soviet cooperation and their planning for the post-war period has ever in the background the fear of Soviet Russia. . . .[18]

Edmund Clubb of the Division of Chinese Affairs also reported in May that:

> There is a small number of leaders such as Madame Sun Yat-sen, Sun Fo, and Feng Yu-hsiang, who maintain still a part of that Kuomintang sympathy for the USSR which was common in the days of Sun Yat-sen; however, the pro-Soviet Members of the National Government, including both Sun Fo and Feng Yu-hsiang, are political personages lacking any major political influence. . . . It may safely be said that practically every important political leader, such as President Chiang Kai-shek himself, Minister of War Ho Ying-chin, Foreign Minister T. V. Soong, and Minister of Education Chen Li-fu are strongly and probably irrevocably committed to an anti-Soviet trend of thought.[19]

[15] Ibid. p. 41.
[16] Stein, pp. 442–43.
[17] Ibid. p. 456.
[18] *FRUS*, 1944, Vol. VI, p. 759.
[19] Ibid. p. 786.

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While the Chinese nationalists were never convinced that the Chinese communists were no longer attached to an international organization under Soviet dominance,[20] Chiang still viewed this foreign linkage as being even worse than the Japanese invasion. In Chiang's words, " the Japanese are only lice on the body of China, but communism is a disease of the heart."[21] This led Mao to conclude that:

> the KMT because of its anti-communist phobia is anti-Russian. Therefore KMT-Soviet cooperation is impossible. And for us to seek it would only make the situation in China worse. China is disunified enough already! In any case Soviet help is not likely even if the KMT wanted it.[22]

Fifthly, it is possible that there might have been a problem of emerging ideological polycentricity between the Chinese communists and the Soviets. This could be traced back to the history of the Chinese Communist Party and its relationship with the Soviets. One of the main targets of the *Cheng Feng* movement, which had been going on since 1942, was those new Party members who had freshly graduated from the Sun Yat-sen University in Moscow and were Soviet-oriented in ideology. Mao had always tried to emphasize the " independence " of the Chinese communists. He told Votaw in July 1944:

> There has been in the past and there is now no connexion between the Communist Party of China and the Communist Party of the USSR. In the past, there was a relationship with the Communist International, but this no longer exists. Neither has the Communist Party of China had any connexion with the communist parties of other countries.[23]

Mao also told Stein that " The Comintern has been dissolved. There was no need for it, and it had no place in the Far East."[24] Though Mao's words could not be taken at face value, it was for him a truism that in order to be truly independent, a nation must not be subordinated to any foreign nation, not even ideologically.

Given the above reasons, the Chinese communists decided that the Soviet Union could not be relied on as a mediator. Since there was only one other capable candidate left, they had no choice but to appeal to the United States.

This choice of the United States over the Soviet Union seems to have been based on a realistic calculation of the Chinese national interest, as well as the relative capabilities of the United States and the Soviet Union. It may be interesting to note, as I shall discuss later, that consideration of the same economic, political, territorial, national, as well as ideological

[20] One KMT official had remarked that " the CCP is an international organization . . ." in Stein, p. 33; for a retrospective account by Chiang Kai-shek, see his *Soviet Russia in China* (New York, 1957), p. 109.

[21] Cited in Lohbeck, p. 258; see also Stein, pp. 428–35.

[22] *FRUS*, 1944, Vol. VI, p. 613.

[23] *AP*, p. 1028.

[24] Ibid. p. 979.

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factors may also have been responsible for a similar decision, made by the same Chinese leaders almost 30 years later in the 1970s, once again to turn away from the Soviet Union and appeal to the United States.

Even in ideological terms, this appeal to a capitalist United States in the 1940s could easily have been justified by invoking such notions as " united front " and " principal and secondary contradictions."[25] As a 4 July editorial of *Chieh-fang jih-pao* (Liberation Daily) in 1944 put it, " Even Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin had highly valued the United States' struggle for democracy."[26] Mao even went so far as pronouncing that " we encourage competition and private enterprise,"[27] and that industrialization in China could be done " by free enterprise and with the aid of foreign capital."[28] By suggesting that " Chinese and American interests are correlated and similar,"[29] Mao was expressing a desire for a closer relationship with the United States.

This appeal to the United States did not by itself constitute an act of " leaning to one side." However, one may wonder why, in their appeal to the United States, the Chinese communists should have deliberately disassociated themselves from the Soviets. As Mao put it, the Chinese communists were " not striving for the social and political Communism of Soviet Russia."[30] They did " not intend to go so far as the Russian Soviets—to take the land from landlords and redistribute it to the people,"[31] and thus they differed " from the Soviets in an economic sense."[32] Politically, they differed from the Soviets in that they did not " call for nor plan a dictatorship of the proletariat,"[33] at least not during the period of the " New Democracy." Their " form of democratic government includes landlords, merchants, capitalists, and petit-bourgeois as well as peasants and workers," as opposed to the Soviet system where there were " no landlords, no merchants, no petit-bourgeois."[34]

It would be incorrect to believe that the Chinese communists disassociated themselves from the Soviet Union in order to persuade the United States to believe that they were no longer communist. The Chinese communists never hid the fact that this was what they were. As Chou En-lai put it, " Our ultimate ideal is the socialist collectivism of

[25] For an elaboration on these concepts, see Tang Tsou and Morton H. Halperin, " Mao Tse-tung's Revolutionary Strategy and Peking's International Behavior," *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 59 (Mar. 1965), pp. 80–99. See also Lyman P. Van Slyke, *Enemies and Friends: The United Front in Chinese Communist History* (Stanford University Press, Stanford, 1967).

[26] 7/4/1944 editorial entitled, " On Celebrating US National Day."

[27] Harrison Forman, *Report from Red China* (Henry Holt, New York, 1945), p. 179.

[28] *FRUS*, 1944, Vol. VI, p. 614.

[29] Ibid.

[30] Forman, p. 178.

[31] " We did do that in the past, I admit; but, by agreement with the Kuomintang and the Government on September 22, 1937, we gave up this policy for a modified one—a policy of persuading landlords to reduce their rents to a reasonable figure, while assuring them that these lowered rents would be paid regularly by the tenants . . ." in ibid. p. 179.

[32] Ibid.

[33] Ibid.

[34] Ibid.

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Communism."[35] The Chinese communists were, according to Stein, " convinced of the correctness of Marxism;"[36] and, as Theodore White pointed out, they denied " the assumption of many American friends that they are merely agrarian reformers, not communists at all. They insist they are communists in the full sense of the word, and they are proud of it."[37] As Mao explained to Votaw:

> Judging from the policy maintained by the Party at the present time, a policy which will be maintained for a long time to come, the Party might be more aptly called a democratic party. But because of our method of working, because our world conception is Marxist and because the result of the evolution of human history will be the eventual realization of Communism, we are not abandoning the name of Communist Party.[38]

Since the Chinese communists appeared to be rather confident about their communist orientation, their deliberate disassociation from the Soviets could only have meant a distinction between themselves and the Soviets on the basis of the different stages of socialist development that the two were undergoing.[39] After all, Mao had stated as early as 1936 that:

> The experience of the civil war in the Soviet Union directed by Lenin and Stalin has a world-wide significance. All Communist Parties, including the Chinese Communist Party, regard this experience and its theoretical summing-up by Lenin and Stalin as their guide. But this does not mean that we should apply it mechanically to our own conditions. In many of its aspects China's revolutionary war has characteristics distinguishing it from the civil war in the Soviet Union.[40]

Moreover, as Po Ku (Chin Pang-hsien), a Chinese communist leader, put it, " China at present is not even capitalistic. Its economy is still that of semi-feudalism. We cannot advance at one jump to socialism."[41] Mao also told Stein that " Even the existence within our party of a group advocating the immediate practice of a communist social system is impossible on account of the concrete conditions in China which make communism unfeasible for a very long time to come."[42] Therefore, one could argue, China was different from the Soviet Union in that what China needed at that particular stage was:

> New democracy—carrying out the revolution of national independence, democracy and people's livelihood, by the masses of

[35] Ibid, p. 180.
[36] Stein, p. 119.
[37] Theodore H. White and Annalee Jacoby, *Thunder Out of China* (William Sloane Associates, New York, 1946), p. 234.
[38] *AP*, p. 1031.
[39] One could also argue that the Chinese communists distinguished themselves from the Soviets because of the same economic, political, territorial, national and ideological factors that I have just discussed.
[40] *SW*, Vol. I, pp. 194–95.
[41] Cited in Service, p. 165.
[42] Stein, p. 118.

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> the Chinese people and on the basis of private property. . . . What China needs most is democracy—not socialism. We are still very far from socialism. . . . China needs . . . to solve the agrarian problem so that capitalism of a progressive character can develop in China.[43]

That the Chinese communists were disassociating themselves from the Soviets because of their different stages in development could be a plausible argument. However, that the Chinese communists should have done so in the context of their appeal to the United States also suggests that they must have presupposed a special interest on the part of the United States in Sino-Soviet relations. In this light, the Chinese communists might have disassociated themselves from the Soviet Union for a special strategic reason: they wanted to convince the United States that, despite the fact that they were communist, they were not on the Soviet side within an emerging context of strategic bipolarity. In effect, they showed a willingness strategically to " lean to one side "—in this case, to the side of the United States.

This thesis—that the Chinese communists were aware of an emerging bipolarity, or competiton between the United States and the Soviet Union in strategic terms—can be further illustrated by what the Chinese communists did in June 1946. After months of negotiations involving the United States as mediator, the Chinese communists suddenly, prematurely, and excessively launched a series of polemic attacks against the United States.

It was reported by non-communist sources that on 22 June 1946, Mao himself sparked off a series of attacks by accusing the United States government of supporting the Chinese nationalists, and thus intervening in the Chinese civil war. Mao also demanded the immediate withdrawal of United States troops from China.[44] An editorial of *Chieh-fang jih-pao*, dated 25 June 1946, denounced the United States by charging that it was building a sphere of influence in China, and thus had become another imperialist power after Japan.[45] On 30 June 1946, commemorating the 28th anniversary of the Chinese Communist Party, Mao said that the Chinese should " travel the road of the Russians—this was the conclusion."[46] Mao further said that it was " childish " to say " We need the aid of the British and the American governments " because they were still " imperialists."[47] In an interview with Anna Louise Strong, an American correspondent, Mao attributed the Chinese civil war to the support that United States reactionaries gave to Chiang, and asserted that they and the atom bomb were all " paper tigers."[48]

Granted that the Chinese communists were utterly disappointed with a lack of progress in the negotiations, and that there was actual military

[43] *AP*, p. 978.

[44] See Wang Chien-ming, *Chung-kuo kung-chan-tang shih-kao* (History of the Chinese Communist Party) (Taipei, 1965), Vol. 3, p. 528.

[45] Reprinted in *Hsin-hua jih-pao*, 6/27/46.

[46] Department of State, *The China White Paper* (Stanford University Press, Stanford, 1967), p. 723.

[47] Ibid. p. 724.

[48] *SW*, Vol. IV, pp. 97–101.

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intervention by the United States in the form of providing transport for Chinese nationalist troops,[49] it still does not make sense that the Chinese communists should have leaned to the Soviet side without first securing a treaty or some form of guarantee of aid. Moreover, why should the Chinese communists have foreclosed the possibility of *rapprochement* with the United States by provoking it so prematurely and excessively? We know that as late as 1949, had the Chinese communists been willing, Leighton Stuart, the last American ambassador, could still have gone to Peking to negotiate.[50] Why had this option not been kept open?

I suggest that the Chinese communists took a drastic turn in June 1946 because they viewed the world as being strategically bipolar. Since they had been disappointed with one pole, namely the United States, they must have felt that they had to counter its influence by leaning towards the other pole, namely the Soviet Union. However, in order to persuade the Soviets to provide aid, the Chinese communists must have felt that they would first have to convince the Soviets that they were on the Soviet side vis-à-vis the United States. Since the Chinese communists knew that the Soviets had been aware of their previous dealings with the United States during the negotiations, the Chinese communists must have felt that they would have to go out of their way in order to correct their pro-United States image. Therefore, the Chinese communists decided to change sides dramatically by vociferously denouncing the United States in 1946.

That the Chinese communists needed to make an extra, if not drastic, effort in persuading the Soviets can be further illustrated by other evidence. For instance, Mao said in a retrospective account in 1962 that, in 1945, " Stalin tried to prevent the Chinese revolution by saying that we must collaborate with Chiang Kai-shek."[51] Not only did the Soviets sign a treaty with the Chinese nationalists in 1945, but they also invited Chiang to go to Moscow in 1946.[52] In Manchuria, the Soviets " destroyed on the spot all the war material that they did not take back into the USSR."[53] In other words, there was no sign of readiness on the Soviet part to support the Chinese communists.

It is my argument that it would not have been necessary for the Chinese communists either to disassociate themselves from the Soviets in their earlier appeal to the United States, or to antagonize the United States in 1946 in order to please the Soviets, had they not seen the two as in a bipolar competitive relationship with each other. It is this shift from one side to the other that constitutes proof of Chinese recognition of strategic bipolarity and the necessity to " lean to one side " at any given

[49] Gittings, p. 117.
[50] Seymour Topping, *Journey Between Two Chinas* (Harper & Row, New York, 1972), pp. 83–84 and 89.
[51] Cited in Gittings, p. 141.
[52] Ibid. p. 150.
[53] Ibid. p. 149.

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time. By leaning towards the Soviet side, Chinese foreign policy also helped consolidate strategic bipolarity.

I must emphasize that this bipolarity remained strategic in nature; ideological differences between the two poles merely helped reinforce already existing divisions of power based on relative capabilities. Had the Soviet Union been an obscure tiny island in the middle of nowhere, the fact that it was communist might not have alarmed the United States. Thus, even though bipolar competition in the 1950s was characterized by the Chinese as a struggle between the imperialist and socialist camps, its strategic primacy should not be confused by the ideological connotation of Chinese polemics.

The Intermediate Zone and Bipolarity

In August 1946, in an interview with Anna Louise Strong, Mao mentioned a " vast zone which includes many capitalist, colonial and semi-colonial countries in Europe, Asia and Africa," which the United States would have to subjugate before it could attack the Soviet Union.[54] This, according to Mao's accounts in 1958 and 1964, formed the basis of his theory of " the intermediate zone," which was first mentioned as such in his speech in Moscow in 1957.[55]

First of all, the concept of an " intermediate zone " does not necessarily negate the concept of " bipolarity," for the " zone " could not be " intermediate " without two " poles." The very concept of " intermediacy " presupposes two extremes.

Even if Mao had taken the view, as John Gittings has suggested, that members of the " vast zone " could " continue to wage different struggles " despite compromises reached by the great powers,[56] I suggest that such a view might not have meant a rejection of bipolarity. Struggles within the " vast zone " were possible not because they were divorced from constraints of superpower competition, but because neither the " vast zone," nor any of the two " poles," was necessarily static or cohesive. Armed struggles in the " vast zone " could be caused by " contradictions " within the zone, just as in the " imperialist " pole, " contradictions " might also have existed between " monopoly capitalism " and the " American people " as well as " the rest of the capitalist world."[57] Such internal " contradictions " did not necessarily alter the external relationships between the " vast zone " and the two " poles." Bipolar competition still constrained the foreign policy behaviour of those in the " vast zone."

Moreover, from China's perspective, armed struggles within the " vast zone " might also have been necessary for the purpose of heightening resistance against expansion into the zone by one of the two poles, namely the United States. It was in this context that Mao

[54] *SW*, Vol. IV, p. 99.
[55] Kim, p. 74; Gittings, p. 144.
[56] Gittings, p. 143.
[57] Ibid. p. 145.

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remarked in 1946 that " The Soviet Union is a defender of world peace and a powerful factor preventing the domination of the world by the US reactionaries," who were " trumpeting so loudly about a US-Soviet war and creating a foul atmosphere " in order to turn " all countries which are the targets of US external expansion into US dependencies."[58] In 1949, Mao unequivocally confirmed his view (traced back to 1926, as mentioned earlier) that all Chinese " must lean either to the side of imperialism or to the side of socialism. Sitting on the fence will not do, nor is there a third road."[59] Against this background, the Maoist conception in 1946 of a " vast zone " did not negate, but complemented what was then an emerging bipolarity. Its implication was that no country could escape from being caught in bipolar competition, and therefore everyone in the " vast zone," China included, must choose one side towards which to lean.

That China, given its own power position in the international system, should have recognized the reality of bipolarity and its implication did not mean that others in the " vast zone " would necessarily behave likewise. Nor, for that matter, did it mean that China itself, through its recognition of bipolarity, would necessarily have to accept bipolarity as static. Members of the " vast zone " might still have had leverage in deciding whether they wanted to choose sides immediately. For that matter, the option of defying bipolarity might also have been contemplated. It was under such circumstances of flux and uncertainty in the 1950s, I suggest, that China opted to pursue a policy of " peaceful coexistence " with those members of the " vast zone " which appeared to be " neutral." From China's perspective, " neutrality " was also desirable as a buffer against " imperialist " expansion. This " Bandung spirit " notwithstanding, the international system, in the Chinese view, must still have been basically bipolar. For without bipolar competition, " neutrality " itself would have been unnecessary. According to Mao (in 1956–58), " the Soviet Union and China are the principal components of the socialist camp."[60] As late as 1963, the " contradiction " between the socialist and imperialist camps was still officially viewed by the Chinese as paramount in the world situation.[61]

Chinese support for the pole centred around the Soviet Union began to falter when the Chinese gradually realized that leaning to the Soviet side did not prove to be beneficial to Chinese national interests. It is not necessary here to trace the origins of the Sino-Soviet split. For purposes of illustration, a few major examples will suffice:

— In 1950, the $300 million loan extended by the Soviets to China, with repayment to begin in 1954 at 1 per cent interest, was even smaller than that extended to Outer Mongolia.

[58] *SW*, Vol. IV, p. 100.
[59] Ibid. p. 415.
[60] Kim, p. 76.
[61] Ibid. p. 77.

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— When the problem of the status of Outer Mongolia was raised by Mao in 1954, he received no reply from the Soviets.
— Mao was reported to have said that during the Korean war, China had to shoulder the onerous responsibilities of fighting a costly war in order to protect a socialist brother.
— The same socialist brother promised to give technical and nuclear aid to China in 1957, but decided in 1960 to withdraw everything.
— While the Chinese insisted that the Soviets lead and protect the socialist camp, Molotov in 1955 and Khrushchev in 1959 proclaimed that the socialist camp neither had nor needed a head.
— During the Sino-Indian border dispute of 1962, the Chinese complained that the Soviets set a precedent of not supporting a socialist country against a non-socialist one.

Other differences between the Chinese and the Soviets can be cited on theoretical and strategic issues, such as when class struggle should end, whether economism should be emphasized, and whether there should be agreements on *détente* and nuclear non-proliferation. For a while in the 1960s, the Vietnam war might have postponed an intensification of their split, but it was clear to the Chinese that the Soviets had never wanted an equal partner, but a junior and subordinate one. This notion was forcefully reflected in the 1968 Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia. Chinese fear of a Soviet attack on China reached its height during their border clashes in 1969, compounded with the Soviet announcement of a proposal to set up a " system of collective security " in Asia.[62]

It was, I think, during the period from 1962–64 to 1968–69, that the Chinese were forced by international realities temporarily to suspend their " leaning to one side " policy. What China advocated during that period was to use the " intermediate zone " as a base to defy strategic bipolarity.

As early as 1962, Mao stated that the " principal contradiction " had turned into one between the peoples of the world (an expanded intermediate zone) and imperialism. This new definition of the principal contradiction was nevertheless not made in public until 1965.[63] Meanwhile, in 1963, the Sino-Soviet split was made open. In 1964, the Chinese viewed the world as being divided into two camps and an intermediate zone consisting of two parts: Asia, Africa and Latin America made up the first part; Western Europe, Canada, Oceania and Japan made up the second. It was not clear, however, whether China itself belonged to one of the two camps or the intermediate zone.[64]

Increased Chinese involvement in the intermediate zone showed that, irrespective of whether the Chinese saw themselves as being part of it, they intended to use it as a base to upset bipolarity. Chinese activities

[62] For a brief summary and analysis, see Harold C. Hinton, *The Bear at the Gate* (AEI-Hoover, Washington, DC, 1971). See also Drew Middleton, *The Duel of the Giants* (Scribners, New York, 1978).
[63] Kim, p. 77.
[64] Ibid. p. 78.

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took various forms, ranging from trade and extension of aid to support for national liberation movements.[65] The primary criterion for regulating these activities was what Van Ness refers to as " state interest."[66] One major aspect of the interest of the Chinese state was maintaining its power position vis-à-vis the two poles. In 1965, Mao told Edgar Snow that by utilizing such a forum as the Afro-Asian Conference, a union of nations could be formed without the United States.[67] In 1966, Mao also remarked that " the revolutionary storm in Asia, Africa and Latin America will certainly deal the whole of the old world a decisive and crushing blow."[68]

United States escalation in Vietnam provided an opportunity for Chinese leaders to debate whether the possibility of confronting both poles at the same time made it necessary for the Chinese to be reconciled with the Soviets. Disagreement was reflected in the famous essays by Lin Piao and Lo Jui-ching.[69] In this context, Mao himself also expressed uncertainty by confessing to Edgar Snow in 1965 that he had not reached a decision on what constituted the principal contradiction in the world situation at that point.[70] By rejecting the Soviet proposal for " unity of action " over Vietnam, Chinese leaders must have resolved that China should continue to pursue its " independence " policy. However, the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 and Sino-Soviet border clashes in 1969 once again must have sensitized the Chinese to the reality of the Soviet threat, and the necessity of " leaning to one side " in what was still a bipolar context.

As mentioned earlier, Mao already hinted in 1962 that the major contradiction was between the peoples of the whole world and imperialism. P'eng Chen and Lin Piao confirmed this thesis in 1965 (P'eng using the term " oppressed nations," and Lin using the term " revolutionary peoples ").[71] By 1968–69, the socialist camp had, in the Chinese view, ceased to exist. Mao in 1968 announced that " a new historical period of struggle against US imperialism and Soviet revisionism has begun."[72] In 1969, the " principal contradiction " was officially designated as one between the oppressed nations on the one

[65] See, for instance, Bruce Larkin, *China and Africa, 1949–1970* (University of California Press, Berkeley, 1971); Alan Hutchinson, *China's African Revolution* (Westview, Boulder, 1976); George Yu, *China's African Policy: A Study of Tanzania* (Praeger, New York, 1975); Jay Taylor, *China and Southeast Asia* (Praeger, New York, 1974 and 1976); Yitzhak Schichor, *The Middle East in China's Foreign Policy, 1949–1977* (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1979); Robert L. Worden, " China's Foreign Relations with Latin America," in Hsueh, pp. 191–231, and Bruce D. Larkin, " China and the Third World in Global Perspective," in Hsiung and Kim, pp. 63–84.

[66] Peter Van Ness, *Revolution and Chinese Foreign Policy* (University of California Press, Berkeley, 1971).

[67] Cited in Taylor, p. 101.

[68] Cited in " Chairman Mao's Theory of the Differentiation of the Three Worlds . . . ," p. 24.

[69] See Uri Ra'anan, " Peking's Foreign Policy Debate 1965–66," and Donald Zagoria, " The Strategic Debate in Peking," both in Ping-ti Ho and Tang Tsou, eds., *China in Crisis*, Vol. II (University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1968). See also Michael Yahuda, " Kremlinology and the Chinese Strategic Debate 1965–66," in *The China Quarterly*, No. 49 (Jan.–Mar. 1972), pp. 32–75.

[70] Kim, p. 79.

[71] Ibid.

[72] Cited in " Chairman Mao's Theory of the Differentiation of the Three Worlds . . . ," p. 36.

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hand, and imperialism and social imperialism on the other.[73] Nevertheless, the Lin Piao affair in 1971— when he was reportedly fleeing in the direction of the Soviet Union when his plane was shot down—suggested that the problem of " which side to lean to " might still have been disputed among Chinese leaders. United States initiatives towards China under Nixon and Kissinger might have lent support to those in China who favoured leaning away from the Soviets.

IN this section, I have so far argued that: (1) the concept of " intermediate zone " does not negate " bipolarity," for intermediacy presupposes two extremes; (2) China's redefinition of the intermediate zone in 1964 and its subsequent action in the zone demonstrated its desire to use the zone as a base to defy bipolarity; and (3) such an attempt turned out to be a failure because of an increasing danger of confronting both poles at the same time. If, through its own experience, China had learned that defiance against bipolarity was impractical and dangerous, what then would be the next logical step for China to take?

I shall argue that, since the 1970s, China has resolved to restore its " leaning to one side " policy—this time shifting back to the side of the United States. As in 1946, this time the Chinese also began the process of changing sides by vociferously denouncing one side, namely the Soviet Union, as if once again they had had to prove their sincerity to the other side, namely the United States.

If indeed Chinese foreign policy has been primarily constrained by China's own recognition of strategic bipolarity, how then can this recognition be squared with the so-called " Three Worlds " thesis?

The Three Worlds and Bipolarity

The origins of the " Three Worlds " thesis have been attributed to a talk given by Mao in February 1974, as well as to Teng Hsiao-p'ing's speech at the United Nations General Assembly in April 1974.[74] According to this thesis, the United States and the Soviet Union form the " First World." Japan, Europe and Canada make up the " Second World." The " Third World " consists of the developing countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America. Furthermore, the two imperialist superpowers " have become the biggest international exploiters, oppressors and aggressors—and the rivalry between them is bound to lead to a new world war." While members of the Third World " stand in the forefront of the struggle against the two hegemonists," members of the Second World " oppress and exploit the oppressed nations and are at the same time controlled and bullied by the superpowers. . . . But they are still a force the Third World can win over or unite with in the struggle against hegemonism."[75]

[73] See *Beijing Review* (*Peking Review*). Special Issue, 28 Apr. 1969.
[74] Kim, pp. 80–81; and " Chairman Mao's Theory of the Differentiation of the Three Worlds . . ."
[75] " Chairman Mao's Theory of the Differentiation of the Three Worlds . . . ," p. 17.

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I shall argue that, in operational perspective, there is no such thing as a " Three Worlds " differentiation. The so-called " Three Worlds " thesis, upon closer examination, shows traces of an immediate bipolar scheme. What China is advocating is a world-wide " united front " between the Second and the Third Worlds against the First. Yet, between the two superpowers of the First World, the Soviet Union is viewed as being more imperialistic, and thus more dangerous. By implication, this means that the world-wide " united front," which includes the United States by practical necessity, is against the Soviet Union alone in the first instance. This means that the world is differentiated into only two " poles ": the Soviet one and the non-Soviet one. Of the latter, the United States happens to be the most powerful member. To the Chinese, international politics is thus still very much strategically bipolar.

Why is the Soviet Union seen as " more crazy, adventurist and deceptive " than the United States, and thus China's " most important enemy? "[76] The official Chinese explanation is fourfold: First, " as the US got bogged down in wars and its strength began to decline, Soviet social-imperialism came up from behind."[77] Secondly, " because comparatively speaking Soviet social-imperialism is inferior in economic strength, it must rely chiefly on its military power and recourse to threats of war in order to expand."[78] Thirdly, it is " easier for Soviet social-imperialism to put the entire economy on a military footing and militarize the whole state apparatus " because " the Soviet bureaucrat-monopoly capitalist group has transformed a highly centralized socialist state-owned economy into a state-monopoly capitalist economy without its equal in any other imperialist country . . ."[79] Finally, " Soviet social-imperialism has come into being as a result of the degeneration of the first socialist country in the world. Therefore, it can exploit Lenin's prestige and flaunt the banner of ' socialism ' to bluff and deceive people everywhere."[80]

Without disputing any of the above four reasons advanced by the Chinese, one may suggest that the Chinese perception of the Soviet threat must alone have been the primary motivating force behind Chinese rhetoric. Since this perceived threat is primarily strategic-military in nature, only a strategic-military response could be effective. China's own military and technological inferiority has already rendered its unilateral efforts inadequate. Moreover, China must also have realized that, if military power is taken as a criterion in determining strategic polarity, the real world is undoubtedly still very much bipolar. (Multi-polarity will only be applicable when economic forces are also taken into account.[81])

[76] Cited in Kim, p. 80, as quoted from a confidential document of the People's Liberation Army issued in early 1973.

[77] " Chairman Mao's Theory of the Differentiation of the Three Worlds . . . ," p. 20.

[78] Ibid. p. 22.

[79] Ibid. p. 23.

[80] Ibid.

[81] This view is most ably articulated by Kenneth N. Waltz. See his most recent treatise in *Theory of*

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Therefore, in its strategic design, China's emphasis has been on portraying Soviet expansion in global-bipolar terms. While admitting that the threat of imperialism " happens irrespectively of man's will,"[82] the Chinese nevertheless believe that " world war, though inevitable, can be postponed." This can be accomplished by " the united struggle of the people of all countries against hegemonism."[83] This global struggle is also a bipolar issue for, between the two superpowers, " in essence, rivalry is primary," and " the Soviet Union's chief rival is the United States."[84]

China's Role in the Maintenance of Bipolarity

I have so far argued that China has recognized the reality of, and linked its own security to, strategic bipolarity. However, strategic bipolarity can be a source of international stability only if an equilibrium between the two poles can be maintained. International stability is important to China not only for security reasons, but also for the purpose of providing a favourable external environment for China's current internal modernization.[85] Therefore, any imbalance between the two poles would seem, to the Chinese, to have destabilizing effects on the international environment, and would thus be of great concern to them. Such an imbalance seems to have been evident to the Chinese since the 1970s.

In the Chinese view, unilateral Soviet expansion has been the primary destabilizing force. To the Chinese, the Soviets are inherently expansionist for historical as well as structural reasons: historical in that their expansionist tendencies can be traced back to the tsarist period; and structural in that the Soviet social system is dominated by a " bureaucrat-monopoly capitalist class," which necessarily seeks expansion and domination.[86] According to the Chinese,

> The Soviet strategy in Asia is to put down a strategic cordon around the continent, stretching from the Mediterranean, the Red Sea, the Indian Ocean and up to Haishenwei (Vladivostok), and using the " Cuba of Asia," Vietnam, as its hatchet man, seize the whole of Indo-China to dominate South-East Asia and South Asia and so edge the United States out of the continent.[87]

International Politics (Addison-Wesley, Reading, 1979). For a critique of Waltz in general, see Morton A. Kaplan, *Towards Professionalism in International Theory: Macrosystem Analysis* (The Free Press, New York, 1979).

82 Cited in " Chairman Mao's Theory of the Differentiation of the Three Worlds . . . ," p. 34.

83 Ibid. p. 35.

84 Ibid. p. 34; and " Soviet Military Strategy for World Domination," ibid. 28 Jan. 1980, p. 15.

85 This view was reportedly expressed by Teng Hsiao-p'ing (Deng Xiaoping) at a 50,000-person conference held in January 1980; see *Qishi Niandai*, No. 122 (Mar. 1980), p. 53. As late as Mar. 1981, the international editor of *Beijing Review* stated that " China hopes that there will be a relatively long period of peace to build up the country," in *Beijing Review*, 2 Mar. 1981. The same message was repeated in April, that " China needs a peaceful international environment to develop its economy and realize the four modernizations," in ibid. 27 Apr. 1981, p. 3.

86 See " Soviet Social-Imperialism—Most Dangerous Source of War," in *Beijing Review*, 30 Jan. 1976; and " Soviet Social-Colonialism Stands Exposed," ibid. 2 Dec. 1977.

87 " Social-Imperialist Strategy in Asia," ibid. 19 Jan. 1979; and " A New Move in the Kremlin's Global Strategy," ibid. 29 Sept. 1978.

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On the eve of launching a " counter-attack " against Vietnam in early 1979, the Chinese tried to sensitize the world to Soviet aggression in 1978 by charging that the Soviets engineered three *coups d'état*,[88] formed semi-military pacts in the form of friendship treaties with two Asian countries, and one African country contiguous to Asia,[89] provided weapons for Baluchistan insurrectionists, encircled Pakistan and Iran, sabotaged Arab unity, and expanded their military capabilities in the Pacific.[90] In view of the subsequent Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979, events seem to have reinforced Chinese suspicion and accusation.

In addition to unilateral Soviet expansion, in the Chinese view, an imbalance between the two poles may also have been caused by a tendency on the part of the other pole to " divert the Soviet peril to the East, to China," just as Chamberlain and Daladier did at Munich by diverting an expansionist Germany to the East, to the Soviets.[91] In order to link Soviet ventures in Asia to the central interests of the West, the Chinese did not fail to warn that:

> the Soviet Union started a large flanking move to encircle Western Europe with the main object of seizing sources of strategic materials vital to the West and controlling the major sea routes linking Western Europe and the United States and those linking the two with Africa and Asia. . . .[92]

In order to " expose and combat appeasement," Vice Premier Teng (Deng), while visiting Washington in early 1979, suggested that " the United States, Europe, Japan, China and other Third World countries should unite and earnestly deal with this (Soviet) challenge."[93] Teng also asserted that " China would not hesitate even to shoulder the necessary sacrifices to uphold international justice and the long-term interests of world peace and stability."[94] It was in this context that his intention of " teaching the Vietnamese a lesson " was made known.[95]

[88] President Mohammad Daud of Afghanistan, killed in a military *coup* on 27 Apr.; President Lt. Col. Ahmed Hussein Al-Ghashani of the Yemen Arab Republic, slain on 24 June; and President Salim Robaye Ali of the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen, executed by the pro-Soviet Liberation Front on 26 June.

[89] With Vietnam in November, Afghanistan in December, and Ethiopia in November.

[90] " Social-Imperialist Strategy in Asia."

[91] Jen Ku-ping, " The Munich Tragedy and Contemporary Appeasement," *Beijing Review*, 9 Dec. 1977.

[92] See note 87 above.

[93] " Interview of Vice-Premier Deng Xiaoping by US TV Commentators," ibid. 16 Feb. 1979.

[94] The *New York Times*, 31 Jan. 1979, p. 6; cited in Daniel Tretiak, " China's Vietnam War and its Consequences," *The China Quarterly*, No. 80 (Dec. 1979), p. 743.

[95] There is of course a possibility that the Chinese " counter-attack " against Vietnam was at least partially designed for domestic consumption: national pride needed to be asserted in order to compensate for the disgrace Chinese residents in Vietnam suffered while being driven out of Vietnam; elements still pro-Soviet as well as pro-Gang of Four, who might be sceptical about or even critical of United States-China normalization, needed to be sensitized to the reality of a Soviet threat *via* Vietnam; the " counter-attack " might also have helped boost the morale of the military, who must have exercised great restraint regarding the border skirmishes and whose prestige had also been on the decline after the downfall of Lin Piao in 1971; in addition, the Chinese military had had no major battlefield experience since the Korean war and the Sino-Indian border clashes, and the war over Vietnam might have provided a useful test of Chinese military capabilities; finally, the action could also have been

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To the Chinese, as mentioned earlier, Vietnam was the Soviet Union's " hatchet man." In order to contain Soviet expansion in the region, Vietnamese expansion must first be checked. As early as 1975, the Chinese already hinted that United States forces could remain in Thailand.[96] When Vietnam invaded Cambodia (Kampuchea), it became evident to the Chinese that United States presence in the region was not effective enough in deterring Vietnamese expansion. Therefore, it was necessary for the Chinese to take things into their own hands.

The Chinese " counter-attack " against Vietnam thus seems to have served at least two Chinese purposes: firstly, it was aimed at Vietnamese expansion *per se*. Secondly, it was used to pass on a Chinese message suggesting that members of the non-Soviet pole should voluntarily contribute to a scheme of strategic division of labour. When asked by Walter Cronkite about the situation in Iran during an interview with television commentators, Teng replied:

> The strategic position of Iran is extremely important. As for China, we can only morally express our points of view. We cannot do very much because of lack of ability there. And I believe that those countries who are in a position to do more should adopt a very serious attitude toward the question of Iran, and adopt more effective measures to help bring about a solution of the problem there.[97]

What China could not do regarding Iran was precisely what it did regarding Vietnam. By example, the Chinese wanted to show that, just as South-East Asia might fall within China's sphere of influence, much of the rest of the world would have to be the responsibility of " those countries who are in a position to do more." After all, as the Chinese warned, " one must not behave selfishly at the expense of others."[98]

Since the Chinese knew that they were not in a position to do more, what they actually did must have been so calculated as to maximize their role in a scheme of strategic division of labour. As far as their bilateral relationship with the Vietnamese was concerned, an escalation of conflict could not have driven the Vietnamese any closer to the Soviets, as the latter two were already very close to each other at the expense of the Chinese. The argument that a war might turn the Vietnamese into permanent enemies of the Chinese also seemed invalid when it was checked against the case of Sino-Indian border conflict; ironically, the Indian External Affairs Minister was in China on a friendly visit on the eve of the Chinese " counter-attack " against Vietnam.[99] Moreover, if the Chinese could prove that they were capable of correctly calculating

meant as a warning to Taiwan that Peking has not ruled out the possibility of a military solution to any problem relating to the national interest and national security.

[96] *Le Monde*, 16 Jan. 1975; cited in Les Buszynski, " Vietnam Confronts China," *Asian Survey*, Vol. XX, No. 8 (Aug. 1980), p. 832.

[97] " Interview of Vice-Premier Deng . . ."

[98] Jen Ku-ping, " The Munich Tragedy . . ."

[99] " Sino-Indian Relations," in *Beijing Review* (23 Feb. 1979).

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Soviet behaviour in a crisis situation, their own international prestige and position could also be enhanced.

No one would disagree that risks were involved; Soviet prestige was indeed overtly challenged.[100] But the Soviets had a record of backing down once confronted with a firm commitment to force from the other side. The Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962, the mining of the Haiphong Harbour in 1972, and the world-wide alert of United States forces ordered by President Nixon with regard to the Middle East in 1973, are cases in point. Moreover, the cost for the Soviets to launch an attack on China would undoubtedly have been enormous. In addition to material and human loss as in any large-scale conventional warfare, mutual escalation could also have led to a nuclear confrontation.

The logic behind Chinese calculations may have been the following:

— Given the bipolar context, the Soviets had to worry about both the western and the eastern fronts at any given time, and it would be unlikely that they could concentrate their forces on the eastern front against the Chinese. Thus, despite their technological superiority, on the conventional level at least, the Soviets might not be able to gain an advantage over Chinese numerical superiority. If war broke out on the conventional level, however limited initially, escalation and then a stalemate would most likely result, which could be very costly as it dragged on.

— In order to break the deadlock without losing face, or to avoid it altogether, one side would have to resort to a qualitative escalation. Since the Chinese had only a limited first-strike, but not necessarily a second-strike nuclear capability, they might be forced to attack first. Given that possibility, the logic goes, the Soviets, for their own protection, might have to launch a preemptive attack on China, thus setting the precedent of the Soviets having first used nuclear weapons in the post-Second World War period—an event that both poles had been trying to avoid.

— Moreover, Soviet nuclear capabilities and performance, such as missile accuracy, manoeuvrability, impact and so on, would also have been exposed to the other pole, with whom the Soviets had so far been only playing a " guessing " game. Once nuclear weapons had been used, not only would the continuing SALT II negotiations be affected, but any future deterrence calculations would also have to be altered, since the assumption of non-use would no longer be valid, and the whole process of reorientation and making new rules could be very uncertain and costly. Moreover, a nuclear exchange between the Soviets and the Chinese would also benefit a third party, with whom the Soviets would still be in competition.

[100] For a discussion and documentation of Soviet reaction, see Buszynski, pp. 841–42. See also *Asian Recorder* (16–22 Apr. 1979), pp. 14843–44.

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— While coping with nuclear fallout would constitute a short-term problem, the Soviets might also have to face a more long-term political problem. Since China could not be physically destroyed or occupied (due to its sheer size and population), a Soviet attack, however limited or " successful," would only mean making a quarter of mankind into a long-term enemy. In the long run, Chinese recovery could not be prevented, and Chinese retaliation could incur an enormous cost to the Soviets.

Given the above logic, the Chinese must have thought that the risks of attacking Vietnam, and thus antagonizing the Soviets, were worth taking. Teng was reported to have said, with regard to Soviet reaction, that " I cannot foresee such action although I cannot preclude totally such risk."[101]

By launching a " counter-attack " against Vietnam, the Chinese tried not only to differentiate between the Soviet and the non-Soviet poles, but also to demonstrate what role they were willing to play within the non-Soviet pole vis-à-vis the Soviet one. In this process, the maintenance of bipolarity must also have been presupposed.

Problems in the Inauguration of China in the Non-Soviet Pole

I have so far argued that since the 1970s, the Chinese grand strategy has been predicated on the assumption that only through the maintenance of an equilibrium between the two poles could international stability be sustained. Since, in the Chinese view, such an equilibrium has already been upset by a combination of unilateral Soviet expansion and Western appeasement, the Chinese have tried to redress the imbalance by volunteering to join the non-Soviet pole, which happens to be dominated by the West. Since the Chinese view bipolarity only in strategic-military terms, they tried, through their " counter-attack " against Vietnam, to show their desire to " lean to one side " only by demonstrating their willingness to use their military capabilities on behalf of the pole they wanted to join. It turned out that such an effort bore little fruit: the Chinese overlooked the fact that members of the Western-dominated non-Soviet pole might have held other criteria than the strategic-military ones in determining who would be qualified to join the pole.

Attributing Soviet expansion to the leadership of a " bureaucrat-monopoly capitalist class," as mentioned earlier, was unlikely to be convincing when those that one was trying to convince did not share the jargon or the ideology behind it, and might as well belong to the same " bureaucrat-monopoly capitalist class " in their respective capitalist countries. What the Chinese thus committed was a fallacy of what can be termed " ideological exemption," i.e. they exempted themselves from their ideological background, and assumed that others would either accept their jargon or disregard its ideological connotation. Maybe to the surprise of the Chinese, in the eyes of capitalist Europe, Japan and the

[101] *Financial Times*, 27 Feb. 1979, cited in Buszynski, p. 842.

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United States, with or without the Soviet threat, China remains a communist country, and thus a potential rival. Such should have been a lesson learned in the 1940s when the Chinese communists were first rejected by the United States.

As far as their relationship with Vietnam was concerned, the Chinese seemed to have failed in using military means to solve a primarily political problem. The Vietnamese tilt towards the Soviets was primarily political in nature for the following reasons: Vietnam was suspicious of China due to geopolitical necessities; Vietnam did not trust China because China began to befriend the United States at a point when Vietnam was still fighting the United States;[102] and Vietnam had to tilt towards the Soviets in order to get post-war reconstruction aid after it had been denied such aid by the United States.[103] This, ironically, was a repetition of what the Chinese themselves did in the 1940s and 1950s. All other problems between the Chinese and the Vietnamese—such as those related to boundaries, railway repair and jurisdiction along the Sino-Vietnamese railway, control over the offshore islands of Nansha and Xisha, status of Chinese residents in Vietnam, historical-cultural images, and so on[104]—would most likely not have surfaced had the major political problem not become so acute, as evidenced in the period prior to the end of the Vietnam war in 1975.

It may be true that a military problem was first created when Vietnam invaded Cambodia on a large scale, under the pretext of supporting Cambodian rebels. However, if China had really wanted to cope with that military problem, it would have had to commit itself to forcing Vietnamese troops out of Cambodia. Since that military solution did not seem to have been China's choice, using military means along the Sino-Vietnamese border could not have solved the problem between the Chinese and the Vietnamese. Whatever the Chinese succeeded in destroying was replaced by fresh Soviet supplies. If the Vietnamese had withdrawn troops from Cambodia during the crisis, troops were redeployed inside Cambodia after the crisis.

If indeed war is but a continuation of politics by other means, Clausewitz must have meant that such a continuation should only occur when all political means have been exhausted. In the particular case of Vietnam, China did not seem to have exhausted all of the possible political options, such as containing Vietnamese influence through more active cooperation with members of ASEAN, the United States and Japan; using diplomatic channels at the United Nations to sensitize international public opinion and impose sanctions against Vietnamese

[102] Buszynski, p. 830: " Nixon's visit to Peking in 1972 was regarded as a betrayal in this respect for it convinced the Vietnamese Communists that Chinese support for reunification was being sacrificed for the wider goal of Sino-American *détente*. The Vietnamese Communists alleged that a ' secret deal ' was struck under which the maintenance of the Thieu regime in the South was a consideration for the eventual return of Taiwan to the mainland."

[103] See Marjorie Niehaus, " Vietnam 1978: The Elusive Peace," *Asian Survey*, Vol. XIX, No. 1 (Jan. 1979), pp. 92–94.

[104] " Memorandum on Vice-Premier Li Xiannian's Talks with Premier Pham Van Dong (10 June 1977)," in *Beijing Review* (30 Mar. 1979).

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aggression on Cambodia; or using economic rather than military means to gain leverage over Vietnam.

In addition to the confusion between the nature of ends and means as discussed above, Chinese tactics might also have failed in that neither the actual strategic configurations of power nor the perceptions of those whom the Chinese wanted to influence had been changed as a result of China's military action over Vietnam. The Soviets might have been glad to see the Chinese and the Vietnamese fight each other, making any collaboration between them less likely. The United States might not have been too concerned either since the conflict involved only communist countries. During the crisis, President Carter remarked that " we will not get involved in conflict between Asian communist nations. Our national interests are not directly threatened. . . ."[105] If China had desired collaboration with the West to contain Soviet expansion, such an aim might have been defeated precisely by China's own action over Vietnam: if China on its own was able to check Soviet influence, as proven in the case of Vietnam, why should the West offer any aid to China for the same purpose in the future?

If the isolation of Vietnam from the non-Soviet pole had been China's purpose, it could have been achieved without the " counter-attack"; for Vietnam was already isolated because of its own expansionist foreign policy towards Laos and Cambodia, as well as its own uncompromising stand towards the United States.[106] Moreover, the isolation of Vietnam might not, in the long run, be conducive to stabilization of the region. As China's own experience clearly demonstrates, when an actor is isolated from one pole, as China was in the 1950s, it will only turn to the other pole, or try to disrupt the international system altogether, as China itself did in the 1960s when it felt rejected by both poles.

Does it, then, mean that China will have to be content with the status quo? After all, why should China insist on total acceptance by the West and the United States? Has China not benefited from the current arrangements with the West and the United States—being friends but not allies?[107]

I suggest that the status quo will be acceptable to China so long as it remains the status quo. However, given the recent trend of Soviet expansion, as perceived by the Chinese,[108] the Chinese will feel increasing pressure from the Soviet pole aimed at altering the status quo, thus threatening Chinese security. Under those circumstances, the current arrangements between China and the West and the United States may be deemed inadequate by the Chinese. To the Chinese, the greatest danger

[105] *Department of State Bulletin* (Mar. 1979), p. 22. See also a statement by Richard Holbrooke, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, ibid. (Apr. 1979), pp. 17–18.

[106] See statement by Holbrooke, ibid. (Oct. 1979), pp. 34–37.

[107] This can be traced back to the Shanghai Communiqué of 1972. For a summary of the positions of both the Nixon and Carter administrations, see Richard H. Solomon, " Thinking Through the China Problem," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 56, No. 2 (Jan. 1978), pp. 324–56; Michel Oksenberg, " China Policy for the 1980s," ibid. Vol. 59, No. 2 (Winter 1980–81), pp. 304–22.

[108] See Jiang Yuanchun, " Soviet Strategy for East Asia," *Beijing Review* (23 Mar. 1981).

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may arise from the fact that, currently, they have all the liabilities of having assumed an anti-Soviet stand, and are thus associated with the West in the eyes of the Soviets, but have none of the benefits of being a part of, and thus protected by, the Western pole.

As I have been trying to show, the logic of bipolarity dictates that any actor who is perceived by others as having the potential to affect or threaten bipolarity must " lean to one side " in order to survive bipolar competition. The implication here is that such an actor can be neither neutral, nor equally friendly with both poles simultaneously. Neutrality would mean leaning towards neither; however, under such highly competitive conditions, a lack of positive posture would be taken by each pole as negative and potentially favourable to the other pole, and thus threatening. Likewise, being equally friendly with both poles at the same time would, given their competition for exclusive support, arouse suspicion from both.

The constraints that bipolarity superimposes on international politics can be detected throughout the period by reference to Chinese foreign policy since the 1940s. At no point has China been neutral or equally friendly with both poles; it has always leaned to one side or the other. The only exception to this pattern occurred in the period from 1962–64 to 1968–69; however, that attempt at defying bipolarity proved to be a failure and, without the necessary capabilities, also dangerous, as discussed earlier. Such a course of action will undoubtedly remain a theoretical possibility in the future. However, in practice, it is unlikely that China, still lacking the necessary capabilities, will once again run the risk of confronting both poles at the same time.

If neutrality, the policy of equidistance, and defiance of bipolarity, are not practical options, and if the trend of Soviet expansion as perceived by the Chinese persists, what choice of policies to enhance their own security will then be left for the Chinese?

Alternatives to Joining the Non-Soviet Pole

If indeed joining the Western-dominated non-Soviet pole meant fulfilling not only strategic and military, but also compromising their own economic and ideological criteria, and if China felt that this would bring a net loss which would be greater than that of failing to check Soviet expansion, then logically speaking, China should abandon its current strategy. Instead, maybe the Chinese should " appease " the Soviets. Or else, a totally new conceptual framework would have to be developed in order to accommodate the various contending, and at times contradictory, forces. Let me first briefly examine the " appeasement " or reconciliation option.

Hypothetically, if the Chinese chose to—and I must emphasize that, despite recent Sino-Soviet talks and Sino-US tension over the Taiwan question, there is still no evidence of such a choice—they could put together an argument for reconciliation with the Soviets. Even without invoking or reviving socialist solidarity, the Chinese could argue that,

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inasmuch as China and the Third World are entitled to a proper place in the international system, there is no reason why the Soviets are not entitled to theirs. They could further argue that components of a " pole " may not necessarily be cohesively bound together as one unit. Just as tension may result from competition among the United States, Japan and Western Europe, as well as within Western Europe, relations between the Soviets and other communist states may also not necessarily be always hierarchical or harmonious. In this sense, " proxies " may not be " puppets " at all but may have their own foreign policy goals.[109] Just as China itself was earlier erroneously seen by the West as a Soviet " proxy," now one may be making the same mistake by assuming that countries like Cuba or Vietnam do not have their independent foreign policies. Thus, the strength and cohesiveness of the Soviet " pole " should not be overestimated, and Soviet influence over Angola and Ethiopia, for instance, should not be seen as more or less legitimate or alarming than French influence over Zaïre, Chad, Cameroon and the Ivory Coast.

The above scenario remains a theoretical possibility, but its full-fledged realization seems unlikely for at least two reasons. In the first place, empirically, the Chinese have had a frustrating experience with the Soviets. In the absence of changes in the essentials (such as Soviet troops stationed along the borders), there is no reason for the Chinese to believe that they will be accepted into the Soviet pole as an equal partner. All the economic, political, territorial, national and ideological factors against leaning towards the Soviets dating back to the 1940s, as discussed in detail above, may still be applicable to the current situation. In the second place, given the reality of bipolar competition, reconciliation with the Soviets would necessarily cause a deterioration in relations with the United States; for bipolar competition dictates that each pole seek exclusive support from others. By pursuing various degrees of *détente* with both poles, China would be faced with various degrees of distrust from both poles. Whatever leverages China may have enjoyed with at least one pole vis-à-vis the other would also be jeopardized as a result.

Whether and when the status quo will be altered, and how China will cope with changing realities, are questions that fall into the realm of speculation. However, whatever the new realities may be, I suggest that an effective Chinese foreign policy in the future must be based on the resolution of at least two major " contradictions," of which the Chinese leadership may or may not have been aware.

Given the discrepancy in military and technological strength between the Soviets and the Chinese, it would be rather difficult for the Chinese to meet the Soviet threat without any help from third parties. In view of such considerations, the effectiveness of this Chinese strategy seems to hinge on whether others also see the Soviet threat in similar light. Joint action will only be possible if both sides see a similar need for it.

[109] Such as Islamic influence in Iran and Afghanistan. On Cuba, see for instance, Jorge I. Dominquez, " Cuban Foreign Policy," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 57, No. 1 (Fall 1978), pp. 83–108.

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Otherwise, a unilateral Chinese call for cooperation will only give an impression of " passing the buck," or delegating what seems to be China's own responsibility. This is especially the case when China, for whatever reason, does not seem to be spending as much on national defence as would be commensurate with its well-advertised concern about Soviet expansion.[110]

Even if others shared some of China's concern about the Soviet threat, they might still decide not to take any initiative and, instead, let the Chinese bear the bulk of the burden. Inasmuch as the Chinese may have wanted to delegate responsibility to others in coping with the perceived Soviet threat, others too may want to delegate the same responsibility to who ever is endowed with exceptional eagerness. This negative phenomenon of mutual delegation of responsibility does not constitute positive collaboration; it only shows that what would make collaboration possible and desirable is absent: independent realization of mutual need. Collaboration means mutual fulfilment of responsibility, the necessity for which is unlikely to be felt until and unless both sides see clear evidence of immediate danger from the same source.

Positive collaboration may become possible in the future as a result of changes in the status quo independently perceived by the separate parties. However, in order to make the realization of such collaboration successful, Chinese leaders must first recognize that, while bipolarity still provides a basic form for international competition and regulation, it does not function in a political vacuum. " Leaning towards " a pole can hardly be translated into " relying on " or " being protected by " it, for positive collaboration, within a pole or otherwise, can only rest on interdependence.

A second " contradiction " that Chinese leaders must resolve is of a less immediate and more theoretical nature. While Chinese leaders may be primarily concerned about strengthening China's national independence, China's communist ideology prescribes that nationalism or patriotism is but a form of " false consciousness," or a form of " alienation " of man from his species.[111]

In the Soviet case, the justification for the necessity of a strong Soviet state was based on the grounds that it was needed in order to protect socialism from the hostile capitalist states surrounding it. This emphasis on the state and state power as superstructural elements was also picked up by the Chinese as early as the Second World War when they formulated their " New Democracy " and " united front " policy. In 1938, in answering the question, " Can a communist, who is an internationalist, at the same time be a patriot? " Mao argued that " We

[110] See, for instance, Lucian Pye, " Dilemmas for America in China's Modernization," *International Security*, Vol. 4, No. 1 (Summer 1979), pp. 3–19.

[111] See R. N. Berki, " On Marxian Thought and the Problem of International Relations," *World Politics*, Oct. 1971. For a neo-Marxist " revisionist " view, see Silviu Brucan, *The Dialectic of World Politics* (The Free Press, New York, 1978). Brucan argues that the relationship between " classes " and " ethnicity " is " dialectic," and " each has a different historical origin and an evolution of its own " (p. viii).

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hold that he not only can be but must be. The specific content of patriotism is determined by historical conditions. . . ."[112] Mao also told Gunther Stein in 1944 that " without a Chinese nation there could be no Chinese Communist Party."[113] To John Service, Mao said, " We are, first of all, Chinese."[114]

Recently, in a revisionist discussion of Mao's statement in 1963 that " the national question is essentially a class question," Chinese theoreticians have gone so far as to say that " the national question and class question differ in nature." Moreover,

> The existence of classes is of much shorter duration than that of nationalities. After the withering away of the former, the latter will remain in existence for a long time. . . . In principle, classes and class struggle are matters within the different nationalities themselves, whereas the national problem concerns matters *between the different nationalities*.[115] (Emphasis my own.)

Although this discussion is primarily directed at the problem of nationalities within the Chinese state, its implications may also be projected onto the international scene. This differentiation between " classes " and " nationalities," and the assertion that the duration of nationalities is longer, represent for the first time a Chinese acknowledgment of the existence of relations between nationalities within the state that are quite independent of class relations or class struggle. By implication, on the international scene, relations between nations can also be seen as independent of class or ideological considerations. A strong nation-state can thus be an end in itself, and nationalism a form of true consciousness.

Although the Chinese assert that " nationalities and classes have their own laws governing their emergence, development and extinction," they also declare that a link between nationalities and classes will occur when the " ruling class of a certain nationality invades, exploits and oppresses other nationalities and when this leads to a struggle by these nationalities against national oppression." Under such circumstances, " national struggle is, undoubtedly, a manifestation of class struggle."[116] By implication, on the international scene, a conflict between nation-states does not become a class or ideological issue unless and until it can be established that " the ruling class " of a certain nation-state " invades, exploits and oppresses " other nation-states.

With regard to the Soviet Union, the Chinese used to argue that the domination by a " bureaucrat-monopoly capitalist class " both corrupted Soviet socialism and caused Soviet external expansion.[117] As early as 1962, Mao argued that " the masses of the Soviet people and of

[112] *SW*, Vol. II, p. 196.
[113] Stein, p. 118.
[114] *FRUS*, 1944, Vol. VI, p. 608.
[115] See " Is the National Question Essentially A Class Question? " *Beijing Review* (25 Aug. 1980), p. 18.
[116] Ibid.
[117] See notes 86 and 87 above.

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Party members and cadres are good, that they desire revolution and that revisionist rule will not last long."[118] As late as 1977, the Chinese still maintained that " world war can be eliminated if a social revolution takes place in the homelands of the two superpowers and transforms them into socialist countries," and they asserted that " such a revolution will come sooner or later."[119] However, recently, the Chinese seem to have put less emphasis on the class element and used the term " social-imperialism " only rarely.[120] Instead, " Soviet hegemonism " has become the standard term. Soviet expansion is likewise portrayed more as a national-strategic phenomenon within an international context than as a class or ideological issue.[121]

What then is the implication of this shift in Chinese emphasis? One point is readily discernible: to the Chinese, the Soviets equate " proletarian internationalism " with " Soviet hegemonism." Therefore, the Chinese try to avoid any issue with the same ideological-organizational connotation, including the issue of international class struggle. Instead, the Chinese emphasize national independence within an international-strategic rather than ideological-class context.[122]

For China, in coping with its perceived Soviet threat, joining the non-Soviet, non-communist, Western-capitalist-dominated pole may require economic and ideological concessions, that could in effect mean modification, if not abandonment, of China's treasured total independence and a socialist internal structure. If China does not join the Western pole, however, there is a possibility that the Chinese state itself may be endangered by the Soviet pole. Such has become the Chinese dilemma: whether Chinese national interests should be put before communist interests or vice versa.

This Chinese dilemma manifests itself most clearly in the economic sphere. On the one hand, Chinese theoreticians continue to point to the failure, decadence and danger of the Western capitalist system.[123] On the

[118] Cited in " Chairman Mao's Theory of the Differentiation of the Three Worlds . . . ," p. 38.

[119] Ibid. p. 34.

[120] The term " social-imperialism " was used as late as Dec. 1980. See Yang Hui and Zhan Xihuang, " Shi Guo Ji Zhu Yi, Hai Shi Ba Quan Zhu Yi? " (Is it Internationalism or Hegemonism?), *Hongqi*, 1980, No. 23, p. 48.

[121] See " Soviet Military Strategy for World Domination," *Beijing Review* (28 Jan. 1980), pp. 15–19 and 26; " Soviet strategy for East Asia," ibid. (23 Mar. 1981), pp. 19–22; Commentator, " Dang Qian Zhan Zheng Wei Xian Yu Bao Wei Shi Jie He Ping " (Immediate Danger of War and Defence of World Peace), *Hongqi*, 1979, No. 11, pp. 53–58; and Yan Fa, " Ping Cai Jiun Wen Ti " (On Disarmament), ibid. 1980, No. 11, pp. 45–48.

[122] See Xu Jungji and Wang Xingbin, " Principle of Independence of the Parties of Various Countries," *Beijing Review* (17 Nov. 1980); Peng Pingshan, " Lie Ning He Min Zu Jie Fang Yun Dong " (Lenin and the National Liberation Movement), *Hongqi*, 1980, No. 8, pp. 40–44; and Commentator, " Wu Chan Jie Ji Guo Ji Zhu Yi Yu Su Lian Ba Quan Zhu Yi " (Proletarian Internationalism and Soviet Hegemonism), *Hongqi*, 1980, No. 4, pp. 14–18.

[123] See Li Zhong, " Guo Jia Long Duan Zi Ben Zhu Yi Yie Zi Ben Zhu Yi Guo Jia Jing Ji De Fa Zhan " (State Monopolist Capitalism and Economic Development in Capitalist States), *Hongqi*, 1980, No. 10, pp. 31–35; Teng Weizao and Xiong Xingmei, " Zhan Hou Zi Ben Zhu Yi Sheng Chan Ji Zhong He Long Duan De Xin Fa Zhan " (New Development in Post-war Centralization and Monopolization of Capitalist Production), ibid. 1980, No. 16, pp. 43–48; Lu Wei, " Zhan Hou Di Guo Zhu Yi Zi Ben Shu Chu De Xin Fa Zhan " (New Development in Post-war Export of Imperialist Capital), ibid. 1980, No. 18, pp. 43–48; and Chou Qihua, " Lun Dang Dai Zi Ben Zhu Yi De Fu Xiou Xing " (On the Decadent Nature of Contemporary Capitalism), ibid. 1980, No. 20, pp. 36–41.

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other hand, Chinese economists emphasize the importance of foreign funds (from capitalists), as well as the " economization of social labour through full utilization of the international division of labour."[124]

J. D. Armstrong has argued that the " national interest " and " ideology " are not two distinct and independent elements in Chinese foreign policy. He uses the term " dual policy " to describe Chinese foreign policy that is supposed consistently to combine both elements.[125] The concept of " dual policy " is, however, more an analytical device than a political reality. In political reality, the Chinese may be as confused by the inherent contradictions between nationalism and communism as outside observers of Chinese foreign policy are.

[124] See Yuan Wenqi, Dai Lunzhang and Wang Linsheng, " International Division of Labor and China's Economic Relations with Foreign Countries," *Social Sciences in China*, No. 1 (Mar. 1980), p. 39. See also Ji Chongwei, " China's Utilization of Foreign Funds and Relevant Policies," *Beijing Review* (20 Apr. 1981), pp. 15–20; and Liu Lixin, " On the Use of Foreign Funds," ibid. (25 Aug. 1980), pp. 23–25.

[125] J. D. Armstrong, *Revolutionary Diplomacy: Chinese Foreign Policy and the United Front Doctrine* (University of California Press, Berkeley, 1977).

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A Reply to Lewis S. Feuer

Misrepresentations of the Frankfurt School

Martin Jay

IN " The Frankfurt Marxists and the Columbia Liberals," Lewis Feuer gently chides my account[1] of the Institute of Social Research's move to Columbia University in 1934 for its " pleasant naïveté."[2] In its place, he offers a revised version that is certainly not intended to be naïve and turns out, alas, not to be very pleasant either. It is a revision, so he claims " based solely on the correspondence preserved in the Presidential Archives of Columbia University."[3] But in fact, it stems from a prior perception of the Institute and its members that gains little, if any, sustenance from the meagre, businesslike exchange of letters between Columbia officials and Institute spokesmen buried in the files. The much more likely source of that perception is Professor Feuer's own earlier contact with the Institute when he was a Trotskyist graduate student in New York in the 1940s.[4] In his article, as in an earlier review of my book,[5] he alludes to the frustration he and other radical students felt in trying to engage Max Horkheimer and his colleagues in political debate. He is still angry at the failure, which he explains in terms that reveal more than just a political animus: " To leave the protective seclusion of one's Institute involved the chance of being confronted with embarrassing questions about the Moscow trials, the Purges, and the Soviet social structure, directed against them from rather blunt-speaking children of Polish and Russian Jews, graduates of the City College."[6] The conflict between German Jews and their *ostjüdische* cousins is an old story, even on the Left, and there is reason to allow a certain justice to Professor Feuer's resentment. But what cannot be accepted is the maliciously fanciful account of the Institute's history to which it has led.

The essence of that account, in so far as it centres on the Institute's

[1] Martin Jay, *The Dialectical Imagination: A History of the Frankfurt School and the Institute of Social Research, 1923–1950* (Boston, 1973).

[2] Lewis S. Feuer, " The Frankfurt Marxists and the Columbia Liberals," *Survey*, Vol. 25, no. 3, Summer 1980, p. 156.

[3] Ibid.

[4] It is perhaps from this experience that he gained what he calls " the knowledge that history has not been made this way by Marxists " (ibid.). What this gnomic pronouncement seems to imply is that Marxists make history by devious and conspiratorial means; the Frankfurt School was Marxist, therefore it must have made history in an underhand and duplicitous way.

[5] Lewis S. Feuer, " The Preconceptions of Critical Theory," *Jewish Journal of Sociology*, Vol. XVI, No. 7, June, 1974. Lest what follows be construed as the reaction of a victim of a negative review, I should make clear that Professor Feuer was very kind to my book, although not to its subject.

[6] Feuer, " The Frankfurt Marxists," p. 170. On the previous page he imputes to them " little desire to engage in any teaching, or work with graduate students." What evidence does he have that they were actually asked to teach?

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coming to Columbia, is expressed in the following accusation: " The Frankfurt Marxists engaged in a subtle sort of misrepresentation to the Columbia authorities."[7] What they misrepresented, according to Professor Feuer, was their original political orientation, which they craftily hid from the unsuspecting leadership of Columbia. The university's president, Nicholas Murray Butler, certainly no man of the Left, was thus duped into thinking the Institute was merely another group of displaced German scholars, when in fact, they were something else, something far more sinister. What they may have been came up only once in the correspondence Professor Feuer discovered, in a letter from the sociologist Robert Lynd to the university secretary, Frank Fackenthal. On 25 June 1934, Lynd wrote:

> The only possible entanglement in this whole affair lies in the fact that the Institute is on the liberal-radical side. I have called this to MacIver's attention and think he is pretty well aware of it. From what little I have seen of their work and from my conversation with Gumperz I think it is fair to conclude that they are a research agency with high standards and not interested in propaganda.[8]

Professor Feuer is not, however, satisfied with Lynd's " liberal-radical " label, which he suggests was a deliberate euphemism designed to lull Butler and his colleagues into believing the Institute was at least partly in the tradition of John Stuart Mill. Ignoring Lynd's second and entirely unobjectionable conclusion—that they were a " research agency with high standards and not interested in propaganda "—he proceeds to give an account of who they really were.

PROFESSOR Feuer begins that account by focusing on the figure mentioned in Lynd's letter as the Institute's major contact, Julian Gumperz. In two and a half pages of detailed analysis, he conclusively demonstrates what historians of the Institute have always acknowledged: Gumperz was " a Marxist of long standing [who] had been active in Germany during most of his adult life in a variety of communist activities."[9] What he fails to add, however, is that Gumperz was chosen as Institute spokesman not because of his politics, but rather because, as a native American, he spoke English more fluently than anyone else at the Institute. And what is more important, Professor Feuer never points out that as a force in the Institute's intellectual life, either before or after 1934, Gumperz was totally insignificant.[10]

Gumperz's politics are important for Professor Feuer, however, because they fit into the general scheme that he wants to establish, which contends that the Institute was not merely Leftist in a vague sense, but was very closely tied to the German Communist Party and, indeed, to the

[7] Ibid. p. 171.
[8] Quoted in ibid. p. 163.
[9] Ibid. p. 158.
[10] He also erroneously says that Gumperz " took his Ph.D. at the Institute " (ibid. p. 168). The Institute never had the power to grant degrees.

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Soviet Union itself. His three other major pieces of " evidence " derive from the presence of Richard Sorge and Karl August Wittfogel at the Institute and the alleged presence of Willi Muenzenberg behind the scenes. To take the latter first, Professor Feuer begins by pointing out that Gumperz was a "great admirer" of Muenzenberg's propaganda apparatus. On the basis of this rather thin reed, and nothing else, he then asks the leading question, " Was the *Institut für Sozialforschung* at its inception one of Willi Muenzenberg's many ventures in the organization of fellow-travellers? " The only hint he can find that this may have been the case is the fact that the letterhead of the Institute had many illustrious names on it and "Muenzenberg had taught that the vanity of the letterhead was a potent agent for conjuring forth fellow-travellers; his pupil Gumperz learned the art."[11] Aside from the fact that Gumperz, who has now quietly graduated from being Muenzenberg's "admirer" to being his " pupil," probably had very little to do with designing the Institute's stationery, this argument is patently absurd. For if an inflated list of advisers is a sign of Muezenberg's sinister influence, then I am afraid the Institute is not alone in being under his spell. Indeed, a glance at *Survey*'s distinguished " International Advisory Board " might suggest that it, too, can be smeared as a front organization, if this criterion were taken seriously.

When it comes to assessing the role of Richard Sorge, the notorious Russian spy, Professor Feuer's imagination grows more lively and his scholarship even shoddier. Referring to Sorge's friendship with Kurt Albert Gerlach, who was the Institute's first choice for director, he writes, " Sorge, in his capacity as the Director's assistant, served in effect as the secretary of the Institute."[12] What Professor Feuer conveniently forgets is that Gerlach died prematurely in October 1922, before the Institute was actually opened. Rather than acting as the Institute's secretary, Sorge was a peripheral figure who helped organize its library for a short while before leaving for more active political work. " *Der dumme Ika*," as he was apparently known by his friends,[13] was out of his intellectual league at the Institute, which scarcely noticed his departure. Professor Feuer, however, uses his brief and inconsequential presence at the Institute to make what is perhaps his most outrageous charge: that the Institute was " evidently a recruiting ground for . . . the Soviet espionage service."[14] Does this mean that Sorge was recruited

[11] Ibid. p. 166.

[12] Ibid. p. 168. The footnote that Professor Feuer affixes to support this alleged fact refers instead to Sorge's purported ancestry.

[13] G. L. Ulmen, *The Science of Society; Toward an Understanding of the Life and Work of Karl August Wittfogel* (The Hague, 1978), p. 63.

[14] Ibid. p. 167. He also correctly mentions that the Institute had good relations with David Riazanov's Marx-Engels Institute in Moscow. What he neglects to add is that their collaboration concerned the scholarly edition of the *Marx-Engels Historisch-Kritische Gesamtausgabe* (the famous MEGA), an invaluable achievement cut short by Riazanov's death in the purges. It was Riazanov who once told Stalin " Stop it, Koba, don't make a fool of yourself. Everybody knows that theory is not exactly your field " (quoted in Isaac Deutscher, *Stalin: A Political Biography*, 2nd ed. (New York, 1966), p. 290).

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there to become a Russian agent or that he recruited others? Professor Feuer does not say because he has absolutely no evidence to support either allegation. But he does imply that if only the Institute had been honest enough to bring up Sorge's extracurricular activities when they contacted President Butler, then Columbia might have been spared the embarrassment of its affiliation. That they were unaware of those activities until much later, when Sorge was publicly exposed, is an embarrassing fact Professor Feuer spares himself.

There were, to be sure, other expressions of what Professor Feuer claims were the Institute's true political colours, which were far less hidden from view. Karl August Wittfogel, who actually did possess one of those cards that communists were always supposed to be carrying, was, unlike Gumperz or Sorge, an intellectually significant Institute figure. Or at least, he was until Horkheimer began to fashion the Institute more in his own image after assuming the directorship in 1930. One of the reasons why Wittfogel progressively became more of an " outsider," to use his sympathetic biographer's own term,[15] was his continued allegiance to the orthodox Marxism of his Weimar years, both in scientific and political terms, until the late 1930s.

PROFESSOR Feuer is, of course, correct in saying that the Weimar Institute under the direction of the Austro-Marxist Carl Grünberg was a relatively comfortable place for communist scholars like Wittfogel.[16] What he neglects to add is that it was also a haven for figures like Horkheimer, Leo Loewenthal, Erich Fromm and Theodor W. Adorno, who had nothing whatsoever to do with the Communist Party, or indeed any other political faction. And of course only the latter group, joined by Herbert Marcuse, came to constitute the Frankfurt School, which actually came into existence on Morningside Heights. Its so-called Critical Theory may have begun as a code word for Marxism, although never in its Leninist guise, but in time it came to represent something different, something unique, whose relation to Marxism has been debated ever since.[17]

Professor Feuer, to be sure, does grudgingly acknowledge that the Institute's orientation changed under Horkheimer, but he is no more able to fathom that change now than he was as a Trotskyist in the 1940s.[18] The term he employs to categorize the Institute during its

[15] Ulmen, op. cit. p. 134.

[16] There were others like Franz Borkenau and Henryk Grossmann, the latter of whom had been a member of the Polish Communist Party. It is sometimes alleged that Friedrich Pollock was also connected for a short while with the Party, for example, by Zoltán Tar, *The Frankfurt School: The Critical Theories of Max Horkheimer and Theodor W. Adorno* (New York, 1977), p. 17. Tar offers no evidence for this allegation, which Pollock denied to me personally.

[17] See, for example, my interchange with Russell Jacoby in *Theory and Society*, 2 (1975).

[18] He mistakenly writes that " their aim was not conceived in opposition to Soviet Marxism but rather for its elaboration along more congenial German philosophical lines " (p. 171). As his source for this contention, he cites two passages from Ulmen and one from Phil Slater's *Origin and Significance of the Frankfurt School: a Marxist Perspective* (London, 1977). There is nothing in Slater that supports this charge; indeed, on the page Professor Feuer cites (p. 55), he attacks Critical Theory for failing to

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American exile is the old standby of an earlier era: the fellow-traveller. " Whatever the circumstances of their foundation," he writes, " the *Institut für Sozialforschung* in its later years became more tepid in its communist leaning, preferring a more amorphous variety of fellow-travelling."[19] For Feuer, the only alternatives on the Left seem to be social democracy, communism, Trotskyism or fellow-travelling. It is because the Institute was certainly not the first of these, no longer the second, and never the third, that they must in his eyes have been the fourth. As he put it in his earlier review essay, once again drawing on his student days:

> Marxism was then making great inroads among the graduate students. The Frankfurt Institute, however, evoked little confidence. Where did it stand ideologically? Its scholars were more Marxist than the German Social Democrats whom they excoriated for their pusillanimity. But then they were not Communists either, and repudiated any such suggestion. Nonetheless, they never allowed themselves to utter a single criticism of the Soviet Union; clearly they were not Trotskyists; they were not prepared to sunder a Stalinist lifeline.[20]

Thus because they refused to stand up and pledge their allegiance to one of the official dogmatic lines that vied for favour among the student radicals, they must have been some sort of fellow-travellers.

The most convincing evidence Professor Feuer finds to make his case is their alleged " lifeline " to the Kremlin. But when he comes to describe that lifeline after the migration, all he can adduce is their reluctance to subject the Soviet Union to a sustained public critique. " As undefined fellow-travellers," he complains, " they criticized bourgeois culture and society, while preserving at least a common denominator of silence with regard to all such phenomena as the purges, ' trials,' labour camps, and ' liquidation ' of Old Bolsheviks and Trotskyists, geneticists, and the more productive peasants."[21] Although this sentence with its unexplained (and undefended) " at least " and its neglect of the Institute's preoccupation with fascism, not merely bourgeois culture and society, is a half-truth at best, it must be admitted that it does point to a weakness in the Institute's work in the 1930s. As its

measure up to Marxism-Leninism. Ulmen, in the first of the two places that Professor Feuer cites (p. 47), does argue that Critical Theory was " not conceived in opposition to Soviet Marxism and the Comintern, nor did it ever presume such a role thereafter." His argument is based on what he sees as the myth of a " Western Marxism " opposed to its Soviet counterpart. He claims that they were essentially the same because they were both primarily dialectical rather than materialist, and therefore equally indebted to Hegel. This is not the place to discuss the problematic nature of these assertions, but there is a growing body of literature on Western Marxism that clearly shows the differences between it and Soviet Marxism-Leninism. To say that both are variants of Hegelian Marxism is to obscure those differences. As for the relationship between Critical Theory and Soviet Marxism, anyone familiar with the diatribes against the Frankfurt School from the Soviet bloc knows how misleading it is to stress their similarities.

[19] Feuer, " The Frankfurt Marxists," op. cit. p. 169.

[20] Feuer, " The Preconceptions of Critical Theory," op. cit. p. 76.

[21] Feuer, " The Frankfurt Marxists," op. cit. p. 169.

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many previous historians have also pointed out,[22] there were very few serious analyses, critical or otherwise, of the Soviet Union in the Institute's published writings.

There is, however, considerable evidence to show that in private they were deeply troubled by events in the Soviet Union. Their qualms began, according to the testimony of Alfred Sohn-Rethel,[23] before the Purge Trials, which apparently provided the *coup de grâce* to their earlier tentative hopes. By 1937, Friedrich Pollock was referring to Stalin as a " gangster " and Adorno chastizing Hanns Eisler for his " miserable defence of the Moscow Trials."[24] When Karl Korsch reported to Paul Mattick on the Institute in 1938, he wrote, " Internally, they are all, without exception, in various degrees, anti-Stalinist."[25] At about the same time, Lowenthal recalls in his recent autobiography, Horkheimer scandalized the still loyal Wittfogel by predicting a pact between Hitler and Stalin, which led to a memorable scene in a New York restaurant.[26] On a less anecdotal level, it should also be remembered that the Institute during the 1930s welcomed into its ranks scholars such as Otto Kirchheimer, who had previously made known his disillusionment with Soviet authoritarianism.[27]

Still, aside from two relatively innocuous articles by Rudolf Schlesinger about Soviet literature on social research,[28] there were virtually no discussions of Russian events in the Institute's journal or elsewhere in its work in the pre-war years. Critical remarks seem in fact to have been deleted from articles where they originally were to appear.[29] But what equally must be remembered is that positive comments were also totally absent. Indeed, as the later brouhaha over the editing of certain of Walter Benjamin's articles attests,[30] the Institute was enormously sensitive to the implications of pro-communist language in its publications. Their silence, in other words, cut both ways.

[22] For example, Helmut Dubiel, *Wissenschaftsorganisation und politische Erfahrung; Studien zur Frühen Kritischen Theorie* (Frankfurt, 1978), p. 57 ff, and David Held, *Introduction to Critical Theory; Horkheimer to Habermas* (Berkeley, 1980), p. 45 ff.

[23] Quoted in Slater, op. cit. p. 62.

[24] The letter from Pollock is quoted in Dubiel, p. 58; the letter from Adorno is cited in Susan Buck-Morss, *The Origin of Negative Dialectics; Theodor W. Adorno, Walter Benjamin, and the Frankfurt Institute* (New York, 1977), p. 289.

[25] Quoted in *Karl Korsch: Revolutionary Theory*, ed. Douglas Kellner (Austin, 1977), p. 284.

[26] Leo Lowenthal, *Mitmachen wollte ich nie; Ein autobiographisches Gesprach mit Helmut Dubiel* (Frankfurt, 1980), p. 86.

[27] See, in particular, Kirchheimer's essay of 1933 entitled " Marxism, Dictatorship, and the Organization of the Proletariat," reprinted in *Politics, Law, and Social Change: Selected Essays of Otto Kirchheimer*, eds. Frederic S. Burin and Kurt L. Shell (New York, 1969).

[28] Rudolf Schlesinger, " Neue Sowjetrussische Literatur zur Sozialforschung," *Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung*, Vol. VII, No. 1, 1938 and Vol. VIII, No. 1, 1939.

[29] Dubiel mentions a change Horkheimer made in his 1939 essay " Die Juden und Europa " from the draft to the printed version, a change which deleted a comparison of the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany. See the discussion in Dubiel, p. 59. The comparison was finally made in an essay he wrote the following year on " The Authoritarian State," which was privately distributed in a 1942 memorial collection for Walter Benjamin. It is available in a number of places now, including *The Essential Frankfurt School Reader*, eds. Andrew Arato and Eike Gebhardt, intro. Paul Piccone (New York, 1978).

[30] See the discussion in Jay, op. cit. p. 197 ff.

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WHAT this suggests is that the rubric of fellow-traveller is totally inappropriate to describe their position during these years. For the essence of fellow-travelling was certainly not discrete silence. No Institute member went on a conducted tour of the Soviet Union and came back with glowing reports of a future that worked; none justified the Purge Trials as a legitimate exercise in revolutionary self-defence against real enemies; nor did any celebrate the leadership of Stalin as that of a stern, but benevolent father, building, as the Webbs liked to call it, a " new civilization."[31] And although the Frankfurt School was well aware of the uses to which red-baiting might be put, none of its spokesmen ever joined Sartre in the quintessential fellow-travelling claim that " an anti-communist is a rat." In fact, the basic fellow-travelling willingness to give the Soviet Union the benefit of the doubt because it was the sole bulwark against fascism was rejected by the Institute, which steadfastly refused the logic of the lesser evil. This choice may have left them without any positive political position, as their critics on the Left incessantly pointed out, but it was by no means that made by fellow-travellers clinging to a " Stalinist lifeline."

Indeed, if one looks more closely at the mentality of fellow-travellers, as discussed by commentators like Lewis Coser and David Caute,[32] the inadequacy of the rubric becomes even clearer. The main attraction of the USSR for many interwar intellectuals was its apparent realization of the old elitist fantasy of rational control over politics and society. " Dreaming of a well-ordered polity in which the key decisions would be made on a scientific basis rather than in accord with the vagaries of the electoral process," Coser writes, " they believed that the Soviet Union was the embodiment of those societies run by scientists and managers of whom Saint-Simon and Auguste Comte had dreamed in their day."[33] Caute adds,

> Only when Stalin turned towards positivistic social engineering did they identify Soviet communism with a re-recovery of nerve, with a reaffirmation of man's capacity to master his environment and his nature. Yet their own spiritual ancestors were Condorcet, Bentham, Owen and Saint-Simon rather than Marx or Engels. They were heirs to the pre-Marxian Enlightenment.[34]

The Frankfurt School, needless to say, had very different dreams, as Caute himself recognizes when he considers and quickly decides against their inclusion in his account.[35] For rather than supporting positivistic social engineering, the Frankfurt School came to associate it with instrumental rationality and the domination of nature in such works as

[31] Sidney and Beatrice Webb, *Soviet Communism: A New Civilization*, 2nd ed. (London, 1937). The first edition had a question mark after the title, which the Webbs then deleted.

[32] Lewis A. Coser, *Men of Ideas: A Sociologist's View* (New York, 1970); David Caute, *The Fellow-Travellers: A Postscript to the Enlightenment* (New York, 1973).

[33] Coser, op. cit. p. 238.

[34] Caute, op. cit. p. 251.

[35] Ibid. p. 51.

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Dialectic of Enlightenment and elsewhere.[36] Indeed, one recent commentator has gone so far as to claim that they are better understood in the context of conservative anti-modernist, anti-Enlightenment thought than in that of the traditionally progressive Left.[37] Even Walter Benjamin, whose actual politics of this period came closest of any Frankfurt School figure to being an apologia for the Soviet Union, was more a partisan of Fourier than of Saint-Simon and deeply pessimistic about any simplistic positivist notions of progress. In the 1930s, to be sure, some Institute members had not yet abandoned the equation of socialism with centralized economic planning,[38] but by the end of the decade, the Institute was clearly aware of the costs of such a view.[39] And in the process they achieved a much more profound understanding of the ultimate roots of Stalinism, indeed of all totalitarian tendencies in modern society, than that reached by Professor Feuer's plain-talking Trotskyists with their agonizingly convoluted efforts to define (and, let it not be forgotten, in some ways defend) the Soviet Union as a " degenerate workers' state."[40]

IF any further proof of the Institute's distance from fellow-travelling is needed, it can be found in the troubled relations its members had with virtually all other leftist intellectuals and organizations during those years. Without citing a source, Professor Feuer mentions a meeting between the Institute's leadership and the editorial board of the Marxist journal *Science and Society* in 1942, which he claims was designed to achieve a *rapprochement* between them. He neglects to add that nothing significant ever came of this meeting, whose very existence he nonetheless implies suggested a commonality of opinion. If this were so, it would be just as valid to claim that the Institute was crypto-positivist because of that other meeting with Otto Neurath, Ernest Nagel and their colleagues described by Sidney Hook in his Addendum to Professor Feuer's article. Far more characteristic of the Institute's relations with more militant Marxists were their uneasy ties to Brecht, Korsch, Bloch and Sohn-Rethel. Brecht scornfully saw them as models for his so-called " Tui-intellectuals " because of their reluctance to engage in direct political practice.[41] Korsch, who had been a major presence during the Institute's earliest days, remained on polite terms with them during the migration, and even contributed occasional reviews to their journal. But

[36] Horkheimer and Adorno, *Dialectic of Enlightenment*, trans. John Cumming (New York, 1972); Horkheimer, *Eclipse of Reason* (New York, 1947).

[37] George Friedman, *The Political Philosophy of the Frankfurt School* (Ithaca, 1981).

[38] Several of the articles by Gerhard Meyer and Kurt Mandelbaum deal with planning. See the discussion in Martin Jay, " Kurt Mandelbaum: His Decade at the Institute of Social Research," *Development and Change*, Vol. 10, No. 4, October, 1979.

[39] See, in particular, Horkheimer's " Authoritarian State." There are also indications of this critique in Adorno's " The Sociology of Knowledge and Its Consciousness," which was first published in 1953, but drafted in 1937. It is included in *Prisms*, trans. Samuel and Shierry Weber (London, 1967).

[40] For an account of these convolutions, see Robert H. McNeal, " Trotskyist Interpretations of Stalinism," in *Stalinism: Essays in Historical Interpretation*, ed. Robert C. Tucker (New York, 1977).

[41] For Brecht's relations with the Institute and his Tui-Novel, see Iring Fetscher, " Bertolt Brecht and Amercia," *Salmagundi*, 10–11 (Fall, 1969–70).

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the association was by no means a completely happy one, as Professor Feuer acknowledges. The reason, however, is not that Korsch had become *less* Marxist than the Institute, as Professor Feuer implies,[42] but rather the opposite. In a letter to Paul Mattick of 20 November 1938, Korsch disdainfully wrote,

> The entire Institute has always been and still is completely grounded in a *double book-keeping* (*doppelten Buchführung*) in politics and revolutionary theory . . . the people from the Institute for Social Research think that because they are merely cowardly and egotistical and limited, and not openly counterrevolutionary, that they are in some way revolutionary and ready for struggle (in secret!).[43]

As for Bloch, who, unlike the Institute, publicly defended the Purges, he was no less disturbed by the Institute's lack of revolutionary fervour and later dubbed them the " Institute of Social Falsification."[44] And Sohn-Rethel claimed, as Phil Slater writes, " the Frankfurt School's distance from Stalinist Russia resulted, due to the absence of an economic theory, in an ' inability to form any concept of communist politics or workers' praxis.' In this sense, the Frankfurt School ' turned their backs on the political praxis of class-struggle.' "[45]

In fact, there is no small irony in Professor Feuer's attempt to tie the Institute to crypto-Stalinist fellow-travelling in the face of the far more frequent lament by its leftist critics that its members had no real radical politics at all. Professor Feuer seems intent on establishing that link because only then can he make a case for the sinister nature of the Institute's " subtle misrepresentation " of its position in its negotiations with Columbia. Only then can he praise Nicholas Murray Butler's willingness to aid refugee scholars in distress and pose the slanderously rhetorical questions, " Would the researchers of the Institute, had fate elevated them as commissars of universities in the Soviet Germany they advocated, have acted similarly? Would they have extended a welcoming hand to refugees from communist tyrannies? Would they have responded to an ethical mandate founded on the rational community of mankind? "[46] It does not take much reflection to provide the answers. After the war, there was a Soviet Germany to which they might have chosen to return. With the sole exception of the economist Henryk Grossmann, who was even more of an outsider than Wittfogel, none of them did. " Fate " chose to elevate Horkheimer to the Rectorship of the University of Frankfurt, where he was anything but a commissar spurning refugees from the East.

[42] Feuer, " The Frankfurt Marxists," op. cit. p. 176. There is also some doubt that Korsch ever completely abandoned Marxism, as Professor Feuer claims. See the discussion in Kellner, op. cit. p. 272.

[43] Kellner, op. cit. p. 284.

[44] Quoted in Tar, op. cit. p. 206.

[45] Slater, op. cit. p. 86.

[46] Feuer, " The Frankfurt Marxists," op. cit. p. 175.

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IF, then, the Institute was not a Muenzenberg front with a lifeline to Moscow and a desire to find another site to recruit Soviet espionage agents, as Professor Feuer wants us to believe, why then did it seek a tie with Columbia? Professor Feuer himself offers a plausible answer when he writes, " Yet all the previous considerations might appear captious when we consider that Gumperz and Horkheimer were speaking for a group of refugees, being driven from one country to another, desperate to find a foothold in the United States where they could resume their creative scholarship."[47] He then admits that " it would be difficult for an onlooker to gainsay this argument,"[48] but proceeds to do so anyway by pointing to the sizeable endowment they were able to bring with them from Germany, which meant they did not really need Columbia's charity.

One can quibble about the calculations Professor Feuer offers to show how wealthy they were, especially because of the support they gave to other refugees, which he neglects to mention. But even if his general point is granted, it is hard to see why it is so damaging. The Institute, after all, had always had a university affiliation in Frankfurt, where according to its charter, its director had to be a professor. When it set up branches in Geneva, Paris and London, the Institute also sought connexions with established institutions, the International Labour Organization, the Ecole Normale, and the London School of Economics. The simple reason, as Pollock said in a gracious letter of thanks to Butler in 1935, was that " the realization of scientific work is not only a question of available funds, but depends to a very great extent upon environment, and a congenial atmosphere."[49] Had Columbia not generously provided that atmosphere, other American universities, such as the University of Chicago and Princeton, were apparently eager to do so. Columbia was chosen, so Lowenthal remembers,[50] because of New York's proximity to Europe and its cosmopolitan population.

In groping for ways to turn these obviously innocent facts into something unpleasant, Professor Feuer finally has to conclude that their links with Columbia made it possible to remain leftist for a longer period of time than their more politically active—read, either communist or Trotskyist—competitors. Confusingly conflating the categories of non-Leninist Marxist and fellow-traveller, he boldly generalizes: " A Marxist fellow-traveller is more apt to remain a Marxist indefinitely because his theories then enjoy a relative immunity to experiment; whatever the ideology of 'praxis,' the persistence of ' Critical Theory ' was proportionate to its attachment to theorizing without practice. For this the Columbia setting provided a unique institutional base."[51]

[47] Ibid. p. 173.
[48] Ibid.
[49] Quoted in ibid. p. 174.
[50] Personal communication.
[51] Feuer, " The Frankfurt Marxists," op. cit. p. 176.

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Well, here I suppose we have to grant his argument some validity. Universities like Columbia have indeed provided the institutional setting for radical theoretical work by intellectuals not immediately engaged in direct political action, as of course they have for other social and political theorists of different persuasions. For someone like Professor Feuer, who seems to think that any gap between theory and practice is a sign of bad faith and that the only real political options are communism or anti-communism, this state of affairs is likely to prove a continuing source of chagrin. But for others, who have a less simplistic sense of the range of possible theoretical and political stances, it will not. The story of Columbia's hospitality to the Institute of Social Research will seem for them less an example of liberal naïveté and Marxist duplicity than a testament, perhaps an all too rare one, to the openness and flexibility of American academic life. That the Frankfurt School was able creatively to grow beyond its political and theoretical point of departure, to which Professor Feuer wants to reduce it as if it were a mark of original sin, was in no small way due to the generosity of the Columbia administration and faculty. Let it be hoped in conclusion that future instances of this kind will not be jeopardized by mean-spirited efforts to recast past ones as cautionary episodes in an anti-Marxist morality play.

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A Reply to Lewis S. Feuer

Heresy? Yes! Conspiracy? No!

G. L. Ulmen

IN a pamphlet written for the American Committee for Cultural Freedom, and in a 1953 book of the same title, *Heresy, yes—Conspiracy, no!*, Sidney Hook defined a heresy as " a set of unpopular ideas or opinions on matters of grave concern to the community," a conspiracy as " a secret or underground movement which seeks to attain its end not by normal political or educational processes but by playing outside the rules of the game," and subscribed to Justice Holmes' meaning of liberalism as " the belief in the free trade of ideas—that the test of truth is the power of thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market " (pp. 19, 21 ff.). In so doing, he argued that " the right to profess publicly a heresy of any character, on any theme, is an essential element of a liberal society. The liberal stands ready to defend the honest heretic no matter what his views against any attempt to curb him " (p. 22). Hook left no doubt about the context of his remarks: " communist ideas are heresies, and liberals need have no fear of them where they are freely and openly expressed . . . the Communist movement, however, is something quite different " (p. 22). He made a point of distinguishing Marx from Lenin and Stalin on the question of conspiracy: " Marx was an unconcealed heretic. Even when writing in non-democratic countries, subject to repression and imprisonment, he scorned the use of conspiratorial techniques " (p. 25 f.). Finally, Hook states: " It is a great pity and a source of much confusion that present-day communists are often referred to as Marxists, without further qualification " (p. 25).

Since Hook's considerations speak directly to the issues raised in Lewis S. Feuer's " The Frankfurt Marxists and the Columbia Liberals,"[1] it is surprising that he chose to write an " Addendum " to an article that plays havoc with them all. I would like to believe that Hook hadn't read Feuer's article beforehand and published his otherwise innocuous recollection of two meetings with members of the Institute for Social Research in New York in the late 1930s on his own account. But the innuendo of his remarks and specifically his concluding statement are so clearly meant to support Feuer's thesis that I can only conclude that Hook was taken in by the presumed revelations of Feuer's windfall—" the correspondence in the Presidential Archives of Columbia University."

Feuer's article is reportedly " based solely " on this correspondence,

[1] *Survey*, Vol. 25, no. 3, Summer 1980.

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to which he was given access by President William J. McGill. Nevertheless, he supplements this correspondence with references to and quotations from, among others, Hede Massing's memoirs, Martin Jay's history of the Frankfurt School and the Institute for Social Research, my own intellectual biography of Karl August Wittfogel and what he refers to as a " Discussion " with Wittfogel. Anyone acquainted with Hede Massing would know that her account of her own life and the events she participated in is more than a little impressionistic and must be treated with extreme caution as an historical source. Feuer takes her recollections at face value. Although the references to my book and Wittfogel are apparently more amicable than those to Jay and his book, they are in reality more inimical in the use to which they are put—namely, the defamation of the Institute for Social Research.

ONE might well ask what is the purpose of Feuer's article other than the defamation of the Institute, since he portrays the " Frankfurt Marxists " as communist conspirators and the " Columbia liberals " as well-meaning dupes. In other words, Feuer's sympathy for the latter is less than genuine, while his enmity towards the former is more than obvious. Indeed, there is a certain distorted logic in Feuer's argument that is central to his thesis. If he is intent upon depicting the " Frankfurt Marxists " at Columbia University as at best fellow-travellers, and at worst communist conspirators operating under the guise of liberalism, he has first to create the fiction that the Institute in Frankfurt was already so constituted. And this is exactly what he attempts to do. He states that " the Institute moreover evidently became a recruiting ground for the Marx-Engels Institute in Moscow and indeed for the Soviet espionage service." In reality, the Marx-Engels Institute was no more than the Frankfurt Institute a recruiting ground for any service. It was set up for the study of Marxism and it was in that capacity that it undertook to publish the *Marx-Engels Gesamtausgabe* or MEGA, with some assistance from the Frankfurt Institute. There was nothing conspiratorial about this arrangement: it was a legitimate intellectual enterprise. In like manner, the Frankfurt Institute also had close relations with the Max Weber circle in Heidelberg, and some of the Institute's members, Wittfogel included, contributed to the *Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik*. Both David Riazanov, the director of the Marx-Engels Institute, and Emil Lederer, the editor of the Heidelberg *Archiv*, paid visits to the Frankfurt Institute as did many other scholars, radical and otherwise.

As for the Frankfurt Institute being a recruiting ground for the Soviet espionage service, Feuer rests his case on Richard Sorge, who ultimately became the most famous Soviet spy in the Far East. It is true that Sorge was connected with the Institute at its inception and that shortly thereafter he was recruited by Soviet intelligence. The only connexion between these two occurrences is that both took place in Frankfurt. Sorge was indeed the assistant to Kurt Albert Gerlach, who died while

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the Institute was still in the planning stage. Carl Gruenberg, the first director, quickly replaced Sorge with Henryk Grossmann, who was intellectually more qualified for the position. Sorge's recruitment by Soviet Intelligence had absolutely nothing to do with the Frankfurt Institute or any of its members.

Gruenberg was a social democrat, never a communist. The leading communist in the Institute, both in Frankfurt and at Columbia, was Wittfogel. Both Gruenberg and Wittfogel were Marxists, as were the other members of the Institute in varying degrees of understanding and commitment. In the Germany of the 1920s and 1930s, to be radical was to be labour-oriented; and to be labour-oriented often meant to be Marxist and/or even communist. The Russian revolution appeared as a beacon to many and the Soviet experiment seemed to contrast favourably with the German dilemma. To hail the Soviet experiment in the 1920s did not, however, make one a communist. Moreover, the fact that German intellectuals were radicals in their own country because of the existing social and political circumstances, did not make them radicals in the same sense in the United States. Most members of the Institute, not being communists, had become disillusioned with the Soviet experiment long before emigration to the United States. When Wittfogel arrived in the United States in 1934 his political affiliation was anything but a secret. He was known as a communist in England. In the United States he was known at least as a Marxist, as a member of the American Geographical Society. His openly Marxist book, *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft Chinas*, was well reviewed in the *American Economic Review* shortly after its publication in 1931. Moreover, months before Wittfogel's arrival, a pamphlet entitled *Brains Behind Barbed Wire, A Collective Report by the Association of Proletarian Revolutionary Writers of Germany*, was published in New York, stating clearly that Wittfogel was a member of the German Communist Party. Even so, he had always been an analyst and theoretician and never engaged in any conspiratorial activities. Both as a communist intellectual and in the struggle against Hitler, his speeches and writings were public knowledge. Despite his growing disenchantment with Soviet communism because of its bureaucratization and forced collectivization, and despite his hatred of Stalin for helping to bring Hitler to power in Germany, Wittfogel was the only one who had contact with the American Communist Party. He didn't approach them; the head of the Agitprop section approached him about publishing a study of the Nazi leadership he had begun in England. It was never published.

In a recent autobiographical exchange, Leo Lowenthal rightly singles out Wittfogel and Grossmann as the adherents of the Soviet Union in the Institute in the 1930s and describes a passionate dispute between Wittfogel and other members of the Institute that occurred in 1937–38, at the Tip-Toe Inn in New York, from which Wittfogel stormed out because Horkheimer had remarked that " he wouldn't be a bit surprised if Stalin signed a pact with Hitler, if only Hitler would make the slightest

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overture."[2] The significance of this dispute is somewhat distorted by Loewenthal's remark that this was one of many disputes with Wittfogel, also involving the Moscow Show Trials. Here Loewenthal's memory is surely remiss. At no time did Wittfogel ever support the Purges. Already in China in 1936 he began openly attacking Stalin and criticizing the Purges, which led to disputes with friends and associates both inside and outside the Party. These continued in New York after his return in the autumn of 1937. His criticism of the Soviet Union was reported to the American Communist Party. At the height of the Purges, in the same winter of 1937–38, he gave a speech at the Institute seminar on " Conditions Under Which Democracy Is Possible," in which he suggested that the total power of the bureaucracy in the Soviet Union had usurped the power of the people. In the heated dispute that followed, Wittfogel answered " Yes! " to Grossmann's question about whether he was suggesting that a second revolution was necessary in Russia. The one thing for which Wittfogel now gave the Soviet Union credit was that it had joined the fight against Hitler. Hence his reaction to Horkheimer's seemingly cavalier, but no doubt perceptive, remark. No communist at that time could have tolerated the suggestion of a pact between Stalin and Hitler, let alone Wittfogel, who had suffered Stalin's early policy in helping Hitler come to power, had been incarcerated in many prisons and concentration camps because of it, and was then witnessing the ruin of many old friends and comrades at Stalin's hands. There wasn't much left to hang on to, and when that was gone—when Stalin did in fact sign a pact with Hitler in August 1939—Wittfogel broke with communism and the Soviet Union.

WHATEVER reservations one might have about Loewenthal's reminiscences, he correctly relates the general disposition of his generation in Germany towards the Russian revolution (p. 39 ff.). Had Feuer bothered to consult Loewenthal's account of the Institute (pp. 63–108) and particularly the letters reproduced at the end of Loewenthal's volume (pp. 242–88), he would have found no defence of his thesis. But since not even the Columbia Archive letters, on which he supposedly bases his article, support his thesis, he undoubtedly would have read into them what the wanted. In one of the letters in the Loewenthal correspondence, Adorno mentions his meeting with Max Horkheimer and Friedrich Pollock in a letter dated July 1924. In this connexion he writes: " Both are communists by the way and we had lengthy and passionate discussions of the materialistic conception of history, in which we found ourselves in much agreement " (p. 248). This statement reflects both the spirit and the naïveté of the times. Neither Horkheimer nor Pollock were communists, but fledgling Marxists. And in their writings thereafter neither evidenced much, if any, concern with the materialistic conception of history. Wittfogel, on the other hand, was a

[2] Leo Loewenthal, *Mitmachen wollte ich nie. Ein autobiographisches Gespräch mit Helmut Dubiel* (1980), p. 86 ff.

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communist and committed to the materialistic conception of history. As such, he was always somewhat of an outsider at the Institute. But even after he became an anti-communist, Wittfogel remained more grounded in Marx than did any of the other members of the Institute. Such is the complex nature of intellectual and political life in our time that Feuer completely misunderstands.

When Wittfogel was subpoenaed to testify before the McCarran Committee hearings on the Institute of Pacific Relations in 1951, he was pressed to make revelations about the Institute for Social Research. He categorically refused even to mention the Institute for Social Research, not only to protect its other members from being brought before the Committee as he was, but also because there was nothing to reveal. I myself have drawn attention to the turn in 1931 of the Frankfurt Institute from social science to social philosophy, paralleling the radical transformation of Soviet Marxism. But I also made clear that this social philosophy, or " Critical Theory," as it came to be called, was not following any party line and was never a copy of that crude distortion of theory and practice that was Soviet communism. I also made clear that in 1931 Wittfogel's theory of " Asiatic " society in general, and his concept of bureaucracy as a ruling class in particular, became anathema in official communist circles, and that he nevertheless continued to follow and develop what he believed to be the principles of historical materialism even after the " Western Marxism " of the Frankfurt Institute and the " Asiatic " Marxism of the Soviet Union went their own and separate ways.

When Feuer visited Wittfogel in April 1980, he discussed among other matters the Institute. At no time did he indicate that their meeting was anything more than a friendly chat. More to the point, he never indicated that he intended to write an article about the Institute, let alone an attack of this nature. Even so, nothing that Wittfogel told Feuer in any way supports Feuer's contentions. Certainly Wittfogel would never knowingly lend himself to such an enterprise, and one that particularly singles out for opprobrium his long-time friend and colleague, Julian Gumperz. Gumperz is apparently the key to Feuer's thesis that the " Frankfurt Marxists engaged in a subtle sort of misrepresentation to the Columbia authorities " (p. 171). Because he was by nationality an American and a man of means, Gumperz assisted the Institute in establishing itself at Columbia, as he assisted many other *emigrés* of various political and intellectual persuasions. Not only does Feuer distort that period of history when the United States opened its doors to men and women of any and all intellectual and political persuasions fleeing the Nazi tyranny, but his defamation of Gumperz's character is nothing short of libellous.

FEUER never bothers to mention the generous reminiscences of Theodor Adorno and many others included in *The Intellectual*

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Migration: Europe and America, 1930–1960.[3] He might have better understood this period and these individuals had he read Laura Fermi's book, *Illustrious Immigrants: The Intellectual Migration from Europe 1930–41.*[4] But that would defeat his purpose. Noting that Nicholas Murray Butler, President of Columbia University, acted swiftly and spontaneously to rescue the " Frankfurt Marxists," Feuer asks: " Would the researchers of the Institute, had fate elevated them as commissars of universities in the Soviet Germany they advocated, have acted similarly? " (p. 175). At another place, he writes:

> The permanent members of the Institute numbered not more than eight or nine persons. With allowance made for the cost of research and assistance, it is clear that the Instituteers were vouchsafed affluence. The provision of a building with offices at Columbia University, rent-free, made even more congenial their exile in the bourgeois Babylon (p. 174).

Advocates of a " Soviet Germany "? Vouchsafed affluence? Tommy rot!

Julian Gumperz was a man of the highest integrity and greatest generosity and was revered by all who knew him, including myself. Certainly, he published an anti-war magazine in Germany at the end of the First World War, established with Wieland Herzfelde the Malik publishing house, promoted such communist writers as Lukács and Wittfogel, became a supporter of George Grosz, and when he visited the Soviet Union in 1923 was filled with tremendous enthusiasm for the Russian revolution. Yes, as a young man in Germany in the 1920s Gumperz was a radical. Who wouldn't have been? But, considering Feuer's allegations about Gumperz's politics in 1934, it is notable that Gumperz belonged to the Right Opposition to Stalin that was thrown out of the German Communist Party and, of course, the Comintern in 1928—which put him at odds with Wittfogel. By the early 1930s Gumperz was already outspokenly critical of Marxism—which put him at odds with some other members of the Institute too. But he was a man of tremendous loyalty, which overcame all political and intellectual differences.

Feuer overstates Gumperz's attitude towards Willi Muenzenberg, who was indeed " a genius without rival in the creation and manipulation of front organizations " (p. 165). He goes so far as to suggest that " Julian Gumperz evidently took Muenzenberg as his model as far as his dealings with fellow-travellers and the German Communist Party apparatus was concerned " (p. 166). He further suggests that Gumperz acted *à la* Muenzenberg in establishing the Institute at Columbia and makes an even wilder allegation in the form of a question: " Was the *Institut für Sozialforschung* at its inception one of Willi Muenzenberg's many

[3] Donald Fleming and Bernard Bailyn, eds., *The Intellectual Migration: Europe and America, 1930–1960* (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1969).

[4] Laura Fermi, *Illustrious Immigrants: The Intellectual Migration from Europe 1930–41* (University of Chicago Press, Chicago and London, 1968).

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ventures in the organization of fellow-travellers? " Anyone who ever knew Gumperz or knows anything about the history of the founding of the Frankfurt Institute knows that this is at best fantasy and at worst a blatant distortion. At no time did Muenzenberg have anything to do with the Frankfurt Institute and at no time did the Frankfurt Institute have anything to do with the German Communist Party or the Comintern. Wittfogel knew Muenzenberg independently through the Party. Moreover, Muenzenberg, together with Heinz Neumann and Hermann Remele, turned against Stalin's Hitler policy, for which reason they were all eventually killed. It was Muenzenberg who defied Stalin by allowing Wittfogel to publish his devastating anti-fascist, anti-Hitler articles in the publications he controlled. The communist movement was never a night wherein all cats are black. Marxism is the *lingua franca* of twentieth-century intellectual life. Twentieth-century radicalism is as many-shaded as twentieth-century liberalism. The Frankfurt Institute was " liberal-radical " in that all its members, including the communists, were both tolerant of the views of others and open to ideas that challenged established traditions and institutions.

MOST of Feuer's contentions are based on innuendo and misleading speculation. For example, he writes that " during the years at Columbia University, the Institute had little desire to engage in any teaching, or work with graduate students . . . rather they found it easier to remain academic fellow-travellers if they avoided interchanges with graduate students " (p. 169). Just the opposite is the case. The Institute would have welcomed graduate students and lamented that there were so few. They even tried to attract students by offering scholarships because, being unknown in the United States, they felt isolated. More outrageous still is Feuer's statement: " To leave the protective seclusion of one's Institute involved the chance of being confronted with embarrassing questions about the Moscow trials, the Purges, and the Soviet social structure, directed against them from rather blunt-speaking children of Polish and Russian Jews, graduates of the City College " (p. 170). The character of this insinuation smacks more of the traditional resentment between the City College and Columbia University than of the political character of the Institute. The substance of it has already been proven false. The reason is transparent in Feuer's statement:

> The Institute's standpoint was not inconsistent with the communist policy of playing down any formulations that singled out the Jewish people rather than the proletariat in general. Nor did any page or paragraph in critique of Soviet society or Stalin's policies ever find its way into their Marxist books or articles. Whatever the circumstances of their foundation, the *Institut für Sozialforschung* in its later years became more tepid in its communist leanings, preferring a more amorphous variety of fellow-travelling (p. 169).

This is the ultimate deception. It was the communist Wittfogel, one of the few non-Jews in the Institute, who in the spring of 1931 put aside his

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scientific work and devoted all his time and energies to combating fascism, Hitler and anti-semitism—actively sponsored and financially supported by the Frankfurt Institute, whose other members read and discussed his articles and speeches. They also financially and otherwise supported the active intellectual and physical fight against the Nazis by one of their junior Jewish associates, Joseph Dunner, late professor of political science at the Yeshiva University in New York. In his autobiographical novel, " *If I Forget Thee* . . .," published simultaneously in German and English in 1937 and personally dedicated, in the copy I have at hand, " To the ' Institute ' (pp. 3, 187) in deepest gratitude for so much assistance, 2 July 1937," Dunner refers to the Institute on the aforementioned pages. On page 3 Dunner's protagonist is cautioned by a communist friend: " The Institute for Economic [Social] Research hasn't a good effect on people . . . I had a friend who went there on the same fellowship as yours, and now he's a good, stand-pat social democrat." At another point he mentions " the Institute's condition that he abstain from political activity while he studied there. . . ." On page 187 his protagonist fairly bursts into laughter at reading the Nazi newspaper article unveiling the mysteries of the Institute and delegating its members to " the staff of the Marxist army." He comments: " I am sure the worthy professors never dreamt it." In his autobiography, *Zu Protokoll gegeben: Mein Leben als Deutscher und Jude* (1970), Dunner relates that the Institute did indeed support him, as an unassimilated Jew, in forcibly expelling Nazis from Frankfurt University. His closest friend was Wittfogel, to whom, together with the Institute, he pays tribute (p. 63 ff., 68, 70 ff.). If Horkheimer and the other members of the Institute remained otherwise aloof from the issue of anti-semitism until the late 1930s, to which Jay and myself have drawn critical attention, the reason may well be, as Jay has suggested, the denial of Jewish identity on the part of many assimilated German Jews. Indeed, it took the holocaust to awaken Jewish identity in many assimilated European and non-European Jews and this had nothing to do with following the Soviet line. No more than the vagaries of radical disposition can the subtleties of ethnic identity be reduced to Feuer's base contention. Feuer accuses the " Frankfurt Marxists " of " subtle misrepresentation." There is nothing subtle about Feuer's misrepresentation.

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A Rejoinder

The Social Role of the Frankfurt Marxists

Lewis S. Feuer

WHEN I read Martin Jay's criticisms of my essay, I found it at first hard to believe he was their author. For in October 1981, he sent me a letter whose tone and judgment were quite different. In response to my sending him a reprint of my essay, " The Frankfurt Marxists and the Columbia Liberals," Professor Jay wrote: " I found the materials you unearthed fascinating, although, as you can imagine, I was not in full agreement with the interpretation you gave of them." Eight months later, in June 1982, what Professor Jay previously described as " fascinating " becomes a " meagre, businesslike exchange of letters." Regrettably, the circumpressures of an ideological environment still evidently mandate a polemical stance. At the very outset, they lead Professor Jay into a blunder in historical method.

Jay attributes the " more likely source " of my " ' perception of the Institute ' " to what he describes as " Professor Feuer's own earlier contact with the Institute when he was a Trotskyist graduate student in New York in the 1940s." Jay's statement contains three mistakes: firstly, I was never a graduate student anywhere in the 1940s; secondly, my formal graduate studies had ended long before, not in New York but in Cambridge, Massachusetts, a fact he could have verified in several of the scholarly biographical dictionaries. From time to time, I informally visited classes or lectures in the Columbia graduate school, especially during one year when I was studying law, and I used the Columbia Library. But that ended in 1939 when I began teaching at the City College. The chief blunder, the " Trotskyist " characterization, is more outlandish. For I never wrote for, or contributed to, any Trotskyist journal, nor did I ever join or participate in any Trotskyist club, meeting, party, association, league, group or grouplet. There were always basic propositions in Trotsky's analysis that I did not accept.

On what purported evidence then did Professor Jay base his blunder? He refers to a review article of mine published in 1974 in *The Jewish Journal of Sociology* in which I recalled " my own observations . . . in New York " during the 1930s (the period Jay was discussing). " Marxism was then making great inroads among the graduate students. The Frankfurt Institute, however, evoked little confidence." I had further described the impression that the Instituteers made on students, some of whom, influenced by Peirce, scientific logic and Viennese positivism, thought that the Instituteers talked a flagrant, pompous

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nonsense akin to that of the Nazi metaphysicians. To American empiricists, the Instituteers seemed a group of evasive Marxist votaries who kept clear of the most pressing questions that confronted Marxists at that time, such as, for instance, the nature of Soviet society. And in my *Survey* essay, returning to this theme, I mentioned that at Columbia, unlike Harvard (where I had done my graduate studies), there was also " a contingent of Trotskyist students." Professor Jay somehow concludes from my historical, descriptive account not only that I was " a Trotskyist graduate student," but also that I personally, as well as other radical students, experienced " frustration " in trying to engage the Instituteers at that time in political debate. It happens, however, that I was never involved in any such personal discussion. I knew a fair number of the Columbia graduate students; several of them, members of an obscure off-shoot of the Trotskyist movement, subsequently went on to notable careers; also, a classmate of mine from high school and undergraduate years actually worked as an editorial assistant for the Institute, translating their German into an equally bombastic English; in later years, he regaled a listener with a reenactment of the scenes he had witnessed of toadying before the " Herr Direktor "[1]; he is also said to have " boasted " that he and a classical scholar, also employed by the Institute and later elevated to English knighthood, were the only students the Institute ever had.[2] I myself once attended an Institute public lecture where, with European war in the offing, the speaker endeavoured to demonstrate that there were no signs in the Nazi war economy of any central economic plan. I suppose it was meant to argue that the Nazi economy was still capitalist, not socialist.

During the academic year 1939–40, however, I had the good fortune, as I began my first full-time job as a teacher, to meet in my classes the most remarkable students I have known. Irving Kristol has written the definitive document concerning that group, his essay " Memoirs of a Trotskyist."[3] They included several who became outstanding sociologists, and their " organizer " was I. Milton Sacks, later Dean at Brandeis University. All evinced as youngsters those qualities that made

[1] Benjamin Nelson is listed by Professor Jay as having been among those " trained " by the Institute. But Nelson's book, *The Idea of Usury*, contains no reference to any of the Instituteers either in its Postscript and Acknowledgement, Bibliography or Index of Names; nor do any of them appear in the biographical sketch of Nelson by Toby E. Huff in the edition of Nelson's writings, *On the Roads to Modernity* (Totowa, 1981). Cf. Jay, *The Dialectical Imagination* (London, 1973), p. 289.

[2] Possibly they were indeed the only two graduate students in history who worked with the Institute. There were, however, several students of sociology, including, for instance, Gerard de Gré, now retired at a Canadian University. I am indebted to a reminiscence of a friend of mine, a distinguished emeritus Professor of History at Rutgers University. The classical scholar employed by the Institute for Social Research during the years 1937–39 later became executive secretary of the American Committee for Democracy and Intellectual Freedom, an organization founded in February 1939, that was especially influential among fellow-travellers in colleges and universities. Its conception of academic freedom was the Leninist one. Cf. Alice Kimball Smith and Charles Weiner, *Robert Oppenheimer: Letters and Recollections* (Cambridge, Mass., 1980), pp. 218–19. The American Committee for Democracy and Intellectual Freedom, *Record . Program . Needs* (New York, 1939). Margaret Mead, *Writings of Ruth Benedict: An Anthropologist At Work* (New York, 1966), pp. 348–49.

[3] Irving Kristol, " Memoirs of a Trotskyist," The *New York Times Magazine*, 2 January 1977, p. 42ff.

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for their later notable contributions—independence of mind, analytic intelligence, wit, broad reading and genuine human sympathies. The examination booklet of one of them ended with the admonition that, in the light of what he had written, reason would prevail; he therefore called upon me to fill out an enclosed application card for membership in the Fourth International. Instead, I kept the examination paper as a remembrance of my first year as a teacher.

That spring three of the Trotskyist and Norman Thomas socialists were charged, with patent falsehood, of having assaulted a police officer during a demonstration. I called a Civil Liberties lawyer to their rescue when they came bleeding and dishevelled to the department office, and I attended the trial at which they were acquitted. Nonetheless, I was never regarded as a Trotskyist. Within a few years, moreover, these men had begun the intellectual journey that has in recent years made them the proponents of what is now called in the United States " neo-conservatism." Their route was a logical one: if Trotsky's descriptive account of the Soviet bureaucratic totalitarian society was accurate, but if his theoretical explanations, for instance that the abuses were due to the triumph of the Stalinist cadres, or to Russian backwardness, or to revolutionary exhaustion, were inadequate, then it probably followed that such tyranny was potential in every centrally planned socialist society, and the whole enterprise of the October revolution of 1917 had been a mistake to begin with. The analytic logic of the neo-conservatives was a continuation of what they had mastered in their Trotskyist student years. Such students, however, had nothing to learn from the hedged, overblown discourse of the Frankfurt Instituteers, who, having helped deride and destroy the Weimar republic as " liberal bourgeois," seemed compelled, like Marxist Bourbons who had learned nothing, to do the same in the United States.

PROFESSOR JAY questions my emphasis on the importance of the role of Julian Gumperz in the movement of the Institute to Columbia University. Historians, he says, have always known about Gumperz's communist activities. In that case, if we take Jay's book as an example, their investigation into Gumperz's career as an agent for the Communist International has been most cursory. Jay dismisses Gumperz's work, *Pattern for World Revolution*, as " an anti-communist book." By contrast, Bertram D. Wolfe, author of the classic *Three Who Made A Revolution*, characterized Gumperz's book as "an amazing, colourful, incredible and deeply moving story." Could Professor Jay seriously have read this book that he dismisses with a Stalinist-minted cliché?[4]

Moreover, it outrages common sense when Jay intimates that Gumperz was really nothing more than an interpreter, chosen because " he spoke English more fluently than anyone else. . . ." The Institute could easily have found a language interpreter if that was all they

[4] Martin Jay, *The Dialectical Imagination*, op. cit., p. 38.

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wanted. Gumperz, however, the famed organizer of many communist and fellow-travelling undertakings, could wrap people around his fingertips, and make " bourgeois-liberals " join hands with " liberal-radicals," that is, Marxist fellow-travellers. Consequently, he was the man to whom they turned in their most critical hour of migration and adjustment to America. Gumperz could say with aplomb that Chicago and Princeton were waiting in the background to welcome the Instituteers; what evidence for this eagerness has ever been adduced? Gumperz was indeed an amazing replication of the man he so much admired, Willi Muenzenberg. Moreover, Gumperz remained the " contact man " for the Institute. When Professor Wittfogel came to the United States in the autumn of 1934, and went to present himself to the Institute of Pacific Relations, " I went there with Mr Gumperz who had established the contact," he recalled to the United States Internal Security Subcommittee. A " contact man " is something more than a language interpreter.[5]

Much of what I wrote about Julian Gumperz was based on the book and congressional testimony of his former wife, Hede Massing. A hypothesis is tested by its fruitfulness in bringing forth new validational facts, and several such came to light as the consequence of my article's publication, concerning the social role and political linkages in the Institute's background:

(a) The executor of Hede Massing's will, the editor of an outstanding monthly magazine, and author of several books of political history, sent a letter that stated: " She occasionally referred to Gumperz as the silly one of her three husbands, all of whom, of course, including Gumperz, were not merely Communist-or-not, but simply KGB people " (4 November 1981).

(b) A noted sociological scholar, author of several significant works, and for several decades a friend of Hede Massing, wrote to me: " I regret that Hede Massing did not live to see it [your article on the Frankfurt Marxists] appear or alternatively long enough for you to interview her. She told us about a year before her death that Moscow regarded the whole operation as primarily cover for Comintern, NKVD and GRU operations like Sorge " (letter of 27 October 1981). The author was careful to add that Hede Massing's statement might or might not be supported by further evidence.

Evidently, in its formative period the Frankfurt Institute was indeed linked to the aims of German intellectuals ready to serve the Soviet apparatus. And it is wrong to say, as Jay does, that Gumperz after 1934 was " totally insignificant " in the life of the Institute. True, he wrote no scholarly works on Marx, philosophy or popular culture, but, in a Marxist sense, he remained a most important person in the Institute. For

[5] *Hearings Before the Subcommittee to Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act . . . of the Committee on the Judiciary*, United States Senate, Part I (Washington, 1951), p. 283. As Professor Jay indicates, Gumperz was an " intermediary " during this period when the " infiltration " of the Institute of Pacific Relations was under way. Cf. *The Dialectical Imagination*, op. cit., p. 285.

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Gumperz was, according to a trustworthy source, chiefly entrusted with the economic basis of the Institute; he managed their investments, providing the Marxist ideologists with the incomes they needed to finance their essays against the " bourgeois society." Gumperz worked from an office in mid-town New York, as a close friend of his, an economist and fellow-traveller, to whom he confided these relationships, has recalled. His own personal investments prospered; indeed, as Karl Wittfogel jocularly remarked, " he taught the capitalists how to make money." Apparently, however, his investments on behalf of the Institute, some reportedly in Westchester real estate, failed to win that same measure of success, and the Institute later ceased to be able to afford its American pensioners a continuing high degree of economic comfort. Was Gumperz perhaps the angel who presided over the Institute's demise in America as he had over its Columbia birth? The economic history of the Institute deserves more careful study; its neo-Marxist admirers, however, when it comes to the economic basis of the Institute, exhibit what we might call " the repression of the economic."[6] In later years, Gumperz himself spoke of the Instituteers with utter contempt, as Mrs Bertram D. Wolfe remembers from the period when she and her late husband were his friends.

SCHOLARS attached to the ideological tenets and personalities of the Frankfurt School tend naturally to repudiate whatever suggests that the Institute was quite prepared to engage in misrepresentation, or condone deception practiced on its behalf. Evidence, however, accumulates that the Institute had little compunction about using people for such deceit. An unusual item in this regard came to my attention when, about two years ago, I had occasion to read through the letters of Bertram D. Wolfe, a correspondence that I hope will soon be published. Wolfe died, unfortunately, before he had completed his memorable autobiography, *Life in Two Centuries*. It was his practice when narrating a given episode to verify beforehand his recollection of the events by writing (when it was possible) to a surviving participant. Thus, Wolfe sent a letter to Felix Weil, the founder of the Frankfurt Institute. I shall cite only a part[7]:

19 September 1973

Dear Felix,

When I visited you many years ago in Santa Monica, I learned many things of great interest to me, some of which I may now want to put in the autobiography on which I am now at work. I have kept track in a casual way of the various members of the Institute for Social Research which you brought into being and kept alive for so many years. I know for example that Horkheimer is now in a chalet . . . , that Adorno, . . . for whom I had the greatest admiration, died

[6] According to Hede Massing, Felix Weil, the endower of the Institute, was " mulcted by the more hardline directors of the operation." He was said to have expected the Institute to see to his later support, but instead died in want. The facts have not been studied by scholars.

[7] Mrs Bertram D. Wolfe has kindly allowed me to publish the text of this letter.

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> of a broken heart . . . when he suffered a shameful revolt of the students. . . . I have also kept in touch with Erich Fromm, have suffered grief at the death of Julian Gumperz, and closely followed the gyrations of Marcuse. But whatever I set down, I am determined to have as accurate as possible and if possible submitted to the knowledgeable people concerned, . . . I have not seen you since the day when Horkheimer wrote in German a review of *Autorität und Familie* and then asked me to translate it into English after which he took it " up the hill " to Thomas Mann who approved of my English and Horkheimer's German and signed the review which was then a first page review in the *New York Times Book Review.* It is an unusual event in my life to have been, if only marginally and for a moment, a ghost writer for the great Thomas Mann and I really should say something about it. I believe you remember the incident for it occurred on the last day that my wife and I enjoyed your hospitality in Santa Monica. . . . I hope life has dealt kindly with you and must say it has done with me. . . . cordially yours,
>
> *Bertram D. Wolfe*

Possibly Felix Weil never replied to this letter; at any rate, no reply is extant in Bertram Wolfe's documents. The full evaluation of Wolfe's letter must be left to the students of Thomas Mann's life and work. But as far as the Frankfurt Institute is concerned, Wolfe's vivid recollection of Horkheimer's design for literary misrepresentation is obviously reliable. Robert Lynd at Columbia performed a function not dissimilar to that which Thomas Mann was evidently expected to fulfil.

IN my essay, I stated that the later Instituteers, those of the Institute's American stage, were far less politically involved and active than those of the first German years. Professor Jay feels that I am not sufficiently enthusiastic in recognizing this. Perhaps he wishes discreetly to relegate the Institute's communist and espionage associations to youthful Frankfurt beginnings that were altogether outgrown in their staid maturity at Morningside Heights. The fact of the matter is, however, that the wartime and post-war activities of the Instituteers in the Office of War Information, the Office of Strategic Service and the Department of State remain unstudied. Enough is known, however, to indicate that Herbert Marcuse was, during his Washington years, in significant contact as an " intellectual mentor " with a group whose chief figures were later convicted in the Federal courts of wartime Soviet espionage. The story appears briefly in the autobiography of the president of Brandeis University, now its chancellor, Dr Abram L. Sachar. Marcuse, writes Chancellor Sachar, was appointed as a professor at Brandeis in 1954. It was known that Marcuse's

> revolutionary views . . . and his association with extreme radical movements had brought him into difficult confrontations with government agencies . . . But he was welcomed to Brandeis . . . [H]e nevertheless worried continuously that his past associations might create problems of security for him. There was the instance when the

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> spy Soblen was brought back to this country to stand trial for possible treason. Marcuse came to see me in great agitation. He noted that the government records would undoubtedly reveal his associations with Soblen, and he was fearful that, when this became public, the University might not be willing to stand by him. I asked him if any of his activity had been subversive, and he assured me that this was not so. He had indeed been an intellectual mentor in the movements Soblen had manipulated, but he had never participated in activity that could be legally judged subversive. I assured him that he had nothing to fear if he had indeed restricted his activity to the exposition of his views.[8]

What was this group to which Marcuse professed to have been purely an " intellectual mentor "? In November 1960, a Federal Grand Jury charged in an indictment that a Dr Robert Soblen had organized an espionage ring that had during the Second World War gathered information that " dealt with the personnel, activities and organization of the Office of Strategic Services and other Government offices engaged in intelligence and counter-intelligence operations here and in Germany." Documents, writings, photographs, photographic negatives were allegedly collected by the ring, and delivered to the Soviet Embassy; a squad of American co-conspirators, mostly young men and women whose names were published, acted as couriers; the ring had continued operations till 1956. Dr Soblen's brother, Jack, already imprisoned, had previously pleaded guilty to a similar role in organizing a ring that collected national defence secrets for transmittal to the Soviet Union.

THE two brothers Sobolevicius, both communists in their native Lithuania since the late 1920s, had become secret Soviet agents very early. They were given the assignment, according to Soblen's brother, of penetrating opposition groups in Europe as well as Trotsky's own secretariat-in-exile. Under the names of Roman Well (Dr Soblen) and Adolf Senin respectively, they joined the minuscule Trotskyist circle in Leipzig, and rose in its leadership; soon Roman Well (Dr Soblen) was proposing to the Paris Trotskyist Secretariat that they assume the responsibility for distributing the widely-read *Bulletin of the Opposition* in Germany and Eastern Europe. Recommended to Trotsky in December 1929, Roman Well (Dr Soblen), together with his brother, visited Trotsky in August 1931 at his Prinkipo island exile; they took their meals with him, and engaged in lively discussion. Soon afterwards, however, Trotsky's suspicions were aroused; the two brothers had a way of exacerbating differences among the German Trotskyist group, setting people so much against each other that scarcely anything was done at this critical time during which Hitler was preparing to take power. Finally, the two brothers broke with the German Trotskyists, contriving

[8] Abram L. Sachar, *A Host at Last* (Boston, 1976), pp. 196–97. Sachar's book was published when Marcuse was still alive; the latter died in July 1979.

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at the same time to publish in the German Trotskyist organ itself a denunciation of Trotsky as a saboteur of the international working-class movement, whereupon the Stalinist daily newspaper republished it in full on its first page. Trotsky then denounced the two men as " Stalin's agents," and in testifying in April 1937, before the Commission of Enquiry headed by the American philosopher John Dewey, referred to them: " Their genuine name is Sobolevitzius." It also transpired that the person who had originally recommended Roman Well (Dr Soblen) to Trotsky had been a secret Soviet agent.[9]

Their next assignment for espionage was said to have been conceived by Stalin's chief of the Soviet secret police, Lavrenty P. Beria himself; as a reward, Beria had allowed the brothers to emigrate with all their Sobolevicius families to America. Both brothers became naturalized American citizens in 1947. In 1960, Dr Soblen was supervising psychiatrist at the Rockland State Hospital in New York. Six months or so later, on 13 July 1961, the jury in a Federal Court found Dr Soblen guilty of wartime espionage, a crime punishable by death. The judge chose to sentence him to imprisonment for life, going to great lengths to ensure that Dr Soblen, who was sick with leukemia, would have proper medical care, and receive frequent visits. The defence counsel announced that he would seek a new trial, based on " newly discovered evidence," to wit, affidavits by two professors, one of whom was Professor Herbert Marcuse, who doubted that Dr Soblen's alleged contacts with the Office of Strategic Services " could have had access to any military secrets "; the government had presented contrary evidence.[10]

The case of Dr Robert Soblen moved on to a tragic ending. The evening after the United States Supreme Court refused to review the decision, Dr Soblen, rather than begin serving his jail sentence, fled on an aeroplane to Israel; he forfeited the bail composed of his wife's total savings and the loans of civil libertarians; his lawyer could not believe that his client would flee. Before he left, Soblen arranged to have a self-exculpating letter sent to the various New York newspapers; he blamed everybody, the judge, the prosecutor, his own lawyers, the witnesses and the press for a miscarriage of justice. He insisted the government had failed to prove that he had given away national defence secrets, though curiously, he did not deny maintaining a courier service to the Soviet Embassy. The Israeli authorities, however, arrested him at a hotel in Tel-Aviv; noting that the Law of Return excluded by amendment the class of convicted felons, the Israeli authorities deported Dr Soblen to Britain on 1 July 1962. Soblen stabbed himself as he entered London but the injury was not fatal. The following month, after considerable debate, the

[9] My account of the Soblen assignment against the Trotskyists is based on Arthur Spencer, " Strange Interlude: A footnote to the Soblen Case," *Survey*, no. 49, Oct. 1963, pp. 113–15. Mr Leopold Labedz kindly brought this article to my attention. Cf. *The Case of Leon Trotsky: Report of Hearings on the Charges Made Against him in the Moscow Trials*, by the Preliminary Commission of Enquiry, John Dewey, Chairman (New York, 1937), pp. 138–39.

[10] The *New York Times*, 30 Nov. 1960, 14 July 1971, 8 Aug. 1961.

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British government also decided to deport him. Thereupon, Soblen committed suicide with an overdose of drugs.[11]

It is not clear whether Herbert Marcuse had come forward at the outset on his own initiative to appear as a witness on behalf of the accused Dr Soblen. As Marcuse had told President Sachar of Brandeis, the government knew of his associations as " intellectual mentor " to the group that the accused Dr Soblen had managed. Dr Soblen himself, in his letter to the *New York Times*, conceded that the purported " new evidence " with its affidavit by Marcuse, had been known to the government and judge but " not disclosed " by them during the trial. Possibly Marcuse, having been interrogated by the government, signed an affidavit in which he endeavoured to exonerate himself on the grounds that he had not observed any activities in the Soblen ring that could have concerned the national defence, that he had been solely an " intellectual mentor." Possibly Marcuse subsequently preferred to remain silent. What criterion, however, would Marcuse have used in defining " information bearing on national defence "? Would he have excluded data concerning the personnel and organization of the Office of Strategic Services, in whose offices he worked, as not directly related to the national defence, and as hence legitimately available for transmission to the Soviet Union?

IN any case, we have here the typically ambiguous role of the Frankfurt Instituteer as fellow-traveller. What, we might ask, could the role of " intellectual mentor " in the Soblen espionage ring have signified? At occasional meetings, we conjecture, Dr Marcuse of the OSS would have appeared and lectured on his views as they had already appeared in his and the Institute's publications, and were still being developed—that bourgeois liberalism was a corrupt social form that inevitably decayed into Hitlerite fascism, that the latter was the defensive political expression of monopoly capitalism, that only socialist revolution could solve the world's problems. Then he would have added, during that period, that Soviet society was the beacon showing the way to a better future, and that the standard for moral choice, for the virtue of a person's action, was the extent of its contribution to that socialist advent. Beyond the usual Washington-agency and inter-agency gossip, Marcuse possibly would have profferred little factual information, though bits and gleanings of facts, inadvertently or confidentially revealed, might have helped a Dr Soblen to formulate patterns. More important, however, was the fact that Dr Marcuse was conferring the intellectual blessings of Critical Theory, i.e. Marxism, upon the circle of couriers and informants to the Soviet Embassy. From his eloquent exposition of the Marxist philosophy of history, his Washington disciples might well have deduced that their ventures into espionage were warranted. He brought them " liberation " from the bourgeois-liberal ethic on such matters; nothing

[11] The *New York Times*, 28 Jun., 29 Jun., 12 Sept. 1962.

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that Dr Marcuse taught would have conflicted with the venture into espionage. They, as authentic Marxists believing in the unity of theory and practice, would then graduate to practical espionage activities on behalf of the one existing socialist state; Dr Marcuse would have done his part by talking so glowingly of " Praxis." The Critical Theorist, in the guise of " intellectual mentor " may have subserved unwittingly a role for a Soviet espionage ring. Was he altogether unaware of what was going on?

For the fellow-travelling of the Frankfurt Instituteer was of a kind wherein the traveller helped prepare the fuel and mend the rails, without actually driving the engine. Marcuse was playing the same role about 30 years later, when, standing hand in hand with a former Brandeis student, Angela Davis, before an applauding university assemblage, he characterized her as the best student he had ever had, though she had publicly avowed her membership of the Communist Party, and though a certain puzzlement persisted in the minds of many as to how her weaponry had found its way into use in August 1970, during an outbreak of shooting and murder in a California court house. Marcuse's favourite student then journeyed to the Soviet Union where she was fêted, given an honorary degree by Moscow University, and presented with the keys to the fabled city of Samarkand.[12]

THROUGHOUT their Columbia decade, the Instituteers were indeed fellow-travellers, in the precise scientific usage of the term. Professor Jay cites what he calls " anecdotal " material to argue that " in private, they were deeply troubled by events in the Soviet Union." But this was of the essence of fellow-travelling; its practitioners were supposed to remain silent about all their misgivings and criticisms of the Soviet Union, i.e. to "shut up," and to speak and write publicly only of that wherein they agreed with the Soviet Union and the Communist Party. The fellow-traveller was always riven by a separation between his " private " views and his " public " statements; the censor, in this case, even for the Instituteers, was the Stalinist one.[13] That is what explains the anomaly that the

[12] Angela Davis, *An Autobiography* (New York, 1974), p. 133 ff., pp. 149, 189. Regina Nadelson, *Who is Angela Davis? The Biography of a Revolutionary* (New York, 1972), pp. 97–103. 134. A. Parker, *Angela Davis: The Making of a Revolutionary* (New Rochelle, 1973), p. 86 ff., p. 211 ff., p. 226 ff. The *New York Times*, 3, 8, 10 Sept. 1972.

[13] Paul Baran, in 1930 an assistant in the Frankfurt Institute for Social Research working on the Soviet economy, and later a professor of economics at Stanford University, was one such fellow-traveller. In 1945, a Washington newspaper charged, on the basis of its " investigative reporting " (as it is now called), that he was probably a Soviet agent, and didn't belong in the Office of Strategic Services. According to Baran's memoirist, the slender basis for this charge was that Baran had emigrated to the United States on the Russian quota. Other facts, however, probably disquieted Baran's colleagues in the OSS. Baran's father, a physician still living in Moscow, had once been a Menshevik activist. The Menshevik survivors fared badly in the Soviet Union especially after the Menshevik trials of 1930. Baran's father, however, was still allowed to practice as a pulmonary specialist, and the son was permitted to visit his parents in 1934 for six months. Meanwhile, as he later wrote, " a great number of my earlier friends and colleagues—students at the University, professors, and researchers at the Agrarian Institute were implicated in one way or another with the Trotsky or Bukharin opposition or under close surveillance. My friend and protector, Professor S. M. Dubrovsky—formerly Director of the International Agrarian Institute—had disappeared. . . ." It was the practice of the Soviet regime to

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world's only presumably independent Marxist research institute never had anything to say about the bearing of such criticisms as Trotsky's on the nature of the Soviet state. Did they ever dare publish a critical analysis of the Webbs' highly influential paean to the Soviet Union as a " new civilization "? Nor does it avail to say that they were preoccupied with fascism as well as the critique of " bourgeois culture and society." For their analysis of " Nazism," national socialism, ignored all the similarities in the workings and structures of Nazi and Soviet societies. Even in later years, the phenomena of Soviet anti-semitism, together with those of the massive purges and " liquidations " of classes in the Soviet Union, remained taboo subjects in their writings. " Fascism," still remained for the Critical Theorists an extension, an inevitable outgrowth of " bourgeois culture and society." Since the Institute's *a priori* postulate excluded any perception of the Nazi-Soviet sociological isomorphism, it could never throw any light on the sociology of socialist culture and society. A single page of Nadezhda Mandelstam or Alexander Solzhenitsyn has more reality than can be distilled out of the collected works of the Frankfurt ideologists.

Nor can the Frankfurt Instituteers be depicted as the heirs to the Enlightenment tradition. The great figures of the Enlightenment, from Voltaire, the author of books and essays on Isaac Newton, to Franklin and Jefferson, who prided themselves on being scientists, were, above all, advocates of scientific method, of empiricism; they wished to defeat all those forces that made for superstition, fanaticism and intolerance. Voltaire would speak up wherever injustice was to be found; Franklin never ceased to advocate a scepticism in spirit, a freedom from dogma; Jefferson warned against the Jacobins, and in political economy thought Adam Smith's *Wealth of Nations* " the best book extant."[14] These men would have drawn back in disgust from Marcuse's denunciation of the " operational " and mathematical methods of science as a distortion of nature, and they would have observed that the sort of " science " he called for in *One Dimensional Man* coincided with the ideological brand that Lysenko preached should replace quantitative, experimental, genetic analysis. Would Marcuse have had any reason not to have countenanced the NKVD suppression of the geneticist Nikolai Vavilov for lending aid to the quantitative method of " bourgeois science."[15] Would he have cheered Vavilov's commitment to a labour camp?

Did the Institute of Social Research, indeed, exert its own form of censorship on its members and subsidized scholars? They refused to publish, for instance, an essay of the critic Walter Benjamin on

use a man's relatives as hostages to extort information and services. Soviet political amorality has been the chief agent in modern times in warping political honesty and trust. As a fellow-traveller, there was a separation in Baran between the private truth in his private papers and his public falsehood that repressed it. Cf. Paul M. Sweezy, " Paul Alexander Baran: A Personal Memoir," *Monthly Review*, Vol. 16, Mar. 1968, pp. 34–36, 41.

[14] Cf. Randolph Benson, *Thomas Jefferson as a Social Scientist* (Rutherford, 1971), pp. 106, 197, 259.

[15] Zhores A. Medvedev, *The Rise and Fall of T. D. Lysenko*, trans. I. Michael Lerner (New York, 1969), p. 71.

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Baudelaire because, as Hannah Arendt tells, Adorno and Horkheimer felt his thinking was " undialectic," that he had related certain superstructural elements directly, " perhaps even causally, to corresponding elements in the substructure." The Instituteers evidently did not argue that what Benjamin said was untrue; rather it was " undialectical "; after all, Vavilov at this time was being prepared because of a similar divagation for a sentence to a labour camp. Benjamin lived in fear that the Institute would cancel his stipend; " he had every reason ' to be docile ' toward the Institute's ' suggestions.' "[16]

SEVERAL writers maintain that both the Enlightenment and the fellow-travellers (and the Utopians since Plato's time) have shared a common tenet: that society should be governed by its intellectual elite.[17] I doubt whether Franklin and Jefferson, given their practical experience with both businessmen and ideologists, would have taken the rule of the intellectuals (or semi-intellectuals) as an axiom of Enlightenment. Jefferson's idea of a " natural aristocracy " did not make it extensive with what would today be called " the intellectuals." Certainly he would have thought, as John Stuart Mill did of German philosophy, that immersion in Heidegger and Hegel was about the poorest way there was to impart political wisdom; this type of learning, however, was for the Frankfurt Institute the hallmark of an " intellectual," the dialectic thinker.

The term " fellow-traveller " denotes, indeed, a stratum first conjured into recognizable existence by the skilful Willi Muenzberg and his fellow communist operatives (Julian Gumperz, for example) with the aim of corralling Western intellectuals into their camp on Soviet terms. The Western intellectual might be a Protestant minister, a religious believer, an existentialist metaphysician, even a scientific, mathematical geneticist or an advocate of the Machian principle of relativity; so long, however, as he kept quiet about his " private " views, never criticized the Soviet Union, but only praised it, and publicly assailed those who at the given time were designated as the Soviet Union's chief enemies, they were accepted as fellow-travellers on the passage drawn by the locomotive of revolution.[18] The recompense of the religious minister was that he would be allowed to feel that he was a modern counterpart of Jeremiah or Isaiah; artists might esteem themselves as the creative unconscious of a movement that endowed their work, otherwise otiose, with significance; teachers might congratulate themselves that they were educators of future redeemers. Each in some way did violence to his own rational judgment; to Bacon's Idols, those of the Tribe, Theatre,

[16] Hannah Arendt, *Men in Dark Times* (New York, 1968), pp. 162–63, 167, 169, 188.

[17] Cf. Lewis S. Feuer, " The Fellow-Travellers," *Survey*, Spring-Summer, 1974, Vol. 20, pp. 206–10.

[18] As Gershom Scholem observed: the Institute's journal, " systematically avoided dealing with the problems arising from the Russian experiences and conditions—and in this it was not much different from Brecht himself." Gershom Scholem, *Walter Benjamin: The Story of a Friendship*, tr. Harry Zohn (New York, 1981), p. 212.

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Market-place and Cave, they added the Idol of the Revolution. By means of the artifice of the " fellow-traveller," the Soviet regime drew to itself a large part of the world's intellectual class, a revolving corps, available on successive issues, of allies, henchmen, servitors and supernumeraries. The fellow-traveller paid little for his ticket on the revolutionary coach: he kept his bourgeois liberties, job and income; he might share in an added prestige especially among the young, would-be revolutionary intellectuals, and if he were on occasion disquieted by some moment in the Soviet dialectic of history, he could quietly, inconspicuously, take a perhaps temporary leave from his political phase. For despite all his dialectical posturings, the fellow-traveller kept open his escape hatch to the bourgeois liberal society. Bertolt Brecht, for instance, became an Austrian citizen in 1950, though the German Democratic Republic in which he resided had become an independent state in 1949.[19] A " Swabian cunning " in taking " appropriate safeguards " one biographer calls it, but this sort of cunning was common to most of the fellow-travellers, including the Frankfurt Marxists, who, for all their Hegelianism, were not prepared to rely on the cunning of history when it affected their private lives.

The Frankfurt School, according to Professor Jay, well aware of the uses to which " red-baiting " might be put, therefore forebore criticizing the Soviet Union; in extenuation he notes that they neither wrote glowing reports on the Soviet Union nor joined with Sartre in saying that " an anti-communist is a rat." One marvels at this parody of a defence of an " independent Marxist research institute." Imagine a biological institute deciding not to engage in genetic research or a physical institute resolving not to work on the general theory of relativity on the grounds that it might give offence to the Soviet Union, then, after having decided to keep quiet concerning the Soviet repressions and falsifications in these domains, defending themselves by saying they had never joined in saying that " an anti-Lysenkoist is a rat," or " an Einsteinian relativist is a bourgeois lackey."[20]

Psycholinguists should analyse the " anti-red-baiting " syndrome instilled into the collective psyche of much of the intellectual class by several decades of Soviet, communist, fellow-traveller and New Left verbal reinforcements. " Red-baiting " is a linguistic signal for preserving unshaken the Soviet political machine as the keeper of the intellectual's conscience; any public criticism that bears on the basic aims

[19] Claude Hill, *Bertolt Brecht* (Boston, 1975), pp. 34, 37. Frederic Ewen, *Bertolt Brecht: His Life, His Art and His Times* (New York, 1967), pp. 543, 432–33. Brecht complained in America of the " aridity " of such as Herbert Marcuse, but their ideological standpoints converged. Ibid. p. 385.

[20] *The Born-Einstein Letters: Correspondence between Albert Einstein and Max and Hedwig Born*, trans. Irene Born (New York, 1971), pp. 101–102. George Gamow, *My World Line: An Informal Autobiography* (New York, 1970), pp. 93–99. The physicist Lev Landau was dismissed from a teaching post early in his career chiefly because he adhered, against Party wishes, to Einstein's theory of relativity. During the next decade he was imprisoned as a " Trotskyist spy." A recent Soviet biography of Landau expunges these events completely. Anna Livanovna, *Landau: A Great Physicist and Teacher*, trans. J. B. Sykes (Oxford, 1980). Cf. L. S. Feuer, *Einstein and the Generations of Science* (New York, 1974), p. 96.

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and practices of the Soviet Union, or on the workings of communist parties, each organized in part, as Lenin insisted, as a secret political society, is debarred. Since intellectuals profess to be the consciences of their societies, the anxiety-arousing signal " red-baiting," with its latent threat of excommunication from the intellectual elite, helps enthrall the social conscience not through men's intellects, but through their unconscious fears.

ACCORDING to Professor Jay, the generosity of the Columbia University authorities had a kind of therapeutic influence on the Frankfurt Group, and enabled it " creatively to grow beyond . . . its point of departure." President Sachar of Brandeis University has quite a different story to relate about the " appreciation " shown by Herbert Marcuse, and the kind of growth he envinced. Marcuse, it should moreover be remembered, was the one Instituteer who, in President Sachar's words, " achieved national prominence as a radical guru." Dr Sachar continues:

> Marcuse's appreciation for the hospitality with which he was received at Brandeis deserves relating, since he became perhaps the most relevant symbol in my experience of the cynical radical who demands independence as a right for himself, but considers it " hypocrisy " when it is expected of him. . . . As Marcuse grew older, his corrosive style became more biting. He baited academia unmercifully, as he did national government. . . . He was contemptuous of the principle of free speech, which he called " repressive tolerance," treating it as a ploy by the power groups. . . . But in the 12 years of his stay at Brandeis, no attempt was ever made to silence or censor him.

Was there any difference between Marcuse's concept and Lenin's ridicule of such bourgeois freedoms as that of freedom of speech? None, except perhaps that Marcuse stated it more turgidly.

Marcuse's last act at Brandeis was his collaboration with an untruth circulated against the University. Since a faculty resolution had made retirement mandatory at 70 years of age, President Sachar offered Marcuse a reappointment that was limited to that period. Whereupon the student newspaper began, and persisted in, agitating, as Dr Sachar tells, " that Marcuse had been ' fired ' for his radical views. . . . Marcuse remained silent through the years that followed, making no effort to set the record straight."[21] This propensity for untruth persisted with Marcuse, and perhaps was augmented by successive experiences of American and university freedom. One day at La Jolla, he appeared at the Chancellor's office asking for a leave of absence in Europe on the grounds that his wife especially needed and wanted it. The Chancellor agreed to the request. Directly afterwards, Professor Marcuse announced to newspapermen that he was going on " strike." It was the

[21] Sachar, *A Host at Last*, op. cit. pp. 195–96.

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same cynicism towards fact that Dr Sachar had observed. Small wonder that the much-publicized hippie chieftain and convicted narcotics dealer, Abbie Hoffman, has rendered tributes to his professor, Marcuse. " Fantasy is the only truth," Hoffman reiterated in his tracts[22]; myth, he repeated, was a category that transcended fact. This was indeed a Marcusean message, an epistemology distilled from a Frankfurt brew.

PROFESSOR JAY makes a few debaters' points in his rebuttal: they are no more than just that. He avers that the Instituteers' meeting with the *Science and Society* editors need no more have betokened a commonality of opinion than their session with Sidney Hook and his friends. The former, however, took place in 1942 after the United States had entered the war; the Instituteers were concerned with emphasizing their degree of agreement with the communist-guided *Science and Society*. The latter meeting, on the other hand, took place several years before the war, and was arranged to argue the Instituteers' claim that their " dialectical " method was an organon for discovering truth superior to that of the " bourgeois logic." Marcuse continued in later years to attack the empiricist logic as " the logic of containment "; he held that operationalist empiricism was intrinsically linked to the programme for containing the expanding Soviet Empire. Professor Jay also makes the point that Gumperz could not have taken his Ph.D. degree at the Institute because only the University of Frankfurt had the power to grant degrees. People often, however, say colloquially that someone took his certificate, for instance, " with the Russian Institute," though that Institute technically as such has no certificate-granting authority, which vests with Columbia University. Professor Jay notes that David Riazanov, the head of the Marx-Engels Institute, cooperated with the Frankfurt Institute during his project for publishing the works of Marx and Engels. But he errs when he says that this achievement was " cut short by Riazanov's death in the Purges "; it was cut short for Riazanov when he and his Menshevik colleagues were ousted by Stalin in 1930–31. Nor is there any record that the Frankfurt Institute ever protested at this ouster, or the fraudulent trial of the Menshevik colleagues, or that it refused to collaborate with the Stalinist successors.

[22] Abbie Hoffman, *Revolution for the Hell of It* (New York, 1968), p. 66. " Marcuse was, with the exception of Maslow, the teacher who had the greatest impact on me. . . . In the spring of 1967 . . . at the Fillmore East. There he was, this statuesque . . . European Marxist scholar, following the Group Image acid-rock band onto the stage, accompanied by the thunderous foot-stamping cheers of America's most stoned-out, anti-intellectual generation." Abbie Hoffman, *Soon to be a Major Motion Picture* (New York, 1982), p. 84. " Herbert Marcuse says flower children have the answer. He smoked hashish at the big world happening in London in early August. Pray tell, what is a good Marxist to do? " Ibid. p. 30. In Marcusean revolt against bourgeois, objective truth, Hoffman describes helping forge a document, Che Guevara's last letter to the " Youth of the United States," and trying to sell it to a magazine. It was finally published in a neo-leftist journal. Abbie Hoffman, *Woodstock Nation: A Talk-Rock Album* (New York, 1969), p. 57. Hoffman also declared as a narcoticist for Critical Theorists and New Leftists: " dope-dealers are well-qualified social critics." Ibid. p. 66. Cf. The *New York Times*, 8 Apr. 1981.

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Riazanov died a number of years afterwards in circumstances still not clear.[23]

Then too Professor Jay indulges in what high-school debaters call a " diversion "; he likens the rostrum of advisers with which the Institute adorned its letter-heads to the names of *Survey*'s International Advisory Board. He omits the cardinal difference, however. The Institute's advisers had no idea of what the Instituteers were doing, nor had done; Morris R. Cohen's name, for instance, adorned that list but he had no conception of their Marxist standpoint. Whereas I would wager that the Advisory Board do read *Survey*'s articles, and know what they stand for.

A more trivial misreading by Professor Jay occurs when he charges that only one of my footnote citations, that from Ulmen, supports my statement that the Institute's programme was not conceived in opposition to Soviet Marxism but rather to elaborate it along more congenial German philosophical lines. He says " there is nothing in Slater (the second citation) that supports this charge." But, if the reader will turn to the cited page, he will find statements by Mr Slater such as " the Russian revolution and the subsequent economic construction never received any serious analysis, . . . ; the defeat of the anti-fascist struggle was never discussed in any adequate terms." In other words, no question that might embarrass Soviet Marxism was raised, but instead the Institute became " ultimately academic," that is reciting and discussing the meaning of " praxis," giving a more Hegelian formulation than Lenin's unity of theory and practice, and above all, criticizing bourgeois culture in their German philosophical vocabulary. The Instituteers in this respect were fellow-travellers in the German philosophical mode. The Instituteers, moreover, according to the recollections both of an old surviving friend and of former students, generally regarded teaching commitments as chores for public relations, and wished to keep them to a minimum. If they failed to draw students to such classes as they announced, probably it was for two reasons: firstly because students sensed that these Instituteers generally preferred not to be bothered, and secondly, because of their evasiveness on basic issues. It might also be said that the Instituteers would have welcomed disciples, but not students.

As the Institute after the Second World War diminished as a society in the United States, and the Instituteers went their separate ways, their latent differences were no longer papered over by the discipline enforced by a common source of livelihood and organizational bond. Marcuse and Fromm respectively accused each other with some acerbity of misunderstanding Freud. Wittfogel was cold-shouldered for testifying before the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee; Adorno assailed the American empiricism of which Lazarsfeld had become the most original proponent, and fared badly in the interchange on scientific logic and

[23] Cf. Lewis S. Feuer, " The Case of the Darwin-Marx Letter," *Encounter*, Vol. LI, Oct. 1978, p. 74. Riazanov's name last appeared as editor of the *Gesamtausgabe* with Vol. 3, Part 3 (Berlin, 1930). The next volumes bore the imprint of V. Adoratsky.

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quantitative methods in the social sciences[24]; Horkheimer found himself arriving at an ultimately Schopenhauerian outlook on the universe.

Among American students today, " Critical Theory " (as I have mentioned) mainly signifies Marcuse's writings. By contrast, the essays of Horkheimer and Adorno, who returned to Germany, have had little import in the United States. None of the principal Instituteers, notes Professor Jay, chose to return to communist East Germany; by this time, they fully realized, more fully than they had in 1933 (though they did not write about it), that in the Soviet Union they would not dare write about Schopenhauer, Thomas Mann or existentialism the way they wished, but would have to capitulate and kowtow as Lukács had.[25] If power, however, had come to them in their Frankfurt prime, they would probably have behaved with the same ruthlessness toward bourgeois liberals that Lukács and his associates are said to have exhibited in the Ministry of Culture of the short-lived Hungarian Soviet Republic.

MR ULMEN refers to the Columbia correspondence that I sought out as " Feuer's windfall." " Windfall," of course, connotes a purely chance finding, " an unexpected gain." But as Poincaré long ago taught, " chance " discoveries in science, even of a minor order, come only to those whose minds are prepared by previous study and theorizing to receive them. Mr Ulmen also would counterpose to my essay such a book as *The Intellectual Migration.* I should have thought that a scientific historian would rather have welcomed further scientific information. An editor of *The Intellectual Migration* indeed responded in this fashion, writing to me that he found all sorts of implications and meanings in the essay.

The history of the Frankfurt Institute leads indeed to some very murky bypaths. An eminent trade-union official, now retired, and once a foremost leader of the American Communist Opposition, remarked to me almost as an aside one evening that the Institute had contributed funds to help finance the International Communist Opposition. He added, however, in a letter to me, that when he " met some of their characters " (after they arrived in America), they " were scared stiff on the occasion of our exchanging of a few words."

Various questions still remain unanswered. How was Robert Lynd approached in the first place with the project of bringing the Institute to Columbia University? He really knew nothing about their work. Was the ubiquitous " contact man " Julian Gumperz the spirit of inspiration? What exactly were the reports and recommendations that the Instituteers made for governmental agencies during the Second World War and afterwards? Marcuse, according to one account, worked hard for the

[24] Cf. Paul F. Lazarsfeld, *Qualitative Analysis: Historical and Critical Essays* (Boston, 1972), p. 173. Also cf. Karl R. Popper, " Reason or Revolution? " in T. W. Adorno et al., *The Positivist Dispute In German Sociology*, trans. G. Adey and D. Frisby (New York, 1976), pp. 296–97.

[25] According to Professor David Sidorsky, the political scientist Hans Morgenthau recalled in later years having helped persuade the Instituteers in 1933–34 against a possible relocation in the Soviet Union. I should doubt that much " persuasion " was required on this score.

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OSS compiling a list of civilian Germans to be executed when the American army would have occupied Germany; he is described as having been mortified when the United States army failed to execute his list. Another project for the State Department that Marcuse once spoke of in hushed tones as " classified " was apparently nothing more than a study of the alleged political significance of German existentialism. Meanwhile, however, a Freedom of Information Act is written on the American statute books. Some graduate student might bring to light the Institute's memoranda much as Joseph Dorfman once did with those of Thorstein Veblen, written during the First World War. One would learn incidentally how the Instituteers embarked on their governmental careers. The Critical Theorists in Washington indeed seem to have been far more adept in their bureaucratic advisory roles than their philosophical forebear Plato was in Syracuse at the court of Dionysius.

TO arrive at a more truthful evaluation of the Instituteers, one must listen not only to the *ipse dixit* utterances of the Critical Theorists, but enquire as to the impression they made upon the scholars of the " bourgeois " world with whom they subsequently worked. Marcuse, for instance, for many years shared an office at Brandeis University with, or was the neighbour of, several professors of political science. An outstanding scholar of this department recorded his conclusion:

> I once accused him [Marcuse] of planning to go to the barricades with the Dow-Jones ticker. Having Marcuse as a colleague—or whatever he was—for a decade was quite an experience: somehow I recall a Dr Naumann who, under Weimar, organized a " Jews for Hitler movement " (slogan: " *Raus mit uns!* ") and how he missed Herbert I'll never know—unless maybe he was a Litvak or some other variety of *Untermensch*.[26]

My own impression of Marcuse was much the same. During the year 1963–64, the Department of Philosophy at the University of California at La Jolla staged a two-day symposium on Marxism, with three invited symposiasts, Marcuse and myself among them. Marcuse's post at Brandeis was terminating at the time, and his La Jolla friends wished to introduce him to their *confrères*. During the discussion, it became apparent that Marcuse lived in a privately insulated, ideological universe impervious to any confrontation with facts. His world of fantasy, built with bricks compounded of Marx, Freud, Nietzsche, Hegel and Heidegger, was fenced off against any crude experimental interloper. When he expounded his view that the American " bourgeois society " was the most repressive in the history of mankind, I pressed him to state the operational criteria on which he based this comparative judgment. He had none, and thought himself exempt from such an empirical challenge. Having recently returned from a semester as an exchange scholar in the Soviet Union, I presented various facts concerning the

26 Letter to the writer, 20 Oct. 1981.

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stultifying impact of its socialist system on the best of its social scientists and philosophers. Marcuse, however, ensconced in his meta-projective universe, repudiated the facts of any empirical socialist society as irrelevant. Thomas Henry Huxley once defined " the great tragedy of science " as " the slaying of a beautiful hypothesis by an ugly fact." Marcuse rendered himself immune to tragedy by obliterating a central dimension of scientific thought.

The chief Instituteers felt about their Jewish descent much as have orthodox Marxists from the time of Marx himself, it was a fact to be banished. Probably that was why the Institute circle aroused a " profound aversion " on the part of such a thinker as Hannah Arendt, and why " personal contact " with Horkheimer " did not inspire any confidence " in Gershom Scholem.[27] Hannah Arendt and Gershom Scholem whose intellectual backgrounds were not dissimilar to those of the Instituteers, felt a concern for the well-being of their fellow Jews; they did not require the holocaust to free some fellow-feeling from an ideological carapace. Hannah Arendt at that time (1939) was director of the Paris office of Youth Aliyah, helping transport children to Palestine. Scholem, on reading an essay by Horkheimer in 1940, " The Jews and Europe," wrote to his friend Walter Benjamin: " The author has neither any knowledge of nor any interest in the Jewish problem," but wishes to rewrite Marx's " repulsive " essay " ' On the Jewish Question.' " Horkheimer, he observed, did not ask what would happen to the Jews after they were eliminated from Europe; to the Director of the Institute, the Jews were simply the " agents of circulation " of capital, while " politically speaking, pogroms are aimed more at the onlookers. . . ."[28] How hollow these words were Horkheimer himself recognized in later years. The critic, Walter Benjamin, though supported in France by the Institute, nonetheless said that he would feel greatly liberated if he were able to be completely independent of it. Its tortuous ambiguities about the Moscow trials, its combination of private anti-Stalinism with systematic silence concerning " the Russian experiences," could scarcely inspire a social analyst with any penetrating insight.[29] The code-word " critical theory " was then being invented because, as Benjamin explained, " Marxism " was " taboo for political reasons." It might have been best defined as a Marxism which, despite the Stalinist experience, refused to become critical concerning itself, and which contrived a non-comparative analysis, blocking from view the concrete realities of socialist society in order more easily to maintain anti-capitalist emotion.[30]

[27] Gershom Scholem, *Walter Benjamin: The Story of a Friendship*, trans. Harry Zohn (Philadelphia, 1981), pp. 261–17.

[28] Ibid. pp. 222–23.

[29] Ibid. pp. 211–12. Despite his own many years' friendship with Walter Benjamin, Scholem could get " no clear sense " from him as to " who was a Communist and who was not " in the Institute; he concluded that Benjamin's attitude " reflected the stance of those at the Institute." When finally, responding to such a question. Benjamin blurted out a " yes," it was one that permitted no further reaction. A taboo enveloped the subject that the Institute never analysed.

[30] Ibid. p. 210.

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Revisionist social democrats such as Eduard Bernstein and Leon Blum during the inter-war period wrote appreciatively of the Zionist effort; though " assimilated Jews," without any background of Jewish tradition themselves, they had risen in wisdom above Marx's compulsion to polemicize against their origins. In Marcuse there prevailed an atavistic regression congruent with the worst side of Marx.

IT is understandable that Professor Karl A. Wittfogel feels an attachment to the memory of the romantic generous enthusiasm that was a part of his experience as a young communist " proletarian " playwright in the early 1920s. It is also understandable that at this time of his life he cherishes a loyalty to colleagues of the Institute, although they joined the " Left " in ostracizing him after his testimony to the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee.[31] When I visited Professor Wittfogel in April 1980, I told him that I had studied what the Columbia Presidential Archives revealed concerning the reception of the Institute, and had found that Julian Gumperz had been the primary agent in the negotiations. I also mentioned that I was writing an essay on the subject. I had scarcely chosen to read those Archives for their intrinsic pleasure as literary or scientific works. Professor Wittfogel replied, as my two critics have later repeated, that Gumperz, in his opinion, was chosen to represent the Institute because he spoke English like a native American; he himself, however, had at that time not yet arrived in the United States. Professor Wittfogel proposed to look again at the book by Gumperz written under the shared pseudonym, Ypsilon, because he understandably did not then have a fresh recollection of it. Professor Wittfogel spoke warmly of Mrs Hede Massing; she was still alive and residing in New York, he said, and urged me to visit her (which, however, I never did; Mrs Massing died shortly afterwards.) We compared notes on Richard Sorge. I promised to send him the names of certain books about Sorge.

I subsequently inserted passages into my essay that made specific reference to certain facts that Professor Wittfogel had brought to my attention, or his divergent opinion with respect to others. To have neglected to do so would have been to ignore the views held by a principal living witness on these specific questions of fact. My chronicle of the negotiations between Columbia University and the Institute and the decision taken by the authorities was based completely on the Columbia Archives. To identify and characterize the *dramatis personae*—Lynd, Gumperz, Nicholas Murray Butler, the Instituteers themselves—however, it was clearly necessary to draw on their background as recorded in books, documents and journals. Most writers on the Institute for Social Research and the Critical Theorists are still stuck at the stage of hagiography. This is naturally a first stage in the historical enterprise. But if understanding is to follow, hagiography

[31] Wittfogel " was conspicuously shunned by the Institute " after he had testified to the Senate Subcommittee in 1951. G. L. Ulmen, *The Science of Society* (The Hague, 1978), p. 336.

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should now give way to biography; this process, it seems to me, is resisted by my two critics. The scientific student, unlike the ideological devotee, will be obliged to enquire into what (adapting titles of Lasswell and Freud) we might call the " psychopathology of ideology." In every period of severe social dislocation, bizarre doctrines blend with political theorizing; charlatan Cagliostros flourished side by side with the men of the Enlightenment. We can leave to the scientific student the task of determining what the blend of these components was among the Frankfurt Marxists. It is scarcely an exhilarating subject, as none of their ideologists was, from the purely scientific standpoint, a distinguished thinker. What the psychopathology of ideology has to contribute, however, is in the tradition of Francis Bacon's portrayal of the Idols. It can help cleanse the intellectual atmosphere, dissipate the ideological miasma, and assist a subsequent generation to achieve a higher measure of rationality.

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1917 And All That

David Floyd

IT is a remarkable fact that, despite all the Sovietology that has been conducted in the last 30 years, we have not had until now a good, reasonably objective and authoritative history of the Soviet Union from 1917 to the present day suitable for both the general reader and the serious student. Sovietologists have generally been more interested in debating the relative strengths of the " hawks " and " doves " they profess to see in the Kremlin, and in prophesying the future course of Soviet history, than in providing the interested reader with a straightforward account of what has happened in the Soviet Union since the Bolsheviks seized power in 1917.

This gap has now been filled by two historians who have both had the considerable advantage of having lived for a long time in the Soviet Union, thus having a first-hand knowledge of " Soviet reality " and life under communism, and having access to Soviet sources. They have also, since their arrival in the West, had time to acquaint themselves with the best of Western scholarship in the Soviet field. These are unusual qualifications which lend great authority to their work, which they have called, for reasons which they do not make entirely clear, *L'Utopie au Pouvoir*.[1] Written originally in Russian, it has appeared so far only in French translation. It is to be hoped that it will not be long before a British or American publisher has the sense to produce a version in English.

THE two authors, Michel Heller and Aleksandr Nekrich, have divided the Soviet period between them: Heller takes the story up to 1938 and Nekrich deals with the rest. Michel Heller was born in Russia where he spent his student years, then emigrated to Poland, where he lived for 10 years before moving to France. He now teaches at the Sorbonne. Aleksandr Nekrich was still working as an historian at the Institute of History of the Soviet Academy of Sciences when he succeeded in having published, during the post-Stalin " thaw," a remarkable enquiry into the German attack on the Soviet Union of June 1941 and the reasons for the early collapse of the Red Army. His revelations concerning Stalin's disastrous treatment of the Soviet armed forces were more than the Soviet establishment could stomach; Nekrich was denounced and his book was banned. In 1976 he managed to emigrate to the United States, where he is now a Research Fellow at the Russian Research Centre, Harvard.

The principal merit of this combined work is not that the authors produce any startling new facts about what has happened in the Soviet

[1] Michel Heller and Aleksandr Nekrich, *L'Utopie au Pouvoir. Histoire de L'URSS de 1917 à nos jours*. Calmann-Levy, 1982.

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Union since 1917: practically all the information they have assembled has been freely available for many years. Their achievement is to have been through it all carefully and to have sorted out the wheat from the chaff, the fact from the fancy. The result is the most reliable and most complete summary of Soviet history to be had today.

It is difficult to pick on any particular episode in Soviet history for comment in a review, because the whole work reflects the authors' conscientious scholarship. Take, for example, the question of Stalin's strange love-affair with Hitler, which Nekrich deals with in rather greater detail than in his book on the subject. This is surely one of the most revealing episodes in Soviet history and one which clearly exposed the nature of Stalin and Stalinism. Yet it is not one to which Western scholars have devoted much attention.

Nekrich traces the origins of Stalin's plans for an alliance with Germany back to the early 1930s. It was Stalin's confidence that Hitler shared his perspective and would continue to share with him the spoils of war that led to the Red Army's disastrous lack of preparedness for war in the summer of 1941 and the colossal losses suffered by the Soviet Union as a result. How strong were his feelings on this matter was demonstrated when the German armies attacked: Stalin at first refused to believe that his ally Hitler had let him down, and it was some days before he was in a fit condition to address the Soviet people over the radio. Even more revealing, however, is the less known, or at least less often repeated, fact that, even after the victory, Stalin still cherished his dream of a Russo-German alliance. " With the Germans we would have been invincible," he sighed to his daughter Svetlana.

Nekrich's verdict on Stalin's conduct of the war against Germany is unambiguous:

> The victory was not a result of Stalin's wise and infallible leadership, nor of that of the State Committee for Defence nor of the High Command. If the Soviet Union was victorious, it was *in spite of* the colossal errors committed by its rulers.
>
> The government's adventurous and dangerous policy led to the creation of a common frontier between the USSR and the principal military power in Europe, Nazi Germany. The removal of defences along the old 1939 frontier and the lack of preparation along the new frontier provided the enemy with considerable advantages and enormous gains in time and territory. These errors alone (not to mention the stupid orders for an offensive in the first days of the war, which led to the encirclement and loss of whole Soviet armies) resulted in incalculable losses and misfortunes. During the first days of the war, the Soviet Union lost territory comparable to that of Western Europe which the Germans had occupied in 1939–1940. It was only the immense expanse of the Soviet territory and the existence of rear areas far from the front, with an industrial base rich in raw materials—the Urals, Siberia, the Caucasus and the Far East—which saved the USSR from defeat in the summer of 1941. In spite of everything the Soviet Union had sufficient resources to

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> surpass Germany in the end, both in the number of its divisions and the volume of its arms production.
>
> If the Soviet Union had been the same size as France or Germany, the mistakes made by its rulers would have led to its ruin. It is sufficient to recall that during the first three weeks of the war, the German troops advanced faster over Soviet territory than they had across Poland.

Nekrich is supported in his view by no less a military figure than Marshal Voronov, who said in his memoirs:

> If the German fascist invaders who treacherously attacked us at dawn on 22 June 1941 had met with organized resistance on the part of our troops on previously prepared fortifications, if our airforce, mobilized in good time and dispersed in rural airfields, had struck at the enemy, if all commands had been ready to act in accordance with the situation, we would not have suffered such enormous human and material losses in the first few months. We would not have abandoned to the enemy such vast Soviet territories, and the population would not have had to bear such suffering and privation.

The story of the creation of the Moscow-Berlin axis is a taboo subject for Soviet historians. If, for some reason, the Nazi-Soviet pact has to be referred to, it is explained as something forced upon Stalin as a means of staving off a war with Germany, which he knew was inevitable, and preparing Russia to meet the attack when it came. The truth is that he did *not* regard such a war as inevitable, that he was shocked into a state of collapse when Hitler struck, and that Russia was no better prepared for war in 1941 than she had been in 1939. Soviet historians have transformed Stalin's colossal error into yet another brilliant stratagem.

The war was, at least in part, of Stalin's own making, and the enormous losses of life it incurred have to be added to the others he caused in peacetime by collectivizing the peasantry, destroying the intelligentsia, capturing the Party, purging the army, and setting up the Gulag archipelago. It is difficult to understand those, even in the West, who still speak of Stalin as a great wartime leader.

The truth is, as this history makes clear, that Stalin cannot legitimately be described as " great " in any respect, except perhaps with regard to the number of human lives he disposed of. He has few rivals in that field in any period of human history.

FOR the most part, the authors do not indulge in theorizing or in making generalizations. They are content to record the facts, and it is only in their jointly written conclusion that they offer some more general judgments.

The Soviet regime, they say, has proved itself incapable of solving any of its domestic problems, economic, social or national. Consequently, the Soviet government adopts an expansionist policy in foreign affairs. " Expansion becomes the only form of life for mature socialism," they write.

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Despite its manifest failures, however, the Soviet regime appears to have achieved a remarkable degree of stability. What are the reasons for this? Why is a regime which has so little to show for itself experiencing so little pressure for reform? Heller and Nekrich suggest a number of reasons.

One reason, the authors believe, echoing Sakharov, is that the population has been " sovietized." The fact that " people have lost hope in a better future and live in fear of the morrow is one of the reasons for the stability of the Soviet regime." But there are other explanations. There is, the authors suggest, a new sort of " social contract " by which the people give up their freedom to the state, and in exchange the state grants them the right to take advantage of their positions and evade what formally passes for the law.

The regime depends for its stability upon the privileged section of society—the Party and state bureaucracy, the military, the KGB, the " corrupt elite of the working class," the scientific and cultural elite—who have privileges but no rights. Stability is also reinforced by the regime's successes in spreading its influence abroad. And, finally, another " reason for the regime's stability is because the West needs it to preserve the world balance of power as it understands it."

There is undoubtedly much truth in what Heller and Nekrich have to say. The Soviet regime has lasted 65 years and does seem to have achieved a sort of stability, all the more remarkable in view of its inability to reform. The population does seem to be utterly docile, either because it has privileges or because it has none. Stalin's brutal policies and a terrible war seem to have drained the Soviet people, Russian and non-Russian, of all spirit and of all active desire for change. *Homo sovieticus* is not ready to raise his head in protest, even 30 years after Stalin has been replaced by such unimpressive leaders as Khrushchev and Brezhnev. Why?

There is another important factor in the preservation of stability which the authors do not mention: the greatly enhanced efficiency of a modern police dictatorship. A secret police force of the size and with the resources of the KGB, which makes use of all the latest means of communication and observation, as well as of a huge and well-equipped internal organization, can do a lot for stability. There has never been such a totalitarian regime in modern history. We must not put all the blame on the unfortunate Soviet man in the street. The all-embracing nature of Soviet totalitarianism accounts for much.

BUT we are still left without an answer to the question: why did it happen in Russia? In their introduction, the authors dismiss efforts by Western historians to find the origins of the Soviet system far back in Russian history, drawing, as they do, comparisons between Ivan the Terrible and Iosif Stalin. Of course Russia's history plays a role, as does its geography, climate and the character of its peoples. But these are not sufficient, the authors contend, to explain the Soviet state, of which the

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specific feature is the Party's monopoly of power in all fields. It is this that has determined the nature of Soviet institutions, as well as that of *homo sovieticus*. The Party's monopoly of power has distorted the development of Soviet society and " given birth to a society and a state hitherto unknown in human history."

We are still left wondering how and why the Party achieved such a monopoly. The authors share Solzhenitsyn's view that 1917 was not a prolongation of Russian history, but was the breaking of its back.

> The history of the Soviet Union is that of the transformation of Russia, a country and a people who were neither better nor worse than others, who had their particular characteristics, but who were comparable with other European states. It is the history of the advent of the USSR, a phenomenon previously unknown to humanity.

The revolution of 1917 and what followed certainly turned Russian society upside down, destroying the old and making a complete break with the past. But is that sufficient reason for the emergence of Soviet totalitarianism?

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Memory and Amnesia: Two Views

A New Russian Free Press?

Nina M. Perlina

WITH good reason can a new five-volume edition of *Pamyat'* (Memory) be compared to the most successful volumes of Alexander Herzen's Russian Free Press.[1] This comparison is not grounded on bare allusion: it has a solid cultural and historical basis. In 1856, in order to paint an objective picture of the social and political situation within the Russian Empire, both for his contemporaries and for posterity, Herzen started the *Polar Star* and *Voices from Russia*. He wrote: " We solicit letters and contributions from our Europeans as well as from Panslavists, our liberals as well as our radicals, our cautious citizens as well as our daring ones. . . . We keep all doors open, and we encourage all manner of discussion."[2]

Herzen's readers responded to this call and provided him with manuscripts that were forbidden in Russia, various documents and materials that could not be discussed within the country. This is how the Russian Free Press came into existence more than 100 years ago.

The purpose of *Pamyat'* is similar to that of Herzen's Free Press editions. The editors explain the main contention that inspired them to undertake this work. They write: " There exists a serious disease: amnesia, loss of memory. An individual who suffers from it loses all contact with the past—both personal and cultural. What would happen if all of society suffered from amnesia?"[3] In such a case, collective memory would be damaged, and history falsified. More than once Soviet history and historiography have been violated through the substitution of myths and legends for an unbiased and objective recounting of the past, through the acceptance of " mystery " as a categorical definition of history and through selected access to documentary materials for professional examination and publication. All in all, the coercive influences of these three factors have caused amnesia, the decomposition of the collective memory of the Soviet people, a societal and social disease. To cure the damaged memory there exists one, and only one, remedy: a retroactive restoration of all the omitted elements in their organic interdependence. This is why the editors of *Pamyat'* seek to save the data and facts of history from oblivion, to return these materials to the public attention and professional re-examination. Collective memory is, after all, a cultural code of the epoch. As with any code, it is built of a

[1] *Pamyat'. Istoricheskii sbornik* (*Samizdat*, Moscow; Khronika Press, New York; YMCA, Paris, 1978–82), Vols. 1–5.
[2] *Golosa iz Rossii* (Trubner & Co., London, 1856), Vol. I, pp. 6–7.
[3] *Pamyat'*, Vols. I, V.

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multitude of cohesively related bits of information. Hence, to restore the code means to bring back and piece together all these elements.

Pamyat' is the work courageously undertaken by a small group of Soviet authors (who had to conceal their identities under pseudonyms) and their few collaborators in the West. The title of the entire collection—" Memory "—suggests the principal method of publication, attribution and annotation of documents: first, to publish the text in a complete form[4]; secondly, to relate the published document to a wider context, established by a number of similar sources; and thirdly, to complement this publication with new information obtained from readers' letters to the editors—that is to restore the living bond of time which unites past and present. Altogether, the publications cover a time-span of 1906–77.[5] The main sections of the five volumes are:

1. Memoirs;
2. Articles and essays;
3. From the History of Culture (and " From the History of the Russian Church," Vols. III, IV);
4. Miscellanea;
5. Reviews, addenda, letters to the editors.

This flexible structure contributes to a versatile and multi-faceted discussion of materials. The addenda facilitates recurring reviews of the sources initially delivered to the editors in incomplete or damaged form. Here the readers of *Pamyat'*, whose recollections are revived through publications of earlier volumes, contribute new materials for further discussion, thus restoring the damaged cultural network of Russian history. In a way, the readers maintain a continuous dialogue with *Pamyat'*, and their letters to the editors are the prompt rejoinders that cure memory from obliteration. Such, for instance, is the case of D. Minin's letter in the addenda of *Pamyat'* III, which complements Volume I, " Ekaterina Peshkova's activity in the Political Red Cross."[6]

The capacity to maintain a mature unrestrained dialogue with readers of different social and political persuasion is a remarkable tradition of the Russian Free Press. As mentioned earlier, it has been inherited by the editors of *Pamyat'* from their famous predecessors, Herzen and Ogarev. The latter symbolized their cultural roots by placing the profiles of the five Decembrists executed by the Tsar on the cover of their *Polar Star*. *Pamyat'* has no bas-reliefs, but in the preface to the first volume the sentiments of Herzen and Ogarev resound anew. *Pamyat'* reminds its readers:

> The editors feel obliged to rescue from oblivion the names of those who died and vanished; of those who were persecuted, defamed, and slandered. The editors feel obliged to resurrect the fates of

[4] All cases of fragmentary publications are pointed out, and the reasons are clarified by the editors.

[5] V. Shulgin, " Beilisiada," *Pamyat'*, Vol. IV, 7–54; " From the Editors of *Pamyat'*, April 1978;" *Pamyat'*, Vol. III, pp. 558–59.

[6] *Pamyat'*, Vol. I, pp. 313–24; Dm. Minin, " More about the Political Red Cross," *Pamyat'*, Vol. III, pp. 523–38.

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> families, one and all, separated, dismantled, and destroyed. The editors feel compelled not to forget those who carried out persecutions and executions, who slandered, defamed and informed. . . . To what degree we will succeed, depends, to a large extent, on our readers. We believe that we will succeed if our readers provide us with new materials, addenda and documents which supplement our publications. We solicit materials signed by the authors as well as pseudonymous and anonymous contributions. (*Pamyat'*, Vol. I, p. ix.)

PAMYAT' is a first-class professional work on the history of Russian culture. All its publications are provided with introductions and commentaries. The introductions aim to portray the personalities of memoirists, to relate their lives and the fate of their memoirs. The commentaries, written in the best academic traditions of Russian textual analysis and literary criticism, are, as it were, condensed monographs aimed at providing experts in Sovietology, history and literature with bio-bibliographical data and historical attributions. In condensed form, the commentaries advance new problems for discussion and suggest new areas of investigation. For example, in the editors' commentary on the autobiography of Vasily Yanov (1897–1971), a peasant who professed Tolstoyism, the reader finds a bibliography of the Tolstoyan press for 1917–20 (materials that are not included in the most authoritative *Bibliography of Literature by and on Tolstoy, 1917–1958*).

SINCE the volumes of *Pamyat'* contain close to 3,000 pages, only a selected review is possible. This review will discuss certain materials on Russian intellectual history which help the reader to understand the implementation of the Soviet version of the Cultural Revolution. This theme runs through the sections " Memoirs," " From the History of Culture," " Reviews and Articles " and " Addenda " in two renditions, specifically: (1) a spontaneous emergence of different independent circles of Russian intellectuals in post-revolutionary Petrograd (1917–18) and the implacable oppression of all types of secret activities in 1927–28[7]; and (2) the fate of the Russian Academy of Sciences (along with several subordinate institutions: Pushkin House, the Academy Library, the Archive of Pushkin House).[8] Two extensive works written by I. Voznesensky, " Names and Fates " and " Only the Orientalists," the publication of the minutes of Academy meetings (1918–20) and A.

[7] O. I. Yatsevich, " From Memoirs," *Pamyat'*, Vol. I, pp. 93–158; N. P. Antsyferov, " Three chapters from the Memoirs," *Pamyat'*, Vol. IV, pp. 55–152; " M. M. Bakhtin and M. M. Kagan," ibid. 249–82.

[8] In the Soviet Union no articles discussing the militant strategies developed by the Soviet government and Communist Party for complete suppression of academic freedom and the Academy's independence from the Party had ever been published. This problem was discussed in the West in several works. The most authoritative and complete sources are: Alexander Vucinich, *The Soviet Academy of Sciences* (Stanford University Press, Stanford, California, 1956), and Loren R. Graham, *The Soviet Academy of Sciences and the Communist Party, 1927–1932* (Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1967). *Pamyat'* provides readers with new information in several cases, previously indicated as obscure and lacking clarity. Cf. L. Graham, p. 129.

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Rostov's memoirs, " The Case of Four Academicians "—the eye-witness account of a victim of the purges in the Academy of Sciences (1927–30)—constitute the main body of this second part.[9]

Diaries, letters and memoirs published under these rubrics fill the hiatus in twentieth-century Russian literature between the post-Symbolists' and Boris Pasternak's writings. The primary sources here are the memoirs of a schoolteacher, Olga Yasevich, who spent five years in forced labour camps, and memoirs written by Nikolai Antsyferov, writer and historian of Russian culture. From these texts and from the editors' commentary, the reader learns about the activity of several literary, philosophical and religious circles of Russian intellectuals in the early 1920s. The most remarkable groups (of whose existence nothing or very little has hitherto been known) are:

Resurrection, a religious-philosophical circle organized in 1917 in Petrograd by Alexander Meyer and Ksenya Polovtseva. Most of the participants of " Resurrection " were arrested in December 1928–January 1929.

Kantian Seminar, initiated in 1918 in Nevel (Belorussia) by a philosopher Matvei Kagan. In the year 1921 the seminar was moved to Petrograd. In 1928, after several active participants of seminar sessions had been arrested, the group was disbanded.

A *group of medievalists* organized in 1924 in Leningrad by Olga Dobiash-Rozhdestvenskaya. Dobiash-Rozhdestvenskaya, who earned her doctoral degree in 1911 at the Sorbonne, was the first woman in Russia to be given the rank of Professor of History. She studied reciprocity between forms of spiritual awareness and guild culture in medieval Europe. She organized a seminar for the advanced study of this problem. In 1927, in order to avoid governmental persecution and confinement, Dobiash-Rozhdestvenskaya disbanded her seminar.

The *Academy of Cosmic Sciences*, a literary-philosophical group, centred around Ivan Andreevsky.[10] The group was organized as early as 1923 and in 1928 ceased to exist due to the arrests of all of its members. The victims belonged to two generations of Russian intellectuals: the elders who were invited to deliver lectures on the history of Russian philosophical ideas, and their younger disciples and friends, who jokingly certified themselves as apprentices, masters, and doctors of cosmic science. The group included Dmitry Likhachev, then a university student and now a member of the Academy of Sciences and a world-renowned expert on Old Russian literature, and Vasily Komarovich, a Dostoevsky scholar.

[9] I. Voznesensky, " Names and Fates," *Pamyat'*, Vol. I, pp. 353–410; " Only the Orientalists," ibid. Vol. III, pp. 429–65; " To the History of the Academy of Sciences," ibid. Vol. IV, pp. 459–62; pp. 463–68; pp. 469–95.

[10] Ivan Andreevsky is known in the West as the historian of the Russian Church, whose works are published under the pen-name Professor I. Andreev.

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The participants of these informal gatherings knew each other. All the circles were interrelated, though not on an organizational or administrative basis but solely on the basis of mutual cultural interests. The typical atmosphere of these meetings and the moods of participants are, perhaps, best described by Nikolai Antsyferov, a member of " Resurrection " from 1918–20.

> In Meyer's circle, free voices were always to be heard, free and liberated from all kinds of clichés and party labels. . . . We decided to forgo all disputes. Someone would propose a topic, and a friendly discussion would follow. In my diary I reflected on all these conversations. But the diary was reduced to ashes during the Leningrad blockade, and now I can but vaguely remember some of the topics.[11] The most varied people participated. They came and went. The biologist Orbely, the artists Petrov-Vodkin and Bruny, the literary scholar Pumpyansky, the artist Maria Yudina.[12] Everyone was welcome at the gatherings. . . . We dreamed that in our small house, with the door open to everyone, with the stove warming a cold room, our restrained conversations would give birth to new ideas, that we were the nucleus of the new Saint-Simonists, successors to Pierre Leroux, Lamennais and George Sand.[13]

The same social sentiments were expressed in the programme of the circle's monthly journal *Free Voices* (edited by G. Fedotov): " Today is the reign of fatum. But the morrow is ours. We call upon the socialist intellectuals to contribute creatively for tomorrow."[14] All participants of the meetings considered the circle to be an element of individual and social consciousness. They viewed the circle as " a crucible to test the ideology elaborated by intelligentsia capable of accepting and fusing together religion and Communism."[15] New materials published and annotated by *Pamyat'* show that in the first post-revolutionary decade (1918–28), the circle was a primary mediator in spreading cultural traditions and newly obtained knowledge to wider social spheres. The circle was also the most suitable form for accumulating, testing, examining and fusing together various intellectual ideas. Respectively, the official repression of the circles' activities lowered the general level of social culture. Moreover, with the elimination of circles the natural, cohesive type of relations between the part (individual consciousness developed by members of the groups) and the whole (the social awareness of the entire country) was severed, and the cultural code of the epoch was destroyed. After the circles ceased to exist, the people were

[11] The editors of *Pamyat'* managed to gain access to a private archive of another visitor to " Resurrection," from which they extracted valuable information on 45 different discussions held by the members of the circle between January 1921–November 1922.

[12] The commentary adds about 30 more names to this list. People mentioned by Antsyferov belonged simultaneously to more than one informal group: Pumpyansky and Yudina participated in the seminar on Kant; Yudina was also an active participant in several musical societies. Petrov-Vodkin belonged to the Free Philosophical Society.

[13] *Pamyat'*, Vol. IV, pp. 58, 60.

[14] From the editor's note to the first issue of the journal *Free Voices*. Quoted from *Spisok sovremennykh izdanii za 1918 god* (Petrograd, 1922), p. 198.

[15] *Pamyat'*, Vol. IV, p. 114.

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deprived of the fundamental prerequisite for elaborating new intellectual concepts: they could no longer maintain free discussions, intellectual dialogues ceased to exist, and an unconditional obedience became the universal law and the universal mode of life.

IN many countries, science and culture are institutionalized in academies. The word "academy" derives from the grove where Plato taught his disciples. Hence, the meaning of the word implies implanting and germination of knowledge. In its ideal form, the academy is an intellectual, elite community of equals. Since the early days of the institution's existence, all members obeyed the Academy statute, according to which they were granted the privilege of free, uncensored creativity. The publications of *Pamyat'* show how all the rights of the Academy were undermined and the traditions of freedom and academic collegiality eradicated from cultural habit.[16] The year 1928 is the ultimate landmark indicating the end of independence, the beginning of the era of collective amnesia and the substitution of legends for history. The sad story of the Academy, demonstrates the incredible manoeuvreability and inventiveness of the Soviet security organs. Using the 200th anniversary of the Academy as a pretext, the Soviet government increased the number of departments and thereby the number of members of the Academy from 43 to 85. The political purpose of this governmental action was the necessity to " infuse the old body of the Academy with fresh Communist blood." The election, conducted in accordance with the Academy statute under secret ballot, showed that three of the communist nominees (all in the humanities) failed to win. This act of disobedience by the academicians was retaliated against: in 1928 the Academy statute was denounced; then a purge committee was settled, and, soon after, 71 scientific workers (more than one-quarter of the Academy staff) had been expelled as " alien elements." In October 1929 another inspection and arrests followed. This is how the " Case of Four Academicians " (Platonov, Tarle, Likhachev, Lyubavsky) began. By early April 1930 more than 250 scholars had been arrested.

In retrospect, it is noticeable that two large groups of humanist intellectuals—those who were freely associated with different circles, and those who belonged to different Academy institutions—were eliminated from social life and incarcerated approximately at the same time. Albert Stromin, the head of the Department of Secret Police in Leningrad, was responsible for the arrest of both groups. Endowed with a kind of macabre theatricality and following the pattern of the trial of the Industrial Party,[17] Stromin made up a scenario of an " anti-

[16] *Pamyat'*, Vol. I, pp. 386–91; pp. 395–98.

[17] The trial of the Industrial Party was held in 1930 in Moscow. Professor Leonid Ramzin, the chief defendant, was accused of being an " agent of French imperialism." He was also accused of being closely connected with the underground organization of the Academicians. The ultimate goal of the Industrial Party was declared as an attempt " to convert the Soviet Union into a technocracy, directed by men of genuine technical accomplishments." Quoted from Loren R. Graham, *The Soviet Academy of Sciences and the Communist Party, 1927–1932* (Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1967), pp. 174–75.

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revolutionary *coup* " concocted by academicians and supported by members of " Resurrection " and other circles. This crude work of Stromin is indicative of how truth was perverted and elements of amnesia were imbued into the collective memory: academicians' business trips abroad were portrayed as visits made to seek foreign support for their conspiracy. Members of " Resurrection " were introduced as conspirators working for the restoration (" resurrection" in Stromin's vocabulary) of the old tsarist regime in Russia. The archival holding of unpublished documents was presented as concealment of these documents. No explanations were taken into consideration. Prisoners' contacts with the outside world were prohibited, and the Soviet press spread slander about the arrested scholars, claiming that the " GPU had thwarted a counter-revolutionary plot of Academician Platonov who attempted to restore the monarchy."[18] Altogether, in the trials of " Resurrection " and of the four academicians, more than 200 people were sentenced to prison and labour camps. Those who were released from prison and those who were hired to replace the arrested scholars, ceased to talk; they were ordered to void their memory. This is how the truth was silenced for more than 50 years, until *Pamyat'* restored it.

The articles, " Names and Fates " and " Only the Orientalists," written by Voznesensky, are highly useful in restoring an unbiased history of the Russian Academy of Sciences. Voznesensky brings together " classes " and groups of academicians whose names were erased from the pages of the officially approved *Memorial* and *Bibliographical Handbooks of the Academy.* These groups are:

1. members of the Russian Academy of Sciences who belonged to the Romanov ruling family;
2. members of the Academy of Sciences who emigrated after the revolution or left Russia during the Second World War (Ivan Bunin, writer, member of the Academy of Sciences since 1909 and a Nobel prize winner was among those anathematized);
3. those who belonged to the Academy of Divinity and therefore introduced ecclesiastic knowledge into the Academy of Sciences;
4. many of the Orientalists whose ideas did not agree with Soviet foreign policy in Mongolia, China, Iran, Afghanistan and the Middle East;
5. members of the Russian Academy of Sciences who were awarded high ranks in the Senate and the tsarist Council of Ministers (M. Speransky, N. Mordvinov, A. Gorchakov);
6. a group of foreign scholars who, for one reason or another, moved to the Soviet Union in the late 1920s–30s (most of them were persecuted by the Nazi regime; in 1939 they were either " repatriated " to Germany after the Stalin-Hitler Pact, and died in Nazi camps, or were arrested as spies and enemies of the Soviet people during the Great Patriotic War in the USSR).

In his article, Voznesensky corrects inaccurate bibliographical and

[18] For a complete text of A. Rostov's memoirs see *Vozrozhdenie*, 1958, No. 81–84.

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biographical data; brings back to the reader's memory the names of the Soviet scholars who were tormented and shot, or exiled and forced to vegetate in the provinces, cut off from professional contacts. Thus, complemented by two works of *samizdat*, the *Memorial Guidebooks of the Soviet Academy of Sciences* provide us with a genuine " who is (or was) who in Soviet science."

In addition to lists of anathematized scholars, *Pamyat'* published several biographies of people who chose to suffer or die rather than renounce their ideas: Academician N. Vavilov who died in prison during the Second World War, and Valentin Voino-Yasenetsky and Alexander Samarin,[19] two outstanding scholars and religious zealots whose biographies are written more in the hagiographic than the secular sense of the word.

SCHOLARS in different fields will find *Pamyat'* highly useful in their professional areas. Experts on the history of Menshevism will be surprised by Meyerov's memoirs on Alexander Potresov whose post-revolutionary activity has not been described in Soviet sources.[20] Even more valuable will be the article written by T. I. Til', " The Social-Democratic Youth Movement of the 1920s."[21] This article is illustrated with photos obtained from private archives, and is provided with an exhaustive commentary which includes statistical data and a biographical index of 181 young members of the Menshevik Party still active in the early 1920s. Memoirs written by the first Commander-in Chief of the Red Armed Forces, Ioakim Vatsetis, will be of interest to students of the civil war.[22] And literary scholars will find new materials in each and every volume of this collection.

Two other aspects of *Pamyat'* are worth emphasizing. The first aspect is *Pamyat''s* direct dependence on and its genuine relation to Solzhenitsyn's *Gulag Archipelago*. The Gulag theme runs through all five volumes of *Pamyat'*. The editors stress their devotion to it: " The dead of Vorkuta, Norilsk, and Kolyma have not the privilege, but the right to be placed in the centre of restored memory." (*Pamyat'*, Vols. I, xi). A reviewer of the Gulag theme in *Pamyat'* must start with the " Bibliography of the Prisoners' Press, 1921–35," by N. Stogov.[23] The work makes public 176 titles of newspapers and magazines along with more than 200 authors, all prisoners of the Soviet regime. The article includes two tables with chronological and numerical data on prison administration, obtained from 53 places of confinement; Stogov provides unique materials describing the labour conditions of typesetters

[19] Mark Popovsky, " The Case of Vavilov," *Pamyat'*, Vol. II, pp. 263–372; " To the biography of V. F. Voino-Yasenetsky (Archbishop Luike)," *Pamyat'*, Vol. II, pp. 513–24; K. Lazarev, " Alexander D. Samarin (1868–1932) in the Memoirs of his Daughter E. A. Samarin-Chernysheva," *Pamyat'*, Vol. III, pp. 329–76.

[20] Ya. Meyerov, " From the Recollections of my Youth," *Pamyat'*, Vol. II, pp. 120–142; about Potresov, see pp. 129–37.

[21] *Pamyat'*, Vol. III, pp. 165–286.

[22] Ibid. Vol. II, pp. 7–81.

[23] Ibid. Vol. I, pp. 527–84.

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and brings statistical details of the regime's increasing pressure on the prisoners' presses. A reviewer of the Gulag theme will not fail to mention the memoirs written by Lithuanian doctor D. Grinkevichute, a tale of horror relating to the deportation of Lithuanian prisoners which sets forth unequivocal evidence of the holocaust unleashed by the Soviet regime in the 1940s.[24]

Another aspect of *Pamyat'* deserving special discussion is the editors' tribute to those who first attempted to restore the truth and revive a feeling of moral responsibility in the consciousness of the people, to those who first courageously attempted to fight the disease of social amnesia. Perpetuating the memory of these activists, *Pamyat'* continues to publish materials relating to the history of the dissident movement in the USSR.[25] The dedication on its first page reads:

> To Gabriel Gavrilovich Superfin and Sergei Adamovich Kovalev in acknowledgement of their outstanding services in the feat of collecting and preserving factual data from the past and present.
> *The Editors.*

To conclude: *Pamyat'* is not only an eminent contribution to the Russian Free Press tradition established by Herzen; it is also a first-class contribution to several areas of the humanities. Prompt translation of *Pamyat'* and a rapid response to the content of this collection would be the most appropriate way for the university communities of the free world to express gratitude and indebtedness to their unnamed Soviet colleagues.

[24] D. Grinkevichute, " Lithuanian Prisoners in Yakutia," *Pamyat'*, Vol. II, pp. 555–67; see also M. Shteinberg, " Deportation during the Second World War," *Pamyat'*, Vol. I, pp. 159–84.

[25] See in particular N. Peskov, " The Case of ' The Bell ',' *Pamyat'*, Vol. I, pp. 269–84; R. I. Pimenov, " Memoirs: One Political Trial," *Pamyat'*, Vol. II, pp. 160–262; Vol. III, pp. 7–119, and a publication dedicated to the 10th anniversary of Anatoly Marchenko's " Testimony " (*Moi Pokazaniya*), *Pamyat'*, Vol. IV, pp. 466–522.

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Memory and Amnesia: Two Views

History as Contraband

Michel Heller

IN 1945 George Orwell wrote that among " intelligent Communists " in the West, " there is an underground legend to the effect that although the Russian government is obliged now to deal in lying propaganda, frame-up trials, and so forth, it is secretly recording the true facts and will publish them at some future time."[1] In 1980, after emigrating to the USA, the writer Yuz Aleshkovsky published his story *Maskirovka* (Camouflage)[2] which had come out long before in *samizdat*. In it he tells how the queues outside the shops in Soviet towns, the poor roads, sloppy workmanship and widespread drunkenness of the population is just camouflage on the very surface of Soviet territory, intended to fool American travellers. Beneath the surface there are in fact underground Soviet factories and laboratories where intensive work is being carried out, about which the imperialists can have no suspicion.

The naïve faith of Western communists, about which Orwell writes, and the ironic cynicism of the Soviet writer are concerned with one and the same phenomenon: the totalitarian Soviet system, at the very base of which lies the nationalization of history, the appropriation by the state of memory. M. N. Pokrovsky's maxim, " History is politics projected into the past," was popularized by " the great proletarian writer " Maxim Gorky: " We need to know about everything that happened in the past, not as it has always been told, but according to the light shed on it by the teachings of Marx-Engels-Lenin-Stalin."[3]

The nationalization of history thus becomes the most important instrument in the restriction of human knowledge, in the formation of the New Man. The importance of this as a tool is witnessed by its application in all socialist countries, where history is made into state property simultaneously with the nationalization of the means of production. This happened even in Poland, where opposition to the Soviet ideology was particularly persistent. In his analysis of the distortion of history in school text-books, the Polish historian Marian Pilka gives a compact and precise list of the methods and aims involved:

> Manipulation, which consists of the selection of material according to ideological considerations, its construction, exposition or glossing over of particular events, the falsification of facts, the insertion of an ideological commentary and jargon, and also the selection of corresponding illustrations and sources, must all

[1] George Orwell, *The Collected Essays, Journalism and Letters*, Vol. IV, (New York, 1968), p. 63.
[2] Yuz Aleshkovsky, *Nikolai Nikolaevich. Maskirovka*, (Ardis, 1980).
[3] A. M. Gorky, *Doklad. Pervyi Vsesoyuznyi Syezd Sovetskikh Pisateley, 1934*. Verbatim report, (Moscow, 1934), p. 18.

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> convince the pupil of the deterministic character of the historical process, the climax of which must necessarily be the creation of the socialist system as the new and ultimate socio-economic order.[4]

It is not the first time that mankind has met with an ideology which dictates to people in what and how they must believe. The Soviet ideology has a character all of its own. Well-known ideologies in the past gave man an immutable system of beliefs, which he could carry with him from cradle to grave. In this system history was the registration of events in the past. In the Soviet ideology the past changes daily, hourly. But each change is proclaimed for eternity. Soviet historians do not say: " Trotsky was a revolutionary who led the October uprising and then became a counter-revolutionary, an agent of the Gestapo." Soviet historians affirm that " Trotsky was a counter-revolutionary, a Gestapo agent at the time when he was making the revolution." That is the way it is, therefore that is how it always was. And always will be—until the next change. Memory becomes a slate from which is wiped off what was written yesterday and on which remains only what was written today. Until the next day.

Thus Soviet citizens uder 25 may know who Assurbanipal is (they've heard of him from school) but not who Khrushchev was: the name of the former First Secretary of the Central Committee and Prime Minister has been completely eliminated from newspapers, text-books, and historical monographs. Lack of memory, for the historian too, becomes a virtue in socialist countries. In certain conditions it is even a guarantee of security. It is easier to predict the future than the past.

THE permanent transformation of the past makes lies absolutely necessary. It turns deceit into a fundamental element of the ideology. George Orwell, first in the West to have understood the essence of the Soviet system, remarked that " organized lying is something integral to totalitarianism," and he forecast that " it would still continue even if concentration camps and secret police forces ceased to be necessary."[5] " The really frightening thing about totalitarianism," wrote Orwell, " is not that it commits ' atrocities ' but that it attacks the concept of objective truth."[6]

That which the English writer deemed a terrible deed—the destruction of objective truth—was extolled 35 years later by the very elderly Soviet writer Marietta Shaginyan as the victory of mankind. At the age of 90 years and four months, Marietta Shaginyan completed the sixth or seventh draft of her " reminiscences," in which she formulated the principle upon which the Soviet ideology stands: " 2,000 years ago a certain Roman nobleman asked a leader of the ordinary people, a fisherman-confessor standing before him: What is truth? The man who was standing in front of him could not answer. He was silent. . . . In our

[4] Marian Pilka, "Deformacje w wykladzie historii. . ." in *Zeszyty Historyczne*, No. 61, 1982.
[5] George Orwell, op. cit., Vol. IV, p. 63.
[6] Ibid., Vol. III, p. 88.

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time there came a man who organized society on new lines. . . . He answered the question: What is truth. Truth is concrete.''[7] '' Truth is concrete '' means that truth is whatever is useful, necessary, whatever is considered to be the truth today by the Highest Authority.

Marietta Shaginyan glorified '' concrete truth '' at the very time when the next attack on the '' concept of objective truth '' was at its height.

The death of Stalin and the ensuing '' Period of Confusion ''—the release of the doctors and the admission that the accusation had been unjust, the condemnation of Beria for having been a '' mussavatist '' and a British Intelligence agent all along, attempts to expose the '' cult of personality ''—gave rise to a sharp bout of amnesia, perceived as an illness for the first time, in the Soviet citizen. Mountain climbers in high altitudes experience the sensation of oxygen starvation, they suffocate from a lack of oxygen in the air. After the death of Stalin a period began in the Soviet Union in which there was a painful sensation of acute '' lack of memory.''

The ideological machine mobilizes historians, writers, and eye-witnesses for its '' treatment,'' to answer the tormented nation's questions about the '' mysteries '': the mystery of the year 1937, the mystery of the camps, the mystery of the military defeats of 1941–42, the mystery of the '' cult of personality.'' The Party's mission is not to provide answers to these questions, not to revive memory. Its mission is to maintain its monopoly on history, on memory. Therefore certain names, previsouly erased from all books, are reinstated, certain facts, well and truly forgotten, are resurrected. At the same time other names are struck out, other facts discarded. During this period '' memory '' is rationed like sugar, it is strictly controlled, permitting or forbidding events of the past, and given as a reward, as though it were a medal.

The publication of *A Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich* convinced the ideological machine of incompatibility of '' concrete truth'' with factual truth. Alexander Solzhenitsyn's story, passed for publication by Khrushchev who wanted to use it in the fierce political struggle which was going on '' at the top,'' was the factual truth about the past. The hope that this truth, which was published by permission of the First Secretary and praised by *Pravda*, would turn into the customary '' concrete truth,'' came to nothing.

Policies keep changing. It is even asserted that '' oxygen starvation '' has been eliminated. The title of the novel by Arkady Vasiliev, *Voprosov bol'she nyet* (There are no More Questions), is a comprehensive indication of the meaning of the new directive. Even the usual notion of memory is cast into doubt. '' It has been noted,'' maintains the Soviet literary critic, '' that people who have a kind heart and are responsible in their judgments and actions, have memories which are constructed in such a way that they retain only the most meaningful, the most uplifting and joyous things. . . .''[8] It is, therefore, quite obvious that only

[7] *Novyi mir*, No. 11, 1978.
[8] *Voprosy literatury*, No. 10, 1977.

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irresponsible, evil-minded people can retain memories of dark and gloomy events.

ONE of the most important differences which separates the post-Stalin era from the Stalinist one, is the appearance of people " diseased with history," breakers of the monopoly, dealers in contraband of the memory. The first of them was Alexander Solzhenitsyn. *Samizdat* opened the flood gates to a stream of memories, of novels about the past, which permitted the restoration of many forgotten, erased and falsified facts on the map of Soviet history.

In 1976, a group of historians prepared the first anthology of *Pamyat'* (" Memory "). It appeared in print in New York in 1978.[9] Thereafter, every year another volume of *Pamyat'* has come out, in spite of the persecution to which its compilers are subjected.

The editorial board of *Pamyat'* has as a sub-heading of the journal—" An Historical Anthology." This was the name of the publication put out nearly 120 years ago in London by Herzen. But the similarity between Herzen's " historical anthologies " and *Pamyat'* is only superficial: 120 years ago, as today, historians collected materials which they could only publish abroad. The two publications differ in essence. Herzen worked to publish historical secrets, " to de-secretify the past," as he called it.[10] His interest was aroused, for example, by the secret of the death of Nicholas I, by the secret history of the tortures and punishments inflicted on the Tsarevich Alexei, by the details of the murder of Paul I. In Herzen's time there was a lack of hard facts in the mosaic of Russian history. The founder of the Free Press sought them out. The compilers of *Pamyat'* focus attention on secrets which are the property of millions of citizens. There can be no secret about the camps which millions have experienced, there can be no secret about collectivization and its victims which affected 75 per cent of the population, there can be no secret about the persecution of science and scientists—meetings were held throughout the entire country in which geneticists and Marrists were branded. At the same time, events which affected everyone, which were known about by everyone, are a state secret, the divulging of which is strictly punished by law since these events have been erased from history.

The historical anthologies of *Pamyat'* have as their aim not the " de-secretifying of the past," but the restoration of memory. This is not an easy task when archives are unavailable and possibly partially destroyed, and where " reference books, are each year cut anew according to the latest ideological trend, and in a country where even the toponymy—the most constant element of the past, as is well-known—changes two or three times in one lifetime."[11] At the same time it is an easy task: " There

[9] *Pamyat'. Istoricheskii sbornik*. Vol. 1, (*Samizdat*, Moscow, 1976; Khronika-Press, New York, 1978).

[10] See N. Ya. Eidel'man, *Gertsen protiv samoderzhaviya*, (Moscow, 1973), p. 5.

[11] *Pamyat'. Istoricheskii sbornik*, Vol. I, " Ot redaktsii," p. vii.

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are millions of witnesses and many of them are still alive! No historian has had access to such an abundance of material. . . . It is paradoxical, but that is how it is: every person over 70 is able to communicate incredible things—nowehere and never before stated."[12]

Side by side with the professional qualities needed by someone who wants to restore the past, to give back our memory, it is necessary to command a rare quality—courage. Moreover, such courage must be shown not only by the person who gathers the evidence, but also by those who give it. Both become breakers of the monopoly, dealers in historical contraband.

The five volumes of *Pamyat'* are evidence, above all, " of the enormous reserves of historical memory." The witnesses include peasants, workers, students, academics, military men, writers. The whole country, the entire Soviet period of history is put into the witness box. Goethe wrote that " only those who have themselves lived through history, have personal experience of it, can make judgments about history. And so it is with entire nations too."[13] Each of the witnesses who gives evidence in *Pamyat'*, has lived through history, has experienced it personally with pain.

The fundamental section of the materials included in the anthology contains reminiscences, personal testimonies, letters. There are very few official documents. The common denominator of all the texts is repression. This is true of the individual people (from different backgrounds, with various professions and views), of parties, organizations, and institutions. The broadest spectrum of repressive acts is presented: death cells, camps spanning from Solovki at the beginning of the 1920s to Mordovia at the end of the '60s, exile, campaigns for the denunciation of " anti-scientific " views.

ONE question naturally arises: does not the selection of materials show bias and one-sidedness? The five volumes of *Pamyat'* give an exhaustive answer to this question: acts of repression were an extremely important factor in determining the life of the country, the rhythm of its development, the psychological make-up of its population in the process of becoming *homo sovieticus.* Soviet citizens lived their lives, worked, fell in love, gave birth, studied, amused themselves. They behaved as all other people in the world; life went on in the shadow of repression. Daniel Defoe in his *Journal of the Plague Year* shows that the inhabitants of London lived normal lives before they died from plague. Memoirs about the camps—both Nazi and Soviet—testify to the fact that life, normal everyday life, springs up even in conditions where inevitable death is expected. Stalin, with his usual frankness, explained the idiosyncracy of Soviet society. Countering the assertion of Emil Ludwig, who had suggested that " the major part of the population of the Soviet Union is experiencing fear," Stalin proclaimed that only " a certain

[12] Ibid., p. viii.
[13] J. W. Goethe, *Wilhelm Meister's Years of Travel*, maxim 517.

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small section of the population is actually frightened of Soviet power," The General Secretary calculated that this " small section " consists of no less than 10 per cent of the population, adding: " we . . . will go further, we will proceed to the liquidation of this bourgeois stratum."[14]

In the year when Stalin had this interchange with Emil Ludwig (1931) the population of the Soviet Union was approximately 170 million people. The *Vozhd* had thus openly declared the " liquidation " of about 17 million people. At that time, in the fourteenth year of the revolution, the country's inhabitants knew that threats by the authorities were always carried out. One can only add that there was no precise definition of what was meant by " bourgeois stratum "—everyone was terrified—with complete justification as was shown by later events.

The materials included in the anthologies of *Pamyat'* convey the atmosphere in which Soviet citizens lived (and, no doubt, continue to live). Without an understanding of what this atmosphere was like, it is impossible to write a history of the USSR. *Pamyat'* as an historical source makes its most valuable contribution in precisely this respect.

Since *The Gulag Archipelago*, which attracted attention to dozens of memoirs about the Soviet camps written before and after *Gulag*, and since V. Shalamov's *Tales of Kolyma*, it is difficult to add anything more to expose the atrocities of the executioners, or the inhumanity of a system which feeds on living human beings. Nonetheless, every testimony which adds even one small facet to the picture of life behind the wire and behind bars is of exceptional value. For 12 years the Nazis murdered and tortured people in their concentration camps. The world neither can, nor wants to, forget this even though the Third Reich is no longer in existence. Soviet camps are thriving even today. On 29 March 1919 V. Korolenko noted in his diary a conversation he had with the " Comrade Chairman of the Ukrainian branch of the Cheka." The writer reproachfully tells the *chekist* that he could compare the Cheka " only with the former offices of the gendarmerie, if they too had been given the right of execution." He is told in reply: " Comrade Korolenko. But you see, this is for the people's own good! . . ."[15] On 10 July 1919, the Chairman of the Poltava branch of the Cheka promised Korolenko: " At present we have to perpetrate many acts of cruelty. . . . But when we've defeated them. . . ."[16]

There are testimonies in *Pamyat'* about the period of " struggle " and about the period " after victory." They demonstrate that even " after victory " the bitter struggle continues, for the " final victory " has still not been won; it retreats, like the line of the horizon, as you draw closer. It is also a history of resistance. The arrests of millions of innocent people created the notion of the nation's unconditional surrender, of its unquestioning submission to dictatorship. The reality was quite different. Resistance, the history of which has not yet been written, goes

[14] I. V. Stalin, *Sochineniya*, Vol. 13, pp. 112–113.
[15] *Pamyat'*, Vol. II, p. 386.
[16] Ibid., p. 392.

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hand in hand with repression. Even just after the peasant war of 1918–22 and the armed resistance during the years of collectivization, the opposition bore a spiritual, intellectual character. Above all it was an opposition to counteract the centralization of thought.

OF the numerous documents published in the five volumes of *Pamyat'*, the memoirs of the Tolstoyan Vasily Yanov, who is a striking example of the strength of the spirit, afford us special interest. The author of biographical notes on Yanov, which point out that he was " a peasant all his life, working on the land," correctly emphasises that " peasant memoirs in Russia are rare." The unique and surprising nature of Yanov's reminiscences lies in the character of their author. Having decided while still in his youth to live according to the Gospel, Vasily Yanov lived all his life this way. He had arrived at the belief that it was necessary to change life, and began by changing his own life. He wanted nothing more than the right to live according to his own conscience. In 1919 he came up against the Cheka for the first time because he had refused to serve in the army. He was sent to a penal colony. From 1923 he lived in the country and worked on the land. His way of life was described in the magazine *Antireligioznik* (The Anti-Religionist): " . . . he wears nothing made of leather or wool. His buttons are wooden, his clothes are mostly hand-woven from flax and linen. He makes his own bread . . . [does not have] a single Soviet book . . . only religious, Tolstoyan works and popular pamphlets on bee-keeping techniques, horticulture and so on."[17] His way of life served as the basis for his arrest in 1930. Tolstoyism as an organized trend was crushed in 1928 (a furious anti-Tolstoyan campaign was carried out in the atheist magazines and Tolstoyan communes were closed down). In the mid-1930s Tolstoyans were liquidated; there was a wave of massive arrests and deportations to the camps. Yanov was sentenced to 10 years in a camp and was sent to Vorkuta. After he had served his time and was released, he was again arrested in 1946 and was again sent off to the North. He died there in 1971.

" Brief Recollections of My Past " was how Yanov called his memoirs, a striking testimony of the strength of the human spirit convinced of the necessity of standing up to evil. Yanov's memoirs recall the indomitable spirit and the depth of conviction displayed in the *Life of Archpriest Avvakum*. There is an undoubted resemblance even in the style. Returning from one sojourn in camp, and before the next, Vasily Yanov does not recognize his familiar surroundings: " And so I looked around at my native country. It was like an ant-hill that had been torn up by bears, and around it wandered tortured, frightened people in torn clothes, starving and worn out with suffering. . . ."[18] The story of Vasily Yanov's life, of the life of a Russian peasant caught in the maelstrom of

[17] Quoted in *Pamyat'*, Vol. II, p. 159.
[18] Ibid., p. 134.

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events, is a document of history such as refered to by Goethe: the testimony of a man who has personally experienced history.

One can judge the extent and nature of the disputes about the Party line after the revolution—what one would conventionally call " the political opposition "—from the paucity of documents on this theme. No doubt this can be explained by the fact that the history of intra-Party discord in the 1920s has been widely studied, by the fact that there are barely any witnesses from that time who are still living, and by the fact that the official documents are kept in restricted-access archives. But there is another explanation—the intra-Party struggle was above all a personal struggle, not one based on principles. The new documents change nothing in this impression.

There is only one official Party document published in the five volumes of *Pamyat'*: a page from the verbatim report of the Plenum of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) of January 1938, containing the interrogation proceeding the arrest of P. Postyshev. The report was published in 1938 for closed circulation. The interrogation is of psychological interest: Malenkov, Mikoyan, Bulganin, Molotov, and Beria accuse Postyshev of excessive cruelty, of the liquidation of " honest communists " in Kuibyshev *oblast'* where Postyshev served as First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Ukrainian Communist Party from February 1937 until he was removed from that position. Of all people, Beria in particular, one might think, was shocked because Postyshev had done away with roughly two-thirds of the Party *obkom*, arresting 36 members and leaving 25 at liberty. Several documents testify to the activities of the Trotskyists. Of these, the most interesting are the notes written by N. N. Gavrilov, " a rank-and-file Leningrad Trotskyist," as he is described by the editors, about his encounters with the leaders of the opposition. N. Gavrilov's reminiscences are illustrative of the following observation made by the editors of *Pamyat'*: ". . . Talking with people who were involved in one way or another in the underground movement of the 1920s, we came across an astounding unanimity in many of the answers given by Trotskyists, Social Revolutionaries, anarchists, and even by members of groups with a philosophical rather than political bent. They all willingly remember things which happened to them *after* their arrest. . . . But they shut up as soon as the subject turns to what they were doing *before* their arrest. . . ."[19] The witnesses, for a variety of reasons, do not want, or perhaps are unable to recount what they knew, what they saw. In general they all have many years of camp and prison behind them. Every tale is enriched by the presence of every name which it restores to memory.

One of the last surviving leaders of the left Social Revolutionaries, G. Maksimov, was freed in 1954 after more than a quarter of a century spent in prison. He tells the story of the trial in Moscow of Yakov Blyumkin in the summer of 1919. Blyumkin was tried by the maximalist

[19] *Pamyat'*, Vol. III, p. 385.

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Social Revolutionaries when they considered his application for acceptance into their Union. The court agreed that he had continued to work as an agent of the Extraordinary Committee (Cheka) even after he took part in the murder of the German Ambassador Mirbach. Having fled from Moscow to Kiev, Blyumkin joined the left SR organization and then betrayed it to the Cheka. The court made the pronouncement: "It has not been proved that Blyumkin is not a traitor." Nonetheless, he was accepted into the Union of maximalist socialist revolutionaries. Subsequently the Union joined the Third International, and all its members entered the Communist Party.[20]

The story told by G. Maksimov is an interesting supplement to the memoirs of I. I. Vatsetis. The recollections of the first Commander-in-Chief of the Red Armed Forces of the Soviet Republic were printed time and again in the Soviet press, but always with cuts. The volume of Vatsetis' memoirs, *The Civil War. 1918*, consisting of approximately 1000 pages of typescript, fell into the hands of the editors of *Pamyat'* and they published three extracts from it. One extract, which is of greater significance, is devoted to 'The July Uprising in Moscow of 6 and 7 July 1918." Vatsetis and his Latvian riflemen, as is well-known, swiftly remedied the situation and demolished what Soviet historians refer to as " the mutiny of the left Social Revolutionaries." The murder of Mirbach was their signal to " mutiny." The assasin Blyumkin had turned up in the German embassy with a mandate from the Cheka, in whose service he was. He fled to the Ukraine, was sentenced *in absentia* to a full three years' imprisonment and was then granted amnesty in May 1919, evidently in gratitude for the service described by G. Maksimov. Blyumkin's behaviour during the " mutiny " and after, and the authorities' attitude to the " murder of the imperial ambassador," strengthened suspicions about the " mutiny of the left SRs." Even the scant documentary evidence that we do have allows us to suggest that there was Bolshevik provocation, the aim of which was to eliminate their coalition partner in the government—the left SRs—and to establish a one-party system. Vatsetis' memoir is one such piece of evidence.

The publication of T. I. Til's " The Social-Democratic Youth Movement of the 1920s "[21] brings forth new facts about political opposition and its attendant acts of violence. The value of this piece is in the additional interpretation it gives of the Leninist concept of power. The arguments are endless about " Stalinism " and " Leninism " being principally different forms of government with practically incompatible views on dictatorship. T. Til's work introduces several details which may be of little import but are very telling. Among them is the following. On 22 February 1922, Lenin dictated a letter to Trotsky over the telephone in which he demanded " a stepping-up of surveillance and repressive acts " against the Mensheviks, and suggested to the national Commissar for Naval and Military Affairs, the most authoritative member of the

[20] Ibid., p. 377.
[21] *Pamyat'*, Vol. III.

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Politburo, that " open war " be declared in the press to make clear the " evil white-guard mentality " in the behaviour of a certain Menshevik.[22] It is explained in the notes to the 54-volume *Works of Lenin* that he is referring to the Menshevik Gurevich who maintained that NEP was " a return to capitalism." The following day Trotsky replied to Lenin in a " top secret " letter[23], explaining that he had already made a speech at the Youth Conference denouncing Gurevich. T. Til' informs us that the person upon whom Lenin rained down with the fire of Trotsky and the OGPU was the student Lev Gurevich, all of 18 years old and a member of the " Moscow Branch of the Union of Social-Democratic Working Youth."

These young Mensheviks were not enemies of Soviet power. Regarding themselves as authentic Marxists, they criticised Lenin's policies " from the left." The bitter and relentless battle against them, which was organized and carried out on the orders, and under the immediate direction of Lenin, was part of the battle being fought by the leader of the Party and country in the process of building the Soviet state. After agreeing to an economic compromise, in 1921–22 Lenin decisively quashed all attempts at political compromise and categorically refused to come to any agreement with public groups or socialist parties. He chose force as the only instrument of power.

The Leninist period in which trends of thought different from the official one and independent views on the country's path of development were suppressed, is illustrated by the materials from the archive of V. G. Korolenko (extracts from his diary, letters to Gorky, an unpublished interview),[24] by recollections about the work of the student section of the All-Russian Public Committee for Aid to the starving which was active for one month in 1921,[25] and by testimonies about the persecution of the Church.[26]

Pamyat' gives convincing evidence that Stalin consistently continued to use the Leninist policy of repression as the most important instrument of power; he used it against other parties, including socialist ones, and what is more, even after they had been disbanded, against social activists, against the Church, against co-operatives.[27] One cannot even with any great ease bring into play Hegel's famous formula about the transition of quantity into quality, for the extent of the Leninist acts of repression, even though they ceded to the Stalinist methods, are qualitatively no different.

On the 100th anniversary in December 1925 of the " first uprising for the conquest of freedom," the old revolutionaries, members of the Society of Former Political Convicts and Deportees, addressed a letter to the Presidium of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR. Not yet

22 V.I. Lenin, *Pol. Sob. Soch.*, (Moscow, 1965), Vol. 54, pp. 130-131.
23 *Pamyat'*, Vol. III, pp. 168–69.
24 *Pamyat'*, Vol. II.
25 *Pamyat'*, Vol. IV.
26 *Pamyat'*, Vol. II. *Pamyat'*, Vol. III.
27 *Pamyat'*, Vol. V.

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two years had passed since Lenin's death, the country was passing through perhaps the most peaceful period of its post-revolutionary history, and yet the old revolutionaries wrote:

> Thousands of Russian citizens fill even the most far-flung and remote of our prisons, deprived of even the tiniest signs of cultural life in all corners of our country. These are the very same imprisonments and forced exile for political motives which, under the old regime, were censured in the most decisive way by public opinion in all democratically-minded progressive circles in states all over the world. . . . We mean here the continued executions in the USSR and, above all, executions performed by organs of the GPU without public trial and without trial in general. . . . If execution without trial, always something terrible and unjust, is permissable in exceptional moments of state life, when open warfare, national or civil, destroys the boundary between the normal state system and everyday life, than surely this is not SUCH A TIME (underlined in the letter) now? . . .
>
> The fact of the matter is that the death penalty and the administration of its enforcement has entered into the customary practice of the authorities. This easy and simple method of ruling has become a norm, has permeated from top to bottom of our new bureaucratic apparatus and has devalued life both in the way that the rulers are presented and in the consciousness of the ruled.[28]

This analysis of the system of government in the USSR by the old revolutionaries in 1925, holds true even half a century later. And opposition to the system does not stop. A special chapter in the history of such opposition is made by the youth organizations which arose and were eliminated by the authorities in the post-Stalinist era. The materials on this theme, regularly published in *Pamyat'*, for the first time allow one to piece together a rather fuller picture of the nature, ideas and composition of the youth movement of the 1950s and '60s.

The inevitability of a youth opposition was so evident to the authorities that they themselves created fictitious organizations. The example was set by the case of the " young terrorist organization," created from start to finish by the NKVD.[29] It comprised 14 people—Moscow students all, they were tried by the Special Board (OSO in March 1945. Alexander Solzhenitsyn in *The Gulag Archipelago* recalls the song composed " by the already convicted, crushed and destroyed Moscow students."[30] These were the members of " the terrorist organization." The article about them in *Pamyat'* closes with this epilogue: " In the summer of 1956, the members of ' the young terrorist organization ' were rehabilitated—three of them posthumously."[31]

The history of another group of Moscow students, convicted in February 1946, brings forth new details about Soviet life in " the wailing

[28] *Pamyat'*, Vol. III, pp. 401–402.
[29] M. I-vich, " Molodezhnaya terroristicheskaya organizatsiya," in *Pamyat'*, Vol. I.
[30] Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, *Sobranie sochinenii*, Vol. 5, " Arkhipelag GULag," I–II, pp. 578–79.
[31] *Pamyat'*, Vol. I, p. 231. 14 people were convicted in all.

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forties," as the youth called this period. Another fake trial, more denunciations. And again among those arrested were the children of condemned " enemies of the people."[32] The security organs' selection always took the same shape: subjected to arrest were the more talented students who were showing signs of independent thought, the " free thinkers."

The materials published in *Pamyat'* permit one to speak of the beginning in the post-war period of " the process of emergence and development of secret political societies."[33] The researcher into this process notes: " We have only scant information about the groups which sprang up in 1944–45. . . . We know that they were all uncovered and completely immobilized; all those involved (amounting to several dozen people) were dispersed to the crowded quarters of the GULag."[34] Between 1957 and 1968 " groups " grew up which, in contrast to their predecessors, managed to " come out," to declare their intentions with manifestoes, and sometimes with leaflets. We find material about some of the more important of them in *Pamyat'*: memoirs of P. I. Pimenov " The History of a Political Trial " (1956–58)[35], an article by N. Peskov, " The Case of ' The Bell,' " which is devoted to the first major political trial in the post-Khrushchev administration (1965), research by S. D. Rozhdestvensky written up in his " Materials on the History of Secret Political Societies in the USSR After 1945."[36] Rozhdestvensky analyses the manifestoes, composition and activities of four groups: the Moscow Historians (The Krasnopevtsev Affair, Moscow 1957), the Leningrad philosophers (The Molostvov Affair, Leningrad 1958), the Leningrad student group (The Trofimov Affair, Leningrad 1957), and the Dragosh group (Kishinev, 1964).

The selection in the historical sections of the anthologies is evidently made on the basis of a number of criteria (though not knowing the editorial staff one can only speculate about this): first is the newness of the material shedding light on the events and personalities of unspoken or falsified official history, secondly, there is the similarity of views. It would appear that this explains the socialist character of the youth groups, about which materials have been published in *Pamyat'*. As a rule all these groups arose as a result of reading Marx or Lenin, " the classics of Marxism," and from their comparison of the " revolutionary project " with Soviet reality. As religious believers turned to *The Bible* during the time of crisis in the Catholic Church, so Soviet young men and women turned to the " Texts " during the crisis of faith which set in in the post-Stalin era. Their programmes and manifestoes insisted on the necessity for a return to " *authentic* Leninism," to the " original

[32] " Sud'ba nishchikh sibaritov," *Pamyat'*, Vol. I. The myth about the " vendetta " being organized by the children of the " suppressed enemies of the people," was widespread among the security organs.

[33] *Pamyat'*, Vol. V, p. 226.

[34] Ibid., p. 227.

[35] *Pamyat'*, Vol. II. *Pamyat'*, Vol. III.

[36] *Pamyat'*, Vol. V.

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Marxism." There is a third factor as well: at this time the majority of " secret political societies in the USSR " were close to socialist ideas.

THE section on culture is the most extensive, in terms of volume, in *Pamyat'*. In the case of the literary documents, attention is drawn first and foremost to the significant number of letters addressed to the Highest Authority. The first of these is an open letter to Lenin from the Georgian writer Konstantin Gamsakhurdia. Published in Georgian in the *Sotsialist-Federalist* (Tiflis) on 7 May 1921, *Pamyat'* was the first to reprint it in Russian. This letter can serve as a standard. Gamsakhurdia, one of the major twentieth-century Georgian writers, addresses his old acquaintance from his days in emigration, now the leader of revolutionary Russia, which had a year earlier invaded socialist Georgia. The writer reminds the revolutionary, who has since become the head of state, that " one can take away everything from an individual and from a nation, but it is impossible to take away knowledge of freedom."[37]

Gamsakhurdia talks to Lenin as one equal to another, about things of great importance. Later authors will write in a different fashion and about other topics. Maximilian Voloshin wrote to L. B. Kamenev (1924) with the request to issue " a warrant for the setting up of an Artists' Colony in my house," which would allow the poet to keep his domicile; he reminds him that he sent two of his books " for his perusal," asking him to help " get them passed by the censors and have them published." The letter ends with a poignant question: " Must I regard . . . your silence as an indication that you found both these books hopeless cases as far as the censors are concerned?"[38] In letters to V. M. Molotov and to Bukharin's secretary Korotkova (at the end of 1930), Nadezhda Mandelstam asks help for her husband: " Essentially," she writes to Molotov, " we are talking about Mandelstam's right to live: is it or is it not necessary to save Mandelstam?"[39] The evolution of the relationship between writers and the authorities, which began with the letter by Gamsakhurdia, comes to a conclusion with the letter of 23 June 1939 written by Nikolai Zabolotsky in the form of a declaration. It begins thus:

> To the Procurator of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics from Prisoner Zabolotsky, Nikolai Alexeevich. Komsomolsk-na-Amure, NKVD Eastern Camp, 27th Column.
>
> *Declaration*
>
> I, the poet N. Zabolotsky, former member of the Union of Soviet Writers, author of two books of poetry and translator of Rustaveli's poem " The Hero in Tiger's Skin," was arrested in Leningrad in March 1938 and, according to the decision of the Special Board (OSO), was sent for a period of five years, commencing on 2 September 1938, to an NKVD Correction-Labour camp, as prisoner

[37] *Pamyat'*, Vol. IV, p. 379. K. Gamsakhurdia was in prison in Solovki from 1926 to 1929, possibly as a result of his letter to Lenin.
[38] *Pamyat'*, Vol. I, p. 301.
[39] Ibid., p. 303.

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No. 48838 accused of " counter-revolutionary Trotskyist activities."[40]

S. Gitovich's recollections about Zabolotsky's arrest (including the poet's declaration) are valuable not only as a source of information about numerous details in this major " affair," in which other prominent Leningrad writers were also condemned; they also allow us to observe the extent and technique of the falsification of history. In the official compilation *Vospominaniya o Zabolotskom* (Recollections about Zabolotsky), not one word hints at the arrest of the poet.[41] An entire spectrum of euphemisms are used to cover up the years in camp. A literary specialist recalls: " At that time Zabolotsky was living in Karagand " (p. 134); his own son writes: " Between the Leningrad and Moscow periods of my father's life there were 10 years of wanderings and ordeals. During this time my father worked in the Far East, in Altai and Kazakhstan " (p. 183); a literary critic informs us: " Between 1938 and 1946 he lived in the most difficult of conditions, far away from the cultural centres, from libraries. . . ." (p. 258). The omission in the poet's biography was given its greatest praise by Alexander Fadeev (who possibly sanctioned the arrest): " What a steadfast, distinctive man is Zabolotsky. He did not go to pieces or become embittered. You could depend on him." (p. 223).

Fadeev's works are an excellent expression of the meaning of government policy in the sphere of culture: selection of victims took place, there was a sifting through—the seeds were destroyed, the weeds were given the chance to flourish with abandon.

Only one of the letters reprinted in *Pamyat'* received a reply: Stalin wrote his famous resolution in red pencil in reply to a letter from Lili Brik. After this episode, in Pasternak's expression, they began to introduce Mayakovsky around as they had done potatoes in the reign of Catherine the Great. It is well-known that Stalin transformed Mayakovsky into the crowning glory of Soviet poetry, first and foremost in order to use him as a stick with which to beat other poets. But it was not by accident that Stalin declared: " Mayakovsky was and *remains* the best and most talented poet of the Soviet era. . . ."[42] Royal favour had set Mayakovsky on a pedastal, it could also throw him off it. The fate and even the posthumous reputation of the poet depended on it. In this connexion it would follow that we look at " Yet Another Version of Stalin's Telephone Call to Pasternak."[43] The telephone call from the Highest Authority to the poet became an event in the history of Soviet culture which contemporaries never cease to recall.

It is not difficult to find an analogy of the relationship between literature and authority with that of Nicholas I and " his poets." However, this analogy seems inadequate to me for, as is well known,

[40] *Pamyat'*, Vol. V, p. 343.
[41] *Vospominaniya o Zabolotskom*, (Moscow, 1977).
[42] *Pamyat'*, Vol. I, p. 310.
[43] *Pamyat'*, Vol. II.

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Nicholas' descendants showed complete indifference to questions of literature and culture. " The Phenomenon of Nicholas I " revived only after the October revolution as a phenomenon of the totalitarian system, scrutinizing culture and literature as an extremely important instrument of power.

THE nationalization of the sciences was an important element in the subordination of culture to the state. The documents collected in *Pamyat'* illustrate with an awful monotony the self same process: the urge for the preservation of the opportunity for independant thought, and its suppression. They convey valuable details about the grandiose " agreement," and about " the affair of the academicians," as it is still called, fabricated by the security organs in 1929–30. The assault on historians and historical scholarship was perfectly logical. It prepared the way for the other trials which took place at the beginning of the 1930s: of the Industrial Party, the Mensheviks, the " Working Peasants Party " (TKP), and then in the mid-'30s for the final seizure of history. The memoirs of N. P. Antsyferov,[44] O. Yasevich,[45] the article by Alexei Rostov,[46] the only one of those who took part in the trial to appear in the West, reveal unknown facts about the preparation for " the affair of the academicians," about the behaviour of those arrested, about the technique of interrogation and about prison conditions.

The fate of the historians provides a model for what happened to all scholars, writers and cultural figures. With every year that passed since October 1917 they experienced the increasingly heavy burden of the state's policy on their shoulders. No one could escape it. The intensification of this oppressiveness can be sensed in the letters of M. Bakhtin to M. Kagan,[47] revealing the spiritual links of a circle of like-minded people, out of which were born " Bakhtinite ideas," nowadays sooner called " the school of Bakhtin." The oppressiveness is felt in the correspondence between Osip Mandelstam and Boris Pasternak.[48]

The rise of spiritual oppression almost inevitably leads to imprisonment. The fate of Osip Mandelstam is well known. Bakhtin's declaration was published for the first time in the national commissariat for public health: " I have been sentenced to five years' exile in Solovki concentration camp. From the age of 16 I have suffered from an acute case of chronic multiple osteomyelitis. . . ."[49] Bakhtin was arrested in 1929 in " the affair of the academicians."

The individual pressure that was brought to bear on isolated cultural figures was combined with intensified pressure on " collectives," i.e., on institutions. The materials published in *Pamyat'* testify to the special " attention " given to the Academy of Sciences. This is supported by

[44] *Pamyat'*, Vol. IV.
[45] *Pamyat'*, Vol. I.
[46] *Pamyat'*, Vol. IV.
[47] *Pamyat'*, Vol. IV.
[48] *Pamyat'*, Vol. IV.
[49] Ibid., p. 267.

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some figures: after October, 115 members of the Russian Academy of Sciences and the Academy of Sciences of the USSR were arrested, a smaller number of 50 academicians was killed in prison (the fate of all of them has not been accounted for).[50]

Arrests and killings were the cardinal methods of coercion. In the string of memoirs[51] numerous other methods of control and indoctrination are described, all in pursuit of the same goal: the formation of a Soviet cultural worker. The awareness that the state has at its command " the cardinal method of coercion " added a supplementary " coefficient of effective pressure " to other methods.

The fate of the great scientist Nikolai Vavilov, who perished in prison from a painful death by starvation, can serve as a symbol of the relationship between the Soviet state and the sciences. The biography of Vavilov[52] indicates that his death was due to accidental circumstances (the animosity of T. Lysenko etc.), but his behaviour was not accidental. Vavilov died a terrible death, but before that he did all that was required of him by the authorities. Included in this was his agreement to carry out the tasks given him by the security organs, which was to convince foreigners he met on trips abroad of the wisdom of collectivization (knowing full well about its awful consequences). Finally, he himself introduced to science his future murderer Lysenko. If one excludes the arrest and death of Vavilov from his biography, one is left with a " real Soviet scientist." And indeed, in all the official biographies today the rehabilitated academician is so presented.

TODAY, the materials collected in the five volumes of the historical anthologies of *Pamyat'* are an important source which historians of Soviet state and society would find it difficult to do without. But *Pamyat'*s significance is broader than the materials collected in it. The publication, compiled by the editors in constant danger for their freedom, under threat of arrest, is a form of spiritual resistance. In 1939 George Orwell wrote: " It may be just as possible to produce a breed of men who do not wish for liberty as to produce a breed of hornless cows."[53] It is possible that the writer's warnings were premature. Refusal to accept falsified history, to swallow a forged past, has turned out to be an important element of opposition and hope.

Olga Freidenberg, a prominent scholar and the cousin of Boris Pasternak, with whom she had a remarkable correspondence, wrote in 1947: " The ideas about heaven, immortality, and the other world, conceived by the peoples of this earth, are all true—not as heaven or

[50] Ibid., p. 459.

[51] K. Yanevich, " Institut mirovoy literatury v 1930-e-1970-e gody," *Pamyat'*, Vol. V. I. A. Mel'chuk, " Moi vstrechi s KGB," *Pamyat'*, Vol. II.

[52] M. A. Popovsky, " Delo Vavilova," *Pamyat'*, Vol. II.

[53] George Orwell, op. cit., Vol. I, pp. 380–81.

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paradise or Valhalla, but as history. It is impossible to deceive history no matter how documents are falsified or facts distorted or concealed.''[54]

The materials collected in *Pamyat'* are imbued with a faith in history as the ultimate tribunal where '' nothing is disregarded or forgotten.''[55] It is at the same time a faith in man, whose spirit cannot be broken.

Translated by Teresa Cherfas

[54] *Boris Pasternak, Perepiska s Ol'goy Freidenberg*, (Harcourt, Brace, Janovic, New York, 1981), pp. 261–62.
[55] Ibid., p. 261.

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The New Soviet Military Encyclopaedia

Albert L. Weeks

UNDER "*Entsiklopedii voenniye*" (military encyclopaedias), the new edition of the *Soviet Military Encyclopaedia* (*Sovetskaya voennaya entsiklopediya*) claims that military encyclopaedias that are produced in capitalist countries " contain valuable factual material but demand a critical approach on the part of the reader." This arises, the *SVE* says, because the " discussion of many problems in such encyclopaedias contains tendentiousness and sometimes outright distortions." This, in fact, is a fair description of the *Soviet Military Encyclopaedia* itself. " Distortions " in the *SVE* there are. Editorial supervision of the eight volumes, issued between 1975–80, was headed by the Chief of the Soviet General Staff, Marshal N. V. Ogarkov. As we know, Ogarkov for years functioned as " supervisor of all the organs engaged in disinformation."[1] Yet, for all this, the *SVE* provides a gold mine of information for the Western student of Soviet military science, doctrine and strategy. The set is certainly worth the price of 7 rubles, 20 kopeks per volume.

THE *SVE* provides its readers with some 11,000 articles on military history and theory, tactics and strategy, biographies, polychromatic plates showing tsarist and Soviet medals and uniforms, insignia and uniforms of foreign nation-states, war maps of campaigns and battles, and a wealth of other material. It stands head and shoulders above such Western encyclopaedic works as the Dupuys' *The Encyclopaedia of Military History* or E. Angelucci's *Encyclopédie des Avions*, and the other reference books that concentrate on particular services. In its conception, the *SVE* is closer to the *Encyclopaedia Britannica* than the great majority of Western efforts to date. It is a follow-up to the 12-volume *SVE* that was published in the USSR in the 1930s under the editorial supervision of R. P. Eideman, Commissar of the Frunze Military Academy from 1925–32, a Latvian, who died at the age of 42 in 1937, a victim of the Great Purge.

Unlike any Western military reference work, the *SVE* is, of course, interlaced with heavy doses of Marxist-Leninist ideology. But this is not altogether unwelcome to the Western researcher: it is important to see how the Soviet military—and it includes outstanding military writers—knits ideological " moral factors " and the guiding hand of Leninism into its message to Soviet officers and men.[2] After all,

[1] *L'Express*, " Chronique de l'Armée Rouge " (16 Apr. 1982), in a review of Viktor Suvorov's, *The Liberators*, p. 87.

[2] The writers, many of them authors of well-known texts comprising the " Officer's Library " and

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Marxism-Leninism is supposed to form the basis for the morale and spirit of the fighting men. Moreover, the ideology reflects, in the last analysis, the control exercised by the Kremlin civilians over the Soviet armed forces. Despite occasional disinformation (particularly in the Editor Ogarkov's own *SVE* article, " Military Strategy "), the new encyclopaedia succeeds in dispelling many of the misleading statements and interpretations about Soviet military thinking, strategy, etc., that are distributed to Western print and broadcasting media for the purpose of disinformation. One such Soviet effort that comes to mind is " Whence the Threat to Peace " issued by the Military Publishing House, USSR Ministry of Defence, Moscow, 1982—the " definitive answer " to the US Defence Department booklet, " Soviet Military Power," published a few months previously.

Doctrine and Strategy

It should come as no surprise to the really serious student of Soviet military policy that not a single major position on strategy proposed by professional Soviet military thinkers/writers since the 1960s has been " revised " by the current *SVE*. Despite some recent misleading official claims, a thorough study of the *SVE* reveals that Soviet policy still includes the following propositions:

1. A nuclear world war is survivable and winnable by the Soviet " coalition " side; the *SVE* tries to indicate how.
2. Such a war, " should the imperialists launch it," would spell the end of " capitalist civilization " and the establishment of world-wide socialism and a " lasting peace " (this is asserted in the *SVE*, Vol. 2, under " Military Doctrine "); devastating as such a war would be, we are told, all would not be lost nor could it be said that a thermonuclear war would not have been " worth it " (see the entry on " Pacifism ").
3. Despite Soviet propaganda to the contrary, the Soviets seek " military-technological superiority," (see " *Prevoskhodstvo nad protivnikom*,"—" Superiority over the Enemy "—and several other *SVE* entries).
4. One such area where superiority could prove crucial, according to the *SVE*, is that of space war. (See " *Kosmicheskaya voina* " and " *Lazer* ").[3]
5. Certain tactics are basic to Soviet military thought, according to the *SVE*; above all, surprise, taking the offensive, and " *maskirovka* " (concealment/camouflage). For which see: " *Maskirovka* "; " *Razvertivanie* " (" Deployment "); " *Mobilizatsiya*," *et al.*, *SVE* entries.[4]

the " Soldier's Bookshelf," include: D. A. Volkogonov, A. S. Zheltov, A. A. Sidorenko, A. S. Milovidov, I. S. Zheltikov, I. Ye. Shavrov, S. A. Tyushkevich, G. V. Sredin, Ye. I. Rybkin, *et al.*

[3] *Sovetskaya voennaya entsiklopediya* (Voenizdat, Moscow, 1975–80) (1977), Vol. 4, p. 380 (" Cosmic War ") and pp. 559–61 (" Laser ").

[4] *SVE* (1978), Vol. 5, pp. 175–77 (" Concealment/Camouflage "); pp. 342–44 (" Mobilization "); (1979), Vol. 7, pp. 39–40 (" Deployment ").

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6. " The imperialists are preparing to wage war against the Soviet Bloc." Period. This is repeated under several *SVE* slots: " Marxism-Leninism "; " War "; " Classification of Wars "; " Military Strategy " (written by Soviet Chief of the General Staff, Marshal N. V. Ogarkov); " Imperialism," and so forth.
7. Terrorism, guerrilla warfare, armed subversion, whatever you wish to call it—is *unreservedly endorsed* by the *Soviet Military Encyclopaedia.* All this (see: " *Partizanskaya Voina,*") is based on an article by Lenin in which the founder of the Soviet state commends assassination, urban/rural guerrilla warfare, and other means of destablizing " bourgeois society " at the " proper time in a revolutionary situation " (cf. V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works* [in English], Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1965, pp. 213–23)[5] Two other *SVE* entries also touch on this subject: the biography of the recently dismissed North Vietnamese Gen. Vo Nguyen Giap, a former student of the General Staff Academy in Moscow who graduated from this highest military school in the USSR just before the Vietnam war; and " National-Liberation War," the *SVE* distinguishing " war " from the more harmless-sounding " struggle " (*bor'ba*), as in " national-liberation struggle " (see " El Salvador ").

By Their Words . . .

Under various headings, including Ogarkov's " Military Strategy," the reader is told that war is a " social phenomenon " presenting revolutionary possibilities for the " just " side in the struggle. " The transition of all countries and peoples to Communism is inevitable," the *SVE* claims, and, as Lenin is quoted as saying: " War is the continuation of politics by ' other means.' " (Lenin's debt here to Baron von Clausewitz is not clearly acknowledged; instead, the *SVE* reads as if Lenin or Engels devised the formula.) Still, we are told in several articles, " war is not *fatally* inevitable," only " likely as long as imperialism exists." *Lasting* peace is possible, says Volume 2, under " Military Doctrine," only when socialist conditions prevail throughout most of the world. But war is a " perpetual threat," the *SVE* maintains, given " capitalist imperialism."[6]

As for national-liberation *war*, this is a " contemporary phenomenon," says Volume 5, p. 538, " which aims at the defeat of imperialist aggression. Victory is assured by . . . the support rendered by the socialist countries." Reading this, no one should be surprised to read in the *SVE*, especially in the volumes co-edited by Gen. P. I. Ivashutin, chief of the GRU, the Soviet military intelligence, that disinformation is a uniquely " foreign " activity.[7] Any " imperialist " attempts to

[5] *SVE* (1978), Vol. 6, p. 228 (" Guerrilla Warfare ").
[6] *SVE* (1977), Vol. 3, p. 516 and 633, and under " Military Doctrine " and " War " in (1976), Vol. 2.
[7] Ivashutin is specially listed as " lending aid in the preparation of materials for [the given]

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frustrate such wars constitute, says the *SVE*, " counter-revolutionary export," which has been precluded by the " shift in the correlation of forces in favour of socialism."

War *and* peace intermingle " dialectically " in the entries of all military editors and writers of the *SVE*—and every noted Soviet strategist, including the most " hawkish," is represented in the volume mast-heads. " Peaceful coexistence," these writers say, " does not signify the revision of the laws of class struggle " (Vol. 5, p. 320). . . . Peaceful coexistence affects only inter-*state* relations [not relations between classes], while at the same time providing favourable conditions for activating revolutionary and liberation movements. . . . Peaceful coexistence [and *détente*] is a specific form of class struggle." Lenin once said that while capitalism exists in the world, peace is merely an " interlude " between wars and that peace treaties were " forewords " anticipating the next war. However, the *SVE* deletes these words of Lenin, going back instead to the Leader's references to what was then known, somewhat adulterously, as " peaceful cohabitation." Whatever it is called, it is taken as more tactical than long-lasting: true peace, we are told over and over again, can only be a socialist peace (i.e. *pax sovietica*).

As for SALT, the *SVE does not devote a single entry exclusively to strategic arms limitations* and other manifestations of US-Soviet *détente* in the early 1970s. What few references it does make to SALT are perfunctory and confusing. For example, what are we to think when reading in Ogarkov's article (in Vol. 7, p. 564) that the USSR does not seek military superiority? But in Volume 6, pp. 500–501, we have already read, under " Superiority over the Enemy," that:

> The bases for superiority over the enemy are laid in peacetime in the process of developing the economy, modernizing the military doctrine, initiating and perfecting the elements composing the armed forces by equipping them with [superior] weapons and other technology, through military training, etc.

It is then candidly added:

> Under conditions of nuclear war, superiority over the enemy may be obtained along several avenues, among which are . . . adopting those measures necessary for precluding massive losses in troops and armaments . . . high mobility of the forces and great ranges of the weapons (rockets and planes) . . . achieving superiority without last-minute concentrations of large masses of troops at departure points located in areas of limited size. . . . Special attention is given to the means of achieving superiority in nuclear and overall firepower, and to the factor of surprise and careful preparation for carrying out combat activities.

volume "—or in the preparation of about half the volumes of the *SVE*. These volumes seem to contain more than the usual number of sensitive topics.

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THE volumes are lavishly illustrated. Besides line drawings showing laser-beam weapons in action, readers are treated to colour prints of foreign uniforms (winter and summer dress, since, presumably, they might encounter American, Dutch, or British, etc., troops at any time of the year!); also plane insignia on NATO aircraft; Morse Code signal flags together with such Soviet code equivalents as " Z-*zemlya* " (land), " O-*on* " (he), " T-*tverdo* " (hard), " A-*az* " (" Alpha "), etc., as well as the Western equivalents, " uiski " (W-Whisky), " vikta " (V-Victor), " fokstrot " (F-Foxtrot), " roumio " (R-Romeo), etc.; colourful maps, including one with tactical-strategic analysis of the Korean War (1950–53), in which the Inchon Landing is highlighted; medals and honours, of which the Russians appear to have more than any other nation. Just to make sure, the *SVE* reproduces colour illustrations of tsarist awards as well. It is replete with numerous references to pre-Soviet Russian military glories and the military leaders who achieved them.

Treatment in the encyclopaedia of the biographies of professional-soldier victims of the Stalin purges is predictable. Not a single one of the biographies—of Marshals Blyukher, Tukhachevsky, Rokossovsky, Meretskov and scores of other Soviet commanders who were shot by Stalin's henchmen—explains why so many officers died in the peaceful mid-1930s. The crowning insult is the glowing biography, with photograph, of L. Z. Mekhlis, the notorious aide to Stalin, who processed the false documents upon which so many of the General Staff were put on trial as " Nazi agents."[8] This infamous Latvian *intrigant* died on 13 February 1953 (just a few weeks prior to Stalin's own death) and was interred in the Kremlin Wall. The *SVE* notes that Mekhlis was the recipient of four Orders of Lenin, two Orders of the Red Banner, of the Suvorov and Kutuzov medals First Class, and of the Order of the Red Star. The reader can only infer that a truly heroic form of heroism was manifested by persons like Mekhlis, or Poskrebyshev, who worked so closely with Stalin, Yezhov and Beria. . . .

[8] *SVE*, Vol. 5, p. 273.

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Erratum. In the article by Edward Rozek in the previous issue of *Survey* the reference to a saying by Ralph Emerson was mistakenly attributed to Hilaire Belloc.

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